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QUINALDO  
AND HIS  
CAPTOR

*by*

MURAT HALSTEAD


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MURAT HALSTEAD.



GENERAL EMILIO AGUINALDO.

(HIS LATEST PHOTOGRAPH.)



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# AGUINALDO AND HIS CAPTOR

THE LIFE MYSTERIES OF EMILIO AGUINALDO AND  
ADVENTURES AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF  
GENERAL FUNSTON.

Historical Stories of Two Memorable Men.

By MURAT HALSTEAD,

HISTORIAN OF THE NEW POSSESSIONS OF THE UNITED STATES.

WRITTEN ON THE DIRECT EVIDENCE OF ALL THE OFFICIAL  
REPORTS AND PRIVATE PAPERS CAPTURED IN THE CAPI-  
TALS AND HIDING-PLACES OF THE INSURGENTS OF  
THE PHILIPPINES, INCLUDING AGUINALDO'S PER-  
SONAL CORRESPONDENCE AND MINUTES OF  
CONFIDENTIAL CONFERENCES ON THE  
BIAC-NA-BATO TREATY OF DECEMBER  
19, 1897, AND OF THE HONG KONG  
CONSPIRACY OF MAY 4, 1898.

The Insurgents' Club Resolved that Itself was the  
Philippine Country, and Aguinaldo Prophet and  
Tycoon of a Thousand South Sea Islands.

THE EARLY FORESHADOWING THAT AGUINALDO WAS THE  
ACTUAL ALLY OF SPAIN, AND THAT ALL HIS STEPS WHEN  
PERMITTED TO GO TO HIS BIRTHPLACE, CAVITÈ, UN-  
DER THE PROTECTION AND PRESTIGE OF THE  
AMERICAN FLAG, WERE GUIDED BY THE  
FIXED PURPOSE OF WAR WITH US; AND  
THIS, DOCUMENTS OF AUTHENTI-  
CATED VERITY DEMONSTRATE.

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


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## INTRODUCTORY.

GENERAL EMILIO AGUINALDO is the mystery of the modern Orient. He has been the specter of Old Asia, haunting us in the Philippines. The truth about him is a strange story. Only now, that he is a captive, have all the facts been accessible. His history will always be an illustration that "truth is stranger than fiction." No novelist, not Hawthorne, Bulwer, Kipling, Haggard, Hugo, or Eugene Sue, would risk founding a romance on the facts of the incredible record of Aguinaldo, though it is not a fable, but history.

There have been a thousand speeches in Congress that have named him, but in no one has there been a study of the man's life and character presented, that commanded and was candid with it, the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, of the sinister but fascinating theme. Some have been restrained from the work of elucidation and full, fair statement, by perversity. Others have been limited by unacquaintance with the exact tendency of the facts; and still others, including the most frank, serious, and able of our public men,

have had too many cares and labors to give time for investigation and annotation, to collect the mass of matter known to exist and to be pertinent, to discriminate as to the details and explanation of narratives with collateral incidents—to collate circumstances, and make consecutive and symmetrical the authentic absolute history of the mystery—associating dates with developments, giving room and form to the influences easily traced, and yet readily lost in their relations to the finer points of the contentions.

It may be substantiated, if questioning is ventured, that Mr. Halstead's *Life and Character Sketches of Aguinaldo*, present the first full-length, front-face portraiture of the man, the curvatures of whose career are so many, that they are only traceable by experts in the facts and in fixing them in their right places, and giving the touches of color indispensable to the comprehension of the biography that is full of the curious, and incessantly approaches the sensational.

Mr. Halstead's advantages in the improvement of opportunities to equip himself for the execution of this work upon clear lines and with painstaking care, have surpassed those of any other man. In the first place, he made the acquaintance of the dramatis personæ of the tragedy of the Philippines. He accompanied General Merritt from San Francisco to Honolulu, and General Otis from Honolulu to Manila, and became in that city familiar with the best-informed men, eye-witnesses

of the truth on the spot, including General Bell, then head of the Bureau of Information of the American Army; General Merritt, the Commander-in-chief; General Babcock, his Chief-of-staff; General Anderson, the first American soldier to set foot on Philippine soil; and General Frank Green, an army officer, and an author of the highest distinction for dignity and brilliancy; and he had the pleasure of meeting Admiral Dewey repeatedly, and of conversing with the most intelligent and leading Filipinos, who gave him their confidence freely. He interviewed Aguinaldo at his headquarters in Bacoor, and the Archbishop at his Palace in the Walled City—had a correspondence with Aguinaldo, advised him to have the Philippines represented by accredited agents at Washington and Paris—introduced a deputation from Aguinaldo, requesting permission for his “Secretary of State” to cross the Pacific on the steamer China, to General Merritt; then the General consulted the Admiral, permitted the Filipinos to take the voyage, and Mr. Halstead had the benefit of the presence of Agoncillo, Aguinaldo’s “Secretary of State” and Representative in Europe, as a fellow-passenger across the Pacific; and his presumed Secretary and interpreter, Sixto Lopez, who resides in Boston, has recently confided a good many of his opinions to the American people, and pleads for Aguinaldo to come to this country, and have a general debate on the relations of the United States with the Philippines.

This experience, by the Author of this Book, was succeeded by studies and the writing of "The Story of the Philippines;" "The New Possessions;" "The Official History of the War with Spain;" and the "Life and Achievements of Admiral Dewey." The production of these works was valuable in the orderly arrangement of earlier observations and investigations, and later consultations of that which has only recently become known, which are the better understood for the careful work of preparation. This was followed by the immense interest excited in the Presidential Campaign of 1900, in the history, military and civil, of the Philippines. Some of the most important issues of the national contest, which absorbed the attention of our own people and was studiously and anxiously followed in all parts of the world, were a part of the Philippine situation. The Life and Character of Aguinaldo was debated on every stump, and there were constant controversies as to the line dividing fact from fiction; thus, the sense of public perplexity as to the elements of our history in the Orient, was increased rather than diminished.

There are millions of Americans who do not, to this day, feel sure what manner of man Aguinaldo is; whether it is well to condemn or to applaud him; whether he is to be celebrated as a patriot or condemned as an ingrate; whether he most resembles George Washington or Benedict Arnold. These questions are all

open, and still liable to be intrusive and absorbing in the debating societies.

We declare that the volume we place before the public about Aguinaldo and Funston, the Captive and the Captor, and the other mysterious Philippine persons and problems, is full of news, and that we act upon the principle of publishing the news and telling the truth about it. The capture of Aguinaldo by Funston guarantees to all the people what, indeed, the greater number of them did not doubt, though some of them had misgivings, that the "Captured Documents," giving the inside official Filipino accounts of the intrigues that caused the war, and the shifting conditions that were surprises—were the rude revelations of the inner secrets of conspirators.

The light that events placed at the correct angle thrown upon each other, fixed in accurate relationship with our own records, may be accepted absolutely sun light. Many papers of the greatest historical value have been printed and circulated, authenticated as United States documents, and there are others of like character, the substance of which is attainable. Altogether that which is new about the news of current history clears up many muddled and irritating questions, that have raised in discussion issues of veracity, and a flood of truth is thrown upon the substance of the subjects that, in public opinion, are momentous. That which is thus presented, must make its way in convincing the people

of this country of the essential truths that will assist them with the testimony of the reliance upon which they must accept the responsibilities of their governing capacity.

Mr. Halstead has been hard at work in this ample field of inquiry, and found abundant stores of testimony that must prevail. We may say he is exceptionally equipped for this historical examination, and to give the results full and fair expression.

THE PUBLISHERS.



## PREFACE.

IT would be a hard task, indeed, to find for the reading of the youth of the enlightened nations of the earth two young men more vividly contrasted in the stories of their lives and the creation of their characters—more remarkable in their unlikeness and instructive in their careers—than Frederick Funston, who has gloriously won the star he wears, and Emilio Aguinaldo, who confounded unverity with diplomacy, and lost his liberty in fighting against the liberators of his race.

Only an Archipelago of Asia, ancient in superstition, could have produced an Aguinaldo, or a free State of Western North America a Funston. One is of the distinct Asiatic, and the other of the decisive American type. They are nearly the same age and size. One is a Captive, the other the Captor. The American is an honest man, a white man, and a hero; and the Asiatic is insincere, subtle, illusive, and of a mixture of colors. This measurement and characterization is according to the standards in their respective continents and countries. They are not similar in conscience or component parts—blood or brain. Their ancestors lived and moved and

had their being in channels remote from each other, where the land, the airs, and the waters vary in the influences that impress all under the skies, and men differ with the phenomena of Fatherly and Motherly Nature. The hemispheres and the atmospheres are not the same, but the same sun and moon rule the day and the night, and the winds blow as they feel the infinite forces. Both are of the family of man, and inherit the rights of man. The broader differences are those of opportunities.

The two young men find in the experiences of humanity, no matter on what zone they dwell, or what their activities are, common problems to solve, and in all races and climes youth meets work to do, and age looks back upon the progress of the great Brotherhood of Man with more or less consciousness of loss or gain. War has its heroes, and so have all peaceful duties, however humble, and there are brave men in the fields and shops who rank in the grandeurs of the Universe as high as the wearers of plumes and swords. The answer some day to the old question, "Shall the sword devour forever?" must be "No," but Justice is to be done, and Valor is summoned to make sure that it is accomplished, and as the world is wired and railed and steamed over, and new powers are revealed, we see that more and more the ends of the earth approach each other—that the oceans become in the service of man as lakes, the far countries draw near, and a Great Power, based upon the breadth of a great continent, between the greater seas

of the globe, has its mission to promote the Mighty Destiny that is competent for the loftier and broader labors that are for all and the good of all.

The American Soldier has never fought to oppress, but to set free—to open the chances for all men to get their share of that which is set before them by The Author of their Being, and their environments upon this planet. The Flag of the Fathers is stainless, and the Republic safe and strong in righteousness, as in the masterful majesty of the Forces that Freedom yields—and

“Like some tall cliff that lifts its awful form,  
Swells from the vale, and midway leaves the storm,  
Though round its breast the rolling clouds are spread,  
Eternal sunshine settles on its head.”

That the Victory of American Arms in the Philippines means there, as here and everywhere, freedom with order, honor with splendor, can not be doubted by those who make up with the Americanism of our age and country. It was the cause of the Filipinos that triumphed when the American Soldiers dispersed or destroyed those representing falsehood and treachery, who confronted them; and the Capture of Aguinaldo by Funston will hasten the day when the inhabitants of the Philippines will realize that the Flag of Stars that streams in Victory is the same that was of good report and happy omen in other days and generations—that there are more stars and brighter ones, and stripes shin-

ing in original luster, than Daniel Webster saw in his dreams, or when he last turned his eyes to see the Flag and the sun in heaven. There has been no event that has dimmed a star or marred a stripe. It is the special glory of the stars of our Flag, that they do not differ in their glories like the stars of the skies, but their radiance is serene and equal. We lose nothing precious to ourselves in doing good to others, sword in hand; and when Americans stand shoulder to shoulder, with rifle to shoulder. There always has been help, not harm, when we have expanded our dominions, adding new possessions until we are at home beyond the seas. There are no people under the Flag who do not have reason to rejoice when it flies over them, and interprets the Constitution for them. No blow has been struck by us since we ended the Colonial despotisms of Spain and drew the line on European aggression, that was not well aimed and for Good Cause. In the language of the capitulations to our military forces of the City of Mexico and of the City of Manila the words are identical in the two Conventions, and have the beauty of truth and the vindication of history, proclaiming that the people over whom our Flag has been raised in triumph may forever confide in the "Faith and Honor of the Army of the United States"—the Army that holds Captive the latest leader of the enemies of our country—the Army in which Frederick Funston is a Brigadier-General, appointed by the President of the United States for distinguished

heroic service, an appointment that has the proud appreciation and confirmation of the people of the re-united and glorified States that, crediting the phrase to the Filipinos, are "The Great Republic of North America."

MURAT HALSTEAD.

CINCINNATI, OHIO, 643 West Fourth Street.

*April 3, 1901.*



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GENERAL FREDERICK FUNSTON.



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# Aguinaldo and His Captor.

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## CHAPTER I.

### AGUINALDO AT HOME.

His Name is Written to Remain on the Scroll of Fame—  
The Mystery of Asia made a Home of his Head-  
quarters at Bacoor—His Dress and Ways and  
Ladies and Music—He was not Impressive, but  
his Surroundings were Attractive.

WHATEVER happens Aguinaldo, prisoner of war, his name is one that will not perish. His face and figure will live in the history of this country. It is not likely that the people of the United States will ever yield to any person, tribe, potentate, or power, the fast hold they have beyond the greatest of the oceans. We are settled to remain masters of the eastern shore of the sea of China. Beyond is the oldest of empires. It is puerile to decry our titles or deny our destiny. As a Malay leader whose ambition crossed our path and disturbed our way, the truth about Aguinaldo is ineffaceably written in our stories of enterprise and triumphs of arms. He is in the record as one of our history makers. His character is the key to many tales of the Philippines. He will have forever the distinction of causing a war in which the United States

was involved in the tropical islands, of one of the most extensive and opulent Archipelagoes of the Oriental oceans.

Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, who declared himself in August, 1898, President of the Revolutionary Government of the Philippines, and general-in-chief of its army, and the first in distinction of the Philippine insurgents at this time, was, at the close of the nineteenth century, thirty-three years of age; small, both short and slender, as unmilitary in appearance as possible, dressing habitually in a single-breasted white coat and white trousers, showing thinness of limbs, often wearing a badge and carrying a little stick—articles of decoration of which he is said to be fond and vain. His eye is cunning and his best feature. There is a light of the unusual in it—a glance that changes quickly from docility to a sharp glare and wild animal alertness. His feet are slender, his hands like birds' feet, delicate, with knotty joints and prominent nails, hair black, thick, coarse, and perpendicular, with a fine gloss of vitality. His voice is low, with a softness so modulated that it is almost feminine, but that swiftly between words changes and has a subtle tone, that one personally interested in what he says and seeks favor, would feel was negating whatever was asked—the words uttered by him blurred slightly, from a habit of protruding the tongue, a little but distinctly, shading the low-spoken tones into indistinctness. The hands are moved about as he speaks, not in a shaky, nervous style, but with a flutter. In his own apartments he moves in a gliding way, and is treated with deference. There is no question that he fully believes in himself,

and that he has a tendency to exact ceremony. As the door of his private room opens for him to enter the reception room, he is announced, "General Aguinaldo." It is altogether agreeable to him to be addressed as "Your Excellency." At Bacoor, ladies of his family, passing from room to room, were well looking, and dressed in highly-colored and pleasing robes of silk, with touches of lace and a flash of jewels. They were not seeking attention or inviting observation, but had composure. There was the tinkle of music in the house, not obtrusive, rather distant, a hint of the musical character of the people. The house was pointed out as the one with a conspicuous roof of reddish tile, like the roofs in the villages of France. It was of two stories, and there must have been four rooms and a broad hall on each. The street ran north and south, and the house was on the west side, with another habitation directly adjoining. There were trees about it profuse in greenery. The day was August 27th, and sultry. The power of the sun was trying. There was no air stirring. The hour was half-past one in the afternoon. There was but one street in the village. There were three rooms on the side of the house front-in the street, in the second story. The general's room of retirement was the northern one. The reception room was central. The ladies had the southern room, and it seemed to be the place of other treasures of the home. The entrance to the house was at the center of the structure, and there was a turn of the stairs at the half-way place of the second story, and two military guards—one at the outer door, and the other at the turn of the stairway. There were perhaps twenty-five armed

men in sight. The arm was the famous Mauser. The swords seemed too large for the men, who resembled, though with a plain difference, Japanese. They were not as large as the Japs, but of the same small makeup and getup and style, with the "cocky" air that the Jap military men refuse to part with, and there was an atmosphere of the enjoyment of importance and of great expectations. The village was Bacoor, and it seemed was chosen because the water of the Bay of Manila, spreading eastward, was too shallow for launches for a considerable distance, indeed not deep enough a hundred yards from the shore to float a canoe with a man in it. The landing was also difficult. It was a spot sure to be free from visitations of surprise. An ocean boat could not get within half a mile. The church standing near the shore was large, stone built, and almost stately, but marked in many places by the shells from the Spanish fleet before the Americans came, because the insurgents had a way of appearing there and taking a peep at misty Manila across the bay, nearly ten miles away, the outlines of the city showing the churches and other structures of prominence, with a background of the faint blue mountains, too distant to give the green tint that reminded Admiral Dewey of the knobs that name his native State, and the scenery about his native city, Montpelier.

## CHAPTER II.

### HERO FUNSTON'S BOYHOOD.

He was an Ohio Baby Boy—On Stump for his Father—West Point Disappointment—Short Spell at University—Independent Journalist One Day—Railroad Conductor—Explores Deserts—Tried Klondike—Lost Canoe in the Yukon—With Gomez in Cuba—Twentieth Kansas Infantry.

THE first fond ambition of the boy Funston was to go to West Point, and his father, a member of Congress, could have controlled it, but subjected it to competition, and the youth was not the first of the competitors. The son of another Kansas farmer got the coveted cadetship. His name was Crawford. A newspaper that uses a large quantity of smoky powder in lighting up the world, says: "The disappointment nearly broke Funston's heart, and he was as savage as a bulldog for months afterward."

He was a student in the University of Kansas, and a classmate says of him, "Although one of the smallest men in the university, he was one of the pluckiest." This was after West Point faded. Deficiency in "classics" is given as the reason for not graduating at the university. A Kansas journal yields the General the name of seeking adventures and facing dangers, always a fighter, and condenses much in a few lines this:

"He was born in Ohio in 1866, but his father, E. H.

Funston, soon moved to Kansas, where he became a congressman, and was known as Foghorn Funston. His first public appearance was made when he was about sixteen years old, at a political meeting at Fort Scott, Kansas. The political meeting happened to be opposed to his father's candidacy, but that made no difference to young Fred. In fact, it was the reason for his being there. After all the speaking was over, and Foghorn Funston had been pretty well torn to pieces, the young fellow got up, took the stage, and said that he had a few remarks to make. He proceeded to make them in the face of strenuous opposition; but when the audience presently discovered that he was telling a good story on his father it quieted down. He finished that story and then another, and then began to tell what kind of a man Foghorn Funston, who had been the butt of so much ridicule, really was. In vain did the organizers of the meeting howl for adjournment; the boy now had his audience with him, and by the time he had finished a brief but well-put statement of the political situation it was a Funston audience, and the effect of his oratory was evident on election day."

This was two years before the university experience. His classmate White, who asked "What's the matter with Kansas?" tells this story of his young chum's college career:

"He is not afraid of anything that can walk. Once the town's 'bad coon' tried to run over Funston. The darky weighed pretty nearly two hundred pounds, and was a 'scrapper' with a razor record. Funston was five feet three, and weighed about ninety-five. He 'bluffed'

the colored brother to a 'stand-still,' and went for a warrant and marched the boss bully through the main streets of Lawrence at the point of a gun.

"Owing to difficulties which he experienced with some of the text-books, he did not graduate, but in 1887 became city editor of the Fort Smith *Tribune*, a stanch upholder of the local Democracy. A few days before the election the editor-in-chief went away, leaving the paper in Funston's hands. He had been getting pretty weary of the Democrats, who had been conducting their campaign on a basis of bribery and intimidation, and his first act when he was put in control was to write an editorial stating his opinions with a degree of frankness which left no room for misunderstanding.

"This engaging open-mindedness did not appeal to the worthy citizens of Fort Smith, who set about showing the young editor the error of his ways by burning down the Tribune building. Funston gathered his staff about him and prepared to defend the place; but the editor-in-chief hastily returned in answer to telegraphic summons from his friends, and appeased the wrath of the Democrats by a hasty issue, explaining editorially what had happened. Naturally, young Funston did not retain his job. There was talk of tarring and feathering him before he could get away from town; but he did not evince any haste in leaving. Instead, he wandered around the place with nose in the air, looking for some of the alleged ringleaders in the proposed scheme. When he did finally leave there were no feathers attached to him except the feather in the cap at having bluffed practically the whole town. When a friend asked him

why he had so foolishly thrown away his situation by printing such an editorial the young man said briefly:

"I was tired of the rotten politics, and tired of the rotten town, and tired of the rotten sheet, and ready to go anyway, so I thought I might just as well wake the place up and let 'em know I was alive before I left."

The internal evidence is that General Funston had read the story of John Phoenix, of California, of an assistant editor who changed the politics of the paper while the senior was taking a day off buggy-riding. The calculation of the length of time before the editor-in-chief had read the revolutionary article, and the speed of his horse returning, was nicely made by the responsible man, and he looked out of an open window and saw on the road "a cloud of dust," and "over it waved a whiplash;" and the spectator said to himself, "Lo, he cometh, and like Jehu he driveth furiously." The able assistant removed his coat, likewise his cravat, just in time, and found himself, after an exchange of attentions, holding the editor-in-chief down "with my nose, which I had inserted in his mouth for that purpose." But Funston was not that kind of a fighter. He got out of a job, aired his views, and became a conductor on the Santa Fé line. The story-tellers proceed in this way:

"One day a cowboy full of rum became rampageous in his car, and, lying down on his back in the aisle, began to shoot holes in the ceiling. The little conductor kicked the revolver out of his hand, yanked him along the aisle, and threw him off the back platform. The cowboy got up and hurled a piece of ballast, which broke an end window, then started and ran down the track, with Funston in hot pursuit, flinging ballast as



he ran, until the fugitive distanced him. By the time he got back to his train, sweating and breathless, half an hour had been dropped on the schedule. The superintendent made an inquiry about it, and the conductor explained.

“‘It was all right to throw him off,’ said the superintendent, ‘but what did you go and chase him for?’”

“‘I suppose I was mad,’ said Funston. ‘Would n’t you be mad if a man threw a rock through your window?’”

“‘Probably, but do n’t do it again,’ said the superintendent.

“Whether because of this restriction or for other causes the young man soon left the railroad’s employ, and cast about him for something else to do. The chances came in an expedition to Dakota, followed by one to Death Valley. From this latter half of the travelers came back permanently disabled, but it seemed to agree with Funston, and he liked so well the exploring of unknown countries that he looked around for something else in the same line. The Agricultural Department wanted some one to collect botanical specimens in the interior of Alaska, and a friend got an offer of the place for Funston, at the same time warning him that it was a perilous job.

“‘That ’s all right,’ said the young man, ‘but as my botanical knowledge does n’t extend much further than knowing a violet from a sunflower, I do n’t think I’d be a valuable collector.’ Nevertheless the prospect was so alluring that he set to work to learn practical botany, and in 1892 was in Alaska. He went over Chilkoot Pass in a late blizzard, struck for the interior, reached

the spot where Dawson City now is, and started down the Yukon alone in a canoe which he had built. His canoe was caught in rapids, split on a rock, and that would have been the end of Fred Funston but for a missionary who chanced to be going along with some Indians, and saved him. That winter he spent with Indians, hunting and exploring, and when he returned it was with a store of highly comprehensive and valuable botanical material. His one criticism of Alaska was that it was a magnificent country, but pretty lonely.

“His next venture was in Cuba, where he went filibustering. Gomez gave him a commission, and he became second in command of artillery under Osgood, the famous Cornell football half-back. He made a record for bravery at Guimaro, in October, 1896, where his chief was killed, and he took command. At the head of his artillerymen and with a dynamite bomb in his hand he charged the Spanish works in the assault which terminated in their surrender. At Bayamo he became a cavalry officer temporarily, because there was more for cavalry than for artillery to do there, and was shot three times; but such was his endurance and physique that he was ready for more fighting in a short time. At Las Tunas he managed the Cuban dynamite guns which wrought such havoc among the Spanish troops, and was again wounded. At the same time his horse was shot and fell upon him, injuring his hips.”

He quarreled with the Cubans because they massacred a squad of guerrilla prisoners, and left the service, and his military education in Cuba, and his courage, and his popular qualities, easily gave him the colonel's commission of the Twentieth Kansas Infantry.



JUDGE WILLIAM H. TAFT,  
PRESIDENT PHILIPPINE COMMISSION.



## CHAPTER III.

### TRANSFORMATION SCENE.

Aguinaldo arrived at Cavité, he was the Deformed Transformed—The American Flag Restored Him to Filipino Confidence—An Army was Handed to Him—The True Story of his Start and the Strange Fortune that followed—Obscurity gave Opportunity.

**A**GUINALDO was quite shrewd enough to understand that whatever his engagements with the Spaniards were, no matter what his sentiments might be as an individual, or how far he had planned to take his chances against the Americans, it was necessary that he should bow to the strong storm of favor that his tribe and all the Filipinos in sight had for the North Americans, with whom they associated victory and liberty. There was a change of air between Singapore and Hong Kong. The cause of it was the smashing of the Spaniards at Manila. Aguinaldo became immediately an enthusiastic American, and it was his favorite way of putting it that all his friends were in favor of annexation to the United States. The word "annexation" he did not personally use. It is to be taken into account, and is an indication of the reserve forces of the young man, that he omitted to say that he was himself in favor of annexation. He merely floated with the irresistible current. He had something to be forgiven

for. It was his friendly relationship with the Spaniards—his lucrative treaty with them—and he knew he was on slippery ground. That was why he feared to go to Dewey. There was acute discrimination in his use of language. He promised everything asked by the consuls, whose zeal had in it something of the effusiveness of inexperience. They were absolute about one thing. Each required the future Dictator to make a solemn promise that he would not be a savage in war; that he would proceed according to the usages of civilized nations; and more, that he would be obedient to Admiral Dewey, at the time the personification of American authority. Dewey did not make any objection to Aguinaldo agreeing to be submissive. On those terms only was the Dictator allowed to go to Cavité.

There is a long list of fortuitous conditions in the environment of the American admiral and the Tagalo President, for the aggrandizement of the latter, on and after the 19th of May, 1898, the day they first saw each other. The native province of Cavité, every path in which was familiar to Aguinaldo, contained some thousands of Spanish troops in garrisons. It is in that province rich lands, owned by the friars, are located. The way to reach it from Manila is to cross the bay, or make a long and difficult journey around that spacious sheet of water. The Spanish fleet destroyed, their troops holding the province were in a hopeless condition. A feature of the garrisons was, they included the Spanish regular regiments, the greater proportion of the ranks filled with natives trained as Spanish soldiers. If it had been practicable for the garrisons to go to Manila, it would have been a serious error to have added

to the crowd in the city the fugitives from Cavité and the provincial towns and villages. The Spaniards had been surprised and overwhelmed to find themselves cut off from Spain. Those in the Cavité posts were actually helpless and disheartened. In Manila itself the American victory simply paralyzed them. The garrisons had to shift for themselves. They rejoiced over finding somebody in the province of Cavité with the appearance of authority, who would consent to accept their surrender. They wanted anybody who could find them in food. There was not a Spaniard in the Philippines who did not know it was beyond the power of their country to send another fleet to dispute the Asiatic waters with America. The situation was soon clear to Aguinaldo and those identified with him. The only hope the Spaniards had was alliance with the natives for the expulsion of the Americans. There is reason and evidence that this was what Aguinaldo hoped for, and this volume contains it. This fact is the key to his correspondence with both the Spanish and American generals. He may have wavered somewhat in judgment as to which side offered him the greater advantages, but, before the war began, made up his mind that the course for him to become the Tycoon of the Philippines was to take part with the Spaniards, and by treachery gain advantages over the Americans that would be decisive. He was a man of decided intelligence; but the United States was a new country to him, as the Philippines were to the United States. Neither side was accurate in its estimation of the capacity of the other for war. The greater miscalculation was on the side of the Spaniards and Aguinaldo. Obviously

he was urged, when arriving at Cavité, by his confidential staff, to make the most for himself and them of the wonderful revelations of opportunity that seemed spread out before him.

The native soldiers in Spanish regiments recognized, within a few days after the decisive battle, that they were liberated, and there was nothing to alarm them in their allegiance to Spain. The comparatively small number of Spaniards in the Cavité posts wanted to surrender at once. They were in the midst of a dense population of natives, and no serious dependence could be placed upon the loyalty of Filipino soldiers. Aguinaldo was the man they wanted. It pleased everybody in the Spanish regiments to meet him. He knew the jungles and the paddy fields, the creeks, towns, and villages, and went out calling along familiar paths, accepting happy prisoners. He had n't any fighting to do; but as he held all the secrets of his party, and the Filipinos were not in personal contact with the American Admiral, the representations of the "President," fresh, with his staff, from Hong Kong, were held indisputable. The transactions of surrender were peaceful ceremonies, their quietude disturbed by felicitations. It had been a precaution of Aguinaldo's to take no one with him in going to see Dewey not chosen by himself. He had secrets to guard, and managed to deceive the Admiral as to his operations, which he was pleased to consider of a military character. It was claimed by the Tagalo leader that his exploits were "brilliant." They were simply the acceptance of the submission of unresisting and unassailed garrisons, whose solicitude was merely to find a friend who would consent to take them



where they could get rations. These pacific affairs were described as "combats," and suddenly Aguinaldo was advertised the world around as a hero of striking exploits, one of the Masters of War. He managed to deceive Dewey about that. His proceedings had rather less military risk and physical exertion in them than the driving of flocks of sheep or swine; for even pigs and lambs have been known to run away after some foolish leader, and not move with placidity in the direction of the pens where they were to be collected until they were wanted to furnish men meat. Aguinaldo's reports of his triumphs invariably mentioned that the Spaniards surrendered "when they were out of ammunition." It was the prudent and thoughtful part of the Tagalo chieftain and staff to take care of the cartridges, and lo, there was an army of Filipinos, drilled men, with arms and ammunition that had been served to them by the Spaniards, and there was not a hostile gun fired in the province after Dewey's signal in the afternoon of May-day to his fleet, to "cease firing"—not a gun fired to kill until two Americans were murdered on the picket-line between Bacoar and Cavité by Filipinos about the middle of the month of August.

Thus Aguinaldo was scooped into the command of the Spanish veterans of Philippine birth, to become the great man of his race, and had a harvest of glory gathered for him and passed over to him at Cavité; and the command of the troops who gave themselves to him, with the consent both of Spain and the United States, was a call to the command in chief, and so there was another army ready made, and, in a shabby sense, equipped for him, in the jungles and high grass round

about Manila, who gave him the salute, "Hail to the chief!" and all the snipers on the Manila side of the bay, who thought they were besieging Manila, were joyful to be enrolled as the followers of Aguinaldo rather than of Gonzales, who, during the absence of the hero of the Mexican-dollar capitulation from home for eight months, had taken care to break the peace so far as he could around Manila, and reported that he had just "thirty-seven thousand men," probably about five times the actual number. Presently the word went forth, near and far, that Manila was to be captured by the Philippine army and plundered by patriots, who were to pay themselves out of the shops of their enemies; and this cheerful information caused considerable reinforcements to come in. Even so Aguinaldo was more and more the master of the Filipinos, and his name rang through all the continents of the earth and the islands of the seas.

The strangest of all Philippine stories is what followed the arrival of Aguinaldo in the province of Cavité—an expedition sorely against his will under the conditions that he undertook it. He was forced to this by the vehement enthusiasm of the Hong Kong Filipinos, to only a small portion of whom Aguinaldo had given his confidence; and a series of accidents made for the adventurer a marvelous success. He is a reminder of the legend of one of the ancient countries of Central Europe, of a man tied upon a horse in order that he might be carried out of the lines of the army to which he belonged because he was believed incapable and timid, and was whipped into a charge upon the foe. In his terror the hero of this

feat tore branches from overhanging boughs as his horse dashed toward the enemy, and lo! there was a panic in the ranks of the foe. The opposing force exercised imagination, and beheld a giant tearing up trees to sweep them to destruction, and fled in dismay. There was a conversion at once of the poor creature, helpless on his horse, into a mighty conqueror; and he was the founder of an imperial dynasty.

If Aguinaldo had not been overruled by the committee at Hong Kōng, by whom he was chosen for a second term of the Presidency by a vote of 16 voices, and compelled to go to Dewey, though protesting it was dangerous to do so, there could have been no chance for him to become important, except, perhaps, as the leader of a Spanish faction; and even that he would have been obliged to undertake with extreme caution and on the losing side. It was a help to the turning of his fortunes from an abject and corrupt secondary part in a rascally negotiation with the Spaniards, that the scene of the annihilation of the Spanish fleet was very near his birthplace. Famous as he is, however, the village where he was born has not been identified with precision. It is only certain that Cavité, where Dewey awaited American reinforcements after his victory, was the home of his boyhood. We may not deny him the title of chief; for he did become the ruler of his tribe. It is one of the tales of his life that he held a clerkship in the arsenal of the Spaniards at Cavité, just where he arrived under the American flag with a staff of seventeen followers. He had no considerable military success or reputation up to that time, but was distinguished because a Filipino who had largely the confi-

dence of the natives—Paterno—selected him as a suitable person to carry on the negotiation of a fake treaty, looking to a fraudulent peace. The core and bark of this was a division of Spanish money between alleged belligerents, who played into each others' hands a game of exaggerated warfare and inadequate pacification for the purpose of bleeding the mother country and sharing the usufruct of the swindle.

The arrival at Cavité of Aguinaldo was during the popular fervor of admiration for our sailors by the natives, who swarmed to that place because the Americans were there, and their great victory had broken the Spaniards and liberated the Filipinos. Their enthusiasm had just expanded to its greatest extent, and reached its highest temperature. The United States consul, who was with Dewey in the battle, and remained with the squadron, with quarters on the *Baltimore*, having been pointed out before Aguinaldo's arrival at Cavité as an American and an officer, was surrounded by an enormous crowd of extravagant Filipinos, who cheered him incessantly, and crowded him, to express their joy, to such an extent that he had hard work to get into his boat and off to the warship, where he was sheltered. In the midst of this inflammable material, ready for organization, Aguinaldo landed under the American flag, no army whatsoever but a uniformed staff, and the fact that he shared in the American prestige regained for him the lost confidence of the Filipinos! It must not be forgotten that Aguinaldo was fortunate in not having been named in the first dispatches concerning him from

the consuls at Manila and Hong Kong. Mr. Williams, at Manila, had referred to the "cash bribe," by which some Filipino insurgent officers had consented to surrender, give up their arms, and go into exile, and had added to this statement that the object of the Spanish Captain-General in making the negotiation and paying the money was to gain the reputation of pacifying the Filipinos, but that the result had not been favorable. When the news spread among the insurgents that some of them had sold out for a large supply of Mexican dollars, and had gone to live abroad with the cash, there was great emulation among the belligerent patriots to follow the illustrious example, and there was more "sniping" of Spanish soldiers in the underbrush than before the proclamation of peace was made. Both sides were warranted in proclaiming that the treaty was not, in terms, complied with beyond the delivery of the arms (seven hundred shotguns) on one side and the payment of four hundred thousand dollars (silver) on the other. Each insisted the other had disregarded the stipulations. Both told the truth; but the parties to the negotiation were aware, from the beginning, that the transaction was dishonorable. Aguinaldo escaped naming by Consul Williams. He was simply one of the generals, and the consular report had the merit of an impersonal expression of public opinion. Equally fortunate he had been when Consul Wildman related the celebrated visit of Agoncillo, five months before the declaration of war with Spain, speaking of the President and the dishonorable proposition then made to the American consul, which he submitted, with due dis-

cretion, to the State Department, where it was contemptuously resented, and the secretary and his assistants were not made acquainted with the personality of Aguinaldo—an obscuration of his record that turned out to give him the opportunities of his life.

## CHAPTER IV.

### AGUINALDO'S VAIN GLORY.

How he Posed as a Cæsar a Fortnight after he was a Suppliant—His Swollen Conceits and Vanities—Small Beggar on a Big Horse.

THAT Aguinaldo had the advantage of a series of incidental good fortunes that he was not influential in bringing about, with a personal purpose, or intelligent comprehension, in his early presentations to the American public, there can be no hesitation in saying. That he was "lucky," all well-informed people know. But there is no occasion to question that he had brightness of mind and energy of character to begin with. That he had half a dozen men of ability about him who were not savages, but possessed with Malayism as a basis, a Spanish education, those who have come in contact with them are well aware. The most notable personal peculiarity of Aguinaldo is a passion for distinction in his clothing, especially in the line of decorations, not tawdry, but conspicuous. He is scrupulously cleanly, anxious about that as any Chinaman; and it is his happiness to be dressed entirely in immaculate white linen. Wildman, consul at Hong Kong, who so unhappily perished in the *Rio Janeiro* on the way home from long, arduous, and, upon the whole, very useful service at Hong Kong, knew as much of Aguinaldo as any one, and had the confidence of the Tagalo chief to as great

an extent as he gave anybody. This President of the Philippines, who is said to have been self-appointed, and really only received the votes of a Committee that he controlled, there were sixteen, when he was reinstated President after the Singapore trip by the Committee that shared with him the delightful burden of Spanish spoils, Consul Wildman described as a man who cared more for the little stick that he carried and the badge he wore than for the place he was to hold in history; and there is the same authority for the statement that he was childish, full of caprice, and had a great gift of vanity. Admiral Dewey was disgusted with the Tagalo chief for his sudden accession of excessive dignity and presumption that he was the really important feature of human affairs in that part of the world. But a few weeks before, this curious evolution was extremely anxious for what seemed small favors, and affected to be grateful for whatever he got. It was a case of "beggar on horseback," though the beggar and the horse were both small. The admiral repeatedly referred to his transformation as a matter of "swell-head." Others referred to the phenomenon as a demand for "enlarged hat-blocks." Certainly Aguinaldo had one Napoleonic characteristic—that of asserting himself. He assumed absolute confidence that he was master of the Archipelago. He gave no indication of diffidence when speaking in the possessive case of the city of Manila, called it habitually "My capital," and resented as informal a call upon him by Admiral Dewey and General Anderson. The offense was because they did not make an official "function" of their call. He fancied he was a potentate. This was on the 30th of April, and he



had arrived at Cavité on the 19th of May. He thought himself the very man when Manila was taken, August 13th, to occupy the palace of the captain-generals, and was shocked, amazed, and indignant because the American commanding general proposed to use the palace for his own headquarters. He thought it a concession on his part when he allowed Anderson's troops to go ashore without contesting the ground they presumed to occupy without his leave with armed force; and he claimed it was benevolence on his part that he allowed the American soldiers to get a good supply of pure water in Manila from the water-works that are supplied by a mountain stream. The alternative was unclean cistern-water.

Aguinaldo posed as if conscious of gigantic proportions, and never consented by a gesture or attitude that he felt small, or even slightly suggested suspecting himself of insignificance. Doubtless those about him played their parts in carefully yielding to him "the center of the stage," and saluting him even in his small beginnings as an imperious, if not potential, personage. They knew he was the head of the group in position, and that, the more they made of him, the greater the increase of their own magnitude. A keen consciousness of humor is not one of the endowments of the Filipino. His levity is frivolous and playful in a childish way, and it has been vividly described as like unto the capricious and fantastical conduct of monkeys, even to "taking a nip" at each other, as something indicative of affectionate hilarity. The remark has been made disrespectful, but there is a point of vraisemblance in it. If we are all monkeys in some degree, there is less

remoteness from the original progenitor in some of the Filipino tribes than in the races that have had the advantage of pausing a long time in Europe on the way from Western to Eastern Asia, if that has been the course of the movements of mankind from primeval habitations.

Three days after the return of the "President" from the Singapore expedition to Hong Kong he appeared before the Junta in that city, and made a strenuous plea not to be sent to Cavité, and did not get there until two weeks later. Commodore Dewey was not impressed with his possible utilities as the American consuls were, and needed ten days' persuasion to give the word that the exile might go to his own home under the American flag. After all the telegraphic adulation, from Singapore, of Aguinaldo, the future admiral was not in the least sure that he had any use for him; and if it had not been for the zeal of the new consuls at Hong Kong and Manila and the survival of the Cleveland appointee at Singapore, the complication with Aguinaldo might have been spared us. There will always be a dispute as to the amount of good service the Filipino insurgents actually gave the Americans before and during the investment of Manila, up to its fall into the hands of the American army and navy on the 13th of August, 1898. Making the greatest concessions, it is certain that if Aguinaldo and his staff had been sent back to Hong Kong without landing, and a few of our naval officers had been detailed to take command of the Filipino Spanish soldiers who were anxious to join the American army, they could have been of much greater utility than can, with any sort of reason,

be claimed for them as affairs turned. We know now that Aguinaldo was not at any time our friend. He had to pretend to be so after the American victory in order to get hold of his own people. They had lost confidence in him. A word of disdain from Dewey would have cleared the decks of Aguinaldo and his alleged republican form of Government, in which nine men prepared a free Government, and called it a New Republic for nine millions of people without communicating with them.

## CHAPTER V.

### AGUINALDO'S POWER CENTRALIZED.

How he Held the Center of the Islands—He had the Spanish Machine of the Philippines before we Signed the Treaty, and we did not Fight for it—The Sacrifice we made for Peace caused him to Fight us before the Treaty was Ratified—Our Mischievous Uncertainties.

THERE has not been much of what we call public opinion in the Philippines, because it has not been possible in the three hundred years of Spanish administration and leadership to develop it. New fashions come slowly in the Orient. If the Filipinos were as the Cubans are—one people, however mixed, and one island, though extensive and variegated—they would be in a position to be rapidly educated and become politically intelligent. The Filipinos are composed of so many tribes and races, and scattered among so many islands and in places difficult of access, there can be no community of thought and no common opinion or purpose, no concert, no initiative of the populace, because they have no sufficient mechanism of representation, even to give expression to such scraps of enlightenment as they possess.

Aguinaldo's advantage after his leadership appeared most largely due to the fact he was allowed to draw lines around the United States troops, and, as the tribes



ON THE TRAIL OF AGUINALDO.



THE PURSUIT IN THE MOUNTAINS.



saw and heard, for they were observers from the outside, possess the one center that had been the seat of authority known to the various tribes in the islands for centuries. He was in accordance with the native understanding, in command in the capital of the Philippines, and was respected, feared, and obeyed accordingly.

General Merritt would not consent to the Filipino army surrounding the Americans in Manila, and his language on the subject was unmistakable as when he demanded pure water, and when he ordered the Filipinos to get out of the way where they were not wanted. As the Aguinaldo array of military forces became aggressive, insolent, and threatening, and it was apparent there was an idea among them they could conquer the Americans, there were extraordinary concessions made for the sake of gaining time for peace. Things that would never have been tolerated by any other army were endured by the Americans for weeks, rather than be in any degree responsible for striking first. The sufferings of the American army under the domineering viciousness of the surrounding Filipinos was something almost intolerable. There has been nothing like it, and it has not been appreciated by their countrymen. On the contrary, they have been accused of misdemeanors and cruelties, and finally of assaulting the lines that were drawn about them with every circumstance of contumely, and insolence positively barbarous, indecent, and expressive of derision, contempt, and meditated vengeance. Our own red Indians were never more artful and obscene in provocation. The central position of Aguinaldo, spreading an army around Ma-

nila, gave him an immense ability for mischief. It placed him in direct intercourse with all the provinces the Spaniards had governed, because all the roads ran to and from Manila, and he held them, and the creeks and rivers swarmed with boats that were capable of making voyages along the shores, so that the surrounding islands and distant provinces found themselves in communication with Aguinaldo and no one else, and he domineered over them to all appearances with the consent of the Americans.

Beyond this was the want of definition in the American policy. There was a clause of uncertainty as to the Philippines in the protocol; a question pending for a long time whether the treaty with Spain would be ratified; still another question, whether, if it was not ratified, the Americans would leave the islands; and, of course, the inhabitants who had substantial interests, and intelligent as to the affairs of the world, knew that if the American army abandoned the islands the despotism of Aguinaldo would take its turn; and all who had not taken part with him would be under suspicion and subject to assessments; and those who had taken part with the Americans, would be liable to confiscation and every form of tyranny after the Spanish fashion. Months passed, from August to February, during which this condition of things lasted. There was even a clause in the capitulation of Manila that would restore to the Spaniards their guns and ammunition—22,000 stand of arms and 10,000,000 cartridges, were two of the items. These things were played against the Americans both ways. There is no purpose of going into



controversy as to the detail of circumstances immediately preceding the first combat in the neighborhood of Manila, between the Americans and the Aguinaldo army. Aguinaldo was only present by wire. His person was in Mololos. He was not personally involved, except through orders wired—his customary method, however, of conducting battles. There is to be remarked a coincidence throwing strong lights upon the subject. When the battle began at Manila, the American army had lost strength in the disbandment and disability of soldiers, and six thousand re-enforcements were on the way. The ratification crisis was just on in the Senate of the United States. It was the belief of the Filipinos in Washington that if there was war in the islands the treaty would not be ratified, and the fact of the re-enforcements crossing the Pacific was well known to the Washington agent of Aguinaldo, and doubtless communicated. The great length of time spent in debating the treaty at Paris and ratifying it at Washington, and the Spanish and Filipino secret influences were substantially united against us.

The anxiety of the President of the United States that there should not be war between the liberated and the liberators in the Philippines was very great. No man was more sensible of the horror of having to turn our arms against those we had set free than he was; but the evidence of his solicitude was Asiatically interpreted to be that the people of the United States were unwarlike, and that our troops could be swept out of the way by the superior numbers Aguinaldo had gathered. In the city of Manila itself there were power-

ful organizations hostile to the Americans, and the overbearing insurgents levied at their pleasure assessments upon property-holders. There were clubs of known conspirators, thousands strong, prepared to stab the American army in the back when it was assaulted in front.

## CHAPTER VI.

### EVOLUTION OF AGUINALDO.

Uncertainties of His Boyhood—He Found a Kind Master—The Traditions of Youth and Evidence of Fancy—Early and Late Hong Kong Experiences—The Story of the Silver-plated Treaty—The History and Romance of a Man of Mystery—What the Romantic Biographers Say.

WHEN Aguinaldo was first making himself interesting to our officers, and the soldiers generally, waiting for the drift of events, he was not taken very seriously by Americans, but known to have a startling conceit of himself. There was much more gossip than information about him; differences of opinion as to what blood of man he had other than Tagalo. He was accused of a partially Chinese ancestry, and that not regarded a complimentary speculation. There is understood his mother was living, and nothing improbable in that, for he was about thirty years of age. If he had a fixed birthday, it was not referred to with specification. It seemed to be known that he was a native of the province of Cavité, and had been in a small way identified with the arsenal. Some said he had been a clerk in the Custom House, and, again, he was charged with being a school-teacher. The contradiction was that he was not well enough educated. It was stated that he had been in attendance at a Jesuit school, and had their praise for diligence and proficiency. So

much was said of his Jesuit education and alleged sympathies with that order, that when in conversation with him he denounced the friars, and said they should go home to Spain, and ought to know enough to go, I asked him whether he included the Jesuits, and after a brief delay he said, "They also should go." It was asserted often, and with confidence, that he had been educated as a priest, and had first quarreled with the Church by becoming a Mason. One of the high crimes under the rule of the Spaniards in the Philippines was joining the Masons. Another story was afloat, and had credence, that he had been a Spanish soldier and petty officer, and started the riotous disorganization of a regiment by assassinating an officer, carrying out a scheme of revenge. After his celebrity was pronounced, the rumor of his service as a soldier had much countenance, and there was added to it, as it first circulated, that he entered the army so as to fit himself to become an insurgent leader, and served with the Chinese also.

There was habitually intruded into accounts of him, and no other man was so much talked of, or curiously regarded, that he had a charm. That meant his followers, of the baser sort at least, believed he was under Divine protection—had a charmed life. The form this folly took was that he could not be harmed by Spanish poisons, as they had often been administered to him by his deadly foes; more than that, he could not be perforated by Spanish bullets, for he had stood unharmed when a shower of them were fired point blank at him, and they must have glanced from him, or he became a phantom and was not disturbed by missiles. One of the most persistently related personal accounts was

that he had been glad for a while to encourage the pretense he could not be slain by his foes, owing to a miraculous token fastened about his neck, until a sudden fear possessed him that those who believed in him might be disposed to prove their faith by private experiments, and he became abjectly alarmed. There is a widespread weakness among the Filipinos that causes them to have faith in the vulgarisms of superstition of all sorts.

In February, 1899, the *Review of Reviews* collected all the information then attainable touching the parentage and youth of Aguinaldo, and sought to treat him with respect and have scrupulous regard for facts. There was this correct statement as to the evidences in his person of his race:

“His complexion is about half-way between the reddish-brown of the Malay and the olive of the Spaniard. There is a yellowish tinge about it which, taken in connection with his forehead, would lead one to infer that a modicum of Chinese blood flowed in his veins, and that in his pedigree was some individual of Igorrote-Chinese or of Tagalo-Chinese or of Tagalo-Chinese characteristics.”

This exhausted the authenticities, and, as to his parentage, it was confessed it would be difficult, if not impossible, to learn the truth, and though not considered a Spaniard, the blame for his appearance in the world was fixed upon Spaniards in this entertaining style:

“So deep has been the moral mire of the Philippines under Spanish rule, so universal the immorality of the dominant race, that neither the civil nor religious authorities have ever cared to keep any record of the

alliances and misalliances, the births legitimate and illegitimate, the wives, concubines and mistresses, slaves and abducted women, who have filled the long years of Spanish rule. It is only of late years that the Tagals, both pure and half-breed, have been permitted to use Castilian names, and then, as though the spirit of grim Gothic humor had permeated the official mind at Manila, the brown men and the brown-white men were allowed to take the best names in Spanish history and literature. No bureaucrat and no parish priest saw the sardonic irony of a half-breed calling himself Aguinaldo, Cervantes, De Vega, Agramonte, Calderon, Legaspi, De Leon, and De Soto. For humor the practice surpassed that which prevailed in our own country before the war, when every plantation saw in living bronze Julius Cæsar, Pompey, Scipio Africanus, Cleopatra, and Epaminondas."

There followed this correct study of the points of the man, giving him credit and stating his weaknesses, after the fashion of the traveling phrenologists, a long time ago held in request:

"In his features, face, and skull, Aguinaldo looks more like a European than a Malay. He is what would be called a handsome man, and might be compared with many young men in the province of Andalusia, Spain. If there be truth in phrenology, he is a man above the common. The zone of the skull, which indicates mentality, is well developed for a European—abnormally large for a Malay. The moral zone is of medium development, and the animal or cerebellar zone is comparatively small, with the exception of the reach over the ears, indicating destructiveness and cruelty."

A holder of a pen of free flow, dipped in red paint, contributed—we assume upon a sudden call for a life of Aguinaldo, that would cover all reasonable demands for particulars—a versatile sketch that “will go down the corridors of the ages,” we presume, his pen-picture of the father of Aguinaldo, the only answer attempted, ought to serve all purposes—and reminds one of an old comedian hailed by a young man determined to be married, and successful in his courtship, until the lady in the case demanding his father’s presence at the wedding, and the expectant lover never had a father, so far as he knew, or knew the want of him until this matrimonial emergency arose. “Will you be my father?” said the orphan to the comedian, and the reply was gracious, “Yes, certainly, I am your father; what kind of an old father do you want?” The article was furnished to order.

This is the sort of father Aguinaldo got after Funston “brought him up by hand,” as they say—it was the father furnished out of the revelations of the inner consciousness of an able, erudite, and dashing space-writer:

“Like himself, his father was a native of the Philippines, of full Malay blood.

“When, a quarter of a century ago, the hatred of the natives of the islands for the Power that held them under misrule and oppression began to take form in slumbering revolt, the Tagalo boy was toddling about the hut which was his birthplace, and none knew that he was destined to make the name of Aguinaldo known as that of the leader of his people.

“The ordinary Tagalo boy’s life is devoid of incident

from the time he can walk until he marries, which may be as early as sixteen, when he is regarded as a man. Not so with Aguinaldo. His father was a native chief—an Orang Malayu—that is, a Malay with literary knowledge, and having a religion and a form of culture. In this way he was distinguished from the Orang Beuna, the Malay of the soil, and from the Orang Laut, the Malay of the sea.”

Now this literally romantic chief was an ambitious creature, and had his gifted son educated; and so the grand and fond old aristocrat, his father, gave him away to the priests, and they were glad to get him, as they saw genius just glowing in him, and wanted him to be one of themselves of course. But the boy Emilio would go for a soldier. He was sent to Madrid, which is quite of the nature of fresh news, for he was never there, and for two years he studied Latin, then drifted, and was drafted into the Spanish regiment, where he organized a revolt, and entered on a career as a professional killer of Spaniards. The way he did it in a case where a reward was offered for his head is thus set forth in the “life history,” that yields otherwise unknown details:

“Bassillio Augusti y Davila was the political governor of the Philippine Islands at that time. Rivera was captain-general. Augusti offered \$20,000 for the head of Aguinaldo. The answer he received to this tender was a note from the rebel leader himself:

“I need the sum you offer much, and will deliver the head myself.”

“Augusti laughed. Ten days later he met Aguinaldo. He paid him \$20,000, but did not receive the head.



"The time for the meeting was a stormy night—a typhoon raging. Augusti sat in his palace engaged on a report of the condition of the island. A priest passed the sentinels at the entrance to the palace, and undisturbed entered Augusti's room. He stopped just back of that official's chair with the words, 'Peace be with you, my son.'

"When Augusti, surprised, had turned his head the priest's mantle was dropped, and there stood Aguinaldo, in his hand a twenty-inch bolo, the terrible knife of the Malay.

"'I have brought the head of Aguinaldo,' said the rebel, thumbing the edge of his blade, 'and I claim the reward. Hasten, else I shall have to expedite matters.'

"Augusti had no alternative. He opened his desk, and from it took \$20,000 in gold, which he gave to Aguinaldo. The latter in turn handed him a receipt, counted the money, walked backward to the door, and bolted. A pistol bullet from the weapon of the enraged Augusti cut the hair over Aguinaldo's temple, but he escaped unscathed."

It has been a long time since there was a stroke of biography accomplished equal to this. The young man who did it should make himself known. He would be delightful if he could be induced not to impart quite such a lurid gloss of truth to confer brilliancy upon the cold, sad facts; but the moderation that understates a truth so as to give it emphasis is not appreciated, and men of lofty talent have not inducements to under-studies for the sake of literary finish. We regret to have heard doubts raised as to the strict research for

intelligence made by the author we quote, for the reason that we have caught him in some slight inaccuracies. It will be remembered that it was with General Rivera that Aguinaldo made the treaty with the silver lining; and Augustin is the man to whom Aguinaldo wrote on the 9th of June, 1898, to save the sovereignty of Spain. According to the writer of the Life Story, there have been thrilling attempts to bribe the heroic Tagalo that failed. We clip one more extract:

“Captain-General Polavieja offered Aguinaldo and Alexandro \$200,000 each if they would leave Luzon forever. Each was to have a free pardon, also, for past offenses. The two accepted the offer, only to learn after they received the money that they were to be assassinated the following night at a festa. The next night came, but the two men engaged to kill the insurgents were found dead in their beds with knives driven through their hearts, and attached to the handle of each was a bit of paper bearing the inscription, ‘Beware of the Malay’s vengeance.’”

We are forced to infer that each of the nimble patriots carried off two hundred thousand Mexican dollars. They must have been athletes.

Aguinaldo claims his birthplace was in Cavité, and no one knows enough to contradict him. The first certainty is that he was known as a little boy in the pleasant town adjacent to the arsenal; and the *Review* sketch mentioned as uncertain in some particulars and inaccurate in others, but not careless or reckless, says:

“His friends say that he was the son of a Spanish general; his enemies in Manila that he was the offspring of a dissolute but learned Jesuit. At the age of four he

was a house-boy in the home of a Jesuit priest in Cavité. Aguinaldo's master was a very kind man, and took a deep interest in the welfare of his little *protégé*. He dressed him well, so much so as to excite the notice and even the wrath of some neighbors. More important still, he gave the boy an education, which, though unequal to what every child receives in the United States, was a hundred-fold better than what is bestowed upon the little Tagals of Luzon.

"When he was fourteen or fifteen he was enrolled in the Medical Department of the Pontifical University of Manila, under Professors Nalda and Buitrago. He was a bright student, but nothing is known of his college career. Shortly after this time he committed what is an unpardonable sin, both secular and religious, in the Philippines, by joining a Masonic order. Masonry was a prohibited thing in the Philippines under Spanish rule, and any man joining the organization might under an ancient law be tortured and executed. About this time (in 1898) he had some trouble with the authorities, and went to Hong Kong, where there was a fair-sized colony of Philippine exiles, and also of Filipinos who had crossed the China Sea in business enterprises."

The claim of friends of Aguinaldo, that he is a Spaniard's son, is not sustained by his appearance, which is Japanese. It is reported that he served in the Chinese army, with the thought of becoming expert in war, and artfully shifted himself to a Chinese warship that had European instructors, serving under the American hero, Captain McGiffin. This seems to be an adornment thought desirable; but as Hong Kong was a practical school in which the young Filipino gained valuable

instruction, and picked up general knowledge of the world. These were considerable advantages. The story that he learned a good deal of English during his journeys is a mistake, or he was such a strategist he never was found out understanding the language. His knowledge of tongues is closely associated with the accomplishments of his interpreter. After his earlier Hong Kong experience—there were ten years between the first and last—he is said to have been an office-holder in a small way in a provincial town, and on bad terms with the Franciscan and Dominican friars, and at enmity with the Church at large because he was a Mason. He was early and active as an insurgent in the time when the most distinguished of Philippine literary men—Dr. Jose Rizal—was persecuted and shot, for, it is said, contesting land titles in the province of Cavité. Aguinaldo's personal part in the skirmishes, before he was a figure in negotiation with Rivera, in which the Spanish Government and the Filipino insurgents, who were honest and meant business, were both basely deceived, has not been made available to historians.

The record of the terms of surrender given by the Filipinos engaged in it, and in possession of our War Department, shows less than three hundred guns were given up, the greater number shotguns, and the whole outfit worthless for military purposes. This is another indication the magnitude of the Philippine rising against Spain did not amount to more than a small, fractional proportion of that in Cuba, and the Cubans' Literary Bureau did the greater part of the fighting for a year before the American fleet and army appeared. Still there were a dozen Cuban generals who surpassed any

developed in the Philippines, where Gomez and Maceo ranked as world heroes.

It is said by the believers in the fighting capacity of Aguinaldo—we quote from a very respectable utterance—that at the beginning of the war between the United States and Spain he showed remarkable foresight, and “told his colleagues and followers that the opportunity had come. He made contracts with adventurers to deliver arms in the Philippines, and he displayed extraordinary activity in personally visiting American naval officers, consular representatives, merchants, sea-captains, and private citizens. The man’s whole soul was in the work, and he set an example which may be regarded with considerable admiration. He also called upon the leading English papers there, and tried in every way to arouse sympathy for his people and his cause. In this work he displayed a patriotism unmingled with selfishness.”

This was published before the treaty between the United States and Spain was signed, and that Aguinaldo was nearly eight months absent from the Philippines before the war, reposing in possession of Spanish money in Hong Kong, the city in which he had spent some years of his youth, and that was to him the most agreeable place in the world. We know that he proceeded to Hong Kong with a group of those associated with him as insurgents; that two-thirds of the active negotiators with the Spaniards, arranging the Mexican money treaty, departed with the money to Hong Kong, one-third remaining in a state of poverty waiting for more Spanish money; that a bitter quarrel sprang up between those who consented to exile for cash and those

who originated the scheme, but were left at home to confront the indignation of the actual enemies of Spain. We know, too, that this treaty was a corrupt affair, not only on the part of the Filipinos, but of the Spanish engaged in it; that the command of Aguinaldo, of which the Spaniards told such astounding tales, was an insignificant force, not all told exceeding five hundred men; such an army as one company of American troops put to flight in any possible position with a rush of five minutes and a few well-directed rifle-shots; that the Spanish officers obtained from their home Government a large sum of money, and that the Filipinos who accepted the cash, as compensation for pacification, did not get half as much as the Spanish warriors and statesmen personally engaged appropriated to their own use; and we do not know that after the hegrira to Hong Kong there was any other activity shown by those who accepted deportation from the country in which the civil war was going on as the equivalent of patriotism, than calling upon the American consul at Hong Kong, Mr. Wildman, infesting his office, and the alleged organization in exile of a new Republic officered by the heroes who had accepted cash for their country—or rather a bribe in common—with Aguinaldo to hold the check-book. We know the only demonstration of great purposes, was in making a proposition to buy guns from the United States for an unknown destination, and the promise by the Hong Kong Committee, eight hundred and twenty-three miles away from Manila, and consisting, when they received Aguinaldo as President, after he was at Singapore, of sixteen men only, of the customs revenues of Manila and two provinces to be



AGUINALDO AND A GROUP OF HIS CHIEFS.

(AGUINALDO IS THE CENTRAL FIGURE.)



ARMY SUPPLY TRAIN, NEAR BAMBAN.





handed over to the United States if this country would recognize that committee as a Philipino Nation. An opinion widely different from this was generally held by the people of the United States for a considerable time; but now we have the proof in official documents that the state of facts is exactly that here related. It cuts down the proportions of the self-sacrificing Filipino Junta men, who made the loudest professions of patriotism. They deceived Consul Wildman, Admiral Dewey, and others for a short time, but imposed on very many of the American people for a considerable period. Happily now the light is so clear that no further harm will be done by the Spanish Oriental eloquence in the forms of falsification that seem to them diplomatic and dignified.

## CHAPTER VII.

### AGUINALDO AS OUR ALLY.

The Filipino Exaggeration of Themselves—Aguinaldo Quoted and Contradicted—American Officers Stamp Out a Falsehood about our Troops—The Filipino “Allies” Falsified and were “Nuisances”—The Proof—Aguinaldo was Helping the Spaniards to Beef—The Siege was in August, and He was our Enemy in June—The Alleged Ally Convicted of Treachery on his own Testimony.

IT was a part of the policy of Aguinaldo and “compatriots” to give all possible importance to the “assistance” rendered by the Filipino army to the Americans in the capture of the city of Manila. Their habit of exaggeration was, unfortunately, supported to slight extent at first by reports of American officers, civil and military. Consul Williams claimed that before the Spanish-American War was started, there was a great deal of war around Manila, and referred to “battles” and many evidences of desperate fighting. There was, however, never a casualty list that exceeded half a dozen killed and wounded in a “battle”—unless the Spaniards, as in one case stated by Williams, massacred a garden party of the natives, and called it a “battle.” The siege of Manila by Aguinaldo was carried on by a few groups of skirmishers in the profuse vegetation, who wasted

ammunition in "sniping;" that is, taking long shots with the view of picking off an occasional man. The fact that Aguinaldo and the Spanish captain-general were running in beef cattle was proven to the satisfaction of General Anderson, when his scouts brought him six men, each provided with a pass signed by General Aguinaldo and General Augustin, permitting the parties to pass the military lines of both armies with animals for slaughter. The Spanish general commanding could hardly be condemned for joining the Tagalo chieftain in promoting an enterprise to furnish the Spanish army of thirteen thousand fresh meat. Beef on the hoof was received with enthusiasm by the Spaniards; but the knowledge of the privileges of drivers of cattle to the Manila market may not have been generally diffused among the Filipinos resting in the shady jungles. It was a proceeding, however, perfectly consistent with Aguinaldo's character. It was grateful to his feelings of hostility toward the Americans, and it was money in his pocket. In the letter of October 25, 1898, to the commandant of Iloilo, written by Aguinaldo, he refers to his own "noble intentions" in writing to General Augustin, June 9th, as if the general had paid no attention to the overture to make common cause against the Americans. This was, however, in Eastern Asia, and there the interpretation most likely to have been given this complaint by Aguinaldo of Augustin was that a close intimacy existed between the Spanish and Filipino leaders! The way to affirm it was to needlessly deny it, and the mere courtesy of a professional enemy of Spain, in addressing a Spanish officer, was to make known that there would be no disclosure, and it would

be safe to do business with so cautious a man of honor! The Iloilo officer would understand that as Aguinaldo did not admit he had formed a bond of brotherhood with the captain-general, it would not be dangerous to establish an affinity with him. When General Anderson appeared, three weeks after the letter of intentions that were "noble" and "warnings" that were "frank," Aguinaldo was deeply exasperated by Admiral Dewey's refusal to take Manila for him. This was precisely what the Tagalo asked, but not the form in which he put it. The circuitous way of the chief of the Tagalos was to call on Dewey and mention to him that he was about to take Manila and do it himself; and Dewey's way of refusing was to disbelieve the probability that the native army could do it.

The claim has been persistently put forth, insisted upon with heat and fury by many who have been prominent antagonists in the United States of the Filipino policy of the Government, and the violent language and extreme and agonized earnestness of manner has impressed some fair-minded people to the effect that the army of Aguinaldo powerfully besieged Manila, contributed vastly to the comfort and success of the American army that beleaguered and captured the town, and that it was one of the most horrible outrages in history that when our brave "allies" had done so much, they were not permitted to participate in the triumph, but held back and driven out of the town, which they assisted with extraordinary valor to place in our possession. Aguinaldo himself seemed almost insane from his treatment in this association. He made all-manner of threats, and finding they were unavailing, his plead-

ing for a place in the triumph became pathetic, and really excited a good deal of sympathy. He claimed to have expended the blood and the money of his beloved people, only to be denied their rights as participants in the occupation of the city they had conquered. It was thought at the time to be well for the American officers to say as many good things as they could of Aguinaldo and his army, to praise them as much as was admissible; but the Filipinos were of less account than our Cuban auxiliaries in the battles before Santiago. This is to be said for the Tagalos, however, that they dug a few wet ditches, though not in the right places, except to get in the way of the American troops who had to do the work. This situation was well known to General Merritt, and, of course, to his chief of staff, General Babcock, and they said all the kind things they could, even indulged to some extent in phrases of flattery; but there was a point of business, the Filipino insurgents were not doing anything to help the attack. It was necessary to put American troops, capable of service, on a line in advance of that of the Aguinaldo forces, that they might have ground to make further advances, and there was persuasion mingled with urgency that was vigorous, and a certain *finesse*, that caused change to be made from the unreal soldiers Aguinaldo was displaying, and the real fighters, to whom the aggressive work was necessarily confided. It throws light upon the critical circumstances of this time to remember this was on the 9th of August, two months later than the date of Aguinaldo's letter to the new captain-general of Manila, written to secure an alliance with him to "save the sovereignty of Spain in the islands." Aguinaldo is the wit-

ness to this, for he speaks of his letter and its nature of the 9th of June, in the letter he wrote to the commandant at Iloilo on the 25th of October following. In that he made no secret of the keenness of his Spanish sympathy and his purposes of doing the Americans deadly mischief. General Anderson had written to the War Department long before that Aguinaldo was treacherous, and had his confidential aide in Manila, and the proof was furnished by his scouts that Aguinaldo and Augustin were partners in furnishing the Spanish army besieged with fresh meat. If he had got the plans of the advance on Manila on the decisive day, it would have been still more decisive. It is really pitiful that he did n't. True, the odds would have been great against the Americans; that is, in numbers, for from nine to ten thousand Boys in Blue, if they had found the Filipinos and the Spaniards all fighting against them would have been obliged to destroy them, and there were altogether about twenty-seven thousand Spaniards and Filipinos. That would have cleared off the job at once. The Filipino question would have been settled then and there. There would n't have been occasion to have pursued Aguinaldo to his lair in the mountain jungles of the province of Isabella, take him by the neck, deliver him to a warboat of ours, and force him to occupy apartments in the palace that he demanded General Merritt should give up to him as the great and only President, Captain-General and Tycoon, Sovereign Lord of the Archipelago.

It is familiar that Aguinaldo claimed to have been fighting terribly during the siege of Manila, shedding much blood and cutting a great swath in the high grass

and deep mud where the operations were carried on; but he confined himself to glittering generalities, as a rule, just as when he described the tremendous military achievements with which he corralled the Spanish garrisons in the province of Cavité, though there was not a gun fired in a fight. He ventured in one case upon a specification of that which he did during the siege of Manila in aid of Americans, and we have the whole truth about that. He told a terrible story. We presume the authenticity of it will not be denied, for it appeared in the *Springfield Republican*, of Massachusetts, and was referred to on the floor of the United States Senate as an authentic production of Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, the Tagalog insurgent leader, entitled "True Version of the Philippine Revolution," and in it the following statement occurs:

"Ten days after the Americans occupied the trenches at Maytubig (this move being well known by the Spaniards, who were intrenched at the Magazine in San Antonio Abad) their outposts, composed of a few men only, were surprised by the Spaniards, who made a night attack on them. They had barely time to get out of their beds and fall back on the center, abandoning their rifles and six field guns in their precipitate retreat.

"The firing being distinctly heard, our troops immediately rushed to the assistance of our friends and allies, repulsing the Spaniards and recapturing the rifles and field-guns, which I ordered to be returned to the Americans as a token of our good will and friendship.

"General Noriel was opposed to this restitution, alleging that the arms did not belong to the Americans since the Filipino troops captured them from the Span-

iards. But I paid no attention to the reasonable opposition of my general, and gave imperative instructions that they be returned to the Americans, showing thereby clearly and positively the good will of the Filipinos. The said rifles and field-guns, with a large quantity of ammunition, were therefore restored to those who were then our allies, notwithstanding the fact of General Noriel's brigade capturing them at a cost of many lives of our compatriots."

This is a sample fabrication that had large circulation, and was very much believed by those who wanted to be assured that the Americans when desperately pressed were wonderfully relieved by the Aguinaldo besiegers. If this had happened it would have been very strong evidence that the Filipinos were fighting side by side with the troops of the United States against Spain, something they never did in one instance, and that they were under competent and honorable leadership. The Secretary of War, Mr. Root, addressed a letter, dated February 16, 1900, to General Francis V. Green, who commanded the Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, in the attack upon Manila. The Secretary said:

"The soldiers of the American army, to which the statement refers, must necessarily have been in your brigade. In none of the very full official reports of the military operations of the period referred to do I find any reference to such an occurrence. Will you be good enough to inform me whether any such thing happened, and, if so, under whose immediate command?"

General Green replied, May 29th, transmitting statements from the following officers: Irving Hale, formerly



colonel First Colorado Infantry; C. M. Moses, formerly lieutenant-colonel First Colorado Infantry; Charles H. Anderson, formerly major First Colorado Infantry; John P. Bratt, formerly colonel First Nebraska Infantry; Victor D. Duboce, formerly colonel First California Infantry; James E. Barnett, formerly lieutenant-colonel Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry; F. A. Grant, formerly major commanding the Utah Light batteries.

These officers and gentlemen were personally cognizant of the facts in the affair to which the imaginative Aguinaldo assumed he was referring when he made the statement that was, as we shall see, conclusively contradicted. The letters from the officers were, at the request of General Green, placed in the files of the War Department. General Thomas Anderson says of the story of the night attack by the Spaniards on the American lines before Manila, driving back our men, taking six pieces of artillery, that he believes "it has no foundation in fact whatever." The general adds:

"I was in command of the division of troops. I was on the ground every day; never heard of it. General Green's brigade was in the trenches, and he never reported it to me. The Filipino general, Noriel, who was reported to have recovered the guns and driven back the Spaniards, never made any such statement to me, though I knew him well and saw him frequently. I am confident, therefore, that there is no foundation whatever for this extraordinary statement."

The trained military precision, reserve, and dignity of this statement by General Anderson are as characteristic as they are admirable.

General Irving Hale, writing from Denver, Colo-

rado, February 28, 1900, has to say of the Aguinaldo story: "I have the honor to state that the story is not only false, but that there was no shadow of a foundation which served as an excuse for such a fabrication." He adds that the Spanish did make several attacks, "but these were all repulsed. The Americans neither abandoned any rifles and field-pieces, nor retreated nor evacuated any portion of their trenches." There was no chance, therefore, for the Filipinos to assist the Americans in regaining positions. General Hale continues to give this certificate of the character and the services of the Aguinaldo army, and incidentally throws light upon the personality of Aguinaldo himself, giving valuable information in these words:

"Consequently the Filipinos could not and did not recapture nor assist in recapturing any American positions or ordnance. On the contrary, their presence in this vicinity was more of a nuisance than otherwise, as they interfered with our operations and frequently drew the Spanish fire, to the great annoyance of our troops in the trenches, in reserve, and marching to and from the trenches."

Colonel Cassius M. Moses, of the First Colorado Infantry, says of the Aguinaldo story of assisting Americans before Manila, "It is simply the product of a diseased brain," and adds:

"The Spaniards made several quite determined attacks on the American lines, but were repulsed at every point. At no time did an American soldier quit his position or lose a rifle or field-piece. The so-called Filipino army was of no assistance to the American

forces, but on the other hand were a nuisance. These facts are so well known to every officer and enlisted man who served on the island of Luzon during the Spanish-American War, that Aguinaldo's statement is simply absurd."

Colonel Victor D. Duboce, of the First California Infantry, says:

"On the night of July 31st and August 1st, during the heavy firing, the insurgents deserted their interior line of trenches, while the Americans held the advance trenches.

"I speak positively in reference to this particular engagement, for the reason that I was in command of the first and second battalions of the First California Volunteers, with headquarters at the crossroads—the Calle Real and the Pasie road—and I can call to your mind the fact that a little after one o'clock on the morning of August 1st I sent one company (Company H, First California) to Pasie upon receiving word that General Noriel's troops had deserted their trenches on the right."

This Noriel is the illustrious patriot who pretended to have protected the Americans and saved their guns for them.

Colonel John Bratt, of the First Nebraska Volunteers, makes like denial with the other officers, and proceeds with this further testimony:

"After our troops intrenched and occupied the position in front of Fort San Antonio Abad I do not remember of ever seeing an armed body of insurgents in the vicinity, and I am certain they were never considered an ally or relied upon for any purpose."

Lieutenant-Colonel John E. Barnett, of the Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteers, writes:

"The Utah Battery did not lose a gun, but fired them skillfully and effectively until the fight was over. The Tenth staid with them.

"In passing it might be remarked that none of the Filipinos were to be seen anywhere around, and that the only beds our men had to be awakened from were mud and water."

In a letter written in New York, February 19, 1900, General Frank Greene says:

"Statements made by Aguinaldo are absolutely without foundation; each and every one of them is untrue; the United States troops did not fall back; did not abandon a single rifle or a single field-gun; did not make a precipitate retreat; the Filipinos did not rush to our assistance; did not recapture the rifles and field-guns, and did not return them to the Americans. The Filipinos took no part in the engagements between the Spaniards and American troops. Every single statement in the extract quoted in your letter is false."

The Secretary of War performed an important public service in calling the witnesses to prove the untruth of a statement by Aguinaldo that found its way to the United States Senate, where it was applauded by the friends of the insurgents. The proof was furnished that the Filipino "allies" before Manila were not a help to our troops, did not do a thing they said they did, ran when there was a fight, were wholly untrustworthy, and were "nuisances."

## CHAPTER VIII.

### THE FIELDS OF FUNSTON'S GLORY.

The Way he Won his Star—Deception of the Enemy as to American Soldiers—The First of the Fighting—Fame of the Twentieth Kansas—Bloody Road to Mololos and Beyond—Luzon as a Hiding-place—Consul Wildman's Hard Fate—Battlefield Telegrams, Official Reports by and about Funston—His Prodigies of Valor—Lawton Wanted Him—At the First of the Fighting the American Soldiers ran at Full Speed to get into the Fight—The Sick Fled from their Beds to Avenge Insults—The Battle Feats of the Brave.

**T**HERE was an Athenian who grew weary of hearing Aristides called "the Just," was opposed to him, and would n't vote for him. This impatience may or may not have disturbed the estimable ancient, who was antagonized for his virtue. His experience has been witnessed in other countries than Greece, and in these days is not unknown in public criticism of those engaged in the business of war.

It is not forgotten, and should always be in mind, that when Aguinaldo was "in the zenith of his power," as General Otis said in reporting that which immediately preceded the insurgent assault upon the American army at Manila, the natives had confidence that the armed men they had gathered and arrayed around the lines of the American garrison of Manila—that was the true

situation—became entirely of the judgment they could safely believe in their numbers, and accepted fully the conviction that when the combat they had so long provoked and insisted upon should come, with “clash of arms,” the thoroughness of their success might be taken for granted; and they were light-hearted when the battle began.

They certainly might have been persuaded by the destruction of the Spanish fleet off Cavité and the storming of Manila, that the Americans were formidable fighting men, but they were not impressed with danger to themselves by the defeats of the Spaniards. They deceived themselves during their constant exercise in jeering at American soldiers—regulars and volunteers—insulting them with word and gesture, pointing guns at our sentinels as they walked their rounds, howling and screeching at them, working themselves into the belief that the “North Americans” were tame people, not fierce, but timid, and that they could be “run into the sea.” There is a pomp and assurance in the Filipino letters and orders of that time, making clear the remarkable inaccuracy of their diagnosis of the situation, a strange undervaluation of those they were forcing into the tremendous trials of war.

The fighting had not been going on an hour when the Filipino troops Spain had trained as soldiers, and esteemed as good military material when well officered, believed to be veterans and invincible, discovered that they had aroused enemies of an extraordinary sort, whose methods were unexampled in Spanish warfare, and a complete surprise. The proceedings of the North Americans were phenomenal, and caused indignant com-

plaints that they were not according to usage or fair. It was the Filipino experience immediately that the North Americans did not, like the Spanish Peninsulars, stand off and fire at long range a while, raising smoke and hearing the music of flying bullets, and whether any one was hit or not, calling it a battle. The American soldiers ran right into the elaborated, alleged impregnable lines of circumvalation, and rushed upon the defenders of the scientific trenches, carrying the barriers and crushing all who sought to withstand the inconceivable shock of encountering what appeared to the imaginative natives infuriated demons.

There was an additional astounding spectacle. The stragglers, so to speak, who ought to be in the rear of the American army, did not drift to the rear, but the other way. Nobody went back, but there was a procession of extraordinary nature going at high speed to the front, with an enthusiastic recklessness that was incomprehensible to all but the Americans themselves. The hospitals were deserted; the sick got upon their feet, snatched guns, and ran for the enemy. Everybody about the various headquarters, who could be spared, set out in the same way, at full speed. They never minded the weather or the way the wind blew. All who could get out of the hospitals, or away from attendance on the camps, were making haste following the supreme direction of war to "go where the guns are at play." The Tagalo boasters had to flee headlong to get out of the road, for their firing had no influence upon the fellows who were getting "forwarder" at every jump, and when the Filipinos undertook to stand in the way they were mowed down by a fire incredibly fatal, run

over, trampled, crushed, by the irrepressible charges of inferior numbers. The labored entrenchments were utterly useless. Even the thorny thickets were not an impediment. The Americans were simply going at full speed to join the dance to the music of the rifles, ferocious to be even with those they had been restrained from attacking by superior orders during the weeks when all under the American flag suffered and were disconsolate, hoping every day the hour would come that they could pay their debts of honor on the field of glory. The time had come, and the debt was paid with all accumulated interest.

This was the beginning of the American-Filipino War—an instantaneous development of a type of American soldiers who made victory certain in every combat, no matter what the odds in numbers or the advantage in position. Frederick Funston, of Kansas, a Congressman's son, was of this sort, and had a high reputation in the far West as a fighting boy, who never dodged an enemy, always was ready to tackle a ruffian, no matter what his size or how he was armed, and took to war with an inherent inspiration, to do what the boys generally did at Manila—"went for" the enemy wherever he stood or fled, no matter what he was like, "got him," and "staid with him" until he ceased to trouble and could do so no more. It was not long in the army, in the midst of heroes, until young Funston, the "fighter from away back"—though there was n't much time to count, for he had n't been in the world more than thirty years—was celebrated for prodigies of valor, for always going ahead to see what was the matter, developing a tact and ingenuity in the discovery of desperate chances,



that he took with enjoyment, and carrying all before him, until the army and the country heard of him. Where all were brave, he was, by common consent and with universal applause, awarded the surpassing honor of being "the bravest of the brave." This much had been said and settled before the lull in the war caused by the flight of Aguinaldo into the jungles of the mountains and the dispersion of his forces. There were instances here and there of offering the same objection to Funston the Hero, that the cynical Greek made for Aristides the Just. The histories of the perils and triumphs, the brave deeds and thrilling enterprise of one man, seem to some, who speedily exhaust their enthusiasm about everything, and content only with the commonplace. It was here and there that Funston's achievements and brilliancy became monotonous to the tedious. The idea was that perhaps Funston carried a charm, knew that the Filipino bullets could n't hurt him—that his feats were of magic. What did Funston do then but go and get wounded? Even that did n't keep him long from the fighting-ground, but a few days; but public interest began to shift to civil rights, the judiciary, and the school question. The Taft Commission was carrying on its work of pacification with statesmanship. This was of good promise. But there was one thing not done in the Philippines by the glorious American army. Frederick Funston brooded on it, and was not satisfied that Aguinaldo was missing. It was Bennett who said to Stanley, "Go and find Livingstone," and he did. No one told Funston to go and find Aguinaldo. The Kansas boy got the idea out of his own head. General MacArthur approved, and it was done.

The island of Luzon is larger than the State of Ohio. It contains masses of mountains, enormous jungles, many rivers, vast thickets, and an enormous growth of grasses, full of hiding-places, where even the anaconda gorges and sleeps in peace save for monkeys. There is hardly such a place for sinister secrets and ambuscades in the whole world. Aguinaldo became a mystery, more mysterious in his disappearance than when he was in evidence. It was the opinion of that accomplished observer and exceedingly well informed man, Consul Wildman, of Hong Kong, that Aguinaldo was dead. He made that announcement in an interview at Honolulu, the last stopping-place on his fatal voyage homeward, after distinguished and honorable service abroad, doomed to terminate in death when he touched the shores of his own country, where there were many waiting deeply interested in the knowledge he had accumulated, ready to concede to him the authority of uncommon intelligence in the enlightenment of the American people by the relation of his experiences, so far as might be compatible with the restraints imposed by official obligation. The exceptional story of unusual personal knowledge has been lost, and the loss is a lamentable one. In his Honolulu interview he held the opinion Aguinaldo was not living, that some one was professing to be the departed chief who was not he, and was running his dictatorship machinery. Funston found out the Tagalo Dictator still lived. There was another chance for Funston. He grasped it, and Aguinaldo is his captive. The capture is a story that will live in the songs of the people. The captivity is a chapter of history that will live for a thousand years, and be immemorial like a fable or a proverb.

The military reputation of Brigadier-General Funston was first made distinguished by his activity and intelligence, bravery and efficiency in the operations approaching and occupying Mololos, the "My Capital" of Aguinaldo when he left Bacoor, in order to organize for war against the United States, without being in the presence every day of American officers. The then Colonel Funston, of the Twentieth Kansas, was of the brigade of Brigadier-General Harrison Gray Otis. The battle of Caloocan was fought, in the language of H. G. Otis, "February 10 to March 24, 1899, inclusive." The famous Brigade was composed of the Third Artillery acting as infantry, the Twentieth Kansas (Funston's regiment), and six companies of the Tenth Pennsylvania, from West Pennsylvania. There was a brigade front of two and one-half miles, and in the forty days under fire a loss in killed and wounded of forty-nine officers and men. Funston's regiment was near the bay, and that was the hottest place on the fire-lines of the seat of war. That was for some reason nearly always the sort of place Funston with the Twentieth Kansas either found or made. The fire of the Kansas sharpshooters was very deadly to the enemy. Otis says, in passing, of a contribution of the navy:

"An escaped Spanish prisoner reported to me that a shell fired by the navy against the Filipino intrenchments near Malabon exploded, killing and wounding between forty and fifty rebel soldiers."

The forty days' fighting was followed by the movement against Mololos. The men were required to carry not less than one hundred rounds of ammunition, but the majority preferred to carry two hundred rounds.

The Twentieth Kansas, led by Funston, "under a severe fire crossed the Tuliahan River, the men wading and swimming the stream at points where the water was neck deep and even deeper," crossed the river, and crossing rivers was one of Funston's fine points, and this was done in this case in "face of a strongly occupied blockhouse on the north bank," and the Twentieth suffered considerable losses in its determined onset, but inflicted severe punishment on the enemy, driving his picked troops from the blockhouse after killing many of them on the bank of the river."

Company H, of the Kansas Twentieth, "encountered a sudden and severe fire from the enemy's intrenchments on the north bank; the men of the first line, with some men from other regiments, rushed gallantly down the steep bank into the unknown stream, wading or swimming it under a telling fire, which resulted in eight casualties in the Kansas company alone. The rush of our soldiers was so sudden and impetuous that the enemy was unable to escape."

At this spot, "oũt of the whole number of Filipinos engaged, twenty-six were killed outright, two mortally and one slightly wounded, and one appears to have gotten away."

Further along Funston struck another river—rivers are abundant in Luzon, and the rebels always intrenched beyond them. This river was the Micalo. Of course the Kansas boys crossed under fire. The next river a little further along. Here the rebels were commanded by their best military leader, Pilar, and the Twentieth Kansas lost twenty-nine men, killed and wounded. Two miles south of Mololos, the Twentieth "were ordered

forward on the double quick." That settled it. Mololos was ours! The sign was, "Smoke and flame burst from Aguinaldo's palace on the public square."

"In the Mololos campaign the Brigade in which Funston served lost one hundred and thirty-six in killed and wounded. The casualty list was two hundred and eighty-five during the service up to that time, more than ten per cent of effectives. Funston was recommended on "the merits" for "such special mark of distinction" as might please the Commanding General and the War Department. The capture of Mololos is thus reported by General H. G. Otis:

"Colonel Funston, with a small detachment of the Twentieth Kansas, had entered about 9.30 A. M. at a point nearer the railway line, which had been his right guide during the advance. He reported to me on the Public Square at about ten A. M.

"Shortly afterwards the First Brigade flag, surmounted by the national colors, were flying from an improvised staff erected in front of the burning headquarters building of a departed rebel government."

Here is a telegram that shines:

"[Telegram.]

"Bagbag Bridge, April 28, 1899.

"Major-General Lawton,—Many thanks, dear Lawton, for your cordial greetings, which are hardly justified by the actual facts. By the splendid daring of Funston, under the skillful control of General Wheaton, we made quite a remarkable passage to the Rio Grande yesterday with very small loss, but which in connection

with two previous days' work, in which they lost very heavily, so impressed the insurgents that General Luna to-day sent his chief of staff with the information that the Filipino Government had ordered a suspension of hostilities and wished to negotiate for peace. Luna's officers are now in Manila, but what has transpired since their departure from here I do not know.

"MACARTHUR."

The four business telegrams that follow tell a splendid story incomparably:

"Hdqrs. First Division, Eighth Army Corps,  
"In the Field, Baliuag, May 11, 1899.

"Assistant Adjutant-General, Palace,—I desire to call attention to the fact that I have no officers of rank except Colonel Summers. Would like active and energetic officer if available; otherwise prefer no change.

"LAWTON, Major-General Volunteers."

"Malacanan, May 11, 1899.

"General Lawton,—Would you like General Funston assigned to your command? He is available.

"BARRY."

"Hdqrs. First Division, Eighth Army Corps.  
"In the Field, Baliuag, May 12, 1899.

Adjutant-General Department Pacific,—The assignment of General Funston will please me very much.

"LAWTON, Major-General Volunteers."

"Manila, May 12, 1899.

"General Lawton,—General Funston very desirous to go, but doctor forbids, as his wound is still troublesome and might become serious on exposure in the field.

"BARRY."

Historical work in our day is helped in a degree hardly realized by the public, through the telegrams that fly about battlefields, between the various detachments and wide wings of armies, and the commanding generals and admirals and the executives of the departments of their respective Governments. The Lawton and Barry—the latter the adjutant of the commander-in-chief—telegrams are an example that is an object-lesson. MacArthur's telegram to Lawton, framing the golden words, "the splendid daring of Funston," is worth more than all the formalities of studied official compliment. Telegrams send forth flashes of fact with the magnetic sparkle of electricity itself, instinct with action, and there is no higher authority than the words the wires bear from the stricken fields farther than the echoes of the thunder's roll.

The wounding of Colonel Funston was in the advance from the vicinity of Calumpit by General Wheaton. Five miles from Calumpit the enemy were found "intrenched upon the north bank of a considerable river, deep and unfordable, and the bridge broken down," the usual thing; and the Twentieth Kansas "became engaged with a large force of the enemy occupying two lines of intrenchments." They were carried, and Wheaton says, "Colonel Funston, Twentieth Kansas, was wounded at this time."

Colonel Funston reported the operations of his regiment from April 24, 1899, northward, until May 4th—also the date of the report—when he says, “I gave up command of the regiment, being wounded.” When the advance was made he had eight hundred and seventy men. One of the combats in which his name flamed forth, was the passage of the Bagbag River. His official account of it is:

“I had advanced with Company K, and saw that the farther span of the railway bridge had been let down to the water, a distance of about twelve feet. After a furious fight of about ten minutes the enemy's fire began to slacken, and some of them were seen to be running. Second Lieutenant Collin H. Ball, with a small detachment from Company E, had just reported from a short exploring tour along the river bank, and when I called for volunteers to join me in a rush on the bridge, these men, with Sergeant-Major (now Second Lieutenant) Cassius M. Warner, Acting Chief Trumpeter Sergeant C. P. Barshfield, and First Sergeant Raymond S. Enston of Company K, responded. We found all the ties and rails gone from the bridge, with nothing remaining to walk on except a few steel stringers about four inches wide. Company K covered us well with their fire while we were working our way slowly along the dismantled bridge. The enemy fired some shots at us until we were half-way across. Reaching the broken-out span, Lieutenant Ball, Sergeants Enston and Barshfield, Corporal A. M. Ferguson, of Company E, and myself descended to the river on the ironwork of the bridge, and swam the remaining distance to the bank. The few of the enemy who had remained fled as soon as we had reached



the bank within a few yards of their trenches. The first one of our party to reach the opposite bank was Lieutenant Ball. I wish to call special attention to the signal gallantry of this officer, as well as of the above-named enlisted men, who volunteered for this extra hazardous piece of work and carried it through to a successful conclusion."

Elaborate trenches were found deserted, and two miles farther on was another river, Rio Grande Pam-panga, "one of the largest streams on Luzon Island," and there was sharp skirmishing. Colonel Funston proceeds:

"When darkness came I asked Corporal A. M. Ferguson, of Company E, who has been previously mentioned in this report, and who has on numerous occasions shown himself to be a fearless and reliable man, if he were willing to attempt a reconnoissance of the railroad bridge, telling him that the work was so hazardous that I would not order him to undertake it. He consented to go at once. Under cover of darkness, Captain Flanders, of Company I, and myself accompanied him to the end of the bridge. Ferguson took off his shoes and, armed only with a revolver, crawled along through the network of iron braces underneath where the floor had been, and then inch by inch worked his way, hand over hand, until he was underneath the insurgent outpost, stationed on the other end of the bridge, and returned with a complete description of the condition of the bridge, which was afterwards verified in every particular. He was gone two hours. A single misstep would have meant a fall of forty feet into the river, while the chances were greatly in favor of dis-

covery by the enemy, which would have meant certain death or capture. I can not too strongly recommend this gallant soldier for the medal of honor. His action was purely voluntary, and of greatest possible danger. He reported that all of the ties, rails, and planks were gone from the bridge, and at its farther end all but one of the steel girders."

It will be noted that the hero gives but little of his space to himself. One brave man loves another, and the colonel proud of the corporal gave him the highest praise.

The position involved was very important. Without it Calumpit would be untenable. The river was broad and deep, and the enemy "was protected by a most elaborate system of field fortifications, with three pieces of artillery and one rapid-fire Maxim. General Wheaton reports:

"Upon consultation with Colonel Funston a point about nine hundred yards below the railroad bridge was selected as the place that he would endeavor to cross a part of his regiment. The enemy's intrenchments opposite this point were well screened by bamboo thickets.

"Colonel Funston advanced to the river bank strong parties that kept up a fire of great volume. The effect of the heavy and continued fire was to drive part of the enemy's force from his works, and Privates Edward White and W. B. Tremby, of Company B, Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry, swam the river with a rope and fastened it to a stake on the enemy's intrenchments while yet occupied. Rafts were pulled over by means of this rope, Colonel Funston going over on the first raft.

"When Colonel Funston had crossed forty-five officers and men he attacked the enemy, turning him out of his works near the bridge. I then crossed the bridge with my staff.

"The night of the 27th the Twentieth Kansas and First Montana bivouacked in the town north of the railroad bridge. The next morning two commissioned officers came in from the rebels under a flag of truce and asked for an armistice, saying they 'wished to acknowledge the valor of the American soldier.' They were sent to the division commander.

"I respectfully invite attention to the gallant conduct of Colonel Frederick Funston, now brigadier-general, United States Volunteers, during these operations.

"The conduct of Lieutenant C. H. Ball and of Sergeants Enston and Barshfield and Corporal A. M. Ferguson, of Company E, Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry, in swimming the Bagbag with Colonel Funston under the fire of the enemy is worthy of regard and of great praise."

Of this material the great reputation as a soldier General Funston has is constructed. It is abundant. In this affair fell Colonel Stotsenberg, of the First Nebraska, leading a charge. The military advantage gained was of great value, and the commander-in-chief, MacArthur, describes the remarkable military achievement in these terms:

"The Rio Grande is a broad, deep stream, from which all boats had been carefully removed by the defending army, and which, in the absence of a pontoon bridge, was passable only at the railroad bridge. The defense

was made by something more than four thousand men in chosen and carefully-prepared positions."

General Bell reported the killing of Colonel Stotsenberg:

"He arrived on the field, and immediately took command of his regiment. As he ran up behind the line, he ordered it to commence firing, and immediately advanced against the insurgent position. On General Hale's arrival, I had joined the cavalry troop, and, observing Colonel Stotsenberg's advance, advanced the troop in unison with him. The insurgents, seeing our advance, abandoned their trenches and fled, not, however, before they had inflicted upon us, in the death of Colonel Stotsenberg, the most serious loss our army has yet suffered. In justice to his memory, I wish to pay an especial tribute to this fearless, brave, and gallant soldier, for, as soon as he arrived, he placed himself in front of his regiment, and, with hat in one hand and pistol in the other, led it against the trenches of the insurgents, routing them completely. It was solely due to this gallant act that we won the fight so promptly."

It was in such gallant acts Funston was conspicuous. The fate of comrades tells the risks. Our country is richer for the heroes of this war—the dead and the living.

## CHAPTER IX.

### THE CAPTURE OF AGUINALDO.

To Hunt Down Aguinaldo in the Jungles was a Well-matured Scheme of Funston—He had under Otis's Orders Scouted the Province where it was done—Some Silly Army Gossip Squelched—Aguinaldo Admits the Audacity of his Captor—Kansas Rises up for Anything for Funston—His Mother thought Frank's Luck would be Bad This Time—The Story of the Raid—A Wonderful Adventure—The Sharp Turns and Critical Escapes—The Future of Funston.

THE expedition under General Funston, to find Aguinaldo and take him, started March 6th on the United States gunboat *Vicksburg*, and had not been out but a few days when the news of the enterprise reached the United States and wherever the wires carry dispatches. It seemed improbable, if the story was true, that the secret should be told. General Otis—not the commander of the brigade in which Funston served early in the war, but the Commander-in-Chief succeeding Merritt—says of Funston's feat, it "proves him a great scout," and "He and his officers and men risked their lives in the hands of the natives, and their bravery as easily might have led them to death as success.

"Every army officer will rejoice over the capture of the wary insurgent, and there doubtless is a sort of a ratification meeting being conducted in Manila. The

best class of the natives will be happy at General Funston's success.

"It long had been General Funston's hope that he would be able to capture Aguinaldo. While in command in the Philippines I sent him on a scouting expedition through the territory in which he realized his hope. It is a part of the wildest country found in the islands. Funston probably was the best posted man on the nature of the country in the army. It is my understanding that he effected the capture about ninety miles inland. To reach that point Funston and his men had to march through mountains covered with undergrowth. There were no roads, and only narrow bridle-paths here and there. When the nature of the country is taken into consideration the capture is the more remarkable."

The statement of General Otis that the idea of finding and seizing Aguinaldo had been long in the mind of the man who did it is most interesting, and in that connection that he "scouted" in the Province of Isabella, assists to make the strong story come out more like a matter of business, and yet it does not spoil, but rather enhances interest, and increases the sense of public indebtedness to the hero. There were for a time a few officers in Washington who held that the feat of Funston was a fake, and they put the case in this way:

"Aguinaldo must have connived at his own capture on the theory that he was impressed with General MacArthur's proclamation giving April 1st as the date when the rebels should lay down their arms. It was suggested that Aguinaldo, with characteristic shrewdness, had governed his own surrender by the imposing fiction of a

Funston capture. It was difficult for some of the regulars here to understand how General Funston and a small band could penetrate to Aguinaldo's secret tent and carry out a hazardous ruse."

This is a sort of "senile gossip" that is not to be seriously considered. There is no more to sustain the suggestion that Aguinaldo and Funston played a part theatrically concocted between them, than the Agoncillo assumption that a false Aguinaldo is a guest in the Spanish palace of the governor-general at Manila. Aguinaldo has compliments for Funston, and often praises the skill and audacity of the General in effecting his capture, saying that only by stratagem could he have been taken. The gratuitous assumption of a ridiculous conspiracy—a bargain-and-sale trick—was crushed by the handsome terms in which General MacArthur gave the full credit to Funston.

Mr. and Mrs. Funston, father and mother of the hero, live in a small frame house five miles from a telegraph wire, the post-office being Iola, Kansas. A newspaper correspondent found the father husking corn in a field of shocks, and gave him the news. The old man said, "Well, that is certainly gratifying." The details read, he said:

"I was afraid when he started out that he might be the dupe of the treacherous natives. At first I doubted the truth of the story, but the more I thought of it the more credence I gave it. This is the first time I ever saw his mother worry." Then he concluded it was the "biggest thing in the century so far."

The mother was at home and joyous, looked long at

the newspaper headlines and pictures, and said with dim eyes:

"I never lost faith in Fred's lucky star before, but I had a feeling he was risking life and everything on a high stake, and that the end would be disastrous. I was afraid those scouts would turn traitors to him, instead of remaining traitors to Aguinaldo."

All Kansas took a deep interest in the hero of the State, unfurled flags, and talked of festivals and of offices for "Fred," and took it for granted that he could have anything the State could give—Governor, Senator, any honor. All was his for saying it, and later came the President's compliments in congratulations, and the appointment to be brigadier-general in the regular army.

There were no fuss and feathers, frills and ribbons, about the plans or performance of the scouting and the seizure of Aguinaldo. It was a plain, severe life-and-death business from first to last. General Funston's account must forever be the highest authority. It was conversationally made and cabled at something over five dollars a word, because Congress is very economical as to using the people's money to complete our conquest of the Pacific Ocean, in which we have a greater interest than any other nation.

General Funston being small, weight one hundred and fifteen pounds, is called the "Little Man of War." On January 24th, a detachment of his troops captured at Punta Bangan, Province of Nueva Ecija, a confidential messenger from Aguinaldo's headquarters at Palanan, Isabella Province, who was carrying letters to the various insurgent chiefs asking them to send rein-





MAP SHOWING LOCATION OF PALANAN,  
WHERE AGUINALDO WAS CAPTURED.



MAP OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.



forcements. These letters were dated January 11th, 12th, and 14th.

On February 8th one of Aguinaldo's staff officers surrendered to Lieutenant Taylor, of the Twenty-fourth Infantry. This officer had in his possession valuable correspondence which told of Aguinaldo's whereabouts and of the strength of the force with him. One of the letters was addressed to Baldomero Aguinaldo, ordering him to take command of the insurgents in Central Luzon, and to send four hundred riflemen to Aguinaldo's headquarters.

This man is said to be a cousin of Emilio, and whether he is or not, he is treated as "one of the family," and was treasurer of the Hong Kong club of Filipinos, that organized itself into the "Government," of which Emilio was elected President. The Filipino colony in Paris play that they are part of a great nation, and they do not admit the Americans have caught the President Aguinaldo, but think it may be Baldomero. However, all their pretenses are false and fraudulent. The possibility of the success of the expedition rested upon the captured correspondence. Among "captured documents" in possession of Funston was the baggage of the Filipino General Lacuna, including many official papers, a quantity of correspondence, and Lacuna's private seal. It was the "seal" that did it. The Filipinos revere seals, and Aguinaldo saw the stamp, and was sure Funston's letters, prepared to deceive—to the horror of mugwumps and some English editors—and they had the desired effect. Aguinaldo could not hide himself securely without cutting off very largely his own sources of information. He could not have a

telegraph wire, and so the world was far off. There was no foundation for the fear that the publication of Funston's scheme, while he was in the woods on the way to the retreat of his victim, would reach the "Capital" deep in the mountain forest. The "President" sending out orders did not know the papers of General Lacuna were in American hands, or of the surrender of a general he regarded as next to himself in importance. It was the seclusion for personal safety of the pretender to the Presidency that caused his capture. The system of hiding himself was at last his undoing. General Funston prepared the letters, used the seal, engaged seventy-eight Maccabebes, twenty wearing insurgent uniforms, the others the garb of laborers. They were armed with fifty Mausers, eighteen Remingtons, and ten Krag Jorgenssens. It would n't do to find too many American guns in rebel recruits. The Maccabebes were commanded by Captain Russell T. Hazzard, of the Eleventh United States Volunteer Cavalry. With him was his brother, Lieutenant Oliver P. M. Hazzard, of the same regiment. Captain Harry W. Newton, Thirty-fourth Infantry, was taken because of his familiarity with Casiguran Bay, and Lieutenant Burton J. Mitchell, Fortieth Infantry, went as General Funston's aide. These were the only Americans accompanying the expedition.

With the Maccabebes were four ex-insurgent officers, one being a Spaniard and the other three Tagalos, whom General Funston trusted implicitly.

The officers wore plain blue suits and Khaaka blouses. Each carried half a blanket. Funston was supposed to be a prisoner taken by insurgents. March 14th, the gunboat ran at night into a cove suitable, as

it was a lonesome place. This was twenty-five miles south of Casiguran, Province of Principe. The landing was a success; the boat disappeared. There were no lights, little noise. The boat put to sea. The expedition took to the woods. An ex-colonel of insurgents was alleged to be the commander. His name, Hilario Placido. The first village was Casiguran, and the troops announced they were on the way to join Aguinaldo, and had encountered an American surveying party and captured some of them. The strategy was fine drawn, and might snap at any time, but the greatest hardship was the march to the interior, where the captured correspondence showed the object of the expedition to be located. There were but five Americans in the party, and these presumed to be the survivors of the surveyors—a shrewd idea, for it was reasonable the Americans, believing in peace, should make surveys. The concocted letters were forwarded to Aguinaldo from Casiguran. The objective point of the excursion was Palanan, Province of Isabella. March 17th the party started on their ninety-mile march, with scanty rations of cracked corn. The road was rough, rivers swift, precipices abounded. March 22d the party was within eight miles of its destination, and the men so weak Funston sent to Aguinaldo for supplies, and the response was serviceable.

American prisoners were treated kindly, but not allowed to enter the town. On the morning of March 23d the advance was resumed. The column was met by the staff officers of Aguinaldo and a detachment of Aguinaldo's body-guard, which was ordered to take charge of the Americans. While one of the ex-insurgent

officers conversed with Aguinaldo's aide, another, a Spaniard, sent a courier to warn General Funston and the rest, who, with eleven Maccabebes, were an hour behind. Having received this warning, General Funston avoided Aguinaldo's detachment and joined the column, preventing observation. The Tagalos went ahead to greet Aguinaldo, and the column slowly followed, finally arriving at Palanan.

This was the critical place. If the detachment of Aguinaldo's guards had not been eluded, the killing or capture of Funston would have been imminent. Though the Maccabebes might have won a fight, it would have been at the expense of the escape of Aguinaldo, and then there would have been extreme danger of the destruction or capture of the whole party on the return trip.

General Aguinaldo's household troops, fifty men in neat uniforms of blue and white and wearing straw hats, lined up to receive the newcomers. General Funston's men crossed the river in small boats, formed on the bank, and marched to the right and then in front of the insurgent grenadiers. The Tagalogs entered the house where General Aguinaldo was.

Suddenly the Spanish officer, noticing that General Aguinaldo's aide was watching the Americans suspiciously, exclaimed, "Now, Maccabebes, go for them!" The Maccabebes opened fire, but their aim was rather ineffective, and only three insurgents were killed. The rebels returned the fire.

On hearing the firing, General Aguinaldo, who evidently thought his men were merely celebrating the ar-

rival of reinforcements, ran to the window and shouted: "Stop that foolishness! Quit wasting ammunition!"

Hilario Placido, one of the Tagalog officers and a former insurgent major, who was wounded in the lung by the fire of the Kansas regiment at the battle of Caloocan, threw his arms around General Aguinaldo, exclaiming, "You are a prisoner of the Americans!"

Colonel Simeon Villia, the rebel chief of staff, Major Alambra, and others attacked the men who were holding General Aguinaldo. Hilario Placido shot Colonel Villia in the shoulder. Major Alambra jumped out of the window and attempted to cross the river. It is supposed that he was drowned. Five other insurgent officers fought for a few minutes and then fled, making their escape.

When the firing began General Funston assumed command and directed the attack on the house, personally assisting in the capture of General Aguinaldo. The insurgent body-guard fled, leaving twenty rifles.

Santiago Barcelona, the insurgent treasurer, surrendered without resistance.

When captured, General Aguinaldo was tremendously excited, but he calmed under General Funston's assurance that he would be well treated. General Funston obtained all of the rebel leader's correspondence, showing that he had kept in close touch with the sub-chiefs of the insurrection in various parts of the Archipelago.

Aguinaldo had been living at Palanan for seven months, undisturbed, except when a detachment of the Sixteenth Infantry visited the town. On that occasion

the entire population took to the mountains, and remained there until the troops retired.

General Aguinaldo admitted that he had almost been captured before; but he asserted that he had never been wounded, adding: "I should never have been taken except by a stratagem. I was completely deceived by General Lacuna's forged signature." He feared he might be sent to Guam, and he was quite glad to come to Manila.

Palanan was guarded by numerous outposts and signal stations. During the fight none of the Maccabebes was wounded.

The expedition rested March 24th, and then marched sixteen miles the following day to Palanan Bay, where General Funston found the *Vicksburg*, which brought him to Manila. Commander Barry, of the *Vicksburg*, rendered General Funston splendid assistance.

General Aguinaldo, who talked freely of past events, said he supposed General Trias would proclaim himself Dictator, evidently not knowing that General Trias had surrendered. He behaved courteously, and gave no trouble.

General Funston says Aguinaldo is above the average in intelligence and has prepossessing manners.

General Aguinaldo was brought ashore and taken before General MacArthur at the Malacanang Palace. He talked freely, but seemed ignorant concerning the situation. He was in good health and cheerful. He lunched with the officers of General MacArthur's staff, and was then escorted to the apartments specially arranged.

The parents of General Funston were justified in



their apprehension for the safety of their son, when the news was given out, or at least scattered about, that he was off on a volunteer expedition to make a prisoner of the rebel leader in Luzon, and there were those who sincerely felt Funston was foolhardy, and had made his work extra hazardous by going "with a brass band" to catch a weasel asleep. If there was any misgiving after the event, it was dissipated by the dispatch of General MacArthur, concluding: "The transaction was brilliant in conception and faultless in execution. All credit must go to Funston."

MacArthur added: "His reward should be signal and immediate. With General Wheaton, I recommended General Funston's retention in the volunteers until he can be appointed brigadier-general of regulars." It was Funston who not only organized the raid from start to finish, but who had originated the idea. A dispatch from Kansas City says:

"General Funston, while colonel of the Twentieth Kansas Regiment, in February, 1899, submitted his first plan to capture Aguinaldo to General MacArthur, who rejected it because of a lack of soldiers."

Representative Curtis, of Kansas, said, referring to the question of appointing Funston a regular brigadier-general, just before that was done, remarked:

"There is one feature about Funston's career that is not generally known, and that reflects great credit on him. He has never asked the aid of the politicians of his State for anything. After he had distinguished himself in the Philippines he did not ask either the senators or representatives from Kansas to urge a reward for his work."

General Charles King says, referring to the Twentieth Kansas Infantry:

“With splendid material, the regiment lacked discipline. Funston gave it, and later, from the day he took the field in the Philippines, he became a noted man. The Nation knows his exploits. In this capture of Aguinaldo he has simply climaxed his career.”

The importance of the appointment of General Funston to be brigadier-general is accented by reason of his youth, which, according to the course of nature, gives him chances to become senior major-general, and in line for the lieutenant-generalcy.

## CHAPTER X.

### THE HERO AND HIS CAPTIVE.

The Maccabebes, the Native Assistance of Funston—  
Native Cruelty to Natives—Collateral Circumstances of the Capture of Aguinaldo—Mystery of the Orient—Whole Truth Wanted.

THE circumstances of the capture of Aguinaldo will have a wholesome educational influence upon the Filipinos as well as the American people. We have been slow in understanding the peculiarities of Malay character, and the Asiatic ideas of the *finesse* of diplomacy, the limitations of patriotism; and the error that lurks in the habit of our countrymen using the word "people" as synonymous with "inhabitants."

It will be easy to give undue importance to the participation of the Filipinos in the expedition that entrapped the Tagalo chief in his own remote and secluded retreat. The natives who played the part of double treachery, and were the efficient allies of the gallant soldier and brilliant adventurer, Frederick Funston, are the Maccabebes, deadly enemies of the Tagalos, but are a numerous tribe. They are distinguished by habitual ferocity. The difficulty in employing them as soldiers, scouts, or police, is that they are prone to savagery, rejoice to slaughter their foes, and relentlessly hostile to people of their own color with whom they have difficulties. They are an implacable lot. As

police they are not satisfied to arrest persons under suspicion, but are urgent to torture them and force confession. They have the grand old Spanish ideas unmodified. They have two methods of procuring testimony that they think reliable. One, the Chinese clubbing with bamboo poles—a ceremony remarkable for the gymnastics of the executioner and the outcry of the victims. The other producer of satisfactory evidence is the “water cure.” When it is applied, the person is placed on his back, and the spout of a funnel inserted in his mouth. Water is poured in according to the elasticity and obstinacy of the alleged culprit; and, after liberal supplies are used, there is abundant evidence of the expansiveness of human beings under hydrostatic pressure, and the culprit will admit or assert anything to stop the treatment. The American authorities have not approved these methods of the Maccabebes, and are, therefore, not themselves in the highest favor with the administrators of preliminary forms of justice in the Philippines.

After the success of the American army in extending its lines, there seemed to be a long waiting time until the people of the United States took a vote that expressed their Filipino policy. The question was whether the Administration of President McKinley should be approved and continued. The military power of the United States had been asserted and established with greater expanse and thoroughness than had been seriously attempted by the Spaniards at any time in their three centuries of partial occupation, and the result of the election in 1900 promised no change in the Philippines, except that which would be ascribed to

gain in confidence, in certainty, and the promises that assurance and ability and certainty gave to the adoption of liberal measures. The Taft Commission made rapid and steady progress in the establishment of civil government, and were warranted in assuring to all friends of America, protection immediately and for all time.

There was no spot in the Archipelago that the Aguinaldo group of warriors could fix themselves and be safe for even a few weeks from American assaults, unless the forces of insurgents were small enough to hide, and while all was going well in civil affairs, and the sufficient strength of the army was provided by Congress to uphold the faith and honor of the army and the glory of the flag, the news came that Aguinaldo was a prisoner in Manila, and the credit for his capture was divided between the army and navy—the Americans and the Filipinos. The war was already over, except in strife to keep up appearances. This was for some time before the capture of the chieftain. It was the circulation of letters prepared by him, commanding the consultation of scattered bands, and threatening submission to the Americans with barbarous vengeance, that the Talago leader and fugitive pointed out his hidden headquarters. There were found volunteers for the expedition that closed with a stroke of strategy and skill surpassing anything that transpired on the American continent in wars between the white and the red man. The world is not only indebted to General Funston for chapters of history that will never fade, but for a zeal and heroism that will live in romance, and a story of adventure that

enriches literature. The excellence of the marvelous achievement is increased immeasurably because it is in behalf of a cause without a blemish, and has removed from his last refuge a man who was never faithful to Filipino, American, or Spaniard, save as he believed he was serving his own purpose; and he had no claim to the fame that is due the fighters for freedom in any land. His government, that he exploited with endless writing and tedious iteration, that it was his very own, that it was his and that he made it, and would dissolve or change it as he pleased, and yet that it was free, had no warrant or sanction of the people, for it was a tissue of tyrannies, an extension and elongation, simply, of the Hong Kong Junta. The American people owe it to themselves to know the whole truth about the strange stories of Aguinaldo and his Oriental mysteries. He is a man who cultivated superstition as a support of despotism, and made selfishly the sacrifices of the blood of brave men. We will know he has repented when he has done works meet for repentance.

## CHAPTER XI.

### OUR FEROCIOUS FILIPINO FRIENDS.

Funston's Guard—The Hereditary Foes of the Tagalos—Their Savage Character—They are Faithful to Spain and to Us—They Pursued Aguinaldo more than Once—The Lamented Lawton's Good Opinion of Them.

THE effective force of the expedition of General Funston for the capture of Aguinaldo was composed of Maccabebes, who, in spite of the Tagalos and affiliated insurgents, have been from the first friends of the United States. Of these tribesmen our officers constantly speak in terms of high consideration. They were first friends of Spain, and the hereditary enemies of the Tagalos, whom they were anxious to fight. After our troops had taken Mololos, it was obvious that a considerable portion of the surrounding country was full of robbers—independent bands hidden in the dense nipa—and General MacArthur thought well of using the Maccabebes against the criminals, who were in no sense warriors. Two companies were raised of one hundred and twenty-eight men each, and in order to test their efficacy they were directed by competent officers to clear out the thieves, and the native soldiers were supplied with small boats. General Otis had for some time to permit such organizations; but the result was they were very efficient as guides, scouts, and detectives, and in going through

Northern Luzon, pursuing armed insurgents, they kept pace with cavalry. The Commander-in-Chief says of them that they were "greatly feared by the inhabitants of all sections of country through which they advanced. Many of them had been Spanish soldiers, and were acquainted only with Spanish methods of dealing with rebellious subjects, or with natives from whom they wished to extract information, and those methods were in most instances attended with inexcusable harshness. Later, when a detachment of sixty were employed as scouts in the extreme south of Luzon, particularly in the province of Tayabas, it was found expedient to withdraw them and send them back to their homes in the city of Maccabebe, that the fleeing inhabitants, who feared them but had the utmost confidence in the humanity of the American troops, might be persuaded to leave their concealments in the hills and mountains and return to their towns." They needed constant watching, as their conduct would be excessively vindictive.

The Maccabebe question has been a superheated one in Luzon, and this telegram from General Funston shows the feeling aroused:

"San Isidro, March 27, 1900.

"Adjutant-General Second Division:

"Last night three men of the company of Maccabebes, now with Major Wheeler, who have been in the hospital of San Isidro and had been discharged from the hospital a few days ago, but had not been able to join their company, were kidnaped on the street of San Isidro by about twenty men and taken to Gapan, where they were kept over night in a house, and early this



morning, with their arms tied behind them, were started toward the mountains. By chance they ran into the detachment that Captain Koehler and I were bringing in. One of the Maccabebes escaped, ran to us, and hastily explained matters, whereupon we pursued the band and killed three of them. A further search, and some of our men came upon two of them engaged in bolioing the other two Maccabebes. They were caught in the act, made no defense, and we took them up into the barrio, within two hundred yards of the scene of their crime, and within ten minutes thereafter publicly hanged them. We then went with the three men to the house in Gapan where they had been kept over night. As we approached the house three men attempted to escape. One of them, whom the Maccabebes recognized as one of the leaders of the kidnapers, was instantly killed. Another swam the river, but was shot on the other bank; the third, dashing into a crowd of women and children, escaped. We burned the house. The two Maccabebes were badly carved up, but will recover.

“FUNSTON.”

It will be remembered that Funston was justified in his confidence in the Maccabebes, who were his body-guard when he sought Aguinaldo.

General Lawton telegraphed November 10, 1899, from Caranatuan:

“One company Maccabebes scouted country in direction of Lupao this morning. They returned at noon, bringing in personal and official papers of General Lanera, whose son we held here as prisoner. Batson, believing Lanera with some force to be in the moun-

tains near here, started out with one company about three o'clock. A messenger from him has just arrived with note as follows: 'Four A. M.—On trail of General Lanera; within two hours of him; will follow. Before four A. M. our people were fired upon by a few Mausers far up in the mountains, about the time they found Lanera's baggage hidden in the woods. They were unable to see an enemy. With the baggage were taken one Winchester with plenty of ammunition and one shotgun,' a courier with a dispatch from 'Tarlac addressed 'Officer in charge of telegraph station at Pantabangan,' with copies of most urgent telegrams via Rosales, San Quentin, Bunion, and at top of envelope 'Via Baninathas;' also dispatches containing important information. All are inclosed herewith.

"I gather from these dispatches that Aguinaldo was in Tarlac yesterday; that all important prisoners of ours held by the enemy are in Aparri or near there; that a telegraph line is ordered constructed from Bambang, province of Nueva Vizcaya, near Bayonbong, on the Rio Grande de Cagayan, over the mountains to Tayug, via Cayapa. The Cayapa referred to is a little town in the mountains over the divide, northeast of Tayug. It is not known on any map that I have, but the postmaster here pointed out the location, and said letters had come from that place. He insisted that it was not the Cuyapo near Tarlac. I consider these dispatches very important as showing Aguinaldo's intentions."

November 12th, Lawton from Talavera to Staff. He had just received news at San Jose of the chase after Aguinaldo:



SUPPLY TRAIN FORDING PARAO RIVER, NEAR BAMBAN.



GENERAL MACARTHUR'S PRIVATE CAR.



“Headquarters Fourth Cavalry,  
“Carranglan, November 11th.

“To Adjutant-General Cavalry Brigade, First Division:

“I have the honor to report that at half-past ten o'clock this morning I intercepted and captured 172 bolo men of the insurgent army. These men are part of a force of 400 that left Nueva Vizcaya on Monday, 6th inst., under orders from Aguinaldo to proceed to this place and act as escort for Colonel Emer, private secretary to Aguinaldo, and now here in custody, and turn over all the property pertaining to the insurgent army and government that escaped capture by the Fourth Cavalry at Talavera. Aguinaldo's orders were addressed to General Canon, who is the officer evidently in command of the insurgent forces in the province of Nueva Vizcaya. On the arrival of the 400 men at Rosario, 228 of their number remained there to procure supplies and rest. Major Coleman, with the property in his charge, was to have been escorted from this place to Nueva Vizcaya. The prisoners captured were without firearms, and carried one day's rations of rice.”

General Young telegraphed Lawton, November 18, 1899, and Lawton remarks:

“He has the Maccabebes and fifty picked men of Chase's troop and thirty picked men of Captain Johnson's troop, Third Cavalry, under Chase. On receipt of Young's note I dispatched Major Swigert with available men of two troops Third Cavalry and Lieutenant-Colonel Parker to Agoó by road, to cut off Aguinaldo if possible and to co-operate with Young. Young seems

very sanguine. He will at least make Aguinaldo very unhappy. It is my opinion that Aguinaldo should be followed every moment from this time. He should not be permitted to establish himself at any point or again organize a government or an army. Wherever he can go an American soldier can follow, and there are many who are anxious to undertake the service.

"In this connection I can not forget the Maccabebes, who have distinguished themselves from the moment of their employment, and are now our main reliance and support. They have been well-behaved, loyal; and active, notwithstanding that they have been maligned and are falsely accused by the insurgents, who, I am satisfied, have themselves committed outrages, representing themselves to be Maccabebes. After leaving Young at eleven A. M. yesterday, I rode through to San Jacinto, where I expected to meet and confer with Wheaton, but found he had come back to this place. I rode through, arriving at this place about dark, having been in the saddle about eighteen hours."

On November 21st the following communication was received from General Lawton, by boat from Dagupan:

"Headquarters First Division, Eighth Army Corps,  
"(In the Field) San Fabian, November 19, 1899.

"Chief of Staff, Manila:

"I was enabled to leave the point where I was water-bound the night of the 17th, and proceeded at once in quest of General Young. I overtook him at Pozorrubio at ten A. M., the 18th, just ready to leave on trail of Aguinaldo. He seemed to be satisfied that he was on

the right trail, and that Aguinaldo had actually passed out in the direction indicated. I inclose a copy of statement made by a prominent citizen of the place, the truth of which I have no reason to doubt. I greatly regret that the insurgents were not 'shut up in the railroad country' by the troops 'at the north,' as I was assured they would 'probably' be, in General Otis's communication of the 2d instant, or that they did not hold the points occupied by them, from which they were almost immediately withdrawn. Hearing nothing, however, from the column in the north, General Young without hesitation pushed rapidly across the Agno River, and occupied the country to or near the coast; not in time, however, to make the necessary dispositions to intercept Aguinaldo, who passed out via Urdaneta, Manaoag, and Pozorrubio, with Young in hot pursuit and fighting with his rear guard. Aguinaldo will probably strike the main coast road at Agoó, where the trail on which he now is comes into said road."

"Bautista, December 6, 1899.

"General Schwan, Chief of Staff, Manila :

"Colonel Bell reports something like circumstantial hearsay evidence to the effect that Aguinaldo's wife, accompanied by Zizialcita, an adjutant, passed through Mangatarem some time since, en route to Orani, with a view to escape therefrom to Cavité or Batangas provinces, or possibly to Hong Kong; that they were supplied with valuable jewelry and twenty thousand dollars in gold. The same people expressed belief that Aguinaldo, in disguise, has gone the same way with a view

to reaching the same destination. The movement of my column in Bataan and Zambales may expedite flight of fugitives if, by chance, they are moving as reported, in which light possibility of intercepting them is suggested if they should attempt embarkation on coast of Bataan.

LAWTON."



## CHAPTER XII.

### THE THEODORO SANDICO POLICY.

The Intrigues and Theories of the Filipino Hong Kong Junta before the War—Prearranged Scheme to Play an Iago Part—The Terms on which Aguinaldo would have been Our Ally—Suggestion of Percentages in Business Matters, and the Logic of it as Applied to the Offer of Two Provinces and the Customs Duties of Manila for Recognition by the United States of the Hong Kong Junta as the Philippine Republic—Letter by Aguinaldo to Sandico, written in Tagalog, Confessing he hardly Understands Spanish—The Letter seems to make Certain that the Dictator only well Understands the Language of his Own Tribe.

**I**T is of much consequence to examine all sources of authentic information, in measuring up the quality of civilization that the most enlightened of the Philippine leaders possess. They have—from Aguinaldo to the subalterns, so far as we know them, in all branches of insurrectionary service against ourselves, as well as in their conflicts with the Spaniards—had a great deal to say of all the fine things that they have heard of, held in favor by the people of the Americas and of Europe. They pose as humanitarians, profess sympathy with the downtrodden, assume that they are civilized creatures and merciful even in combat. They claimed our good offices at the beginning of our association with them,

when it was not questioned that they were antagonists of Spaniards; that they conducted warfare upon rather Christian and philanthropic principles. Aguinaldo repeatedly promised all our consuls he met that there should be no barbarism on the part of the natives allowed to discredit their struggle for liberty. So far as proclamations went, he kept his word, except in his denunciations of all Filipinos who held any communication whatever with Spaniards. Such offenders were to be executed at once, and their corpses were made conspicuous, bearing the label "traitor." It is now evident that the object of Aguinaldo in prescribing such terrible penalties for talking with Spaniards, meant simply he wanted a monopoly of intercourse between the Spanish and those he was pleased to call "my beloved people." He had the same cautiousness in this respect that he had when compelled by his fellow-committeemen, who called themselves a Republic at Hong Kong, not to go to Cavité without a contract with Admiral Dewey. Then he made it a condition that no one should go with him he did n't want, and that no one should be permitted to refuse to go that he did want. He was playing a double game then. The official minutes of the proceedings of the Hong Kong Committee, who had converted their Club into a "Government," examined in connection with circumstances throwing sidelights established that the celebrated journey of Aguinaldo to Singapore was a private enterprise on his part to open negotiations with the Spaniards. Undoubtedly he prepared the way for overtures from himself to the new Captain-General Augustin. The old Captain-General, Rivera, the one with whom he had made the treaty—

or rather Paterno negotiated it, and he approved it and carried off the cash—had promised in the so-called “protocol” to remain in the island and see that the additional money was paid and execute the Spanish reforms that were promised, but Rivera never meant anything by the stipulated reformation, and Aguinaldo never expected anything. Each knew the other was a cheat, and strove to outwit his fellow “pacificator.” Rivera took flight to Spain—knew all the time he was going, made of the treaty his own last scheme for getting money for himself and associates, and then sneered at the Filipinos from Madrid.

Aguinaldo seems to have been at a tolerably early date aware that the strained relations between the United States and Spain would culminate in war. What he desired and worked for with intensity, was to take all the chances between the two to gain an advantage for himself and those who were about him, and had already gone through the motions and the forms of organizing a “Government” that they desired above all things should be “recognized” as one of “the nations of the earth” by one of the “great Powers.” He was moving in that direction—on that line of policy—November 3, 1897, when he sent Agoncillo from his quarters in Hong Kong to those of the American consul, Wildman, to propose a contract for guns to be immediately attended to, and also at the same time to offer the United States two Filipino provinces and the revenues of Manila, about two million dollars a year, to obtain the recognition of their self-ordained and appointed Junta as the Republic of the Philippines. The two provinces, undoubtedly, were Manila and Cavité, much the most im-

portant in the island, very populous and of commanding situation. It naturally seemed to this new Government, that (according to their official minutes) was composed of sixteen persons, the provinces would be a great temptation to a country with a reputation for acquisitiveness of territory like the United States. Aguinaldo was in the position of the devil on the mountain. He could give away the two provinces, just the same as the devil could give away the whole world, and the consideration of this audacious and most impudent presumption gives the key to Aguinaldo's character in the first attempted transaction reported officially with the United States. He had concealed himself in the matter, and put forward Agoncillo, having "empowered him with power" (a phrase that Agoncillo applied to himself) to make treaties. Much has been said of the vast and varied knowledge of Aguinaldo of the Constitution and Administration of the American Government; but he do n't seem to have known enough to know that the American consuls were not one and all empowered to make treaties, and to ratify them for the Government, which they represented, and he implied that he thought they might as well make money in it, and he, doubtless, expected to get an ample share of the cash that the United States would have in hand, in case they accepted and occupied and possessed the two provinces he graciously tendered.

His Spanish education taught him there would be millions to divide, and he associated this very large transaction with his initiative looking to a gun contract. It is n't quite clear what he meant about those guns, but he wanted a contract for guns. Perhaps the basic

proposition in his mind was that a gun contract might be made to include all the money he and his associates got from the Spaniards when they sold their guns to make peace. If they were to have an army, of course they needed guns, and wanted them landed at a "spot in Luzon." It would have been quite easy, if the Americans had not been liberal when the allotment of surplus money was made, to have sold the guns to the Spaniards; that is, to have sold the secret of the location where they were, and allowed the Spaniards the pleasure of picking them up. But the characteristic feature in the proposal for the gun contract was the offer of twenty-five or thirty per cent of the money. The phrase used was, that the United States was to get this money. It really was an offer deeply disguised to bribe the American consul, who dutifully at once wrote the whole truth about it to the Government. Inside of this was the subtle suggestion that if the bargain was consummated all round, Mr. Wildman kindly making and signing the treaty for the United States, and Agoncillo doing the same thing for the Republic of the Philippines, and the United States recognized the Hong Kong Club as a Republican form of Government, Aguinaldo, Agoncillo and Company, would in equity and through common sympathy reasonably claim and secure twenty-five or thirty per cent of the value of the two provinces, and unto them would be annexed the other provinces, and Aguinaldo would be the Viceroy of the Great Northern Republic and live in the Captain-General's Palace.

With such inducements, of course, he would betray the Spaniards, no matter what negotiations he might

have had with them; no particular concern about whatever oaths he had taken. With a treaty amounting to this, no doubt Aguinaldo would have gone with all his energy as an ally of the United States, and he and Uncle Sam would have shared and shared alike the Spanish spoil. It is to be remarked that when the self-appointed President of the Philippines, duly confirmed in his High Office by the sixteen members of the Club, who were converted by a resolution of their own into the Cabinet and military officers and Great Dignitaries, Potentates and Plenipotentiaries of the Government, which was of themselves and for themselves—when this Supreme Official started to Singapore, he had heard from the American consul, who had heard from Washington in response to the flattering propositions that had been made for the alliance and strict co-operation of the two Governments, the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of the United States, and that the latter contemptuously declined the great gun contract and the two provinces, and ruthlessly rejected the whole magnificent scheme to combine two Republics, to crush out Spain and take charge of Oriental affairs and divide the profitableness.

We, the people of the United States, were not enabled at first, or indeed until the official dispatches were published and the documents captured by our soldiers at the various Aguinaldo Capitals, to point out just the point at which Aguinaldo made up his mind that his first choice of a partner in the war-dance that was coming off was not the United States, but his old friend, Spain. Aguinaldo, therefore, set off to Singapore, and entered into "negotiations" there, as he pretended,

through the American Consul, with Admiral Dewey, but actually through the British renegade Bray, with the Spaniards. We see in the minutes of the Hong Kong meetings precisely how this scheme worked upon the Dictatorial mind, why he went to Singapore, why he asserted he negotiated with Dewey—why, when he got back to Hong Kong, and found that the American fleet had annihilated that of Spain, he felt that all his plans had gone awry, and was compelled by this change in affairs, which he had evidently not anticipated or dreamed, to change his program of Imperial conduct, as the President of a Hong Kong Club, into a profession of intense friendship and admiration for and devotion to the Americans. The Hong Kong minutes, duly recorded in what the New Republic officials termed their "Book of Acts," display this state of facts as in an illumination. There is n't a point in the narrative now that is in doubt. The case is a transparency lit up.

The first move of Aguinaldo was an effort to get what he called a "contract" with Dewey. This was a considerable descent from the lofty altitude on which he attitudinized when he proposed to chuck up two provinces in a treaty to be made offhand and forever between his man and the American consul. He was beginning to get down to the facts, but he does not seem to have immediately ascertained where the functions of American officers—naval, military, and civil—ended in representing the Government of the United States, in making treaties that our Constitution styles the "supreme law of the land." He may not mean to falsify, or did not, but he did falsify when he said Admiral Dewey had promised him to help him acquire the

possession, the authority, the ruling influence, the dictatorship, of an Independent Philippine Government. The admiral has repeatedly denounced this fabrication with a good deal of animation. He did it in his dispatches, did it in his conversation. He was early to inform the Government that he had not the confidence of Aguinaldo, and declined to co-operate with him for the capture of Manila until the American soldiers came.

Right here Aguinaldo parted with the Admiral in anger, doubtless, but did not display that. He was smooth and suave and cunning in certain phases of politeness, but a mortal enemy, notwithstanding his smiles. Possibly there was a phase of this intercourse not understood by the Admiral. Aguinaldo seemed to think that if Wildman allowed him to sit two hours in his office, and be very much in the way, and was given an occasional cigar, and told good morning and little things like that, that it was an official recognition by the United States Government, and the President of the Filipino Club, which had resolved that it was a sovereign Republic, and, therefore, Aguinaldo was at perfect liberty to change the form of it, has only asserted his good faith in accepting the salutations of the American admiral as a treaty of recognition of his *E Pluribus Unum* impersonation, nine millions of Filipinos in one man, and according to his habit issued proclamations to that effect.

It is a matter of concern, gravely so, to the people of the United States to be able to analyze, with scientific certainties, the composition of General Aguinaldo—the ingredients of his construction. Much depends



upon his faith, and perhaps upon his interpretation of his oaths—his sense of personal and official obligation. It is well to follow closely, and observe studiously, his facile manners and methods of contradicting himself, of teaching the arts of conspiracy to his followers, giving them specific and artful instructions how to become traitors and carry on a game of treason; of his repeated proclamations commending falsehood and lawlessness, and prescribing secret murderous assaults, ordering the widespread devastation of property by fire, and more than all, notwithstanding his frequent voluble expressions of anxieties to be merciful and esteemed as an enlightened, civilized being, how shall we be sure that it means anything when he makes profession of a change of policy and sentiment, even a passion for peace? It is n't the first time he has done that sort of thing. Can he be trusted now? If he had command of the resources of a few provinces in the Philippines, and was permitted to hold an official relation to the people and to the Government of the United States, what dependence could be placed upon his word of honor—if you please, his oath? The most fearful oaths are rather frivolously considered in the Philippines. That is marked in their many secret and desperate societies that did not all grow out of religious prejudice, or a care for self-defense. The torch and the dagger are their insignia.

One of the most instructive associations that Aguinaldo has had has been with Mr. Theodoro Sandico. He was one of the important men of the Hong Kong Committee. In the absence of Aguinaldo on his Singapore expedition, when the war opened between the

United States and Spain, Sandico was permitted, through the intercession of Consul Wildman, to go with the admiral, and was present in the battle of Manila. He had a great deal to say about the affairs of the Republic, agreeable to Americans. He was a plausible person of high degree. He could spin as many fine phrases as Aguinaldo himself, in the same Spanish style. He made as many promises and professions expressive of his loyalty to the United States as any one. It is to be presumed, he was one of the friends of whom Aguinaldo said, they were "all in favor of annexing the Philippines to the United States." A change came over the spirit of his dream, and soured the original sweetness of his disposition. He is the author of the much disputed, but absolutely established as a verity, murder order, applied to the women and children of Manila, the ghastly distinction of which is that it was constructed to mean that white women and children, without any other identification as enemies, were to be slaughtered. Only the Filipino families were to be saved from the massacre. This Theodoro Sandico is a literary man, and wrote many letters. He was the friend and adviser, confided in and influential in his company, and by correspondence a prominent figure in the Filipino "Government," and familiar relations with Aguinaldo developed atrocious propensities on the same line with the man he called master, and with whom he enjoyed fellowship.

General MacArthur forwarded to the War Department in the summer of 1900 a Sandico letter—dated Central Filipino Committee, Hong Kong, May 16th—showing that Sandico was keeping out of harm's way

as far as he could. He gave a striking sketch of American politics of the encouragement of the insurgent Filipinos, saying:

“I communicate to you as most important the state of American politics with reference to our country. Above all, it is positively assured that the struggle between the imperialists and the anti-imperialists continues with implacable fierceness, the former feeling greatly encouraged by the triumph they expect to obtain for the upholders of the capitalists in the coming elections, and the latter, firm at their posts of honorable aspirations and not dismayed one moment, trusting that the light of justice will fall upon American ears (!) and soon penetrate their hearts, carrying good for all.

“In Congress the imperialists have set forth: That the Philippine Islands are not a part of America, but the property of the United States; that expansion is inherent to the genius of America, and gives a certainty of riches for the future; that in McKinley’s hands should be placed all power to direct the future of the islands; that no resolution of Congress is necessary therefor; that the Archipelago should be held to civilize it and redeem it from Tagalo savages.

“The anti-imperialists, on their part, have defended us, whether protesting energetically against the extravagant applause of the imperialists for the ideas of expansion; whether opposing the policy of the Administration with regard to the islands; whether making inspired speeches that show that the retention of the islands will surely bring international complications and constitute an economical error for the United States, or, inaugurating the many demonstrations of sympathy, they show

that the spirit of upright men is not lacking in the halls of Congress."

It appears this publicist has a fair flow of the lingo of our politics. He refers to a great speech by a Boston man, and to a Methodist bishop in New York who spoke of the Great Father of all races and their rights, and adds:

"They say that McKinley heard the sermon with a confused, hypocritical look that characterizes him.

"From all this we may deduce:

"1. That we must not consider the armistice except upon condition of an immediate independence.

"2. That now in America proper the supporters of our cause are being increased in number.

"3. That the victories obtained by our seasoned army in this unequal struggle exercise great influence in the very impressionable mind of American people.

"4. This impression is, and will be, one of the determining causes of our triumph."

June 23, 1900, Sandico was writing again:

"The present campaign and some other circumstances have created in America a political situation that may, perhaps, produce the downfall of McKinley, which will signify the triumph of our ideals.

"I believe, moreover, it very necessary and urgent that we send a patriotic call to all local residents in this zone, that they lay down their offices as presidents in the briefest possible time; failing to do this, they must be considered as suspects and as supporters of the American cause.

"In conclusion, I send a copy of a letter directed to me from the Central Committee at Hong Kong, signed

by General Riego de Dios, and from which we may deduce that our cause prospers in America.

"If the re-election of Mr. McKinley be accomplished and the revolution in China be wiped out and the war in the Transvaal take no new complications, then will I be the first to accept the peace that I believe to be necessary, though it be at the cost of acknowledging the sovereignty of the United States, since I consider that our forces are now impotent to defend our sacred and legitimate rights.

"I believe, then, that under the conditions so favorably colored by the present circumstances, it is necessary that we continue the struggle, and only accept peace on the base of independence, although under an American protectorate.

"In planning this line of conduct it is not my desire to inaugurate a campaign against the noble and patriotic propositions of Señors Paterno, Buencamino, and Velarde; nor do I wish to signify by this that our leading men who are working patriotically for peace are proceeding on a base of individual considerations, and are so simple in political matters that they do not recognize the present favorable circumstances.

"I take my leave as your affectionate servant, whose hand I kiss. (Signed,) T. SANDICO,  
"The Superior Chief Republican Guard."

The exact language of the Sandico order is:

"2. Philippine families only will be respected. They should not be molested; but all other individuals of whatever race they may be will be exterminated without any compassion after the extermination of the army of occupation."

The Secretary of War, the Hon. Elihu Root, in a public speech read from the Treaty of Biac-na-Bato :

"1. Don Emilio Aguinaldo in his quality as Supreme Leader of those in the Island of Luzon now waging open hostilities against their legitimate Government, and Don Baldomero Aguinaldo and Don Mariano Llanera, who also exercise important commands in the forces mentioned, are to cease their hostile attitude, surrender their arms that they are using against their fatherland, and are to surrender to the legitimate authorities claiming their rights as Spanish Filipino citizens which they desire to preserve. As a consequence of this surrender, they obligate themselves to cause the surrender of such individuals as actually follow them, and those who recognize them as leaders and obey their orders."

The program prepared and signed for carrying out this treaty was :

"25th December.—Departure of Don Emilio Aguinaldo and his companions, with Don Pedro A. Paterno and Don Miguel Primo de Rivera, for Lingayan, where the Spanish Government will have a merchant steamer to take them to Hong Kong, the gentlemen going aboard may take their revolvers and the two rifles asked for by Don Emilio Aguinaldo. On the departure of these gentlemen from Biac-na-Bato the Spanish Government will give, by Don Pedro A. Paterno to Baldomero Aguinaldo a letter payable to the order of the Spanish-Filipino Bank upon some bank in Hong Kong for the sum of \$400,000, the cost of exchange being charged to the Spanish Government," etc.

August 31, 1899, Aguinaldo issued an elaborate

proclamation from Tarlac. The Americans had been comparatively quiet, and among his many phrases he said:

"We ourselves are prepared to encounter any difficulty and to fight while there remains a breath of life within us.

"The Filipino army would a thousand times rather succumb in the defense of justice than live without honor and in slavery. What value, in truth, have we for life under such circumstances?

"It would be a pity that, after three centuries of ordinary life with our old mother country, Spain, which gave us her own civilization, to allow ourselves to be dominated by an enemy who wishes to impose upon us new ideas and customs; for example, their language, which in order to learn one has to return to his childhood."

Here are three things pertinent to the captivity of Aguinaldo: First, his resolution to fight while a breath of life remained; second, a preference for death to slavery; third, good words for Spain. He added this:

"I make known before the face of all civilized nations that the Filipino Nation does not forget the agreement of alliance and friendship concluded by me, as its representative, with Admiral Dewey, the first representative that came here from the United States, through the American consuls of Hong Kong and Singapore.

"Do not attribute this declaration to my vanity, but to my desire to fulfill a former promise. This, aside from the fact that the struggle for the independence of our country is just and based upon our perfect rights.

"We are not alarmed by the numerous arms or the valor of the enemy. What is life to us if we are to be

the slaves of the foreigner? It is a pity that all the enlightened Filipinos do not employ their knowledge and experience in the defense of their country."

These passages prove the hostility of the Hong Kong Committee in part to date before the departure of Aguinaldo, and these are the persons taken with him, with Agoncillo left behind to watch those who might give signs of the peril of Americanization. Already war with the United States was contemplated; Spain eulogized; and Aguinaldo has not lost any occasion when he could put forth the doctrine, that he must die fighting, quoting his oaths of office.

This chapter fitly closes with a letter written by Aguinaldo to Sandico. It is an "authenticated verity."

"(Translation.)

"Tarlac, August 2, 1899.

"Mr. Theodoro Sandico, Santo Domingo:

"Respected and Dear Sir,—I received your letter to-day, and immediately take my pen to answer it.

"Do not believe the notices you have received, nor accept them as true, for I have heard nothing of them. You may be sure that I will suppress them in time; that I will not allow them to pass, though you did not write to me. I am disposed in defense, for I must be the first of all; especially now that you are involved.

"Concerning your brother-in-law's letter, I received it to-day with yours, and thank him.

"Regards to all of you, and command me always.

"(Signed,) E. AGUINALDO."



"I have now received new advices which say that Mr. Mabini has an article in *La Independencia*, entitled, 'Something for Congress,' which says that he criticises that body, apart from the fact that this should not be done because it is an ugly thing for our country, and that it is an obstacle which proves that we are not united, I do not know, for I have not read it even, and if I wished to read it I would not understand it well, for you well know that I hardly understand Spanish, and that they say the said article is signed with the name Paralitico. Your comrade,

"(Signed,) RUBRICA."

This letter has a curious interest, because it shows the intimacy of Aguinaldo with Sandico. They were Talogs together, and corresponded in that language. The letter above is translated from Talog, and it disposes, on the highest authority, of the claims that Aguinaldo is a scholarly man. He says, "You know well that I hardly understand Spanish," which proves the truth to be, as often suspected, that the Aguinaldo literature was translated out of coarse stuff by his secretaries and interpreters. Practically, there is no Tagalog literature, and a man who knows no other language than that must have a very limited range of information.

## CHAPTER XIII.

### AGUINALDO'S SPLIT ROCK TREATY.

The Official Filipino Story of the Negotiations at Biacna-Bato—It is an Exposure of False Pretense, Treachery, and Bribery—Copied from the Hong Kong “Book of Acts”—Aguinaldo’s Plea not to go to See Dewey—Schedule of Property Surrendered, “225 Fire-arms”—The Place where the Treaty was Made.

[Official Filipino.]

“Act of Filipino Committee, in Hong Kong,  
May 5, 1898.

“DON DORETEO LOPEZ Y PEREZ, private secretary to the Filipino Committee established in Hong Kong with the object of watching over the interests of the country,—

“Certifies: This to be a copy from the Book of Acts, volume one, whose literal contents are the following:

“In the city of Hong Kong on May 4, 1898, were gathered together in committee the following gentlemen: Don Filipe Agoncillo, Don Mariano Llanera, Don Miguel Malvar, Don Andres Garchitora, Don Servo Buenaventura, Don Amastasio Francisco, Don Teodoro Sandico, Don Maximo Kabigting, Don Faustimo Lichanco, Don Antonio Montenegro, and Don Doreteo Lopez. The session was opened by the temporary presi-

dent. The temporary secretary read the following act, which was unanimously agreed to: 'The temporary president informs you that Don Emilio Aguinaldo has just arrived here from Singapore, and he must now take possession of the office to which he has been elected; it is also necessary to fill the position of Vice-President, which has been vacated by Señor Alejandrino (Don Jose), since, under the conditions which confront the Filipines, it is necessary to draw to the side of this committee men who, by their ability, can throw light upon the solution of those most important problems which the Filipinos must now consider. In view of these circumstances the committee proposes the election of a suitable person, whose substitution for Señor Alejandrino will give universal satisfaction.'

"When the votes had been counted it was found that Don Galicano Apacible had received ten votes, Don Arcadio del Rosario two, and Don Justo Lucban one. Accordingly Señor Apacible was elected by a majority of votes.

"Then on account of the unexpected arrival of Señor Aguinaldo, the session was suspended for a few moments for the purpose of adjourning, so that previous to taking their oaths they could take possession of their respective offices. The session having been resumed, with Don Emilio Aguinaldo and Don Galicano Apacible present, the following oath was taken by the two latter, it being administered by the temporary president: 'You swear upon your honor to be faithful to our fatherland, and to carry out loyally and faithfully the duties which you have just accepted.' When the candidates replied, 'We swear it,' the president said, 'This the country

offers you as a reward, and if you fail she demands it of you.'

"When this ceremony was over, Don Filipe Agoncillo turned over the Presidency to Don Emilio. He and Señor Apacible took possession of their respective offices, after having expressed to the gentlemen of the committee their profound thanks for the high honor they had done them, promising to carry out faithfully all of the duties of their offices as far as their poor abilities would permit, since they held those charges to be most sacred ones. The President described the negotiations which took place during his absence in Singapore with the American consul of that English colony; both agreed that the President should confer with the admiral commanding the American squadron in Mir Bay, and if he should accept his propositions as beneficial, in his judgment, to the Filipinos, he should go in one of the cruisers which form the fleet, and take part in the subsequent events. As he did not find the admiral he thought it well to have an interview with the American consul in this colony, but was not able to obtain one.

"Considering the critical situation in the Filipines at present, he begged that the Committee would decide whether or no it would be proper for him to go into those islands with all the leaders of prominence in the last rebellion now resident in this colony, in case the admiral gave them an opportunity to do so. Señor Sandico says that from conferences which he had with the admiral of the American fleet and with the American consul in this colony he believes that it is absolutely necessary for the President to go to the Filipines, the

situation being what it is, since, according to the American consul, Manila has been taken by the fleet and a provisional government is now being formed in that capital; the intervention of the President in the formation of that government is undeniably essential, since his prestige, which everybody recognizes, will evidently avoid dissensions among the sons of the soil, and with it will be obtained a perfect organization for the military and civil development of that country.

"Señors Garchitora and Apacible expressed themselves in about the same terms. Notwithstanding the previous remarks, the President insists that he considers it dangerous for him to go to the Filipines without a previous written agreement with the admiral, since it may happen that if he places himself at his orders he may make him sign or seal a document containing proposals highly prejudicial to the interests of the fatherland, from which may arise the following grave disadvantages:

"1st. If he accepts, he undoubtedly executes an unpatriotic act, and his name will be justly eternally cursed by the Filipinos.

"2d. If he refuses, the break between the two is evident. And to avoid this fatal dilemma he proposes to the committee that the four committees of the insurgents now here, under charge of heads named and appointed and authorized in writing by him, should go to the Filipines to intervene, by means of conferences with the admiral, in these most important questions. These are the means, he thinks, which should be first employed to find out certainly what are the intentions of the United States in regard to that country; and if his inter-

vention is necessary, it will not be out of the way for him to go at once to the Philippines, procuring by such means as he can obtain, this he will arrange, succor for the fatherland, to which he offers and always will offer willingly the sacrifice of his life.

“He adds, besides, that the admiral, there being no previous contract, may not divide the armament necessary to guarantee the happiness of the fatherland; if this happens, perhaps he will be under the necessity of taking a fatal resolution, fatal to himself, since nothing could then prevent the \$400,000 being claimed by the Spanish Government on account of his subsequent conduct, quite apart from the attachment against that sum which Don Ysabelo Artacho has obtained from the supreme court, which, yielding to his claim, has suspended the payment of this sum by the Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Chartered Banks, although that suspension of payment can only operate at present against \$350,000, since he holds \$50,000 in his hands, a sum which he drew from the Chartered Bank on account of this demand; he was not able to draw out all the funds, in spite of the need for them, because the directors of the said banks objected to it, the attachment being in force. Two hundred thousand dollars are on time deposit in the Hong Kong-Shanghai Bank, and the other \$200,000 are in the Chartered Bank, under the condition that he can draw from that sum \$50,000 every three months, so that there remains now 150,000. Srs. Sandico, Garchitora, Gonzago, and Apacible reply that it thoroughly agreed upon with the admiral of the American squadron that he is to give to the President all the arms which he needs, since the former is convinced that the fleet can do nothing in

the Filipines if it is not used in connection with the insurgents in carrying out their plan of war against the Spanish Government.

“It is impossible to believe that the admiral will be anything but pleased to take the President and his leaders aboard one of his cruisers. As to his making the President sign a document containing agreements prejudicial to the Filipinos, the gentlemen present think that can not occur when one considers the degree of culture and civilization of the admiral, and if it does occur after all, the President may refuse, stating that in this colony there is a committee which carries on the functions of government, which is charged with all political questions, and with which it is necessary to first come to an understanding. The authority to treat which the President thinks of giving to the other chiefs, without reflecting at all upon their personal deserts, they do not believe can be as effective as his personal attention to the matter, to such serious affairs as those which are the subject of discussion. There will be no better occasion than the present for the expeditionary forces to land on those islands and to arm themselves at the expense of the Americans, and assure the attainment of our legitimate aspirations against those very people.

“The Filipino people, unprovided with arms, will be the victim of the demands and exactions of the United States, but provided with arms will be able to oppose themselves to them and struggle for their independence, in which consists the true happiness of the Filipines. And they finish by saying that it made no difference if the Spanish Government did claim the return of the \$400,000, and if the claim was effectual, since the

object of the sum would be secured if the admiral obtained for the Filipinos the arms which were necessary for them to struggle with to obtain the satisfaction of their legitimate aspirations.

“Señor Agoncillo, taking into consideration the reasons set forth by Señors Sandico, Gonzago, Garchitora, and Apacible, that in the present circumstances the result of the President's going is undoubtedly dependent on chance in the actual circumstances so critical for the country, we can see that from what has happened, for probably no one foresaw a war between the United States and Spain.

“In order to set aside the difficulties which the President urges, it is necessary to examine the benefits which the country will receive and the ills which she will suffer if the President goes or does not go to the Filipines, and this must be done without losing sight of the prestige which he acquired in the last rebellion, and which is so deeply rooted in the soil of the Filipines; and if we weigh in a balance the ills against the benefits we shall undoubtedly discover which weighs the heavier. Once the President in the Filipines, with his prestige, he will be able to arouse those masses to combat the demands of the United States if they colonize that country, and will drive them, the Filipinos, if circumstances render it necessary, to a Titanic struggle for their independence, even if later they should succumb to the weight of the yoke of a new oppressor.

“If Washington proposes to carry out the fundamental principles of its Constitution, it is most improbable that an attempt will be made to colonize the Filipines or annex them. It is probable then that independ-



ence will be guaranteed; in that case, then, the presence of the President is necessary; since he will be able to prevent dissensions among sons of the soil who desire place and position, dissensions which may cause the intervention of foreign Powers, which there is no reason to doubt would be highly prejudicial to patriotic interests. He will save that country, and on account of the confidence placed in him will be able to create in that country an organization as perfect as the present circumstances will permit and adapted to the new conditions there. The conditions in the Filipines are such that that country calls for the aid of her strong sons in controlling her destiny, and not, we hope, for their aid in guarding her. What injury can come to the Filipines even if the admiral does not give arms to the President on account of his refusal to sign a document containing an agreement prejudicial to the country, if he has first taken all means to provide for her defense? None.

“Such an act of the President could not be censured, but would be most meritorious, because it would be one proof more of his patriotism. His failure to go to the Filipines at the present critical moment would be charged to want of patriotism; the fatal consequences of such a charge are evident. His inaction, even momentary, could be attributed to criminal weakness, and all these things would destroy the glory which the President so worthily conquered in the last rebellion. It must be known that he who consecrates himself to the well-being of his country must risk his life in a thousand ways, and if it be sacrificed it will be well spent and will be eternally blessed.

“Señor Agoncillo thinks that he, in a general way,

has stated the advantages which will accrue to the Philippines if the President goes there in the present critical circumstances, and the considerable dangers which are sure to arise if his departure is postponed for even a short time, for in that time may arise all those dangers which his presence will cause the country to avoid. And, finally, the suspension of the payment of the funds must be agreed to and reckoned with as short as compared with the delay caused by the suit which Don Ysabelo Artacho has entered against the President, as shown. To-day they are the object of a suit whose end can not be seen, hence skillful measures are not necessary to arrange for those funds, whose purpose is known by all here present. In consequence, no good will arise for the country by waiting for the time when we can dispose of these funds, while the problems which confront the Philippines to-day require immediate solution by those of her sons in whose hearts burn the sacred fire of patriotism. On account of the reasons given, Señor Agoncillo is of the opinion that Señor Aguinaldo, with the other leaders, can go in one of the vessels of the American fleet, now that one is offered, and asks that a vote be taken to decide whether the President should leave the management of affairs relating to the policy of the country to this committee if it inspires him with absolute confidence to manage affairs of this nature.

“The vote having been taken upon this proposition of Señor Agoncillo, which was also supported by Señors Gonzaga, Sandico, Garchitorena, and Apacible, the roll being called, the proposition was unanimously agreed to in all its parts. Also the request of the President that absolute freedom be left him as to the choice of persons

who were to accompany him upon the next expedition, was unanimously agreed to, and his request that none of the persons named by the President for this expedition should be at liberty to decline to go was also unanimously agreed to; and as the affairs which were the subject of discussion were of the highest public importance, it was agreed that the proper act should be drawn up for the approval of those taking part in it, and it was agreed that in accordance with his request the President should be given a copy of the said act.

"Emilio Aguinaldo, Felipe Agoncillo, Faustino Lichauco, Andres Garchitorena, Galiciano Apacible, Severo Buenaventura, Gracio Gonzaga, Anastasio Francisco, Tomas Mascado, Macimo Kabigtin, Vito Belarmino, Miguel Malvar, Mariano Llanera, Teodoro Sandico, Antonio Montenegro, D. Lopez.

"(All duly signed with rubrics.)

"This agrees with the original, and by direction of the committee is handed to Señor Emilio Aguinaldo for his compliance.

"In Hong Kong, the fifth day of May, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.

"The temporary President,

"FILIFE AGONCILLO.

"The temporary secretary,

"DORETEO LOPEZ PEREZ.

"I certify that this translation of the certified copy of this act found among the papers of the insurgent government in my charge is correct to the best of my ability.

"JOHN R. M. TAYLOR,

"Captain Fourteenth Infantry, in Charge of Insurgent Records.

"Manila, Philippine Islands, January 25, 1900."

## "Program.

"Negotiations at Biac-na-Bato, December, 1897.


"14th December.—Departure of D. Ysabelo Artacho, with the approval by the Ex. Sr. governor-general of the convention of peace.

"16th December.—Don Emilio Aguinaldo issues the order proclaiming peace to all his troops in the various provinces.

"23d December.—Departure for S. Miguel de Maimino of the Ex. Sr., D. Pedro A. Paterno with the Ex. Srs. generals chief of the general staff, Don Celestino Fernandez Tejeido and Don Ricardo Monet, an adjutant, two staff officers, and Lieutenant-Colonel of Infantry Don Miguel P. de Rivera.

"24th December.—Arrival at Biac-na-Bato of the most excellent Señors Generals Tejeiro and Monet, who will, with his two aides and adjutant, be met and received by D. Ysabelo Artacho and D. Jose San. Natividad.

"25th December.—Departure of D. Emilio Aguinaldo and his companions with D. Pedro A. Paterno and D. Miguel P. de Rivera for Lingayan, where the Spanish Government will have a merchant steamer to take them to Hong Kong; the gentlemen going abroad may take their revolvers and the two rifles asked for by Don Emilio Aguinaldo. On the departure of these gentlemen from Biac-na-Bato the Spanish Government will give, by Don Pedro A. Paterno, to Baldomero Aguinaldo, a draft payable to the order of the Spanish Filipino Bank upon some bank in Hong Kong for the sum of \$400,000, the cost of exchange being charged against the Spanish Government.



REBEL CHIEFS IN RAILROAD CAR ON THE ROAD TO MANILA.

(AGUINALDO APPEARS IN THE MIDDLE WINDOW.)



"27th December.—The above-mentioned gentleman, having left the port of Lingayan and having arrived at Hong Kong, Don Emilio Aguinaldo will telegraph to Don Artemio Recarte in order that he may carry out the following: First, the turning in of the arms and munitions inventoried; second, the execution of the order of Aguinaldo, given before his departure from these islands, directing the surrender of all arms remaining in the hands of the various groups of insurgents scattered in the various provinces; third, that he may notify General Tejeiro and the other gentlemen who remain in Biac-na-Bato that they may leave the said town. As soon as the officially inventoried articles, 225 firearms, 2,382 cartridges, and 20 pieces of ordnance, and 2 swords, are turned over to the Spanish Government at Biac-na-Bato, Don Artemio Recarte will notify Don Emilio Aguinaldo in cipher, in order that he may draw upon, or cash the draft for \$400,000 guaranteed by the Government of the Filipines, and the captain-general will notify Don Miguel Primo de Rivera and Don Pedro A. Paterno that he has received the arms mentioned.

"Generals Tejeiro and Don Artemio Ricarte will distribute passes and guarantees to the insurgents, permitting them to go where they see fit.

"As soon as seven hundred men and arms have been surrendered, at least half the arms being modern firearms, Don Pedro A. Paterno will be given two checks for the like sums, \$200,000 each, which will be good when the Te Deum is sung and the general amnesty is proclaimed, which will be as soon as peace reigns in the Filipines; the continued existence of bands of Tulisanes

(armed robbers) will not be considered as a violation of peace.

"The surrender of arms, when the two hundred and twenty-five arms and other articles inventoried have been verified, will be made to the commander of any body of troops, and will be made on triplicate receipts—one for the governor-general, one for Don Pedro A. Paterno, and the third to Don Artemio Ricarte, to whom the governor-general will give the necessary instructions.

"This program is the same as the original project by the Most Excellent Sr. D. Pedro A. Paterno, with the exception of insignificant variations whose explanations accompany them. These variations are made in agreement with the said gentleman, who signs it at Manila, 14th December, 1897, with the General-in-Chief.

"The Captain-General:

"FERNANDO P. DE RIVERA.

"The Arbitrator:

"PEDRO A. PATERNO.

"There is a seal inscribed 'Office of the Captain-General of the Filipines. Headquarters of the General Staff.' There are two signatures—Fernando D. de Rivera and Pedro A. Paterno."

The place from which Aguinaldo emerged as a great man, having conducted negotiations with Captain-General Rivera so successfully, will, of course, be at least a long time held as one of the immortal names—Bacna-Bato, or "Split Rock." It is described by General Lawton to be, as the name indicates, a gigantic cleft in the mountain range, forming a natural fortification, located south of Mount Madlon, Mount Madio being



higher and to the rear or east. There are no inhabitants except the garrison. Country rocky; no crops; plenty of wood and water. Was successfully held January 8, 1897, by sixteen insurgents against nine hundred Spaniards. The place was esteemed impregnable, owing to its position, but was taken by the Americans, and Lawton ordered it to be held until the surrounding country could be examined. Colonel Hayes, of the Fourth United States Cavalry, telegraphed from San Miguel, December 13, 1899, to Lawton, who transmitted the dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief, this account of the capture of the Split Rock:

“Headquarters Fourth Cavalry, Biac-na-Bato,  
“December 12, 1899.

“Adjutant-General, San Miguel:

“Sir,—I have the honor to report that I arrived at this point to-day at noon, and on my approach was fired upon by the enemy from the precipitous height of the opposite side of the river. It was impracticable to cross the latter, and the advance guard under Lieutenant Arnold, Fourth Cavalry, dismounted, crossed the river, and drove the enemy from the commanding position on the heights that had been reported inaccessible. Lieutenant Arnold discovered in this natural stronghold a storehouse containing the following property: Ten rifles, thirty thousand pounds rice, six hundred dollars worth uniform cloth and clothing, a large and various collection of tools and material for the manufacture of explosives, medical supplies, etc. Major Charles Morton, Fourth Cavalry, with a force of seventy officers and men, dismounted, will start at daylight to-morrow morning

to reconnoiter the stronghold beyond the point reached by Lieutenant Arnold. The trail leading into it is impracticable for all kinds of troops, except foot troops, and is extremely difficult for foot soldiers. Lieutenant Arnold deserves credit for the energy and persistency displayed in overcoming all the obstacles encountered. Apparently the enemy has been collecting supplies in this naturally strong defensive position for several months."

It was here that Paterno got the reputation of the Arbitrator. The defensible character of the position gave it a formidable reputation among the Spaniards, that went far to justify the use of so much money as was paid to Aguinaldo to give it up, and he got but the smaller share of the sum drawn from Spain to pay for the surrender, as the army and equipment of Aguinaldo was ludicrously overestimated. The sum "pacification" by Rivera cost Spain was not less than one million, and he had reported he was authorized to draw two millions; and it was asserted, to justify the large investment, that an army of one hundred thousand would be needed to take the Split Rock. Seventy American officers and men took it. The notion that military positions might be sold, as Arnold sold West Point, prevailed extensively among the Filipinos. General Rio del Pilar wrote to an acquaintance in Manila, and his letter went into American hands, that he would soon take the town and capture the archbishop and carry him off, but for one million dollars he would hand over to the Americans Aguinaldo and his Government. He was assassinated in Aguinaldo's anteroom because suspected.

## CHAPTER XIV.

### AGUINALDO'S FIRST OFFICIAL APPEARANCE.

First Reports of Him by American Consuls in Asia—  
The Peace Bribe Increased the War—There were  
Others wanted Mexican Silver—The Offer of Two  
Provinces—General Whittier's Official Interview—  
State Department Heard from—Analysis of Early  
Situation.

**I**T is interesting and it is important to go back into the correspondence of our consuls before the war, and see what foundation there is of record as to the character of the Tagal chiefs, and note in what apparel and for what purpose they first appeared in our official papers. The first consular report about the Philippines is the first document, under the head of consular correspondence in the Senate peace treaty papers, No. 62. It is interesting as being the earliest official information touching the Philippines when war was in the air, and in giving it we omit only a few lines of a personal nature. The date of this paper is February 22, 1898. This was three months, lacking three days, before Aguinaldo's return from exile, and he had been absent from the Philippines nearly six months.

There was no peace after the treaty of Split Rock, because there was no integrity in it on either side. Mr. Williams, our consul at Manila, said in his first report

that mentioned the treaty bargain and sale, that "certain rebel leaders were given a cash bribe"—and then comes this striking phrase—"to consent to public deportation to China." There is dishonor in every word of that line for those deported.

Aguinaldo cut but a small figure in the public eye then. But he got the check bribe, and Mr. Williams says, "This bribe and deportation only multiplied claimants and fanned the fires of discontent."

Aguinaldo was not named, but indicated. Here is the first paper:

"Consulate of the United States,  
"Manila, Philippine Islands, February 22, 1898.

“. . . Peace was proclaimed, and since my coming festivities therefor were held; but here is no peace, and has been none for about two years. Conditions here and in Cuba are practically alike. War exists, battles are of almost daily occurrence, ambulances bring in many wounded, and hospitals are full. Prisoners are brought here and shot without trial, and Manila is under martial law.

"The crown forces have not been able to dislodge a rebel army within ten miles of Manila, and last Saturday, February 19th, a battle was there fought, and five left dead on the field. Much of such information is found in my longer dispatch, referred to, and which is at your command.

"The governor-general, who is amiable and popular, having resigned, wishes credit for pacification, and certain rebel leaders were GIVEN A CASH BRIBE of \$1,650,000 to consent to public deportation to China.

This bribe and deportation only multiplied claimants and fanned the fires of discontent.

“Insurgents demand fewer exactions from Church and State, a half of public offices, and fewer Church holidays, which seriously retard business.

“A Republic is organized here, as in Cuba. Insurgents are being armed and drilled, are rapidly increasing in numbers and efficiency, and all agree that a general uprising will come as soon as the governor-general embarks for Spain, which is fixed for March.

“OSCAR F. WILLIAMS, Consul.”

The Spaniards agreed to turn over double the sum of money they paid, and the insurgents to give up twice as many guns as they had. This shows the character of the transaction.

The second appearance of the “new Republic of the Philippines” was in a letter from Consul Wildman to Secretary of State Day. It is presented here, with the response of the State Department:

“(No. 19.)

“Hong Kong, November 3, 1897.

“Sir,—Since my arrival in Hong Kong I have been called upon several times by Mr. F. Agoncillo, foreign agent and high commissioner, etc., of the new Republic of the Philippines.

“Mr. Agoncillo holds a commission, signed by the President, members of Cabinet, and General-in-Chief of the Republic of the Philippines, empowering him absolutely with power to conclude treaties with foreign Governments.

“Mr. Agoncillo offers on behalf of his Government

alliance offensive and defensive with the United States when the United States declares war on Spain, which, in Mr. Agoncillo's judgment, will be very soon. In the meantime, he wishes the United States to send to some port in the Philippines twenty thousand stand of arms and two-hundred thousand rounds of ammunition for the use of his Government, to be paid for on the recognition of his Government by the United States. He pledges as security two provinces and the custom-house at Manila.

"He is not particular about the price—is willing the United States should make twenty-five per cent or thirty per cent profit.

"He is a very earnest and attentive diplomat, and a great admirer of the United States.

"On his last visit he surprised me with the information that he had written his Government that he had hopes of inducing the United States to supply the much-needed guns, etc.

"In case Señor Agoncillo's dispatch should fall into the hands of an unfriendly Power and find its way into the newspapers, I have thought it wise to apprise the State Department of the nature of the high commissioner's proposals.

"Señor Agoncillo informs me by late mail that he will proceed at once to Washington to conclude the proposed treaty, if I advise.

"I shall not advise said step until so instructed by the State Department.

"I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,  
"ROUNSEVILLE WILDMAN, Consul."

MR. CRIDLER TO MR. WILDMAN.

“(No. 23.)

“Washington, December 15, 1897.

“Sir,—I have to acknowledge receipt of your dispatch, No. 19, of November 3, 1897, in which you announce the arrival at your post of Mr. F. Agoncillo, whom you describe as foreign agent and high commissioner of the new Republic of the Philippines, and who holds full power to negotiate and conclude treaties with foreign Powers. Mr. Agoncillo offers an alliance ‘offensive and defensive with the United States when the United States declares war on Spain, which, in Mr. Agoncillo’s judgment, will be very soon,’ and suggests that twenty thousand stands of arms and two hundred thousand rounds of ammunition be supplied to the Government by that of the United States.

“You may briefly advise Mr. Agoncillo, in case that he should call upon you, that the Government of the United States does not negotiate such treaties, and that it is not possible to forward the desired arms and ammunition.

“You should not encourage any advances on the part of Mr. Agoncillo, and should courteously decline to communicate with the Department further regarding his alleged mission.

Respectfully yours,

“THOMAS W. CRIDLER,  
“Third Assistant Secretary.”

General Whittier, of General Merritt’s staff, called on Aguinaldo by appointment at Malolos (see page 498, Senate Document 62, Treaty of Peace papers), and had

a business talk with him. There occurred between the General and the Tagal tyrant a thorough conversation on the subject of the American protectorate of the Philippines. General Whittier told Aguinaldo that in a few days he would go to Paris to appear before the Peace Commission sitting in that city, and the General added (we quote his official report of the conversation):

"I started the talk by announcing to Aguinaldo that I was to leave in a few days to appear before the Peace Commission, and that I had a very friendly feeling for the Filipinos and admiration for many of their good qualities, their quiet, cleanliness, temperance, and great imitative power, and a possibility of learning almost any profession or business; that I would like to be able to present to the Commission his and his people's views and demands, and what relation they expected to hold to the United States in case we decided to keep the islands."

It will be noted that General Whittier expressed himself very fully and clearly. He says:

"Aguinaldo replied, rather naively, that his people were divided into two parties—those in favor of absolute independence and those of an American protectorate; that the parties are about equal; that he is waiting to see who will have the majority, in that case, to take his position."

This report of what Aguinaldo had to say about a division of opinion between independence and an American protectorate was nearly two years ago. Aguinaldo had made himself troublesome at Bacoor, and his removal to Malolos, it is evident now, was a step that meant preparations for war with the Americans. He



found he was not to be admitted to Manila, and made choice of a position on the railroad from which he expected to turn and capture the city. He was engaged in this work when General Whittier called upon him, and he eluded the penetrating question asked him by saying the parties among his countrymen in respect to absolute independence or an American protectorate were about equal, and he was waiting to see who would have the majority to take his position.

Aguinaldo has this habit of avoiding giving a straight answer to a strong question. General Whittier told him the objections to Philippine independent government that existed, and says:

"I pointed out to him that it would probably be useless to try to bring those in favor of absolute independence to any change of opinion, but they must consider that they are without any navy and without capital, which is greatly needed for the development of the country; that the Philippine Government alone did not possess the element of strength to insure the retention of the islands without the assistance of other Governments. They would be at the mercy of any of half a dozen Powers striving to take either a part or a whole of the islands, and they must consider that their greatest prosperity would come by the gradual accession of power under American auspices."

This was to the point, and Aguinaldo was disturbed. There is n't a particle of doubt that he had already fully made up his mind to make war for complete independence without any expectation or desire to please the United States, but it was too early for him to avow his purpose. He knew perfectly that his views of carrying

on a personal government could not be acceptable to the people of the United States. The reply of Aguinaldo to Whittier and his remarks upon a further question are of sensational pith and moment now. We quote General Whittier's report:

"He said: 'But the civilized nations of the world would see that our possessions were not taken from us.' I replied: 'How has it been in China, where England, Russia, France, Germany, etc., all strive to control territory?' To this he could make no reply. I further asked what that side would expect America, acting the rôle of protector, to do. He said: 'To furnish the navy, while the Filipinos held all the country and administered civil offices with its own people.' 'And what then would America get from this?' said I. 'That would be a detail,' he said, 'which would be settled hereafter.'"

General Whittier adds: "We pursued this subject of a protectorate for some time without getting any satisfactory results. Mr. Higgins, a friend of Whittier, who accompanied him, felt that Aguinaldo had been simply repeating a lesson, but I did not feel so sure of that. Buen Camino, a close friend of Aguinaldo, was not present at this conversation, but came in and gave his opinion—he was an intimate of Aguinaldo—that the President was in favor of an American protectorate."

It was on the 5th of May, 1898, that Aguinaldo appeared before the Committee, or Junta of Filipinos, in Hong Kong, after his journey to Singapore, which has never been explained consistently with his honor. According to Bray—an Englishman devoted to much newspaper writing, who had known Aguinaldo in Manila, they say; and Pratt, the American consul, who

seemed, for a few weeks, to be persuaded that he was making the world hum like a top—it was desirable the public should theorize to the effect that the object the Tagalo chief had in going so far away from the American fleet was to place himself in communication with Commodore Dewey! On the way from Hong Kong, his residence, according to the Paterno treaty, “during the pleasure of the King of Spain,” Aguinaldo stopped at a Chinese port, and there is no trace of him there that his friends give, and no knowledge of him in possession of others, because he was not known, save to the extent that his Mexican silver treaty had been heard of. Even the greater part of that was credited to Paterno. The rôle of Aguinaldo in it was a false pretense. He was a pretender that he had a great army, and was for business purposes sustained by the Spanish officers.

All that has been made known of that which took place at Singapore during Aguinaldo's visit relates to his conference with the British writer, Bray, and the influence held over the American consul, Mr. Platt, the cables to Dewey, and the response that he was to “come at once.” The reason for the words “at once” was revealed when the Tagalo got to the home of his silver cash during his period of deportation, and discovered that the American fleet had shattered, burned, and sunk that of Spain. Three days after the arrival of this pilgrim he met the Committee formally, and got reinstatement as President—that great office was filled by Agoncillo in his absence—and he made a report of his “negotiations” with Commodore Dewey—at Singapore—that is, through the American consul. When told it was the opinion of his compatriots that he should

make haste to join Dewey, he shrank from the task, and was fourteen days making haste slowly from his silver-lined exile to the place where he was born. There are two things certain in this case: First, that Aguinaldo had at least an intuition he did not want the society of Dewey; and, second, knowledge that the business which took him to Singapore was not about relations with the Commodore, nor was it to invite and promote friendly relations with the United States. He had been some months before justly and severely snubbed by the State Department of the great North American Republic, and he had not forgotten it, and the Americans had never heard of it, for in the consul reports he had been distinguished in his alleged position from Hong Kong by his office, and not by his name. He had taken up his residence in Hong Kong, at the Spanish expense, in September,\* and in November had a new Republic ready, and "empowered" Agoncillo to make treaties—draft, and sign, and ratify them—and the comprehensive statesman and agent wanted two things—this is official—for the late Hong Kong Consul Wildman made an official report of it. The first thing was a gun contract, the United States to furnish and smuggle the guns into Luzon, and accept from twenty-five to thirty per cent for money-making compensation. This has until lately all the time been believed to be a monstrous proposition to our Government to engage in finding arms and ammunition for the insurgents as against Spain, while we were at peace with that king-

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\*I find the fact to be that, in Wildman's report, he must have written December; and the typographical error of September in the official publication has been very misleading.

dom, and an urgency to accept a bribe for our amiability toward those who fought against oppression. There is now a very different understanding. Aguinaldo's captured papers show he was for Spain as against us, and the true purpose seems to have been, by the purchased "ally" of Spain, to have invested Spanish money for the use of Spain in the war against us. It would have been a good joke on Uncle Sam to have bribed him to smuggle rifles and cartridges into some sequestered spot of Luzon to be used against himself. It would have been perfectly consistent with the character of Aguinaldo to have invented and carried out such a plot as this, and the arms could have been given away to the Spaniards by a timely tip of friendly information. Such a service would have been highly appreciated by Spain, and a second installment of the Mexican dollar treaty fund might have been paid as a "bit of bread" cast to the consenting exiles, as Captain-General Rivera said in the Spanish Cortes a little later, describing his dealings with the exiles.

It may be said to discredit this, that the Spaniards had many guns and much ammunition in Manila; but they did not have them in November, 1898. The large supply of Mauser rifles and "clips" arrived but a few weeks before the war opened. Whatever Aguinaldo meant to do if the United States had entered into the proposed gun contract, it was on his part an infamy, and was so treated by our State Department. Assistant Secretary Cridler wrote Consul Wildman a note of warning not to have anything to do with such a person.


## CHAPTER XV.

### FIRST PROOF AGUINALDO'S TREACHERY.

He Says he Made Cash Treaty on Account Scant Resources—His People to be Free had to Submit to Him—Make Him a Despot, and he would be a Republican—His Letter to General Rios, of Iloilo, Proves him Traitor.

ON the 25th of May, 1898, Admiral Dewey mailed to the Secretary of the Navy three of Aguinaldo's proclamations; and this incident of formally forwarding information has been one of the points in the Filipino contention that the admiral recognized the Tagalo chief as the President of the Filipino Republic, assumed at Hong Kong to exist. A translation by Captain John R. M. Taylor, Fourteenth U. S. A., "in charge of Insurgent records," differs slightly, but not materially, from the first version published. According to Captain Taylor, the proclamation of Aguinaldo of May 24th opened with these words:

"My Dear Countrymen,—I accepted the peace proposed by Don Pedro A. Paterno, together with the captain-general of these islands, under certain conditions, in consequence of which I laid down the arms and dissolved the forces placed immediately under my orders, because I believed that this would be more beneficial to the country than to keep up the insurrection which was being carried out with very scant resources;



AGUINALDO'S HEADQUARTERS AT TARLAC.





but on account of want of compliance with some of these conditions, some forces were discontented and did not surrender their arms, and because now, after the passage of five months, none of the . . .

This was a smoothing over of the fact that Paterno had differed with him about the Spanish money, claiming that those left behind to confront the Spaniards were more deserving than they, who, consenting to exile at the expense of Spain, took the treaty money with them. It was in this proclamation that Aguinaldo proclaimed for the United States these principles to govern us in the Philippines:

"I see that the Spanish Government is unable to struggle with certain elements which constantly oppose the progress of this country, and whose deadly influence has been one of the causes of a rising of its masses, and now since the powerful and great North American Nation has come showing a disinterested protection, which will enable us to secure the liberty of this country, I come to assume the command of all the forces, ready to insure the attainment of our revived aspirations. I establish a dictatorial government."

Before concluding, the Dictator stated that when the islands "have been brought completely under my Government, we shall be able to form a constituent republican assembly;" and when this happened, he would "resign the command of these same islands." This was "given at Cavité," five days after Aguinaldo's arrival there, less than three weeks after he had been pleading desperately at Hong Kong not to go without a "contract" to Dewey. He already was "Dictator," and able to define the policy of the North Americans for them;

and sixteen days later he was writing to the new captain-general of the Philippines—General Augustin—with a “noble” purpose, to instruct him how to “save the sovereignty of Spain,” notwithstanding the American victory. The way, of course, was to make common cause with the Filipino Dictator, the policy of whom was simply that, before anything else was done, all the islands had to be brought “completely under my government.” The incidental observation that the United States’ policy was “disinterested protection” was gratuitously presented, and this was a case of Malay statesmanship, with no room for veracity.

The Tagalo chief who, on May 5th, at Hong Kong, was anxious not to go to Cavité, on May 25th was apologizing for his treaty with Rivera—charging his surrender to Rivera to scanty resources, claiming that he had to be put in possession of the whole country as a Dictator before it could become a republic; and he had, on the 3d of November previous, sent his Hong Kong lawyer to Consul Wildman, to announce a New republic for the Philippines, established in Hong Kong, that desired recognition by the American Republic, and professing to pass over two Philippine provinces to the United States for the concession of recognition, also the customs revenues of Manila, and twenty-five or thirty per cent of a gun contract, the guns to be smuggled into Luzon by the American Government. In his proclamation of May 24, 1898, Aguinaldo used the name of Paterno to claim favor with his countrymen, who did not approve of the sale of arms and offices to the Spaniards. On the 9th of June, Aguinaldo has himself informed us, in his 25th October letter to the commandant

of the Spanish forces at Iloilo, he had written to General Augustin at Manila, who had taken the place of the treaty-maker—the cash payer for the deportation to China of disarmed Filipino insurgents who had made sale of their guns, rendering him good offices for the Spanish cause. The 9th of June was three weeks before an American soldier placed his foot on the soil of the Philippines. The first officer of the American army to re-enforce Admiral Dewey landed at Cavité, April 30th—nearly two months after Dewey's victory—was General Anderson; and Aguinaldo, after tendering himself as an ally of Spain, wrote Anderson that his object in going down from Hong Kong to Cavité was to prevent his countrymen from fighting with the Spaniards, and he invented that idea.

“(Private.)

“Revolutionary Government, Philippines,

“Office of the President,

“Mololos, October 25, 1898.

“The Excellent Señor, General Diego Rios:

“Respected General,—I write to you without any desire of offending your dignity or your patriotism, or of interfering in your high duties in the present circumstances, so critical for all of us—Filipinos, Spaniards, and Americans. I write to you, General, actuated solely by the desire of doing an act of evident justice, compatible with your honor and with those high duties which I cite above, and **ESPECIALLY WITH THE HOPE OF YET SAVING FROM THE SHIPWRECK THE SOVEREIGNTY OF SPAIN ON THESE ISLANDS.** I shall explain

myself, General, to see if you can understand me, and to see whether it will be the same as with General Augustin, who did not care to pay any attention to THE FRANK WARNINGS I GAVE HIM, WITH NOBLE INTENTIONS, IN MY LETTER OF JUNE 9TH LAST.

"I am informed that you are considering surrendering the place to us or to the Americans. After six months of vigorous siege and of total abandonment, I understand how you can prefer us to the others.

"The way to make this surrender is to join us and proclaim the federation of the Filipino Republic with the Spanish Republic, recognizing the chieftainship of our honorable President, Señor Emilio Aguinaldo. A fraternal embrace will take place between Filipino Visayans and Spaniards; there will be hurrahs for Spain and the Philippines united as a federal republic; your troops will pass into the common army; you will be promoted to be a lieutenant-general; the Spanish employees in the Visayas will be supported by us; the Government will pass to our provincial councils and local juntas.

"Those who want to go back to Spain will be sent back at our expense, with enough to pay their way to Spain, and the flags of Spain and the Philippines will float side by side. You will give an account of this to Madrid, and especially to Pi. Marfal; and in the meantime we shall fight the Americans together; we shall conquer, and then we shall wait (and adjust our future relations).

"My ideas are placed before you in this confused manner because I am pressed for time, but the bearer can give you fuller explanations, and I ask you to see

in this only my desire to stop the shedding of blood by Spaniards and Filipinos, and to reconcile both of them by appealing to the chivalric feeling so characteristic of the high and lofty point of view of Spain.

"The surrender of the heroic column you command is the greatest outrage which can be inflicted upon those valiant men, since they have suffered the humiliations which their unfortunate companions suffer here; and you, the able and upright and valiant general, are you going to sign a treaty with the Americans?"

"God preserve you from it, sir!"

"All of us admire your valor and your self-restraint in battle and in misfortune. For this reason we want to keep you as one of ours; for in this camp we can appreciate a brave man, even if he is an enemy.

"Your transfer to our side does not really involve treason to Spain, since the moment sovereignty passes to the Americans you are free to transfer your allegiance. This is in accordance with the principles of national honor. On the other hand, if you join us you cause the following: First, liberty for all the nine thousand Spanish prisoners in our hands, and then it would serve as the first base of the new alliance between Spain and the Philippines; and then from both will come honor and applause for you as having been the one fortunate enough to effect it. This is all that I can say to you at present, and I hope that you will tell me that you agree with me, and then I shall be able to present this to my Government and obtain from it an agreement to what I have written as a private individual.

"Your most respectful and affectionate,

"I—I—9—6—I—M."

"I certify that this translation is correct to the best of my ability.                    "JOHN R. M. TAYLOR,  
"Captain, Fourteenth Infantry, in Charge Insurgent  
Records."

"Manila, Philippine Islands, February 16, 1900."

This is thoroughly an Aguinaldo letter, written on official Presidential paper, and aided in producing the embarrassing incident of the surrender of Iloilo. The signature is the more positive identification, because it is a cipher used by Aguinaldo; and the "M" stood for the word in the code that was Emilio. The authorship of the letter, traced to the President, has only been denied by Filipino advocates under stress of debate.

## CHAPTER XVI.

### THE TRUE STORY OF THE BRIBE.

Complaint by Paterno and Others that Spanish Bribe was not Justly Divided—The Matter Considered by the Hong Kong Junta, and the Facts Made Known—Aguinaldo Drew \$50,000 for Current Expenses—Official Filipino Statements.

THE Senate of the United States, January 17, 1900, passed a resolution requesting copies of communications between the Executive Departments of the Government and Aguinaldo, or other persons undertaking to represent the people in arms against the United States in the Philippines; and the President was requested to "communicate without delay so much of such information as was in his possession," or in any department, "without waiting to obtain so much information as may require considerable delay, or communication with the Philippine Islands, and to communicate the remainder of the information as soon thereafter as it can be obtained."

This uncommon urgency of inquiry shows the Senate's conception of the value of the information on the way. The President submitted, March 27, 1900, this:

"Meeting of the Filipino Committee in Hong Kong,

"24th February, 1898.

"In Hong Kong, an English Colony,

"To-day the 24th February, 1898.

"The gentlemen representing the supreme council of the people have united this day, and Señor President

Emilio Aguinaldo showed to the committee the copy of the act made by the leaders in the past insurrection, which had been sent him by Señor Pedro A. Paterno, which act was as follows:

“There is upon it a seal in black ink, which says, ‘Republic of the Filipines. Office of the President.’

“Those who sign, principal leaders of the insurrection, remaining in Biac na Bato in order to carry into effect the basis established in the convention of harmony and pacification between the Spanish Government and the Filipino republic, represented respectively by the most excellent Señor the Marquis de Estrella, Señor Don Fernando Primo de Rivera y Sobremonte, and by the most excellent Señor Don Pedro A. Paterno as mediator, which convention met on the 29th December, 1897, in Biac na Bato, under the presidency of Don Ysabelo Artacho as principal and first representative of the supreme council of the Filipino republic, to deliberate concerning the form and manner of carrying out the compliance with the original bases. The object of the meeting having been explained by the president, there followed a long discussion, at the end of which the following was unanimously agreed to:

1st. That Don Jose Salvador Natividad be sent to Don Pedro A. Paterno to explain to him that it is the insurgents actually damaged in their persons, families, and interests who should first be the objects of the care and attention of the Government of the Republic, and they should receive some succor and indemnity for their losses, since they are the people who have enjoyed and who will enjoy the least of the benefits of the pacification, since up to the present no money has been given



to them nor any assigned to them, since there is but little left in the Filipines in charge of the secretary of the treasury, Don Baldomero Aguinaldo; the exact amount is not known by those present, but according to the secretary there is hardly enough to pay off some chiefs and officials remaining at Biac na Bato and Cavité.

“2d. That there exists a certain discontent in various groups of the insurgents and leaders on account of that want of attention, in addition to the natural feelings of discontent produced in many who held a better right to a share in the benefits of the pacification than those who received them, by the fact that they have been left abandoned on these islands while others of less desert have gone abroad to live off of the so-called treasury of the insurrection.

“3d. In consequence of this the members of the meeting feel that there is a certain difficulty in carrying into effect the provisions of the agreement, and this will remain until the sad situation of the insurgents and disheartened leaders left on the island of Luzon be remedied.

“4th. That, as a fair and equitable remedy, they propose that the whole of the last two payments, or \$400,000, be given to the most necessitous insurgents, which sum of money will be turned over to Don Jose Salvador Natividad, in accordance with the present act, for distribution.

“Biac na Bato, 29th December, 1897.

“Ysabel Atracho, Artêmio Ricarte Vibora, Jose Salvador Natividad, Isidoro Conn, Paciano Rizal Mercado, Francisco M. Soliman.

“The Arbitrator: PEDRO A. PATERNO.

“Note.—The power given me by the present act I transfer to Don Paciano Rizal, as a man in my confidence, enjoying in full that which should exist between brothers in arms.

“Manila, 7th January, 1898.

“JOSE SALVADOR NATIVIDAD.”

The President declared that he had received a letter from Don Miguel Primo de Rivera in the name of General Fernando Primo de Rivera, stating that he would not pay the \$200,000 remaining unpaid, forming the third payment, until the complete pacification of the Filipines and the total disappearance of the Katipunán. He also showed the committee the letter and account sent him by Señor Artacho. In the said communication he resigns his position as secretary of the interior and head of the committee on commerce, since he is going abroad, according to the agreement made at Biac na Bato (Filipines) on 19th December of the past year, and Señor Artacho also asks that he be paid the sum of \$508.75, which, according to him, he is owed, as will be seen from his accounts.

In consequence of all this the President asked for a detailed discussion, and as a result of it the committee is of the following opinion :

“That the writing or contract made at Biac na Bato (Filipines), December 19, 1897, is void and of no value. Equally are null and void the parts of the ‘constitution’ cited in said writing, since it is not possible to carry them out; first, because the other members of the government now in the Filipines want to divide up the \$200,000 of the second payment; second, the third pay-

ment is not to be made; there is then an end to every convention which was agreed upon in the writing of 19th December, 1897, since of the \$800,000 promised by the Spanish Government to Don Emilio Aguinaldo, the President of the Filipino republic, through Don Pedro A. Paterno, only \$400,000 have been received to date, which sum is deposited at four per cent interest in the Chartered and Hong Kong banks. Now that the writing of 19th December, 1897, is to-day modified and declared null, all persons here present agree that only Señor Emilio Aguinaldo will be authorized to spend anything of that sum except the interest, according to the plan agreed on on the 9th of last January, also that on no account will the principal or the \$400,000 be withdrawn except for the common good. If any one claims a share in said fund, Señor Aguinaldo will decide whether the claim is just, and he will also decide what amount to pay himself for having been chief of the insurrection, and he who knows most about it, since he alone is acquainted with the merits and demerits of his several coadjutors. If later on a better place for the deposit of the \$400,000 be found, and if, perhaps, later on we receive from the Spanish Government the third payment, or a bank paying a higher rate of interest be found, those here present will investigate the matter.

“They will accept the resignation by Señor Ysabel Artacho of his charge as secretary of the interior, and in charge of the junta of commerce, now that the writing of 19th December, 1897, is declared null and void; and as for the sum which he asks for, it will not be paid without consultation with Señors Pedro A. Paterno and Baldomero Aguinaldo, to find out whether Señor Arta-

cho received anything from the Spanish Government on account of the peace.

"We agree to comply strictly with this agreement, and I, the secretary, certify to it.

"Emilio Aguinaldo, Vito Belarmino, Mariano Llenara, Anastasio Francisco, Doreteo Lopez, Vincente Lueban, Lezaro Macapagal, Salvador Estrella, Luis Viola, Escolastica Viola, Tomas Mascardo, Leon Novenario, Miguel Malvar, Pedro Aguinaldo, Carlos Ronquillo, Teodoro Legaspi, Rosendo Banaag, Anastacio Vida, Gregorio H. del Pilar, Elias Mendoza, Sebastian Castell, Wenceslao Viniestra, Maximo Cabagting, Benito Natividad, Manuel Tinto, Antonio Montenegro."

The date of this meeting of the "Filipino Committee" was two months and one week before the destruction of the Spanish fleet; two months and two weeks before the declaration of the war with Spain by the United States; and three months after Agoncillo called on the American consul at Hong Kong to make a treaty with him, involving a gun contract and offering a percentage of the profit to the Government of the United States, and a couple of provinces of territory for a paper of recognition.

The communication from Biac na Bato was dated the 29th of December, twenty-six days before action by the Hong Kong Committee. The Committee that treated with the Spanish Captain-General was divided, the minority remaining at the place of the treaty with Paterno, "the Arbitrator," and the majority going with Aguinaldo and the money to Hong Kong. Aguinaldo,

having deposited the money, was supported by "all here present." The Biac na Bato communication is an official report, showing the inside of the cash transaction, and announces "discontent produced by many who held a better right to a share of the benefits of the pacification than those receiving them." Artacho is the man denounced by Agoncillo as the one influenced by the Jesuits to dissipate the money. The possession of \$400,000 by Aguinaldo is conceded by him at Hong Kong, January 24, 1898, and May 5th he admitted that he had drawn \$50,000, under a provision that he could take that much a month out of the Chartered Bank, and he gave no account of his expenses. It seems that this sum was used in the Singapore journey, or in that way accounted for.

## CHAPTER XVII.

### AGUINALDO A STRANGE COMPOUND. HIS NATURE AS MIXED AS HIS BLOOD.

His Personal Instructions for Assassination of Americans, mingled with Mockeries of Professed Good-feeling—His Style of Regard for his Oaths, and Artful Duplicity—His Falsehoods, and Contradiction of Himself—He Perjures Himself Cheerfully—He is Cruel, Revengeful, and Gloats over Horrors that Might have Appalled a Pirate.

WHATEVER may be the proportion of the blood of races mingled in the composition of the Dictator, a title warranted by his repeated proclamations of that dignity and duty, there is no avoiding the conclusion that there is mixed in his makeup the characteristics of the yellow, red, and dark peoples we call off-hand Orientals. He has often officially announced himself as observing the humanities of civilization, and sometimes the amenities and courtesies of communications between antagonists in the intervals between armed conflicts. Lieutenant Gilmore, who was for several months a prisoner among the Tagalos, made haste when the Chief of the Tribe was taken prisoner to say a good word for him in remembrance of favor shown himself. There are easily traced two influences that affected an amelioration of the personal propensity of Aguinaldo. One was the importance imposed upon him by our con-

suls in Hong Kong, Manila, and Singapore in the early state of American relation with the Filipinos, that civilized usages should be scrupulously observed. That was the first thing the consuls thought of; and the second was that the little barbarian, always ready to profess true goodness and smile away apprehension, should give promise on his word of honor that he would be obedient to Admiral Dewey.

It occurred, of course, immediately to Aguinaldo, whose grand passion from the beginning was to get some nation to recognize his committee as the government of a country, that his recognition would be promoted, perhaps depended upon, an understanding in America and Europe that he was civilized, and there was no way of so certainly pressing that point upon the great peoples as awarding to prisoners of war humane consideration. The prominence of Lieutenant Gilmore's case made it exceptional, and the kindnesses to him were not obscure. American public opinion, Aguinaldo was eagerly advised, was going to his aid, and he was pressed to do all he could to promote its favorable progress with every blandishment he could bestow. The Tagalo Katupuna (blood brotherhood) was no doubt restrained to some extent by this influence occasionally.

When the American army advanced through the provinces, where the insurgents were strong, each day's lessons were that though the cause of the American authorities might be disputed at home in the States, the armed forces of the Great Republic were conquering and to conquer in the Philippines. The Tagalos were less well acquainted with the Americans than the Boers with the British. The Boers knew that their wives and

children were safe where British authority was secure, and were comforted when exciting their fighting mobility by that knowledge. The Tagalos were not sure until they gained information by contact; and then from Aguinaldo, up or down, the truth that the Americans were not hard on the helpless had illustration, and was taken advantage of and calculated upon. Aguinaldo was as well satisfied his wife would be treated with respect as Oom Paul was that his wife could remain tranquilly in Pretoria while he sought aid in Europe against England.

The relentless cruelty and crafty treachery of Aguinaldo was constantly displayed in his dealings with his own people, and he was engaged in schemes of burning and slaughter as horrible as the habits in war of the original North Americans.

The most competent of witnesses in this matter is Major-General E. S. Otis, who says in his official report, from September 1, 1899, to May 5, 1900, that at the date of August 1, 1899, war had in the proper meaning of the word ceased to exist, and the chief care of the American soldiers was to give protection to the natives who wanted peace from the scattered insurgents. General Otis says:

“Under Tagalo domination, or what was really the irresponsible, unlimited dictatorship of Aguinaldo cruelly enforced by his military officers, there was no rule by which the right or wrong of personal action could be determined, nor indeed did individual liberty of any kind exist. The so-called insurgent Government, whatever it might have been at its inception, degenerated into a military despotism of a low order, in which



neither property nor life had the least security. Insurgent officers were given a discretionary power to assume entire control of all places, barrios, or municipalities, in any wise occupied by their troops, and to use the inhabitants and their property for war purposes as their judgment dictated, if the exigencies of defense or the desire for attack appeared to them to warrant it. The people, of course, were obliged to contribute very largely of their property acquisitions and in manual labor.

"The embargoed or confiscated estates of absent owners, and the assassination of residents on suspicion merely, indicate that the rule of Aguinaldo and his lieutenants was relentless."

It would have saved many American lives if the authorities had consented to the unsparing use of natives against the enemies of the United States, but that it then seemed would have been promoting savage cruelty and devastation. General MacArthur, telegraphing January 5, 1900, from Bantista, gives a telegram from General Grant, at Magalavy, giving account of a skirmish in exploring Mount Arayet, says:

"Five American prisoners were retaken, all having been shot and mutilated by bolos. Two are dead, one will probably die, and two (one of whom is a sergeant of the Twelfth Infantry) may recover. American prisoners were all from the Ninth and Twelfth."

The claim of Aguinaldo's friends has been that he was attacked before Manila when he had been inoffensive. There is abundant outside proof to the contrary; but the strongest witness is himself. As the commanding general of the United States army says, "it is absolutely convincing evidence of intention to attack

the United States troops found in Aguinaldo's autographic instructions of January 9, 1899 (nearly four weeks before active hostilities were inaugurated), wherein he displays great simplicity in knowledge of military matters, but not that savage ferocity which characterized his instructions issued after the signal defeat of his troops on February 5th, and which were set out on page 182 of my report of August 31st last. His duplicity at this time was marvelous, for he was professing friendship toward the United States, manifesting a great desire to restrain his people from committing hostile acts, and, upon the day his instructions bear date, he appointed a commission to confer with one to be appointed by myself 'for the sake of peace,' as he expressed it. The instructions are in Tagalo, and the following is a translation:

“ ‘Malolos, 9th of January, 1899.

“ ‘Instructions to the Brave Soldiers of Sandatahan  
of Manila.

“ ‘Article I. All Filipinos should observe our fellow-countrymen in order to see whether they are American sympathizers. They shall take care to work with them in order to inspire them with confidence of the strength of the holy cause of their country.

“ ‘Whenever they are assured of the loyalty of the convert they shall instruct them to continue in the character of an American sympathizer in order that they may receive good pay, but without prejudicing the cause of our country. In this way they can serve themselves and at the same time serve the public by communicating to the committee of chiefs and officials of our army whatever news of importance they may have.

“Article 2. All of the chiefs and Filipino brothers should be ready and courageous for the combat, and should take advantage of the opportunity to study well the situation of the American outposts and headquarters, observing especially secret places where they can approach and surprise the enemy.

“Article 3. The chief of those who go to attack the barracks should send in first four men with a good present for the American commander. Immediately after will follow four others, who will make a pretense of looking for the same officer for some reason, and a larger group shall be concealed in the corners or houses in order to aid the other groups at the first signal. This wherever it is possible at the moment of attack.

“Article 4. They should not, prior to the attack, look at the Americans in a threatening manner. To the contrary, the attack on the barracks by the Sandatahan should be a complete surprise, and with decision and courage. One should go alone in advance in order to kill the sentinel. In order to deceive the sentinel the one should dress as a woman, and must take great care that the sentinel is not able to discharge his piece, thus calling the attention of those in the barracks. This will enable his companions who are approaching to assist in the general attack.

“Article 5. At the moment of the attack the Sandatahan should not attempt to secure rifles from their dead enemies, but shall pursue, slashing right and left with bolos until the Americans surrender, and after there remains no enemy who can injure them they may take the rifles in one hand and the ammunition in the other.

“Article 6. The officers shall take care that on the

top of the houses along the streets where the American forces shall pass there will be placed four to six men, who shall be prepared with stones, timbers, red-hot iron, heavy furniture, as well as boiling water, oil, and molasses, rags soaked in coal-oil ready to be lighted and thrown down, and any other hard and heavy objects that they can throw on the passing American troops. At the same time in the lower parts of the houses will be concealed the Sandatahan, who will attack immediately. Great care should be taken not to throw glass in the streets, as the greater part of our soldiers go barefooted. On these houses there will, if possible, be arranged, in addition to the objects to be thrown down, a number of the Sandatahan, in order to cover a retreat or to follow up a rout of the enemy's column, so that we may be sure of the destruction of all of the opposing forces.

"Article 7. All Filipinos, real defenders of their country, should live on the alert to assist simultaneously the inside attack at the very moment that they note the first movement in whatever barrio or suburb, having assurance that all the troops that surround Manila will proceed without delay to force the enemy's line and unite themselves with their brothers in the city. With such a general movement, so firm and decided against the Americans, the combat is sure to be a short one, and I charge and order that the persons and goods of all foreigners shall be respected, and that the American prisoners shall be treated well.

"Article 8. All of our chiefs in the suburbs should prepare groups of the Sandatahan, who will attack with

ferocity and decision the Americans within their lines, attempting to surround each group of Americans or to break through their lines. This must be done if the nature of the ground occupied by the Americans will permit, and if the Sandatahan have the proper amount of courage and resolution, and the more courage and intelligence that they show in the moment of the attack the surer will be the result and the fewer will be their own losses.

“Article 9. In addition to the instructions given in paragraph 6 there shall be in the houses vessels filled with boiling water, tallow, molasses, and other liquids, which shall be thrown as bombs on the Americans who pass in front of their houses, or they can make use of syringes or tubes of bamboo. In these houses shall be the Sandatahan, who shall hurl the liquids that shall be passed to them by the women and children.

“Article 10. In place of bolos or daggers, if they do not possess the same, the Sandatahan can provide themselves with lances and arrows with long and sharp heads, and these should be shot with great force in order that they may penetrate well into the bodies of the enemy. And these should be so made that in withdrawal from the body the head will remain in the flesh.

“Article 11. It can be taken for granted that, if the above instructions are observed, the enemy will not be able to use firearms because of the confusion in his ranks, as they would shoot one another. For this reason I have always thought the rifle useless in this kind of combat, for experience has taught me, my dear brothers, that when the Sandatahan make their attack with cour-

age and decision, taking advantage of the confusion in the ranks of the enemy, the victory is sure, and in that case the triumph is ours.

“Article 12. At last, if, as I expect, the result shall favor us in the taking of Manila and the conquering of the enemy, the chiefs are charged with seeing that the officers and soldiers respect the consulates, the banks, and commercial houses, and even the Spanish banks and commercial houses, taking care that they be not seduced by the hope of plunder. As if God sees this, he will reward us, and the foreign nations will note the order and justice of our conduct. I charge that in the moment of combat, the officers, soldiers, and whatever patriots take part in the struggle will not forget our noble, sacred, and holy ideals, Liberty and Independence. Neither will you forget your sacred oath and immaculate banner; nor will you forget the promises made by me to the civilized nations, whom I have assured that we Filipinos are not savages, nor thieves, nor assassins, nor are we cruel; but on the contrary, that we are men of culture and patriotism, honorable and very humane.

“Above all, I expect that you will respect the persons and goods of private persons of all nationalities, including the Chinese; that you will treat well the prisoners and grant life to those of the enemy who surrender. And that you be on the sharp lookout for those traitors and enemies who, by robbery, will seek to mar our victory.

EMILIO AGUINALDO.”

There is no doubt in any sound mind of the authenticity of this murderous paper, and no question that it is the most hideous proclamation that ever appeared

in the history of wars. It was issued when, pretending that he was pleading for peace, he was planning wholesale massacre; and it was not his first treachery preparing to burn and slaughter, and purring peace. That is what he was doing when our troops took Manila by storm, and would not let him in to fraternize with the Spaniards and turn on the Americans.

July 7, 1899, B. Lagardo wrote to Aguinaldo, who had asked his frank opinion of the situation then, these words of personal flattery and public truth:

“I will refrain from making a critical judgment of all your actions prior to the 4th of February, the date of the outbreak of hostilities, taking them simply as data upon which to base my deductions, and will presuppose in all of them good faith from the point of view of the patriotic motives which impelled you to perform them.

“We have commenced hostilities; we have had our wish—for I remember perfectly well that war was the desire of the majority in Malolos, the military element, however, being prominent in this majority, and raising its voice upon the subject, dragging after it the rest of the people. And what has been gained? Nothing but ruin, death, and desolation.

“We have not been able to prevent the Americans from going anywhere they pleased, and it has been plainly evident that the valor upon which we depended was not enough; but to conquer, it is necessary to have many things which the Americans possess in abundance, and which we lack.

“As time goes on, our chances for victory grow less, and the further the American troops advance so

much worse is our condition for asking concessions for our unhappy country.

“Up to the present time the American troops, in my opinion, have had no other object in view than to show their bravery, a quality which had unjustly and erroneously been denied them both privately and in the public press. So far, either on that account or for other reasons, America has not sent here an army capable of a military occupation of all our territory, nor has a formal campaign been commenced; that America can do so we are unable to doubt, and that it will be done if we persist in our present attitude we may feel certain. And what will then remain to us? What could we ask for?

“We are in error, and yet we persist in that error, impelled by those who dream of a triumph of a party which is to-day in a minority in the United States, without perceiving that this party is also American, and that they are not going to give us our independence out of hand as a matter of sentiment at the expense of the honor of America, and in spite of the grave responsibility, both international and domestic, contracted under the treaty of Paris. Others dream that, because part of the press of Europe copies from the American anti-imperialist papers the criticisms of that party against the Government of President McKinley, a European intervention in our favor is to take place, without reflecting that the treaty of Paris was made before all the civilized world, and with its assent.

“The war so far has only laid bare our insufficiency and our shortcomings.

“In my judgment, giving these conditions, the time has arrived for your policy to change in a radical man-



ner, unless you wish to see forever annihilated the hope that our people may some day take its place in the concert of the civilized world, unless you wish to see the complete ruin of our race and of all our country, and unless you are willing to accept the grave responsibilities which will fall upon you.

"To-day, then, I address you as a friend and as a Filipino, and say: 'Peace is an imperative necessity. Nothing can prevent the triumph of America. Do not struggle against the inevitable.' Peace must come some time, and the man who restores peace to the Philippines will win the admiration of the world and the gratitude of his country. Be that man. Since 1896 you have been the soul of the people, and have merited their blessings for your wonderful and providential wisdom. Be now the peace-maker, that your glory may be perpetuated. As you are the man who, when brought here by the Americans, roused the people as one to the work of our emancipation from Spain, be now the one to say: 'Enough of conflict. We have seen that our ideals can not be realized by this means; let us make peace, and let us work and learn. For by working and learning with a free people, such as the Americans, we shall cast from us the vices of our old masters, and will some day win the independence we so much desire.'"

Herein Lagardo tells Aguinaldo: "We have commenced hostilities," and "gained nothing but ruin, death, and desolation." Here in substance is the reply of the Dictator:

"I am convinced of this fact, and even before the outbreak of hostilities was sure that with their wealth and their innumerable and powerful elements of war,

they could, whenever they so desired, send as many as they need. In reply to this I must tell you that it is impossible for me to turn back from the enterprise which I have undertaken—that of defending our country, and especially as I have sworn that as long as life lasts I shall labor until I gain the acknowledgment of the independence of the Philippines.”

How void his oath to recognize the sovereignty of the United States after this:

“We must no longer allow ourselves to be fascinated by the flattering promises of the enemy. You know that they first solemnly assured me that they would acknowledge our independence.

“I repeat, we will not give up the struggle until we gain our longed-for independence; death is of but little moment to us if we are but able to assure the happiness of the people and of future generations.

“I advise all those who do not feel themselves strong enough to accept this sacrifice, and whose services are not indispensable to our Government, to return to Manila and the towns occupied by the enemy, reserving themselves to strengthen the organization of our Government when our independence is gained, replacing those who, wearied by the struggle, are in need of rest.

“I am not displeased that some Filipinos have consented to hold office under the Americans; on the contrary, I rejoice that they have done so, for thus they will be enabled to form a true estimate of the character of the Americans. I also rejoice that our enemies, having had recourse to the Filipinos for the discharge of the duties of high positions in the public service in its vari-

ous branches, have shown that they recognize the capacity of our people for self-government.

“Before closing I take the liberty of addressing you the following question: To what is due that policy of attraction employed by our enemy if not to the resistance of our army? ‘One should never repent of a just determination.’

“Kind regards to your family, and to Messrs. Arelano, Pardo, Torres, and other friends.

“Command at will your most affectionate friend,

“E. AGUINALDO.”

What is his oath worth if he swears to accept United States sovereignty? What do his words mean if he issues an address? They would give him another chance to betray another people.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

### AGUINALDO'S TRUE INWARDNESS OUT.

When and Why He First Hated Us—He Declared War on Us Secretly in Hong Kong, May 4, 1898—What His Friendship would have Cost—Wanted Contract with Dewey to Divide Armament—He to Furnish Army, We to Protect—Official Minutes Cited—Wanted us to Furnish Arms to be Used against Us—The Part the Bribe Money Played—Forced Return to Dewey—His Money in Bank and in Pocket.

THERE is a consistency in the characteristics of Aguinaldo's proclamations and letters, early and late; and the two most prominent points are the display of his enmity toward the United States, which was prominent in his speech before the committee, that he regarded as his personal Government, in Hong Kong, on the 4th of May, 1898. He knew then that the Spanish fleet was destroyed, and could foresee the fact that probably the most important opposition he would meet, if he undertook to assert himself in behalf of the committee, which he controlled, as the highest authority among the Filipinos, and to strive for the establishment of an organization to possess the Archipelago, of which he should be the head, would be the people they are in the habit of calling in that part of the world, to particularly distinguish them, "North Americans." And he made declarations then of hostility to the Government of the United States.

The official minutes of the meeting said the President, Aguinaldo, "described the negotiations which took place in Singapore with the American consul." This was in accordance with his habit of regarding anything that placed him in touch with an American consul as something important and official, and that must be taken to be impressive. He had returned three days before to Hong Kong, and reported that as he did not find the admiral—there was a good reason for that—he thought it well to have "an interview with the American consul in this colony, but was not able to obtain one." Now Mr. Wildman, the consul, stated in his official correspondence that Aguinaldo called upon him "immediately," and there is nothing said to the effect that there was any difficulty in their coming together. What Aguinaldo desired then and there was to obtain some official status through the action of the consul, and he persisted in seeking some assistance from American officials, with the purpose that is now seen was deep in his mind, to insist upon the courtesies of civil officials and officers of the army and navy. He was in a way to magnify every little thing of that kind, so great was his solicitude to get the Americans to commit themselves to the policy of accepting him as the head of the Philippine Nation. He considered the situation of the Filipinos at the moment critical. He used the language, "considering the critical situation in the Philippines at present," and begged the committee would "decide whether it would be proper for him to go into those islands with the leaders of prominence in the last rebellion, in case the admiral gave them an opportunity to do so." At this point, Señor Sandico (Theodoro)

said the conferences which he had with the admiral on the American fleet, and with the American consul at Hong Kong, led him to believe it was necessary for the President to go to the Philippines. The necessity existed "because Manila had been taken by the American fleet"—which was a mistake. The American fleet was able to destroy Manila, but there were only marines enough to land and guard the arsenal at Cavité. Dewey therefore sent word to Manila that he would destroy the city if they fired another gun at his ships; but he did n't take the town. That did not happen for something more than three months. The Hong Kong Committee thought the town had been taken. Sandico had been in a hurry to get to Hong Kong after the battle—if it is really true that he was in it—and he stated that "a provisional Government was being formed in that capital," and the intervention of the President in the formation of that Government was undeniably essential. That is, Sandico knew there was an intrigue to fix up a Government there, and it might interfere with the Hong Kong Committee. Other members of the committee were anxious to have Aguinaldo go; but he said he considered it "dangerous" for him to go to the Philippines "without a previously written agreement with the admiral," as "it might happen that if he placed himself at Dewey's orders" he might make him "sign or seal a document containing proposals highly prejudicial to the interests of the fatherland, from which may arise grave disadvantages." Here, again, Aguinaldo's extreme urgency on the subject of a contract, that was written, with the Americans reappeared. He grew very strong in his language, saying, if he accepted such a situation

as he had recited and Dewey might force him into, "he would execute an unpatriotic act," and his name "would be justly eternally cursed by the Filipinos;" and if he refused, the break between the two was evident! This he held to be a "fatal dilemma." He proposed that a committee should go, named and authorized in writing by him, to the Philippines, to "intervene with the admiral in these most important questions."

Aguinaldo desired not to come in personal contact with the Americans at all, but to authorize a committee to maintain his dignity in ascertaining what they were about, and doing nothing without a written contract. He thought these were the means to be first employed, to find out certainly what the intentions of the United States were in regard to the Philippines. He would arrange, he said, to procure such means obtainable and "arrange succor for the fatherland, to which he offers, and always will offer willingly, the sacrifice of his life." He spoke of this sacrifice very freely, but added, that the admiral, "there being no previous contract," might "not divide the armament necessary to guarantee the happiness of the fatherland." Clearly Aguinaldo wanted the contract that he was calling for to contain a provision that the admiral should "divide" authority with him. There is no other meaning to be attached to the phrase "divide the armament" than this.

The Filipinos certainly had no power at sea. They had n't a ship, and the admiral had n't military forces. Aguinaldo wanted then and there to have his portion of the authority fixed. He desired the admiral to coincide with him, that there should be a division of force and authority; and this should be in the written contract

for which he strove. There was no other way to "guarantee the happiness of the fatherland." As there was n't any previous contract, the admiral might not consent to parceling out power, and if this happened, said the President of the Committee, he would be "under the necessity of taking a fatal resolution—fatal to himself." That was, if he was sent without a treaty made up for Dewey to sign, or if Dewey would refuse to sign or to consent to his wishes, there would be a necessity of taking a "fatal" resolution if he was there in person. In this committee of four that he wanted should go, they could negotiate; he, being the executive, would wait to act. There would be no power behind him to whom anything could be referred; hence, the opening for a fatality. It should not be forgotten that while Aguinaldo was exploiting the fancy that he had most vividly in his mind all the while, that any American officer could do anything he pleased for the United States when far away from home, he manifestly believed that Dewey would, in the Agoncillo phrase of the 3d of November, be "empowered with power" by the United States to make a "written contract" with the head of the Junta, located nearly a thousand miles away from the Philippines, and unknown to the United States, or any other country officially, as having no titles to speak for or act for the Philippines. The preoccupation of Aguinaldo was constantly that he was the Philippine Nation, and that all Americans who were friendly with him recognized him in that capacity, and catered to his ambition to become a sovereign. Of course, Admiral Dewey was expected to turn over to him all there was of authority for regulating the land, governing it, taxing the people, con-





THE LUNETTA, MANILA, WHERE INSURGENTS ARE EXECUTED.



scripting soldiers, levying assessments on property, thus building up a military power that might be used for or against the Spaniards or the Americans, and that has been his idea ever since. If the Americans accepted him as an ally, he would want the land and all it contained to rule over, and get the share of the lion; and the Americans could command the sea about the Philippines, and protect him as Lord of a Thousand Islands. Here was the line of cleavage, the place of difficulty. Aguinaldo told the writer of this substantially that, and told General Whittier of General Merritt's staff. The terms of alliance was that the land was his, the water ours. He never has failed to present and insist upon it. But what was the fatal resolution of himself, if Admiral Dewey declined to receive him as the President of the Philippines, and forced him to take a part with the Americans against the Spaniards, all for the want of a signature and a seal? What was the fatality? In a moment he explained. It was that "nothing could then prevent the \$400,000 being claimed by the Spanish Government on account of his subsequent conduct." That was his way of saying that when he accepted, and those who were around him and constituted the Government had also accepted, so far as they could, the \$400,000, they had placed themselves under obligations not to be hostile to Spain. If they did, that would be fatal subsequent conduct. This was why Aguinaldo called for a written contract. He had one of those written contracts with Captain-General Rivera, and as early as the 9th of the next month he was writing to the successor of Rivera—Augustin—wanting to get into confidential communication with him for the preservation of the

Spanish monarchy as the sovereignty in the Philippines. By that time—the 9th of June, 1898—Aguinaldo had cast in his lot with the Spaniards, and that was before the first detachment of American soldiers had arrived. The first arrival of the American army was on the last day of June, fifty-five days from the time that Aguinaldo was delivering himself to the committee at Hong Kong about the faultiness of his subsequent conduct.

It would be a fatal thing, Aguinaldo said for himself, to give up that money. Hong Kong is an English colony; the courts are English. What the President of the Filipino Club, who presently appointed himself several times Dictator of the Philippines, was most afraid of, was the integrity of the courts that the money—the price of “two hundred and thirty-two fire-arms” and a supposed impregnable position in the cleft of the mountains, that was called by the Tagalo words for Split Rock—Biac-na-Bato—and for five hundred ragged fellows, that it was an agreement should be made up to seven hundred. The hard-earned money paid for this portentous pacification, \$400,000 for two hundred and thirty-two guns and some scattering skirmishers—and this paid for surrender to Spain and agreement to be deported and to remain in exile so long as it was the pleasure of the King of Spain. Those were the terms of the convention and compensation and deportation for patriotism, and subsequent misconduct to Spain would be fatal to him. If he should go to war with Spain, the Spanish consul in Hong Kong might procure an injunction tying up the money, which had been placed in two banks, the “Shanghai” and the “Chartered,” and the precious silver might never be within

reach of a patriot for sale any more. That was the fatal thing, and in the expression of this apprehension Aguinaldo stated what he felt to be the responsibility he had taken upon himself, and the obligation that rested upon him when the money was given to him. That was his fraction of the money that the Spanish Government had been buncoed out of by a ludicrous exaggeration of the importance of himself and his cleft in the rocks, that was held to be impregnable because nine hundred Spaniards failed to take it when it was defended by seventy men. The fact that the position was not impregnable was demonstrated by a company of American cavalry, numbering seventy. They carried it with a rush, though some hundreds of Filipinos, a more considerable force than Aguinaldo had there to surrender, believed themselves to be defending this ever distinguished gorge in the rocks. In this connection out came a confession from Aguinaldo of the sharpest pertinence. He said, and it is so reported in the official minutes that we have certified to us is a true copy from the Book of Acts, Volume I, "whose literal contents are," and so on. This is a formidable style for vouching the solemnity of the minutes of a committee meeting. One of the "literal contents" is that in the report of Aguinaldo's speech, and we quote it literally, page 6, line 7, from the bottom of Senate Document 208, part 2. The minutes are included in a message from the President of the United States, transmitting "in further response to resolution of the Senate of January 17, 1900, additional papers relating to the Philippine Islands, and the conduct and events of the insurrection against the United States in the Philippine Islands." In another

chapter of this paper the entire minutes of this meeting of the committee and record of Aguinaldo's speech and subsequent proceedings are literally given.

It has been claimed from the beginning of controversy concerning Aguinaldo's conduct, and is deepened continually from the commencement, because there has been added from time to time testimony that had been lacking, and that has cleared up the difficulties of the situation, until now we have the whole story and are able to scrape the bottom of the matters long in issue. One of the averments of those who have persisted in championing Aguinaldo as a virtuous patriot, is that the sum of \$400,000 had been held sacred, not a Mexican dollar of it touched. What Aguinaldo had to say about this in the seventh line from the bottom of page sixth is, "that suspension of payment can only operate at present against \$350,000, since he holds \$50,000 in his own hands, a sum which he drew from the Chartered Bank," and Aguinaldo goes on to say, "On account of this demand." Now that demand was another story that should have been mentioned sooner. The "demand" was that Artacho had "obtained from the Supreme Court, which yielding to his claim has suspended payment of this sum (\$350,000) by the Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Chartered Banks." Aguinaldo apologized for not being able to draw out all the funds, as he explained, "in spite of the need for them, because the directors of the banks objected to it, the attachment being in force." That was rather a good reason for objection on the part of the directors of the banks. One of the patriots who had obtained the money, at least had seen it safe into Aguinaldo's hands, this very Artacho, wanted

his share of it, and began legal proceedings. Still Aguinaldo had \$50,000 of it "in his hands," as was stated, and this seems to have been the expeditionary fund of his voyage to Singapore with a staff—a show of prosperity—and glory of uniforms, and which began evidently in a very different temper, and was carried on for a very different purpose from that in which it ended. It is in line to notice how carefully Aguinaldo had kept the accounts, and how those who were loyal to him were to support his absolute authority, particularly over the money that gave him his greatness and got him into mischief.

There was, it needs saying here in explanation, a meeting of the Filipino Committee in Hong Kong, on the 24th of February, 1898. The minutes are the first part of the document we have just been considering, and the date of it has some significance as follows: "In Hong Kong, an English Colony, to-day, the 24th of February, 1898." This was the day upon which "the gentlemen representing the Supreme Council of the people" united, and "Señor President Emilio Aguinaldo showed to the committee a Copy of the Act made by the leaders in the past insurrection." There was a seal upon this in black ink—that is, upon the copy of it that fell into the hands of American military authorities—and the seal said, "Republic of the Philippines, Office of the President." A Filipino poses on a seal.

Now Aguinaldo, though a few months later confessing his obligation to Spain, under the law of the English colony where he had agreed to live at the pleasure of the King of Spain, admitted that Spain would have a claim for the money if he took up arms against her.

He had received from eight members of the original committee, one the Arbitrator himself, Pedro A. Paterno, and Don Paciano Rizal held a power of attorney from another member. These illustrious patriots said there existed a "certain discontent" in various groups of the insurgents, etc., and those who had been living on the islands were in a sad situation and disheartened, and wanted some of the money. Aguinaldo presented this remonstrance of those who had staid at home against those who got the money and were abroad and enjoying themselves at Hong Kong, the city that seems to the Filipinos as quite the greatest and most fascinating in the whole world; and in referring to the paper mentioned he had received a letter from Primo de Rivera, in the name of General Fernando Primo de Rivera, the Spaniard who pacificated with cash; and this Señor said he would n't pay the \$200,000 he had agreed to pay, and had n't paid, forming the third payment, until the Filipinos were really pacificated, "and the total disappearance of the Katipunan," which is the most alarming of the secret societies in the Philippines, and known as the Bloody Brotherhood. Aguinaldo could n't put down the Katipunan, which is as fiendish as any in Italy, or could n't suppress the insurgents. He had got a great deal more for what he had sold than it was worth, and his announcement meant that there was no more money coming from the Spaniards. At the same time Artacho was displaying himself as a dissatisfied patriot, and resigned his position as "Secretary of the Interior and head of the Committee on Commerce." It will be noticed at once here was a person of prominence and probable social dignity. More than



that, he was going abroad, according to an agreement made with him when the treaty was negotiated at Biac-na-Bato (the Split Rock), and this was on the 19th of December of the past year; that is, the 19th of December, 1897. Now this Artacho even wanted to be paid \$508.75, and sent an account that it was owing to him. The committee decided that the contract made at Biac-na-Bato, December 19, 1897, "is void and of no value," and "parts of the constitution" cited by the disturber Artacho were "null and void," since it was not possible to carry them out—because members of the Government wanted to divide the money. Eight hundred thousand dollars was promised the Biac-na-Bato dignitaries by the Spanish Government, so Aguinaldo stated to Artacho, through Don Pedro Paterno, and only half had been received, and that was deposited at four per cent interest. Especially it would n't do to disturb that, and it was resolved and carried that "the writing of the 19th of December, 1897, is to-day, 24th of February, 1898, modified and declared null. All persons as are present agree that only Señor Emilio Aguinaldo will be authorized to spend anything of that sum except the interest," and if any one claimed a share in the fund, "Señor Aguinaldo will decide whether the claim is just, and he will also decide what amount to pay himself for having been chief of the insurrection, and he who knows most about it, since he alone is acquainted with the merits and demerits of his several coadjutors," and as for paying anything to Artacho, it could n't be done without consultation with Paterno, and also Baldomero Aguinaldo. This Baldomero Aguinaldo is said to be a cousin of Emilio, and the last official act that the Presi-

dent who three times appointed himself Dictator performed before he was captured by Funston, was to issue an order from this financial cousin of his was to take charge of guerrilla warfare in a certain district. It is interesting to notice that this member of the royal family was watch-dog of the treasury when it had that \$350,000 in it. Aguinaldo himself had an arrangement with the Chartered Bank that he was to pull out \$50,000 a month, and he had only got one pull, but he had reduced the funds to \$350,000, so that the sacred bulk of Mexican dollars so much talked about had been violated. One quarter of the fund made holy for war, made a permanent disappearance in Aguinaldo's pocket.

Sandico, Apacible, and others replied to Aguinaldo's plea about money and dignity and written contract and all that, that they agreed that the admiral of the American squadron should give to the President all the arms he needed. Sandico was convinced the fleet could do nothing in the Philippines if it was not used in connection with the insurgents, and it was "impossible, in his judgment, to believe the admiral would be anything but pleased to take the President and his leaders aboard one of his cruisers;" and, as to making the President sign a document concerning agreements prejudicial to the Filipinos, the President might refuse, "stating that in this Colony there is a Committee which Carries the Functions of Government, which is charged with all political questions, and with which it is necessary to first come to an understanding." Distinctly there was in this reply to the personal and pecuniary plea of Aguinaldo to be permitted to remain in Hong Kong a threat. The words were smooth. but they were an assurance

to Aguinaldo that he was not so much the master as he thought he was, that he was not a sovereign whose importance would not permit him to be risked. There was a "Committee that carried the functions of Government," and it "is necessary to first come to an understanding with it." Sandico is a scoundrel, but he called upon Aguinaldo to remember he was not endowed with the only authority, and that was manly. Apacible, however, who was the Vice-President, appears to have been the man of will who had his way.

The termination of the discussion was that Aguinaldo had to go, and Consul Wildman states that it took two weeks to get permission from Dewey for him to go. Dewey did n't want him, had no use for him, did n't telegraph Wildman to "tell Aguinaldo to come at once," because he was n't in any hurry to go away from Manila, as he was to leave Hong Kong in April. Wildman was at the time impressed that Aguinaldo could be a great help, and called his morose bits of pride sulky childishness. The arrival from Singapore was May 2d, the committee met on the 4th, and the arrival at Manila was the 19th. Wildman must have asked permission before the committee met. Then came the statement that the Filipino people were unprovided with arms, and this is at the beginning of the third paragraph of the seventh page of the paper of the Filipino Secret Acts. It runs that unprovided with arms the Filipinos would be victims "of the demands and exactions of the United States, but provided with arms, able to oppose themselves to them, could struggle for independence." This evidently was from a very plain-spoken person, and a part of Aguinaldo's business, according to the views

of the committee, one that he was personally competent to perform, was to go to Cavité and be gentle with Dewey, and get arms from him to fight the Spaniards with, and he did that very thing, after some delay, multiplying the guns received, and he got other arms from the Spaniards, those that were surrendered by the cut-off and broken-down garrisons, then looking for a helper to whom they could surrender.

The undertone of animosity already felt toward the Americans by this self-constituted, high-tipped Hong Kong Committee is to be carefully considered. It was on November 3d that this committee had made a dishonorable proposition to our country to recognize them as a nation, and a dishonorable proposition also to smuggle arms for somebody into Luzon, and take twenty-five or thirty per cent of the gun contract money for doing so; and in the same connection to give two provinces that they did n't possess, a thousand miles away, to the Americans for a "written contract," but that was not verbally specified, that the United States would uphold the Aguinaldo Government. Mark these words: "Provided with arms, the Filipinos will be able to oppose themselves to them (the United States), and struggle for their independence." That is, if the United States could be persuaded to arm the Filipinos they would be able to fight the United States. The committee were looking forward to it then. They "got the guns and got the money too," like the British jingoes; but they did n't have any ships. However, they did fight the United States with those very guns, and had sympathetic admirers in the United States as Christian statesmen and warriors and signers of the Declaration

of Independence for doing so, and it turned out that the forcing of Aguinaldo to go to Cavité was the incident upon which his fortunes turned. The tide was at the flood, and led on. The transformation scene followed literally. An army was wafted into Aguinaldo's hands, and the delays in the treaty-making and long-protracted uncertainties caused the array of a powerful force of enemies of our great and generous country.

The people of the United States should understand the hostility of Aguinaldo, that his attitude toward the Americans was premeditated from the moment of the refusal to recognize the Hong Kong Committee as the Philippine Republic, and the fact of the refusal of the United States was, of course, stated formally to the Hong Kong Committee, through the American consul, Mr. Wildman, who was curtly instructed by the Third Assistant Secretary of State of the United States, not only not to accept the base propositions made, but not to give Mr. Agoncillo and others of his committee encouragement to make themselves further intimate and intrusive in our affairs.

## CHAPTER XIX.

### THE TALES NOT TRUE.

Told by Aguinaldo's Agoncillo—Specifications of Falsification—Attempt to Entrap Admiral Dewey, in order to get Him to make a Contract—The Biacna-Bato Bleeders of Spain—Aguinaldo never Forgave the Snub from Our State Department when He Attempted to Introduce International Bribery as a Patriotic Duty.

ON the steamer *China*, which left Manila for San Francisco, by way of Nagasaki, General Wesley Merritt was a passenger, *en route* for the Paris Conference of Treaty Commissioners, and for him the steamer was diverted to Hong Kong, where the General took an English boat to pass through the Red Sea into the Mediterranean. General Frank Green was the ranking officer for the rest of the journey, and among the passengers were Agoncillo and Sixto Lopez.

General Green was laboring during the trip, preparing an exhaustive report from Spanish documents on Philippine history and resources, and he stimulated Agoncillo to get up a paper on the contested points of the clash between Spaniards and natives. Evidently the labor was one of extreme difficulty, for days were spent in fashioning single paragraphs. The result was the well-known memorandum entitled "Brief Notes," included in my "Story of the Philippines," and generally known.

Any reader of the "Notes," now that there has been an accumulation of indisputable evidence that covers nearly everything of note, can understand the severe struggle of Agoncillo to distort and deny the truth, and substitute systematic falsification.

The work Agoncillo undertook was that of a lawyer dealing with a crooked client. The first "note" written is this:

"On the same day that Admiral Dewey arrived at Hong Kong, Señor Aguinaldo was in Singapore, whither he had gone from Hong Kong, and Mr. Pratt, United States consul general, UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM SAID ADMIRAL, held a conference with him."

Admiral Dewey did not give the American consul "instructions," but Agoncillo wanted to thrust upon the record that there was a "recognition" of the Tagalog as a Government. The next clause of the note was there was an agreement "that Señor Aguinaldo and other revolutionary chiefs, in co-operation with the American squadron, should return to take up arms against the Spanish." There was no such agreement. The word was used expressly to deceive. Agoncillo said there was an agreement, because he wanted to give that style of untruth a run in the world, and he succeeded in that. He took the liberty of stating right there that it was the "sole desire" of "the Washington Government" "to concede to the Philippine people absolute independence." Where was that information to be obtained? Only the State Department or the President of the United States could express such a desire on behalf of the Washington Government. In his Taga-

log ignorance and Malay mendacity, that was what Agoncillo would have been glad to get, but he continued the policy of quoting the consuls as if they spoke officially for the Government, and he founded a school of imitators in America.

There was method about the falsehoods with which Agoncillo was so facile. He wrote this stuff in September, and in the previous May he had been present at the meeting of the Committee of Filipinos in Hong Kong, where Aguinaldo strove to find excuses to avoid going to Manila to meet Dewey, desiring to send a committee to demand "a written contract." It has been the game of Aguinaldo and his advisers ever since to declare that unauthorized persons had traded away the United States with them, though they were the dishonorable who, November 3, 1897, offered to buy a "written contract," that would be a recognition, with two Philippine provinces! Why any one should persist in the preposterous stupidities of fabrication in the matter, and take what is said against the Americans in accusations of impossibilities, and at the same time treat all American authorities who tell the plain truth as falsifiers, is a muddle of Agoncillo's distemper for telling not the truth that seems like brain disease disordering mind, but it may be regarded as a Malay mania, and charged to the climate.

The second paragraph of the "Notes" opens with "By virtue of this agreement"—still insisting that there was a bargain—Aguinaldo proceeded by the first steamer, "for the express purpose of embarking on the *Olympia* and going to Manila," but this did not happen. Why not? "Because the American squadron left Hōng



Kong the day previous to his arrival." Agoncillo knew perfectly well when he wrote it this was the reverse of the truth. He was at Hong Kong, and knew Aguinaldo got to Hong Kong, not the day after Dewey left that place, but the day after the battle of Manila, eight hundred and twenty-three miles away. In support of this falsehood, effervescing in foolishness, the Hong Kong lawyer says, "This is what Mr. Wildman, United States consul-general in Hong Kong, said to Señor Aguinaldo in an interview that took place between them." This is another effort to strain a quibble to give the appearance of official recognition. Wildman could not have said anything of the kind. Four months before this perverse writing, Agoncillo was present at Hong Kong when Aguinaldo made another false statement that he had not succeeded in visiting Wildman three days after landing, though Wildman reported that Aguinaldo called immediately after his arrival, but that it took at least ten days to persuade Dewey to let "the President" of the Hong Kong Club go to him at Cavité. Instead of giving the facts, or any approach to them, as he continued his version of that which had happened, by saying what had not, Agoncillo went out of his way so far as to say when the *McCullough* arrived, "his commander said to Señor Aguinaldo that Admiral Dewey needed him (le necesitaha) in Manila, and he brought an order to take him on board." This was to say that Dewey was in such need he gave to the commander of the *McCullough* "an order" for this man, who was a necessity. This has no resemblance to the truth. Agoncillo was a participant in the May 5th meeting of the Hong Kong Club, heard Aguinaldo plead to be per-

mitted not to go, and was constrained against his will to go by Sandico and others. In every line of Agoncillo's notes there is tampering with the truth, as we now have it before us in form that is not rationally questionable. Repeatedly he challenges the fact with a square, telltale falsehood. He talks about the "campaign" against the Spaniards by Aguinaldo, a thing he never did. With his staff of seventeen he is supposed to have marched out and conquered the Spanish General Pena, who surrendered fifteen hundred soldiers. The revolutionary army is declared in six days' "operations" to have captured seven garrisons. There was no fight, however; not a gun fired in anger or earnest. The garrisons were wild to give themselves up. Still we have it recited—a queer fancy in these terms, "At the same time the province of Cavité was being conquered." The conquering was done by the guns of the American fleet May 1st. There is a coincidence to which we shall call attention in a paragraph we copy, this: "On the 9th of June last the whole province of Cavité was under the control of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, and there were many Spanish prisoners and friars, seven thousand guns, great quantities of ammunition, and some cannon." What is there familiar in the date, June 9, 1898? Simply, it was the very day in which Aguinaldo wrote his letter described by himself as one of "frank warnings" and "noble intentions" to the Spanish Captain-General Augustin. Undoubtedly that letter was intended to make an alliance with Augustin, and it succeeded, though the fact was concealed for a time, that it might be used against Americans as a surprise. As soon as Aguinaldo got



RAILROAD STATION, TARLAC.



FIRST MILITARY TRAIN MADE UP NORTH OF  
TARLAC, AT PANIQUI.



hold of his native province, and had "seven thousand guns and a great quantity of ammunition and some cannon," he proceeded to prepare for the use of arms against the United States, as he intimated he would do in his speech officially reported at Hong Kong on May 4th. Aguinaldo was in command of the native soldiers who had been in the Spanish army, and with them in hand, gathered in the bushwhacking snipers on the other side of the bay, and he was ready to unite Spanish and Filipino armies, and make a joint assault on the Americans as invaders.

The letter that Aguinaldo wrote on the 25th of October, 1898, that was influential in the surrender of Iloilo to the Filipinos after the Americans were informed the town was to be given up to them—the statement was made on authority to General Otis—marks the line of co-operation of Aguinaldo with the Spaniards. It was in the Iloilo letter that Aguinaldo speaks of his "noble" letter to Augustin, and gives the key fact to much that might, without that captured paper, have proved troublesome to unravel. Now it is plain. It was in this connection Agoncillo stated that "The Spanish Government has sent to Señor Aguinaldo various emissaries who invited him to make common cause with Spain against the United States;" but it was "too late," the "word of honor" had already been pledged "in favor of certain representatives of the Government at Washington." This was written for the American people by a man on the way to Washington and Paris, who knew it would be disadvantageous to tell the truth. Finally Agoncillo wrote out his story of the Biac-na-Bato treaty, disguising and changing the facts to suit himself, espe-

cially writing in speaking of the Artacho suit, "Señor Artacho, induced by the father solicitor of the Dominicans and the consul-general of Spain, filed in the courts in that colony," etc. Agoncillo knew all about that suit, but never thought of the "Book of Acts" doing service for the whole truth as a "Captured Document," and did not find occasion to be accurate, but dealt out that new story of the father solicitor of the Dominicans and the Spanish consul-general. The minutes of the meeting of May 5th show that Pedro A. Paterno, the Arbitrator, and Paciana Rizal, brother of the martyr, demanded a division of the Biac-na-Bato money—the letter of this party claiming the cash was largely for them—and it was signed by eight names. Agoncillo says three only were dissatisfied. He says specifically "forty-seven revolutionaries were opposed." They mustered only twenty-six, including two Aguinaldos. There is not a sign in the official proceedings of the father confessor or the consul-general. Agoncillo is a dramatist, and put that in as an ornament. It seems that telling anything truthfully was quite unnatural to Agoncillo, and he introduces the "solicitor of the Dominican order" and the Spanish consul at the close, and boasts of paying Artacho \$5,000 to withdraw the suit. The reason for that payment is, Aguinaldo had drawn \$50,000 and held it, but could get no more, for Artacho had attached the money in the bank, and it could not be used at all unless the attachment could be raised. Artacho was paid \$5,000 to raise it.

The course of the Filipino insurgents toward Admiral Dewey has been steadfastly malignant, and at the same time dull-witted. The reason is obvious. He

refused to conform his conduct to their views of their own dignity. He held them in light esteem, though he said they were more capable of self-government than the Cubans, but that was not saying they were capable at all. The minutes of the Filipino Committee in Hong Kong, May 4th, unveils the motives that actuated them. They had made a bid five months and two days before that proposing direct and indirect bribery of the United States officials to buy "recognition." That was what they pined and planned for from the first. They did not lack a certain intelligence, and knew that this proceeding was rascally; that is, they knew it as well as Malays with Spanish education could comprehend anything disgraceful in public affairs.

On the same day—November 3, 1897—they tried to have a secret understanding with Consul Wildman, and to purchase the United States. This personal movement was awkward and candid, though crooked. All Wildman would have had to do to get some of the Spanish money was to make a consenting gesture, and he could have been the Philippine agent of Tagalog schemes for the purchase of firearms. If there had been a corrupt National Administration of the United States, the offer of two provinces they alleged to be theirs and two millions in annual customs duties would have been fascinating. It would have been more land for the people. It involved the commitment of this country to support the Filipino Hong Kong Committee in its pretension of nationality for all time; and if we set up the committee as the country, then were the spoils to be made over to us, and we could have offered twenty-five or thirty per cent as a "bit of bread" for good fellows.

Agoncillo was able to have written, signed, sealed, ratified, and recorded the treaty giving the Manila and Cavité provinces—the broad harbor, the great city, the arsenal—a magnificent Asiatic station just to our hand, with the rock of Corrigedor, another and greater Gibraltar, at the mouth of the bay. All we had to do was to have Wildman sign a treaty, put a ribbon and wax, stamped with a great seal of some sort, on the paper, record it in the "Book of Acts," and all there was of the Philippine Republic would have been ours most devotedly, and Aguinaldo could never have refrained from crying out, waking and sleeping, that all this he had done for the good of a great cause. He would have sworn this on his word of honor, touched it up with some of his Imperial Tagalog tongue, converted into grand Spanish by a talented and educated secretary and interpreter, and then added as an emotional indication of brotherly affection, "O, my beloved countrymen!" This was the plot of a committee to capture the United States with two bribes—one the money with which the Spaniards paid for "peace" when they did not get any peace; and the other, two rich provinces for the United States, just such a treasure and located so that any great European Power would have been ready to go to war about it.

This "diplomatic" adventure, clearly and fully known, and set forth with the sustaining documents recently supplied by the capture of the archives of the committee that resolved itself from a club into a country at war, is proof of the semi-barbarous state of the Filipino leaders. They are but little advanced in the understanding of international morals beyond the in-



terior tribes of Africa. The statesmen of Biac-na-Bato soon ascertained that the United States would not enter into a fraudulent transaction with them. Consul Wildman wrote the whole story to the State Department promptly, and got his instructions, which, of course, it was his duty to communicate to the committee, that was self-styled a Junta—for that word had an official sound, and seemed to some people to signify formality, dignity, and revolution. This was before the war, and already the Biac-na-Bato treaty-makers had one transaction and two proposals on their record—each dishonorable. First, the treaty itself was a fraud from the first—an imposition by the Spanish officers upon their Government—making false representations to get money, paying \$400,000 for less than seven hundred tramps in the cleft of the mountains and two hundred and thirty-five arms; and, as was claimed, twenty cannon, when they had not one effective as a shotgun—cannon of bamboo wound with a rope, no doubt! The negotiations were sordid. The whole affair was a case of bleeding poor Spain by a combination of Spanish officers and a parcel of alleged insurgents. There is nothing more scandalous in the bloody and shameful colonial history of the kingdom of Spain.

The second dishonor was that of the proposed gun contract. The idea was for the United States to sell, ship, and smuggle guns, make money, depositing the weapons, imported by and with the advice and consent of the United States, in the woods, so that the patriotic Hong Kong Committee could sequester them, and send word to the Spaniards to promptly take care of them. There never was a more infamous case of fraudulency.

If there is an exception to this generalization, it is in the endeavor to set up a claim to two Philippine provinces, title to be furnished by the bribed committee at Hong Kong, who sold the guns of their soldiers, that the "leaders" might run away with the money, and be, as Aguinaldo confessed, good to Spain that gave it, or not be able to get it out of bank. They had no more title to the provinces of Manila and Cavité to sell and convey to a foreign Power, than Benedict Arnold had when he sold West Point (and did not deliver it) to make over New York and Connecticut to the British Empire or Spain or France.

The disreputable schemes urged upon the United States, through our own consul at Hong Kong, were disdained and rejected, and the fact that their atrocious overtures were treated disrespectfully rankled in the bosoms of Aguinaldo and his compatriots, and gave the coloring matter to the secret proceedings of May 4th.\* The Singapore expedition followed, and Aguinaldo was in funds, for he had drawn \$50,000 out of the second \$200,000 the Spaniards had turned over to the patriots, who had, with their consent, been exiled from O! their "beloved country!"

On the return from Singapore, the Spanish fleet battered, burned, and sunk, Aguinaldo begged not to

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\*It is possible that some innocent and incredulous persons, unable to account for the use of the State secrets of the Filipinos, who have been in arms against us, may want to know just exactly how it occurred. Aguinaldo found himself defeated and driven from Malolos, and fled so closely pursued that he had to walk around villages in the night. His wife and her mother were captured, and also his official papers; and they have been translated, and, by order of the Senate of the United States, made public documents.

be put in Dewey's hands, and Dewey did not want him, but allowed him to "come." It would have surprised the gallant and amiable admiral if he could have known, on the 19th of May at Cavité, what the proceedings of Aguinaldo and Company had been at Hong Kong on the 4th, when Aguinaldo begged to be spared from Dewey, unless supported by a "written contract." This passion for contracts has been the leading feature of the President and Dictator ever since he was chosen as the head of a committee, and became fierce to grasp all in sight, that all his titles should be made good. He suddenly wanted the world. It has been with him an inconsistency and incongruity to claim that he was recognized, and at the same time entreat all comers—Commodores, Consuls, and Generals—to give him recognition. He wanted promises given by Dewey and Anderson, the first men to find out and expose his treacheries. They were first only, however, because they had the early opportunities, that were given by his conduct in personal testimony.

All others sources failing, he recognized himself, and had the ceremony duly certified, signed, sealed, and put away to be captured some time. It was the only recognition from a friendly Power he ever had.

General Anderson, nineteen days after his arrival at Cavité, wrote:

"The insurgent chief, Aguinaldo, has declared himself Dictator and self-appointed President. He has declared martial law, and promulgated a minute method of rule and administration under it. We have observed all military courtesies, and he and his followers express great admiration and gratitude to the great American

Republic of the North; yet in many ways they obstruct our purposes, and are using effort to take Manila without us. I suspect that Aguinaldo is secretly negotiating with the Spanish authorities, as his confidential aid is in Manila."

The date of this letter was July 18, 1898. Aguinaldo had opened his clandestine correspondence with Augustin June 9th, and the treason to the Filipinos and conspiracy against the Americans was ripening rapidly. May 26th, Secretary Long cabled Dewey his entire confidence, told him he must exercise full discretion, but it was "desirable, as far as possible and consistent for your success and safety, not to have political alliances with the insurgents or any faction in the islands that would incur liability to maintain their cause in the future."

It was known to the Government of the United States that there was too much zeal among the consuls; but they all knew their duty much better than the Tagalog Dictator knew his limitations. Six days before Aguinaldo notified Augustin that he was for sale to another captain-general, this dispatch was sent by steamer to Hong Kong, cable being cut:

"Cavité, June 3d; Hong Kong, June 6th.

"Have acted according to the spirit of the Department's instructions therein from the beginning, and I have entered into no alliance with the insurgents or with any faction. This squadron can reduce the defenses of Manila at any moment, but it is considered useless until the arrival of sufficient United States forces to retain possession.  
DEWEY."

It was ten days after the arrival of Aguinaldo at Cavité when he attempted to do business with the admiral, and this is Dewey's report:

"Hong Kong, May 30, 1898.

"Secretary of Navy:

"Aguinaldo, revolutionary leader, visited the *Olympia* yesterday. He expects to make personal attack on May 31st. Doubt ability to succeed. DEWEY."

The time that steamers were under way from Manila is to be remembered, when the dates of cable dispatches are considered. The voyage occupied about three days. Aguinaldo did not expect to attack Manila seriously. It was not his plan to push the fighting with the Spaniards without "a written contract" with Dewey, to be construed as a treaty with the United States. He had not made his arrangements with Captain-General Augustin at that time. When Aguinaldo tried his *modus vivendi* on Dewey, and opened the game by telling when he would attack Manila, the real intention was to get Dewey to declare himself. It would have been the greatest satisfaction to the Tagalog Dictator to have a written contract with the admiral that the fleet was to take the city, and Aguinaldo garrison it with his army, when he could have carried on his policy of offering bargains to the Spaniards and Americans, and occupying the palace to air himself and the city as his base. Dewey did not make a written contract or any other. He calmly told Aguinaldo that he would wait for American soldiers to garrison the town. That was to the Tagalog a declaration of war; and his first move was to write with "noble intentions" to the Spanish captain-

general, at Manila, sent to him to stay with him his most confidential aide, and presently he was besieging the city by levying a tariff, exorbitant but not prohibitory, on the importation of cattle. The Spaniards still had money for meat, and Augustin and Aguinaldo issued joint passes on the roads to the Filipino cowboys, who are a very different breed from our cowboys, and there is the same broad variations as to beef cattle. General Anderson's scouts captured six of the natives provided with passes good through both lines, if accompanied by meat on the feet.

## CHAPTER XX.

### THE PARTING OF THE WAYS.

The Methods of Aguinaldo to Appeal to the Vanity and Ambition of His Followers—They Stimulated and Expanded Him in Turn—He took the Measure of the Amount of Impertinence an American would Stand, and when he Found he Crossed the Line he Flinched, Apologized, and Promised—How he Repeated at Cavité the Hong Kong Anxiety for Divided Armament—He Grew from Tentative to Pompous Insolence, and Declared War in Principle in July, '98—After that the Logic and Intent of every Step of the Tagalog was War with Us.

WHILE it is understood that Aguinaldo is not a highly-educated man, he has been held by many to be, on account of the style of his public writing, and nearly all his papers are published, including private letters, one can not think that he is ill-informed as to the relations of nations and the forms of transacting international business, as he frequently affected to be. He has, from the first move made in his character of ruler, acted as if he knew nothing at all of diplomatic intercourse between Governments, great or small. He has proceeded with the arrogance of an African king, or Red Indian Great Chief, to rudely assert the total supremacy of his will. Napoleon Bonaparte never took things into his hands and made the laws of nations conform to his fancies, so far as he had force to give his

words substance, as did Aguinaldo. The first contact of our Government, through our consuls, with him was in several ways the most remarkable experience of the United States. Unless Mr. Wildman was unaccountably in error, Aguinaldo and his club of Biac-na-Bato colleagues arrived in Hong Kong in September, 1897, but the proceedings of the convention of peace were in December of that year, and the "contract" was the "writing," as the Filipinos call it, and are distinct in doing so, was dated the 19th of that month. This would appear to mean that the migration was after the settlement. There is here a confusion of dates, or a misprint.\* Either Wildman or Aguinaldo was wrong as to the date, or there is somewhere an error of figures. The dates that the convention was in the September preceding the organization of the Government are more probable than to put it the other way. That is, the "contract" must have been signed December 19, 1896, whether it was a preliminary "writing" or a "treaty." Perhaps some time was lost in the final revisions. Spain may have been tedious in adjustments, as our peace commissioners were in passing from the stage of the protocol to that of the treaty. The peculiarity under attention is that the first we hear from Aguinaldo as to foreign affairs is the same as the last. He wanted the American consul to make a treaty with his Secretary of State, and could not understand that any man bearing the commission of the United States was not a sovereign diplomat, capable in his own official right of binding the nations in obligations that would be supreme

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\* The fact is, there is both confusion and misprint and a missing link; but truth that is important is not involved in doubt.



law internationally. It is hard to measure the intensity and obduracy of such ignorance, but he was adhesive. Agoncillo evidently was of the persuasion, when he added the word general to the title of consul, that there was no doubt possible of his equivalency to any potentiality in national contracts to be described as "this writing." He had the same view all the way through from the assumption of imperialism as a right to the acceptance of captivity as fate. His price for helping the Americans in the war with Spain, and going into partnership with them in affairs international, has not changed from asserting the position of the Americans, that of protecting the Archipelago from European interference and colonization, yielding to him the land with its inhabitants and the fruits thereof. He wanted all the land and the people, and assigned to the Americans the part of disinterested benevolence, quoting the Cuban precedent, and desiring to extend it. His outcries for recognition meant that precisely. As the war approached, the committee at Hong Kong was converted into a free country with a dictatorship—Aguinaldo the Dictator—and wanted to be recognized as a Nation; and the Dictator prescribed a gun contract with money in it for the United States, and a gift of two provinces to the United States, to give the committee the necessary status to play the part in the world of a Power. He wanted to "divide armament"—a really clever phrase—with the United States, and to make a "written" bargain with Dewey. The contract was that he should be protected by the American fleet, and, as the Spanish fleet was removed, he was economical in land, and had no provinces to spare. The Spaniards had no navy.

The Americans had no army at hand, but were much engaged in Cuba. Therefore, there was to be an alliance. Aguinaldo and Dewey were to be the high contracting parties, each to speak for his own great country. The Americans had not even considered the Polynesian gift of two provinces and two millions of Mexican dollars a year; and the war was on. Aguinaldo, as he had been to Singapore on an expedition that he has never explained, and always has darkened as much as he could when he had anything to say about it, evidently considered himself fixed to drive a negotiation between Spain and the United States, and throw the Filipino insurgents into the game to be placed, and secure all that was possible for their manager, and incidentally themselves. The first blow was struck while Aguinaldo was at sea on the way to Hong Kong, and the American fleet was unharmed, while that of the Spaniards ceased to exist. This was a new situation, and enhanced the idea of the original Aguinaldo policy of assigning Dewey the mastery of the sea, and using him and his country to help the Hong Kong Club to an empire with greater resources than Japan, in all but people; and of this imperial thousand islands, why not Aguinaldo for Tycoon? On the 4th of May, 1898, when the President of the Biac-na-Bato Club walked into the committee-room he had much on his mind—more than he could trust to any one. He had glimpses of a great hereafter. Spain and the great Power of America were at war, and Spain already cut off from her Oriental colony. He might aid the Americans to blockade the Spanish troops, and force their surrender! He needed,

first of all, to use to the utmost his Presidency of the Filipino Committee at Hong Kong, to hold the assignment of Chief Executive of the insurgents. What was he to get after doing that? What for himself—for his fellow-committeemen—for the population of the islands, not Spanish? He had a pull on the Spaniards, for he had been in a notorious transaction with a captain-general and associates. There had not been formed a Blood Brotherhood, but a Mexican Silver Community. He had been scornfully refused when he had made advances to the United States, and named the consideration he would agree to give as security for recognition as a Republic, in the event of the war now opened. The Battle of Manila had shuffled the cards. The Dominion of Spain would be at an end in the Philippines, unless the insurgent Filipinos co-operated with Spain. Of course, the Spaniards would be ready to agree to anything that would unite the Filipinos with them, and so that line of communication was open for negotiation, but the population were, for the moment, with and for the Americans. In certainly one particular Aguinaldo had a vast advantage over the American officers. They were in a far, strange country. They were not in communication, save by a costly cable and a slow boat across the Sea of China, with Washington and the world. Aguinaldo was in Cavité, and all the world for him was there. He was acquainted with it, and whatever news there was he got daily. The Americans had helped him to this confidingly, and he used the very weapons they gave him against them, according to arrangement with his compatriots and without scruple. In the Asiatic

sense of brightness, nothing else could be quite so brilliant. It adds zest to assassination to use the victim's knife, or, as the Filipinos would say, "bolo."

It was necessary to make a movement with caution. He did not want to meet the victorious American admiral, and to him commit himself for the Americans, and not know what he was to get. Hence, the languishing requirement of Aguinaldo that the admiral should make a "contract," a "writing," terms and conditions specified. There was already a rebellion in the midst of the committee of peace—the negotiators of the "cash bribe" treaty—and Paterno, Artacho, Rizal, Natividad, and others, "all honorable men," had demanded division of the bribe money, in which his strength was, and attached the payment of the deposits in the Chartered and Shanghai Banks of Hong Kong. If that was gone, the prop that did sustain an empire had fallen. If he displayed himself as warring upon the Spaniards, they also would attach the money, and so he must not go, but send to Dewey. He was getting too precious to the public to travel. Presently he saw he must go or lose his leadership at the moment it was everything but the money, and he took the leap in the dark and came out in the light, bought off Artacho for \$5,000, and saw the waves of imperialism rise and fall at his feet. The Admiral knew better than to commit himself to a contract, written or spoken; but his refusal was looked upon by Aguinaldo as in the nature of the caprice of an individual, and in no word recorded has the Presidential Dictator ever conceded or appeared conscious of the fact that all officers of the United States had not assigned to them the unqualified treaty-making preroga-

tive, and he considered the admiral's words of civility to be promises that he would see to it that the Filipinos had their independence. Aguinaldo did not know twenty words of English, and had a talented interpreter.

There was art in the way he handled the delicate questions arising from his predicament. In the absence of a written "contract" he tried to substitute events that would bear the construction he wanted. He had wonderful success in finding Spanish garrisons in the Cavité province ready and eager to surrender, all given to him or forced upon him. It was a prodigy—almost a miracle. Suddenly he held the entire province, and had seven thousand firearms, and with the swarms of snipers around Manila he had an army numerous as that of the Spaniards, ineffective in some particulars, but tenfold what he had ever seen. This was the realization of what he had hoped at the outset from formal negotiation, and was the state of affairs June the 9th. He had the land, and the Americans the water—the very "division of armament" he said at Hong Kong was the necessity of the Philippine Republic. This had been hurled upon him. He made two propositions, one to the Spanish commander, Augustin, in writing, fixing up a soft place to fall in with the Spanish, if Dewey was not willing to divide with him. It did not occur to him in such a way that any sign of it survives, that the American admiral was not at the head of his Government. The attempt to use the American fleet through Dewey was adroit. He would furnish the army and Dewey the navy, and they would take Manila, and he would take the town and Dewey keep the harbor. There was the ideal division of forces. Dewey waited for American

soldiers to hold the town after it was taken; and he knew the Filipinos could not conquer the city, for they did not have the artillery or any sufficient equipment to make a serious impression upon Manila well fortified, with a great store of rice, abundant cannon, twenty-two thousand stand of arms, ten million cartridges, and thirteen thousand trained soldiers.

When General Anderson arrived and became acquainted with the situation, he suspected Aguinaldo of secretly negotiating with the Spaniards, and said so. This was July 18th, two weeks after landing. Anderson knew at once what a hard nut Manila would be to crack if the Spaniards fought, and on that had remarked: "The city is strongly fortified, and hard to approach in the rainy season. If bombardment fails, we should have the best engineering ability here." Here were two timely and pregnant observations in one letter.

The conduct of Admiral Dewey was excellent throughout his association with Aguinaldo and his promoters. When Consul Pratt began to bombard him with fulsome praises of the Tagalog Pretender, from Singapore, and was backed by the literature of the British spellbinder Bray, telling the surprises that could be wrought with a little co-operation, and that inside invaluable insurgent information could be procured, Dewey then wanted to see Aguinaldo "at once," for it was touch and go with him, and there was hurrying and hiding, and Aguinaldo set out in disguise and under a false name, as though he was too important to allow him to go forth where he would strike daylight, without protection from the direct rays of the sun. It was rather a sorry way to take the road to glory. At that moment

there was an American fleet and a Spanish fleet, and it was not in the Oriental mind a sense of certainty which would win. Dewey was no longer in haste for the insurgent who had been pushed upon him with such easy profusion. He declined to strike Manila for the Malay's sake. The reason was perfect. He could not occupy the town, but could destroy it. He held the harbor and arsenal, and announced that there must be no firing upon his ships, or he would destroy the city. That was a different thing from bombarding it, and turning over what was left standing to the Tagals. He declined the offer of Aguinaldo to go into partnership and take the city. In the correspondence that opened the operations before Manila, the admiral insisted that the notice of bombardment would be followed by firing should be given with the qualifying phrase that the fire should be directed upon the "defenses." That was to say, not upon the city itself. When the American admiral declined to use his guns on behalf of the Tagalog policy, and declared he would wait for American soldiers to garrison it, the "two Nations" were at the parting of the ways, and parted. Our war with the Philippines was proclaimed then in the mind of Aguinaldo, who began his confidences that Dewey had promised him the independence of the inhabitants of the Archipelago, when he had no more right than a boy in the street to make such promises, and it was not in the man to do such folly; his education for his profession, his experience, his professional dignity and trained intelligence of duty of his Government forbade him to make agreements beyond his authority. Still, Aguinaldo was responsible for statements in a pamphlet published by deluded

American citizens, and called a "True Version of the Philippine Revolution," when it was as false as any fable in a yellow novel. Of these versions here is a specimen:

"That in course of an official interview General Anderson solemnly and completely indorsed the promises made by Admiral Dewey to him, asserting on his word of honor that America had not come to the Philippines to wage war against the natives nor to acquire and retain territory, but only to liberate the people from the oppression of the Spanish Government."

This was one of the many falsehoods about Anderson that he did not care enough about to contradict; but as to this he was asked by the Secretary of War whether it was true, and answered, saying:

"This interview of Admiral Dewey and myself with Aguinaldo took place on the 1st of July, 1898, and not upon the 4th. I did not make the statement asserted by General Aguinaldo, as I was not aware that Admiral Dewey ever had made him any promises, and did not know at that time what had happened or what passed between Consuls Pratt, Wildman, and Williams, and Admiral Dewey on the one part, and the Filipino leaders on the other. In this interview Admiral Dewey made no promises or statements whatever."

This was a critical time for Aguinaldo. He had been opposed to the sending of American troops. That was against the purpose of his life—the division of armament, the land and water apportionment. Anderson was the first American general to arrive, and the interview was the first day after he got there, and while his troops were on shipboard. Aguinaldo had been in possession of the province of Cavité for nearly a month.



It was the place of his nativity. He was of the opinion that he was a man—the man with greater rights than another. He was about to demand that Anderson should tell what his object was in landing troops, and wanted a “writing” about that; and it is believed he thought of resisting with arms the landing of American soldiers without a written contract. There was a reason for his omission to make war then—the American fleet—and he may not have perfected his alliance with Spain, foreshadowed in the 9th of June letter. That which was in the mind of the Tagalog comes out quickly according to Anderson, the very man to give him the information he was seeking. Dewey had made no promises or statements. Anderson says of himself—he arrived June 30th, and this was July 1st—and states this:

“I told General Aguinaldo that I had come with a brigade of troops; that I had come to fight the Spaniards, and that it would indirectly, of course, be to his advantage; that as we were fighting a common enemy, I would have to appeal to him or his people for transportation, forage, fuel, and other supplies; but that his people would be liberally and surely paid for whatever we received from them.”

Anderson had no expectation of the wild and woolly swollen state of Aguinaldo and his excessive pretensions. Dewey would not recognize his Government—calmly paid no attention to the farcical pose of it. Possibly Anderson was the treaty man, the writing contractor, who had been prophesied, looked, and longed for, and he rushed his question upon the American general. Anderson says:

“He asked me if my Government was going to rec-

ognize his Government, calling my attention to the fact that it had been proclaimed a few days before."

Aguinaldo, deeply versed in American affairs—wonderful man to know so much of us!—thought perhaps it was the military man that looked after the treaties! He had been rebuffed by the State Department, to whom he had proposed before the war two provinces as "security"—after recognition—for recognition; and here was Anderson, who ought to do it for him without any provinces. Anderson said of recognizing "my Government:"

"I answered I was there simply in a military capacity; that I could not acknowledge his Government, because I had no authority to do so, and of course, up to that time, even the Government of the United States was probably not aware of what he had done. I may have said on that or some other occasion that we had come to liberate the Filipino people from the oppression of Spain; but I told him then, and repeatedly afterwards in correspondence, that I could not recognize his political authority."

That was a conclusive answer—perfect in form; and to an intelligent person the self-evident truth. Upon this Aguinaldo began to work up his war with the United States. His proceedings bear the marks of a perfected policy of aggression and insult. He arrested one of Anderson's staff officers that day—did it because the officer crossed an imaginary line drawn by the Tagalog to define a supernatural assignment—and this was meant as an announcement of a conflict of military authority. A message was conveyed to him that by no chance must such a mistake occur again. It was no mis-

take at all, however. July 4th, Aguinaldo apologized in a sneering way, having "ordered my people not to interfere in the least with your officers," and he wanted to be "informed of any misconduct" of "his people." July 6th, Anderson wrote of the expectation of additional forces; and said Aguinaldo told him he had about fifteen thousand men, eleven thousand armed with guns, and four thousand prisoners, and added:

"When we first landed he seemed very suspicious, and not at all friendly; but I have now come to a better understanding with him, and he is much more friendly and seems willing to co-operate.

"But he has declared himself Dictator and President, and is trying to take Manila without our assistance. This is not probable; but if he can effect his purpose he will, I apprehend, antagonize any attempt on our part to establish a provisional Government."

The quartermaster of the American army wrote Aguinaldo, July 17th, that another expedition had arrived, and there would be from five thousand to seven thousand men encamped at Paranaque, and certain assistance was required to supply this army—horses, buffaloes, carts, bamboo for shelter, wood to cook with, and—

"For all this we are willing to pay a fair price, but no more. We find so far that the native population are not willing to give us this assistance as promptly as required. But we must have it, and if it becomes necessary we will be compelled to send out parties to seize what we may need. We would regret very much to do this, as we are here to befriend the Filipinos. Our Nation has spent millions of money to send forces here to

expel the Spaniards and to give good government to the whole people, and the return we are asking is comparatively slight."

This business letter so astonished Aguinaldo, that he sent a man to see whether such things could be. The quartermaster had even added this:

"General Anderson wishes you to inform your people that we are here for their good, and that they must supply us with labor and material at the current market prices. We are prepared to purchase five hundred horses at a fair price, but can not undertake to bargain for horses with each individual owner."

As Aguinaldo wanted very much to know, he got this in response to a formal demand to whether the terrible quartermaster spoke with Anderson's knowledge:

"First Brigade Headquarters,

"July 17, 1898.

"The request herein made by Major Jones, chief quartermaster, was made by my direction.

"THOMAS M. ANDERSON,

"Brigadier-General U. S. V., Commanding."

"L. R. No. 137.—Received July 22, 1898. From Jones, Sam R., chief quartermaster, First Brigade. Dated at Cavité, P. I., July 20, 1898.

"Brief.—States that it is impossible to procure transportation except upon Señor Aguinaldo's order in this section, who has an inventory of everything. The natives have removed their wheels and hid them.

"Action.—Filed."

This was the spirit of a policy well studied out of obstruction of the American army. Anderson presently discovered that Aguinaldo was on intimate and treacherous terms with the Spaniards. July 22d he wrote as to the announcement of Aguinaldo that he was a Dictator and proclaimed martial law: "I have no authority to recognize this assumption. I have no orders from my Government on the subject." A long letter from Aguinaldo followed, containing these passages:

"I came from Hong Kong to prevent my countrymen from making common cause with the Spanish against the North Americans, pledging before my word to Admiral Dewey to not give place [to allow] to any internal discord, because, [being] a judge of their desires, I had the strong convictions that I would succeed in both objects, establishing a Government according to their desires. . . .

"I consider it my duty to advise you of the undesirability of disembarking North American troops in the places conquered by the Filipinos from the Spanish, without previous notice to this Government, because as no formal agreement yet exists between the two nations the Philippine people might consider the occupation of its territories by North American troops as a violation of its rights."

Before concluding this letter, Aguinaldo admitted that the American fleet had helped the cause of his Government, and made a sardonic attempt to be smilingly gracious about it. He had been concealed from the United States as the author of two shameful and silly schemes by his lack of importance, and was through in-

significance the anonymous President of a Junta, composed of the men who had taken Spanish money for the abandonment of the insurgent cause, and this Presidential potentate had hastened to Singapore to renew, or rather continue, amicable relations with the Spaniards, returning from exile for that purpose, shrinking later in the presence of the Junta that had advanced him, confessing that he had taken \$50,000 from the "concession of cash," and that he feared to lose it all if he appeared as an armed enemy of Spain again, an admission that he had sold himself, his men, and guns to Spain—paying \$5,000 to a "compatriot" who attached the "cash bribe" in bank, to give up legal proceedings; and this was followed by the infamous plan that succeeded, of procuring, through the favor of the United States, arms to be used against them and for the Spaniards! After this came the rush of Spanish troops to Aguinaldo's arms, and then into his ranks. That the Spanish officers at that time had an intimation that it was known the Filipino leader was a traitor is not improbable, but no documents yet captured prove that. The fact, however, forces itself upon our attention. In due order, when the conspirator had paid the Artacho blackmail of \$5,000, and could draw money from the Hong Kong banks, and Dewey's victory had spoiled the credit of Spain, why, the fact that the bribe was a plain case of dishonor and treason to the Filipino cause was denied, for the Aguinaldo policy was to be in, to all appearance with the Americans, and yet to be their enemy, protesting and threatening when they landed, claiming that he had gone to Hong Kong to prevent his countrymen from aiding the Spaniards, and yet at once

instigating and deluding them to do that very thing. His task was to convert his followers to accept his treason.

Mr. Williams, as the American consul, took part in getting the Spanish money out of bank, giving his legal services to the execution of a power of attorney to draw all the money from the Shanghai and Chartered Banks, and this on a "fake" gun contract. There is reason to doubt whether a gun was purchased. There was a show of a contract for three thousand guns, after Aguinaldo had boasted that he had about fifteen thousand troops with eleven thousand guns, so that three thousand was about the number wanted to complete his armament. That was a fixed-up coincidence. In fact, Aguinaldo had not that many men or guns, but he held the province of Cavité and some thousands of guns, did not need them for anything visible, and did need money, and by favor of the polite assistance of the United States consul the money was drawn on a power of attorney and disappeared, and in the Malay sense the sequestered fund was a sacred thing. It ceased from troubling.

Admiral Dewey treated Aguinaldo as an interesting little fellow, stupidly vain, childishly conceited, suddenly inflated, and to be poopooed, but did not see the dark and bloody and treacherous side of his character. When Funston captured the Dictator, and delivered him at the headquarters of our army in Manila, the admiral was genial in his appreciation of the heroism of the deed, and said almost compassionately, and quite benevolently, that he had sometimes wondered whether it might not have been possible for Aguinaldo to have been treated so as to win him to be smoothly friendly

with us. The thought was generous, but the truth does not support the suggestion. The logic of the course of Aguinaldo, from the moment Dewey did not give him Manila to set up a royal and imperial Tycoon establishment, was to make war on the United States, and to use the Spanish power for his own elevation and enrichment, the bloodshed an inconsequential "detail." One thing Dewey and Anderson might have done—and they must have had temptations to do it—Aguinaldo should have been eliminated from the Philippine situation by his forcible deportation to Hong Kong when he obstructed the American army. He was the declared enemy of the United States before Anderson arrived. Indeed, Anderson's brother officers did not understand the utility of that general's correspondence with Aguinaldo, though it was that which saved the American position from being ashore, second to the Aguinaldo Government, before the arrival of the appointed Commander-in-Chief of the army of the United States in the Philippines. Aguinaldo had passed the forks of the road, and marked out his course for the camps of Spain.



## CHAPTER XXI.

### MADRID SCHOOL OF ASSASSINATION.

Aguinaldo's Identification by Proclamation with the Madrid Revolutionary Committee's Book of Tactics and Strategy to Systematize Guerrilla Warfare—The Madrid School of Murder is Devoted to Killing "Yankees"—But the "Yanks" Beat the Tagals at that Game, Killing Twelve to One—General MacArthur on this Aguinaldoism.

THE Presidential election, into which the consideration of our relations to possessions in Asiatic islands had an interesting, and for a time an incalculable, part, having been peaceable, and the result indisputable, the minds of our citizens have been opened to studies in aid of truth rather than partisan help, and the time was propitious for the reception at their full worth of the captured documents of the Philippines; and these to the candid whose intelligence had been cloudy have been surprises in the certainties they have established. It was not believed until made sure by testimony it would be irrational to contest, that Aguinaldo was during the Spanish-American War a symapthizer with Spain. We find him at Hong Kong proposing, as a deliberate policy, to get arms from Americans, on the ground that Filipinos were allies of the United States, to use against "the North Americans." We find him seeking a contract with the United States Government for arms to be

paid for out of the Split Rock fund, and placed at the direction of Aguinaldo in Luzon, that they might be handed to either party according to circumstances, and, as it turned out, if there had been such a contract the Spaniards would have got the arms. We find Aguinaldo writing to the Spanish officer in command at Iloilo, and influencing him to surrender to the Tagalo\_interest, when he had sent word to General Otis that he was ready to give up to the irresistible arms of the United States, and referring to a letter of June 9, 1898, which was the first day he had an army to command, addressed to the war Captain-General Augustin, "frankly" avowing his allegiance to the Spanish side, and doubtless claiming that he had and would give Spain compensation for the Split Rock money, in which General Rivera represented the King of Spain, and handled the Spanish silver; and next he argued before his own committee in Hong Kong that he must not even pretend to take up arms against Spain, for the English courts in the Colony of Hong Kong would tie up the bribe money in the banks if he did so.

All this means that Aguinaldo had sold himself to Spain, and was faithful to his bargain, having for a time fancied he could secure American recognition and a protectorate that would cause him to be what he was assuming to be, a friend and partisan of the United States.

These things are of such supreme consequence and significance, that they quite change the scenery, and Aguinaldo appears as an "ally," it is true, but as the "ally" of Spain, and all he said and did falls into line with that course of conduct.

There is further confirmation, and it comes not from any of the seats of American learning, but from Madrid. There is a school of the art of assassination there, that is exclusively applicable to the "Yankees," and no doubt has its relationships in the United States, its correspondence and co-operation. It is, at any rate, a part of Aguinaldoism. When the war in the Philippines was over, so far as the engagement of organized military forces was concerned, there arose a new school of tactics and strategy for the teaching of methods of war after the manner of the savages, we of the United States dispossessed of the territory occupied by our several States.

When Aguinaldo ascertained that he could not keep armies in the field, he adopted the desperate plans, the preparation for which was made in Madrid; and he was not anticipating captivity, for he managed to give the scouts and expeditions pursuing him the slip, issued an address commanding guerrilla war in such terms that he could not claim the immunities of a prisoner of war, in the presence of severe orders; but he has saved himself from capital punishment by being "satisfied with the Americans" and swearing allegiance to the Government.

A copy of an Aguinaldo order was found in the possession of General Pantaleone Garcia, who was captured May 6, 1900, and, in the language of Major-General Arthur MacArthur, "affords an interesting suggestion and authentic glimpse of the proceedings of a council of war held at Bayambang, Pangasinan, about November 12, 1899, which was attended by General Aguinaldo and many of the Filipino military leaders, by whom a resolution was adopted to the effect that the

insurgent forces were incapable of further resistance in the field, and as a consequence it was decided to disband the army, the generals and the men to return to their own provinces, with a view to organizing the people for general resistance by means of guerrilla warfare."

This is the order officially declared authentic by the Commander-in-Chief of the army of the United States in the Philippines:

"In accordance with the present politico-military status in this, the center of Luzon, and using the powers I possess, in accordance with my council of Government, I decree the following:

"1. The politico-military command of the center of Luzon is hereby established, comprising the provinces of Bataan, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac, Zambales, and Pangasinan.

"2. The superior commander in question will have full and extraordinary powers to issue order by proclamation, impose contributions of war, and to adopt all such measures as may seem for the good service of the country.

"3. The troops which will operate in all of the described district will maneuver in flying columns and in guerrilla bands; and these will be under the orders of the aforesaid superior commander, to whose orders all the other leaders and generals will be subject, reporting to him and receiving from him the orders and instructions of the Government; nevertheless, all orders received direct from the Government will be obeyed, and advice of same will be given to the superior commander aforesaid.

"4. Sr. Don Pantaleone Garcia, general of division,

is appointed politico-military commander of the center of Luzon, and he will assume in addition the judicial powers which belong to me as Captain-General.

“Given at Bayambang, November 12, 1899.

“The President,      EMILIO AGUINALDO.”

Of the nature of the warfare that followed, General MacArthur remarked:

“In war relative situation frequently counts as much as positive strength, a principle which, consciously or otherwise, the insurgent leaders possibly had in view in making such a change of methods, as the country affords great advantages for the practical development of such a policy. The practice of discarding the uniform enables the insurgents to appear and disappear almost at their convenience. At one time they are in the ranks as soldiers, and immediately thereafter are within the American lines in the attitude of peaceful natives, absorbed in a dense mass of sympathetic people, speaking a dialect of which few white men, and no Americans, have any knowledge.

“A widely-scattered formation of the Filipinos quickly followed the adoption of the guerrilla policy above referred to, which led to a corresponding dissemination of American troops, the rapidity and extent of which may be appreciated by reference to the fact that the fifty-three stations occupied in the Archipelago on November 1, 1899, had, on September 1, 1900, expanded to four hundred and thirteen. Of course, under the conditions described all regular and systematic tactical operations ceased; but as hostile contact was established throughout the entire zone of activity, an infinite number

of minor affairs resulted, some of which reached the dignity of combats. As the actions themselves were isolated a connected narrative thereof is impracticable, and in view of the record of events, which has been regularly transmitted by semi-monthly installments, it is not necessary for information of the Department. It may be stated, however, that the casualties arising from this irregular warfare in the American army between November 1, 1899, and September 1, 1900, were 268 killed, 750 wounded, 55 captured. The Filipino losses for the same time, as far as of record, 3,227 killed, 694 wounded, 2,864 captured. It also may be stated, in conclusion of this paragraph, that the extensive distribution of troops strained the soldiers of the army to the full limit of endurance. Each little command had to provide its own service of security and information by never-ceasing patrols, explorations, escorts, outposts, and regular guards."

It is not known and appreciated in its bearings, that in the capital of Spain a Filipino Revolutionary Committee is engaged in putting down the "Yankees," and that the specialty of the committee is stirring up the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands to endless and savage warfare. This malignancy is due in all probability to the direct influence of Aguinaldo, who would be received as a Spanish patriot and hero if he should visit what he calls "the Mother Country" now. The Revolutionary Committee have systematized the regulations for the government of guerrillas. These have been compiled and published. The Filipino guerrillas laboring in Madrid go rather further than sympathizers with the insurgents in this country.

We give extensive extracts from a pamphlet published under the auspices of the Filipino Revolutionary Committee in Madrid by Isabelo de Los Reyes, Madrid, July 15, 1900.

The pamphlet purports to teach "guerrilla tactics," and the object is—we quote the language—"imperialists" who "want to reduce us to slavery and confiscate our rich Archipelago, and, in order to hide their greed, they allege that, without their interference, anarchy would be general in the Philippines."

These people are to be shown by guerrilla warfare that they are mistaken. "Our guerrillas," it is carefully stated, "will not have to give battle in the field; the diseases shall soon enough finish off the enemy." "Peaceable people are to be prevented from getting tired of the war and helping invaders." The guerrillas are to "seek the sympathies of the people," and "defend them against bandits and thieves." In fact, the guerrillas are so confused with bandits and thieves that discrimination is not possible.

The instructions of the lovers of liberty in Madrid is divided into three parts:

#### "I.—Guerrilla Tactics.

"The guerrillas shall make up for their small numbers by their ceaseless activity and their daring. They shall hide in the woods and in distant barrios, and, when least expected, shall fall upon the enemy, and disappear at once to enjoy whatever spoils they may have taken from the Yankees; but they shall be careful never to rob their countrymen.

"Before going into action the guerrilla chief shall

carefully review his forces, adding to them if necessary, and leaving behind any men liable to interfere with the rapidity of his movements; he shall keep his men in good trim by giving them plenty of food and plenty of rest.

“The guerrilla chief must be clever and daring, but also prudent—as daring without proper caution is productive of disaster. Always in ambush and watching for an opportunity to cause some damage to the enemy, he shall never camp two days on the same grounds, in order to better thwart the enemy and his spies; he shall march at night, shall allow himself to be seen at places where he does not intend operating, to fall suddenly where least expected; he shall be on the watch when everybody sleeps, and sleep in the daytime in distant and secure parts, protected by vigilant sentries.

“When the guerrillas are resting the officer shall choose a strategic point, and designate the places of assembly in case of surprise, after taking all the usual means of precaution.

“By his spies he shall be informed of the position and the tactics of the enemy, which shall be easy, as all the inhabitants are in our favor.

“The soldiers and horses of the guerrilla forces shall be carefully chosen.

“As a matter of precaution our soldiers shall draw their food at some distance from the place which they intend to surprise; they shall ask for contributions of war in the shape of rice, poultry, hogs, etc., but without taxing the pueblos too high, on account of the miserable condition due to the war, and shall only take what is absolutely necessary. They shall always let the natives



believe that they are in great numbers, to make themselves better respected.

“When an attack is made on a pueblo occupied by the Yankees, our forces shall divide into three platoons: First, the most active men for the attack; second, men who are not so active; third, the heaviest men. The two last platoons shall be placed in ambush, in echelons, on our line of retreat to protect the men of the first platoon when they run away. Care shall be taken not to pass in muddy places for fear of betraying our movements by the tracks left in the mud.

“Five hundred Filipinos are sufficient for one province; we shall divide them between the different pueblos, with a base of operations chosen in strategic conditions in the mountainous part of the province. Each party shall only consist of a few men, so as not to call attention and to easily disappear when necessary. When the enemy attacks the small parties they shall retreat toward their base of operations, and, once the enemy tired out, shall unite to fall upon him all together, with all the advantage of a position carefully studied beforehand.

“Having no telegraph, our chiefs shall teach the different parties an easy method of signal, by cuts on the trees, heaps of stones, strips of cloth, balloons, fires, etc., changing them frequently, as well as the password and countersigns, to prevent the enemy from discovering them.

“We must also be careful to hide our movements from the prisoners, who are likely to make excellent guides for the enemy.

“Our wounded, when they interfere with our operations, shall be turned over to the inhabitants of the

country, the latter being threatened with severe penalties if they should not properly care for and conceal them.

“When our men are closely pursued in one part of the country they shall move to another, only to come back suddenly as soon as circumstances should allow it.

“We say again that a guerrilla warfare is easy to sustain and to keep up indefinitely, all the pueblos protecting, of course, our guerrillas, who are only defending the common cause, and are satisfied with a handful of rice or corn, and we shall certainly do all we can for the men who are risking their lives for the honor of the nation, for our independence, and the future of our sons.

#### “II.—Surprises, Ambuscades, Attacks of Convoys.

“Before starting on a surprise party a chief must have a well-studied plan, anticipating all chances of danger so as to be prepared to avoid them or meet them beforehand, and never risk the lives of his men, his own life and reputation in the mixup and the confusion which are the fatal consequences of the lack of plan and calculation.

“A surprise, properly planned, always gives great results, and it often happens that a few guerrillas are enough to gain the most unexpected triumphs; for such reason we recommend the method to our soldiers.

“A surprise is an attack with superior forces, brought forward by rapid marches, made on the enemy where he does not expect it.

“An ambuscade consists of a party of soldiers concealed in a proper place, and which suddenly falls upon the enemy while on the march.

“Surprises often give better results than ambushades, as the enemy is likely to be on the lookout for the latter.

“The object of surprises and ambushades is to prevent the enemy from extending his field of action by pushing on rapidly, as a few severe lessons shall teach him caution; also to cut off a convoy, to crush a detachment, or to secure any real advantage, as we must not risk the lives of our men and waste ammunition to no purpose.

“Ambuscades are excellent to prevent convergent movements on the part of the enemy; a few of them should, then, be prepared in favorable points in anticipation of the enemy’s attack on the flanks of our positions.

“We say again that the result of a surprise depends on the way the plan has been laid out, all contingencies being provided for and nothing being left out, as it often happens that an insignificant piece of negligence brings about a disaster. All possible advantage must be taken of the position chosen, the men shall be properly posted and concealed, and all measures taken to cause an immense loss to the enemy with as little as possible to us.

“The chief who takes charge of an ambushade must be skillful, prudent, unmoved by danger, and resolute in the attack; before all, he must not lose his head, but quietly wait for the proper opportunity before giving the order to fire. The soldiers must be picked men, accustomed to warfare, who shall keep cool and reserve their energy for the moment of the attack.

“In an ambushade it is a matter of “Risk all to gain all; succeed or die;” nevertheless the position shall be

chosen so as to allow a chance of escaping in case of misfortune; our guerrillas are sure to feel better if they know that there is a way open behind them.

“The positions to be preferred are those commanding a narrow passage, where the enemy can not deploy; also those with a way in for the attack, and a way out to escape; if possible, the position should be at a certain distance from the road, far enough to escape discovery by the flankers of the enemy, but not too far, so as to allow our men to grab what they want and get off before the enemy is ready to fight.

“The Philippines are full of woods, mountains, passages, cañons, gullies, cocoa-tree groves, inclosures, etc., which are excellent places for surprise.

“Rainy days and nights are the best to allow a party to approach the enemy without being discovered; darkness shall add to the confusion in the enemy’s ranks, and they may finish by fighting each other.

“It is a good plan to prepare an ambushade when night is to overtake the enemy while on the march, or even to surprise detachments of fifty men in their own quarters, when they are least prepared for an attack.

“Ambuscades can be prepared by infantry, cavalry, or combined forces. The great point is always to have plenty of forces on hand. As we are the attacking party, our forces should be superior in number to those we intend to attack; in that way our soldiers shall feel confident of success, and such a feeling is a great advantage. If we have a strong chance of succeeding, the soldier shall not be impatient or become scared, and fire before ordered to.

“In order not to be discovered inopportunately, the

men shall be forbidden to fire before the order of their officer. At the order of "Fire!" a general volley shall be fired, and the men shall rush on the enemy with bayonets and bolos, to take advantage of the first moments of confusion. And nothing can add more to the confusion than a vigorous mixup with bolos and machetes. If the ambuscade consists of cavalry, it shall rush upon the rear guard, the flank, and the vanguard, or on several distinct points at once, throwing everything into confusion by the attack and preventing the enemy from forming again.

"In a combined ambuscade by the two arms the cavalry shall rush into the foe, the infantry keeping its position and firing, at the same time serving as a reserve and base of action.

"In case of victory, our guerrillas shall not be allowed to throw themselves altogether on the spoils, as an officer of the enemy might rally his forces and change the victory to disaster; a large part of the guerrillas shall preserve their formation, to serve as a support to the party which is pursuing and disarming the enemy.

"Cavalry is very useful for sudden ambuscades, with the purpose of arresting the progress of the enemy when they are pursuing us. In such cases the cavalry is hidden while the enemy marches past, and makes its attack on the flanks or on the rear guard.

"To surprise a convoy the best moment is when the enemy are off their guard, as, for instance, when they are watering and feeding the cattle, when they have broken ranks to rest, or when they are most tired.

"The most favorable points are rough and hilly places, bridges, fords, gullies, woods, etc., where the

escort can not easily deploy, and has to fight on a reduced front.

“If our forces outnumber the escort, we could attack by the front and flanks, and occupy the two ends of a defile, to make a complete haul. But it shall be prudent for our chiefs not to attempt front attacks on troops as well organized as the Yankees.

“Even with inferior numbers we can be successful if we know how to take advantage of our positions, because the enemy is aware that surprising forces are generally superior in numbers to the attacked party; he shall suppose that our numbers are vastly superior, and shall be ready to run for it, especially so if our first volley has caused serious losses—for which purpose the best shooters are to be chosen.

“It is better to attack a convoy by the flank, and, if our forces are too small, we should attack by the rear, to take hold of the wagons which will surely be left behind. A front attack shall be made when it is necessary to cut off the advance of the enemy.

“An attack, by surprise or ambuscade, must be determined and perseverant. Our chiefs shall never allow their soldiers to dispute over and take the stock of the spoils before everything has been placed in safety.

“For the ambuscades to give good results, a good service of spies must be organized to avoid falling into some trap prepared by the enemy; before preparing a surprise it shall be necessary to know exactly the strength of the party which is to be surprised, what forces might come to his assistance, and what are the distances between the different forces of the enemy.

## "III.—Combats.

"In order to give or accept combats, it is essential to have a plan of tactics, to thoroughly reconnoiter the ground in order to take every advantage of its conditions, and to know the strength of the enemy.

"A reconnoissance shall always be made, if only a brief one, as it would be an act of temerity to engage an unknown enemy, or to escape when there might have been a chance of beating him.

"When two hostile columns accidentally meet, there is always a moment of astonishment and of expectancy. We must avail ourselves of that moment of indecision to reconnoiter and beat the enemy before he has made up his mind, if we have fair chances of success; or to escape in time, in the other case.

"Want of foresight is a cause of disasters, as is also the perplexity of a chief who does not know how to take a decision on the spot and avail himself of opportunities.

"Victories raise the spirits and defeats lower them, so that we must not engage raw and unseasoned troops without strong probabilities of a triumph, especially so when our object is only to protract the war, as in the actual campaign; good care must also be taken to support the recruits with a number of veterans.

"Artillery, cavalry, and infantry shall be combined so as not to interfere with their respective actions, but to support each other; the sweeping fire of the artillery prepares the ground or defends our positions; the infantry sustains the brunt of the fight, and the cavalry breaks the enemy's ranks, and follows in pursuit, or keeps him busy while we retreat.

“The troops, before the combat, shall occupy the best positions, in their proper order of battle, and execute the necessary marches according to tactics.

“It is essential to choose a strong position, well protected from the enemy’s fire, and presenting obstacles which shall be in his way when he charges. On the extreme flanks of the position a place shall be cleared so as to allow our troops to maneuver freely.

“Above all, look out for the key of the position, and re-enforce it when necessary. In all positions we must consider the line of attack, the flank, the front, the space occupied by our troops, and the line of retreat.

“The lines of attack shall be interrupted as much as possible by ravines, hills, and woods, where we can place a few outposts to check the onward rush of the enemy. If, on the contrary, we are the attacking party, we shall choose a line free from any obstacles which might delay our onslaught.

“Let us see that our flanks are well protected, either by natural obstacles, or by breastworks and trenches placed in good positions, well hidden and well defended; our men shall feel more confident if they know that the flanks are safe.

“At the same time an outlet must be disposed on each flank to allow our troops to sally suddenly and crush the battalion which may be attacking the extreme points, if any opportunity should present itself, as we must not always remain on the defensive, but take the offensive as soon and often as possible, in order to better repel the assaults of the enemy. We must not forget that the tactics of the foreigners consist nearly always of flank attacks, so that good ambuscades shall always



be prepared to surprise the enemy when he comes up on our flanks.

"It is, of course, understood that our front must be as strong as possible, and dominate all lines of attack. Outside of its natural defenses our front shall be protected by trenches, breastworks, and rifle-pits. Inside the position the ground shall be cleared to allow the defending forces to maneuver easily.

"And, finally, every position must be supplied with an excellent line of retreat, with plenty of obstacles to hinder the advance of the enemy when he comes after us.

"We shall dispose our forces according to the nature of the ground, giving each arm the most suitable ground for its action; the different parties of guerrillas shall be so combined that, although acting independently, they shall support each other and concur in the proper execution of the plan agreed on. We shall always have sufficient reserves to support the troops that may require help, or to take a decisive action in case of victory.

"We have said that the troops of the different arms should be disposed according to the nature of the ground; generally the infantry occupies the center, the cavalry the wings or a position behind the infantry, and the artillery is placed in advance, in echeloned batteries, separated by 250 meters (or 300 varas).

"The regular order of battle should be in three consecutive lines, so as to present a reduced front to the good Yankee cannons and facilitate our movements.

"The first line, deployed as skirmishers, is intended to resist the first onslaught of the enemy, when on the defensive, and, in the offensive, to charge resolutely, and throw him out of his positions.

“The second line, formed in column, and concealed by the sinuosities of the ground, shall be the support of the first line, relieving it when necessary and filling up the blanks caused in the files.

“The third, or reserve, shall consist of picked men of the different arms, under the orders of the general in chief, who shall throw them forward to decide the victory or protect the retreat.

“We repeat that we must not give or accept combats with such a powerful foe if we have not the greatest chances of success, as, even should we rout him three times, or five times, at a heavy loss for ourselves, the question of our independence would not be solved. Let us wait for the deadly climate to decimate his files, and never forget that our object is only to protract the state of war, although, of course, we shall avail ourselves of every opportunity to do all the harm we can to the enemy.

“The first thing to be done before a combat is to reconnoiter the weak points of the enemy; next, after ascertaining these points, we shall occupy his attention on other points, and, when he least expects it, we shall make a vigorous attack on the weak points, with all the forces which we have prepared beforehand. The principle of a combat is at first a mere reconnoissance; if the results are good, the column of attack shall be strengthened; if not, the first plan shall be rectified as may be necessary; in case of retreat, our reserves shall protect it in order to avoid a disaster.

“To resume, the essential point in case of combat is to choose a strong position and to prevent all reconnoitering on the part of the enemy, and, if necessary for

that purpose, to oblige him to deploy his forces before we decidedly accept the battle; to decoy him into places where ambuscades have been prepared by us, and to occupy his attention wherever it may be necessary, in order to facilitate our movements."

Evidently this system of warfare has been wrought with a great deal of devotion and considerable intelligence. It is the hand of Spain, using the Filipinos for revenge on us for ending the colonial scandals in America of the Spaniards. We repeat the figures of the casualty lists in the course of nine months of this organized assassination after civilized war was over. There were killed: Americans, 268; killed of guerrillas, 3,227; or twelve guerrillas killed to one soldier. It is a horrible business, but it does not appear to be encouraging to the professors and performers of irregular warfare.

The words of General MacArthur on these results are full of thoughtful encouragement:

"In the Philippines there is no dynasty to destroy; no organized system of feudal laws to eradicate; no principles inconsistent with republicanism, which have solidly insinuated themselves into the national life, to displace; no adverse aspects of nature to overcome. On the contrary, nature, which is exuberant, balmy, and generous, has nourished into existence several millions of sensitive and credulous people, without allegiance to any existing institutions, but animated by certain inchoate ideas and aspirations, which by some unfortunate perversion of thought they conceive to be threatened by America. These people, fortunately, are intelligent, generous, and flexible, and will probably yield quickly and with absolute confidence to tuition and advice when

thoroughly informed of American institutions and purposes.

“As a future thought in the same direction, it may be suggested that the Aryan races are making their way back into the old continent, which as a consequence is likely, within a generation more, to become the theater of gigantic political activities. Up to this time the practical effect of republican institutions has not been considered in this connection; but the rapid extension of republican civilization in these islands, which is not only possible, but probable, must of necessity exert an active and potential influence upon the affairs of Asia; which, under the inspiration of American ideas, transmitted through Filipinos, may yet exhibit the greatest of political wonders.”

A close examination of the official dispatches and summaries shows that the greater part of the fighting of the guerrillas is forced by our troops taking the initiative, and pushing things. For example, this “Mention” contains familiar names of “Yankees,” as the Madrid Committee call Americans:

“June 11, 1900.—Brigadier-General F. D. Grant, U. S. V. (accompanied by Brigadier-General F. Funston, U. S. V.), commanding a column consisting of Troops H and G, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, two guns of Battery E, First U. S. Artillery, nine companies Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, detachment Thirty-fourth Infantry, U. S. V., six companies Thirty-fifth Infantry, U. S. V., Company M and scouts Forty-first Infantry, U. S. V., scouts of Fourth and Fifth districts, and one company of Macca-

bebe scouts attacks five hundred insurgents under Colonel Claro, occupying fortified positions on Mount Bulubad and two adjacent hills, near Sibul, province of Bulacan, Luzon, P. I., and forces them, with great loss in dead and wounded, to evacuate the positions which had been considered impregnable. Twenty-three buildings are destroyed, great quantities of rice captured, and growing corn pulled from the ground. The United States forces lose one man wounded."

This is different, but not radically so :

"July 12, 1900.—Six hundred insurgents attack Oroquieta, Mindanao, P. I., garrisoned by Company I, Fortieth Infantry, U. S. V., under First Lieutenant K. C. Masteller, and are repulsed with a loss of eighty-nine killed and twelve wounded, who are captured. The United States forces lose one sergeant killed, one sergeant wounded, and a sailor on the U. S. S. *Callao*, which rendered valuable assistance during engagement, mortally wounded."

The inhabitants of the Philippines suffer even more seriously in property than in casualties in the operations of the guerrillas, who run away as soon as they can get off, leaving the country devastated. Aguinaldo's connection with this system of destruction is direct, intimate, and official. He is individually and functionally responsible, and it is a matter of discretion as to the application of the laws of war and what civilization owes to itself. The importance of the capture of Aguinaldo

is increased in the understanding of the extent of the scenes of fire and slaughter.

In bringing this crowning affliction upon his people, Aguinaldo has displayed his accustomed indifference to their welfare. The condition of things in the Philippines when the Taft Commission arrived is displayed in the news given in the page of official summary of intelligence, as follows:

“June 1, 1900.—Captain Ambrosio Sandoval, with one lieutenant, twenty-nine men, twenty-six rifles, four revolvers, and seven hundred rounds of ammunition, surrenders at Cuyapo, P. I., to Second Lieutenant F. J. McConnell, Twelfth U. S. Infantry.

Major E. Z. Steever, commanding Troop E, Third U. S. Cavalry, strikes a band of insurgents at Mount Parayan, near Badoc, P. I., and kills twenty-seven. The troop loses one man killed and two wounded.

“June 3, 1900.—Eighteen men of Company A, Thirty-fifth Infantry, U. S. V., First Sergeant Donald W. Strong commanding, while scouting near Bustos, P. I., engage a band of ladrones, killing its captain, severely wounding one man, and capturing three rifles.

*Philippine Commission arrives at Manila, P. I., on transport Hancock.*

“June 4, 1900.—Detachment of thirty-five men of Company E, Thirty-fifth Infantry, U. S. V., under Second Lieutenant Allan Lefort, encounters, four miles northeast of Norzagaray, P. I., a party of

insurgents, and loses four men wounded, one mortally. Insurgent casualties unknown.

"June 5, 1900.—The insurgent Captain Versola turns in four rifles at Cuyapo, P. I., and Lieutenant Quinson, at same place, brings in thirteen insurgents, eight rifles, and some ammunition. Three rifles are surrendered at Aguila, P. I.

"June 6, 1900.—Insurgent Captain Mendoza surrenders, at Cuyapo, P. I., ten guns, and, on same date, ten rifles and three shotguns are surrendered at Camiling, P. I.

"June 7, 1900.—Captain John P. Grinstead, commanding twenty men of Company A, Thirty-second Infantry, U. S. V., on an expedition into the foothills northwest of Mariveles, P. I., encounters an insurgent outpost, and kills one insurgent. Following direction taken by insurgents, their barracks are found and destroyed.

"June 23, 1900.—First Lieutenant Frank S. Burr, Fifteenth U. S. Infantry, with twenty-three scouts, Fifth District Scouts, finds and destroys in mountains west of Mabalacat, P. I., an insurgent stronghold and magazine containing twenty tons of ordnance stores, machinery of all kinds for manufacturing ordnance, chemicals for making explosives, and twenty-four cases of two hundred pounds each of powder.

"June 24, 1900.—Twenty-two men, under First Lieutenant James M. McManus, Company G, Thirty-fifth Infantry, U. S. V., scouting near Santa Maria, Bulacan, Luzon, P. I., engage twenty insurgents, and defeat them, killing five, wounding four, and

taking five prisoners and seven guns. No casualties to detachment.

Detachments of Companies E, F, and H, Twenty-fourth U. S. Infantry, commanded by First Lieutenant William P. Jackson, encounter a party of insurgents near the junction of the Agno and Amburayang Rivers, and scatter it, killing six, wounding four, and capturing nine rifles and three ponies equipped."

This is an average page, and shows the presiding fact to be that the Americans are as superior to the Filipinos in guerrilla warfare as in the regular form of proceeding. Killing twelve guerrillas for one American soldier killed by guerrillas, and destroying ten times the military property of the bands following the Madrid rules and Aguinaldo's commands, affords a sufficient explanation of the great solicitude of the natives to stop fighting with the close of the war, and that Aguinaldo's captivity, so much lamented in Spain, promotes.



## CHAPTER XXII.

### AGUINALDO'S ZENITH AND DECLINE.

His Wonderful Influence and Power when He Opened War upon Americans—Rabid Selfishness when He Knew He could not Win—Forced His People to go on with a Hopeless Fight—His Cruelty—A Craze for Revenge, and Path of Ruin—Sorrows He Brought upon His Countrymen—Himself a Fugitive.

MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS, describing the situation immediately before the clash of arms in the environs of Manila, says of the forces, military and moral, that Aguinaldo had at command, he was at the zenith of his power. He had recently repressed rebellion which had raised its head in Central Luzon. He had assembled a pliant Congress, many members of which had been appointed by him to represent far distant congressional districts, and which had voted him the Dictator of the lives and fortunes of all the inhabitants of the Philippines. He dominated Manila, and when he ordered that the birthday of the martyred Rizal should be appropriately observed there, business was paralyzed, and not a native dared to pursue his accustomed daily labors. Not a province had the courage to oppose his appointed governors, backed by their Tagalo guards, although a few of those governors had previously suffered martyrdom for the zeal exhibited

in collecting money and sequestering private property. The southern islands were obedient. The appointed governor for one, and that one not eager for independence, wrote in January:

“To the Honorable President of the Revolutionary Government of the Philippines:

“Honorable Sir,—This Government has received the respected communication from the Presidency under your command, ordering that under no pretext whatever are American or other foreign troops to be permitted to land on this island, which order it will be my pleasant duty to comply with as far as the scanty forces under my command will permit. I have, under to-day's date, ordered the officials under my command in charge of the towns of this province to follow the same instructions, under pain of the most severe penalties.

“I have the honor to reply as above to the communication before cited. God guard you for many years for our liberty and independence!”

He was hailed from Europe as the savior of his country and as first of “the generous and noble Tagalo people,” and was assured of “the sympathy of all liberal and noble nations.” He was called upon to take a prominent part in United States politics, and those extending the invitation said:

“President Aguinaldo:

“Dear Sir,—In the interest and welfare of the Filipino Republic, I take the liberty to write you regarding an educational work to be published in this country rep-

resenting the views of the anti-expansion party, who wish to see a free and independent Philippine Republic.

"The object of this work is to increase public sentiment against annexation of the Philippines. Therefore, believing that some facts from the pen of Your Honor would strengthen the cause, I am authorized to ask certain questions."

There seemed to be a considerable number of persons having a mania of this nature. Here and there minds presumptively sound and disposing were darkened. In the Philippines, in December, 1899, there was observed in Luzon a fanatical lunacy, in its character supposed to be religious, a feature of which was prophets who declared themselves revealing and proclaiming new creeds which were quite markedly variable in origin and nature, and were collecting converts in Bulacan, Pampanga, and Pangasinan. In a secluded spot a few miles from Calumpit, a sect numbering several hundred had located itself and erected several nipa buildings, where it practiced its rites and incantations. It was dispersed by our troops, and its chief prophet sent to Manila. He proved to be an individual who earlier had set up an establishment in that city, from which he was taken by the police and sent to prison, where he was kept in confinement several months for illegal money exactions from the more ignorant natives.

Intelligent Filipinos had for some time been warning the military officers of the United States, and giving various accounts, of this queerness. Some attributed it to the terrors and intensities of the war; others to the tendencies of the natives to return, under stress of emo-

tions, to the superstitions that existed before the Spaniards came; and still others to the effect of religious liberty when the Church, which had been powerful in the Government, was no longer stronger than the State itself. There were several manifestations of peculiar excitement that was visionary, and the fact that the war consisted of widespread skirmishing, and the fighting between small organizations but an unbalancing intensity to the experiences of those who participated.

One of the closest and most judicious observers who have visited the Philippines, with the purpose of giving the people true facts and fair information, is Mr. Theodore W. Noyes, who made the journey as the editorial correspondent of the *Washington Star*. While he was interviewing General Otis, a dispatch was handed the General, saying "that Aguinaldo's wife and sister had just been made prisoners in North Luzon, and that Aguinaldo himself was being chased from rancherio to rancherio, with some prospects of his capture. Practically all of Aguinaldo's people are now in custody, and only his presence here is needed for a happy family reunion in Manila. Many of Aguinaldo's Cabinet officers and his civil and military lieutenants have also been captured."

The date of this was New-Year's Day, 1900, and the family reunion has occurred, whether happy or not. In reply to questions by Mr. Noyes concerning Aguinaldo's character and influence and the importance of his associates, General Otis said:

"Aguinaldo's prestige and influence with the Filipinos have been very great. Even now the lowest class endow him with superhuman attributes, including im-

munity from bullets; but his hold has weakened among the more intelligent Filipinos, and he has been denounced among them as a mountebank. From the time that he returned to Cavité in May, 1898, and became subject to Mabini's inspiration, he had never the intention of co-operating faithfully with the United States, except in so far as the Republic would be useful to him in holding Spain helpless while he worked his scheme of self-aggrandizement. Some of his associates were mere mercenaries; others were ambitious for power. Mabini was the master spirit, able, radical, uncompromising. He furnished the brains which made Aguinaldo's Cabinet formidable. He was brought before me recently, paralytic and a prisoner. I offered him his freedom on parole not to stir up trouble; he hesitated, and said, 'I have not changed my convictions.'

"I told him that I did not respect him the less on that account, and repeated the offer.

"'I have no means of support; I can not put my freedom to any use,' he replied.

"Buencamino is a professional turncoat, everything in turn and nothing long. He has been an officer in the Spanish army, and was Secretary of State in Aguinaldo's Cabinet when he was captured.

"Paterno, who is not yet in custody, has played a curious rôle. He arranged the treaty by which Spain bought off Aguinaldo and his associates in the revolution of 1896. He demanded from Spain money and a title of Castile, prince or duke, as the price of his achievement. After the United States intervened he again appeared as the agent of Spain in a proclamation which pronounced monarchy the fitting government for the

Filipinos, and advised them to side with Spain against the United States."

The following is a letter from Aguinaldo four weeks before the fighting at Manila, warning a friend of his to leave the city. It is in carefully-chosen words, and the photograph is something understood to have a special meaning:

"[Presidency. Personal.]

"Revolutionary Government of the Philippines,  
"Malolos, January 7, 1899.

"My Dear Don Benito,—I write this to ask you to send to this our Government the photograph you have in your house, and I will pay you for whatever price you may ask. Also please buy me everything which may be necessary to provide the said photograph.

"I beg you to leave Manila with your family, and to come here to Malolos; but not because I wish to frighten you—I merely wish to warn you for your satisfaction, although it is not yet the day or the week.

"Your affectionate friend, who kisses your hands,  
"EMILIO AGUINALDO.

"Sr. D. Benito Legarda."

The only interpretation of this that can be considered is, that the Dictator, who was in a wild state with his favorite proposition to bring the civilized world to him, was to strike those who were in disagreement with him by wiping out Manila with fire. He had a grand passion about this. He did not reason it out.

It was a part of the Filipino pomp presenting Aguinaldo as a supernatural being, that his soldiers would not allow him to take the risk of personally taking part

in combats. However, if General MacArthur was not mistaken, the Tagalog chief was nearly under fire in a skirmish at Santa Maria during the Malolos campaign. In an official account of the affair, this passage occurs:

“Opened on the enemy with machine guns, and attacked him with infantry, deployed in the extended order, and drove him in flight in the direction of Santa Maria and east of Bocaue.

“Found that there had been a spirited combat at Bocaue, and that the four companies of infantry in the vicinity had preserved the railroad intact, and had inflicted loss upon the enemy.”

General MacArthur reported later:

“General Wheaton displayed on this occasion a splendid warlike ferocity, the practical results of which can not be overestimated in classifying officers for honorable mention or substantial reward, as it is probable that his emphatic methods had a great deal to do with inspiring the pertinacious and rapid action which was manifested by the commands engaged, and which was indispensable to the situation.”

If Aguinaldo was within sight of this fight, he was not sufficiently animated with “warlike ferocity” to get into it, and the glimpse he may be presumed to have had was not encouraging. General MacArthur has a way of giving praise for conduct in action with delightful emphasis.

Señor Pedro Paterno was the arbitrator of peace, which Aguinaldo consented to because his resources were scant. There was money offered and other inducements. This man of peace became very violent

toward the Americans; June 22d issued a proclamation of resentment, because Americans did not make war or peace like Spaniards; and crying, "To war, then, beloved brothers!" and proceeded:

"The God of war, in whom we have put our faith and hope, is helping us. Interior and international dissensions and conflicts rend the invading army. Its volunteers, being aware that we are in the right, fight without enthusiasm, and only in compliance with their forced military duty. Within the American Nation itself a great political party asks for the recognition of our rights, and Divine Providence watches over the justice of our cause.

"Viva the Filipino sovereign people!

"Viva national independence!

"Viva the liberating army!

"Viva Don Emilio Aguinaldo, President of the Republic!"

"[Republica Filipina, Arsenal of Gerona.

No. 316—Section C.]

"On this day, and in compliance with superior orders, I have forwarded to the headquarters of the army six dynamite bombs, with a letter, of which this is a correct copy:

"In compliance with your orders about dynamite bombs, I send six to your headquarters, ready with their anvils, pistons, and cartridges of dynamite, for loading at the proper moment. Sr. Manuel Roviroza, who is in charge of them, carries them and directions for their use. As soon as others are ready I shall send them. I need pistons for these last.'



"I have the honor to notify these headquarters for their information and action.

"May God keep you many years!

"AURELIO RUSCA,  
"The Lieutenant-Colonel in Charge."

"This gentleman" got into Manila with his bombs, but was "obliged" to refrain again because his chosen occupation was found too dangerous to himself.

It is to be observed as a guide to conduct in dealing with Filipinos that they are quite facile with their solemnities. The marriage vow of a woman the men hold to be especially binding and sacred, and they are revengeful and relentless when she breaks it; but they give their word of honor freely and lightly. Eugenio Blanco, at Cavité, July 1, 1898, wrote Aguinaldo that he desired to serve the Philippines. The whole letter is of exceeding interest.

"Sr. Don Emilio Aguinaldo,  
President of the Philippine Republic:

"Respectable Sir,—He who signs this, desiring to employ his small ability for the service of the Filipines, of which he solemnly declares himself to be a son, desiring to show that it was only on account of exceptional circumstances that he was forced to adhere to the Spanish cause, he asks that he may be given liberty in order that he may go to Manila and impress upon General Augustin the necessity of surrendering the place.

"I declare and solemnly swear upon my word of honor that whatever the result of the negotiation may be I shall return to this town to place myself anew at the

disposition of the revolutionary Government as a prisoner of war; and if I violate this oath without just cause I shall submit to the punishment imposed upon me by the said Government, renouncing all rights and guarantees which, according to international law, I may claim.

“EUGENIO BLANCO.

“Cavité, July 1, 1898.”

It is evident on the face of this letter, and the outside proof is conclusive, that this man was inviting an engagement to do a work of treachery, and was very ready and easy in swearing on his word of honor.

Aguinaldo issued instructions to a society of murderers in Manila, 9th of January, 1899, preaching treachery as a virtue, and recommending savagery in war. The instructions are express and cunning provisions for systematic assassination. The document was written in Tagalo, not Spanish, and headed, “Instructions to the brave soldiers of Sandatahan, of Manila.” In this paper in the midst of most barbarous gibberish there are parenthetically appeals to the most elevated sentiments, with sentences interspersed of protecting the people from banditti.

The inflexibility of Aguinaldo in self-assertion gave way to force, and he was pleased in his phrases to do that which was unavoidable. When his armies that he thought sufficient to beat the Americans gave way and were so demoralized it was not practicable to maintain the appearance of organization, he issued orders, stating that “not many men were needed” under their system to remain in the army, and he had so much confidence in “his brave men” that he was glad they had returned

to their homes, and begged them to be in as good relations as possible with the Americans. It was better to see them. . . . The reason for pressing themselves upon Americans was to plot their destruction, and the red savages, whose hunting-grounds we of North America possess, would have scrupled to be treacherous as the wily Malays, who had no sense of dignity to control their craft or limit their malice. And yet the London *Saturday Review* is one of the most sorrowful sheets out of America to complain that there was a trick played on Aguinaldo—gross treachery. Then the dark mud adder was beaten by his own tactics. The *Review* proceeds:

“He gave the Americans invaluable assistance in the capture of Manila and in the previous maneuvers. He proved a faithful ally until, partly owing to a change of policy in Washington and partly to a want of tact . . .

The conclusive answer to this is that Aguinaldo did not give the Americans any assistance before Manila, but had written himself the partner of Spain before an American soldier landed in the Philippines.

Still it is to Americans almost incredible that the man posing as the master of the islands and prancing in that character as our misunderstood friend, was committed to the Spaniards at this time, and had been so for two months, before the fall of Manila, writing long letters of philosophy and affection to Consul Williams, and communicating through secret channels with the Spanish in the city the Americans besieged. There is no serious questioning now of the fact, and the weight of evidence is that there was a plot to combine the powers of Spaniards and Filipinos against the Amer-

icans; that there were machinations lacking to a triangular fight in Manila—the Spaniards and Filipinos against the Americans—a proposition supported by a mass of information; but there are two doubts to be discussed on the evidence. First, whether Aguinaldo was sure he had then sufficiently overcome the partiality of the Philippine population to risk assailing Americans openly. Second, whether the better opportunity would be during the assault of two armies, with advantages of surprise, against one; or to wait until there would be “joint occupation of the city,” and the streets and houses used as ambuscades and fire-traps. Aguinaldo prepared and issued elaborate instructions for the private murder of Americans who were alone and unsuspecting, and the tactics of guerrilla war therein displayed that comes to us now from Madrid is the same in principle and characteristics, and differs from the masterpieces of the Dictator only in detail.

Colonel Jewett, of New Albany, Indiana, Judge-Advocate of the Eighth Army Corps, was acquainted with Aguinaldo, and what he says is of much interest:

“Aguinaldo’s hold on the Filipinos was largely a matter of superstition. Ignorant ones believed him to be ‘anting anting,’ which is their way of describing one who bears a charmed life. Before he left Cavité, in July, 1898, it was currently reported and believed among these people that he underwent the ordeal of having a volley of rifle-balls fired at his breast at close range, and was unharmed.

“His mother, a pure Filipino woman, was of dark-brown color, with straight black hair, and absolutely devoted to and proud of her son. She was very cour-



GENERAL MACARTHUR,  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF UNITED STATES TROOPS  
IN THE PHILIPPINES.



teous to strangers, and I was several times under obligations to her for a cigar and a light from the burning end of her own cigar.

"My own notion is that Aguinaldo is glad to be captured. The Filipinos thoroughly understand the humane treatment which our people accord to even the worst criminals, and I imagine that in his captivity Aguinaldo will become reconciled to American domination, and even hope that he may be of great service to his own people in reconciling them to a Government that can not fail to be advantageous to them. All the stories about Aguinaldo going to and from Manila during the American occupation are a mistake. He was never in Manila from the time he was exiled by the Spaniards, in 1897, until Funston brought him in."

The Colonel is to be credited with the best sketch that has been written of Aguinaldo's mother, but he does Aguinaldo injustice in saying the Captive is glad he was caught. No doubt he is playing contentment to the best of his ability; but he is a tameless creature, and would take the chances of an escape in an instant and run or fight for liberty. He has recommended assassination as no other warrior chief, not an utter barbarian, ever has done. There are horrors in his directions to burn towns and kill Americans, such as can not be found in the utterances of any other desperado, and he sandwiched them between precepts of humanity and adorable phrases cultivating the sweetness of civilization.

This was a time of much perturbation among the peacemakers, and the natives who were seriously desirous to open ways for peace had the hardest of times. The

experience of one who was encouraged not to weary in well-doing, at the time of the first bloody collision between the United States troops and Filipinos, is thus related by General Otis, and is illustrative of the despotic caprice which was a feature of Aguinaldo at his highest point as an insurgent.

Judge Torres, the present attorney-general of the islands, who had recently arrived from Cebu, where he had filled a judicial position under the Spanish Government, immediately upon his arrival in Manila exerted himself to the maintenance of peace, and offered his services to Aguinaldo to assist in bringing about friendly conditions. On January 9th, Aguinaldo had appointed him senior member of what was termed his Peace Commission. He was at his home in Manila, February 5th, and visited me on the evening of that day, praying that I would propose to the insurgent authorities the establishment of a neutral zone, that terms for peace might be considered. He was informed that as the war was the act of the insurgents we would not initiate proceedings, but that it must continue until they (the insurgents) were ready to submit propositions. He then asked that a fellow-member of his insurgent commission, Colonel Arguelles, who was in the city, might be permitted to pass through the lines in order to visit Malolos and confer with Aguinaldo and his principal advisers. This was granted, and Arguelles was taken by Colonel Kilbourne, of the Pay Department, to that portion of General MacArthur's line of battle opposite Caloocan. It being quite late in the evening when he arrived there, he concluded to return to the city and recommence the journey early the following morning, which he did. He



was passed through the lines under flag of truce, was absent two or three days, when he returned, and was properly received by a party, which was viciously fired on by the insurgents as soon as their flag of truce had withdrawn a short distance. The firing caused our party to retreat quickly, Arguelles leading it and anathematizing his countrymen.

The destructiveness of barbarism breaks out in the insurgent forces when driven from Malolos. In an official summary this appears:

"14. The enemy's line of retreat, all the way from Caloocan and Malabon to Malolos, had been made, by his own act, literally a pathway of incendiary fire and a scene of needless desolation."

Burning all things inflammable seemed to be the popular form of keeping up declining courage and mending fallen fortunes. In the isle of Cebu, Pablo Mejia, a prominent American sympathizer, was assassinated in front of his own door. It was alleged that this was due to his friendliness to the Americans, and that his name headed a "black-list" of sixty who were to be assassinated, all of whom had received warning to that effect. Those were of the natives who had been avowedly friendly to the occupation of the United States.

In May, '99, Lawton's fiery spirit flashed in messages as annexed:

"Baliuag, May 6, 1899.

"Scouts sent from here day before yesterday send in report as follows: 'Destroyed about forty-eight thousand bushels rice, seven tons sugar, large quantities cloth from which uniforms are made, a lot of shoulder-straps, gold lace, buttons, etc., for same; a quantity of ammu-

dition, large lot of empty shells, three sets of reloading tools. Killed officer mounted on fine horse; got horse. This A. M. destroyed about twenty thousand bushels rice, said by natives to belong to Captain Ambrosio, of insurgent army.' Scouts will continue their work.

"LAWTON, Major-General."

"Baliuag, May 7, 1899.

"Chief of Scouts,—Move all your scouts as quickly as possible to Norzagaray, near which place on the road to San Jose you will find the mounted troop of cavalry. It is reported that a strong force of insurgents is coming over that trail toward Angat. There are troops at San Rafael and at Angat. Assist the cavalry all you can, and make it as hot as possible for the advance of the insurgents. There are said to be two generals with them—Geronimo and Pio del Pilar. Get one or both if you can. Look out for five pack-mules lost near San Rafael when we came up.

H. W. LAWTON."

## CHAPTER XXIII.

### EXTRAORDINARY MARCHES OF TROOPS.

Very Remarkable Scouting—Our Troops Storm Ambuscades, and Rush Exploring Expeditions—Affairs in Northeastern Luzon—The Corner of the Country in which Aguinaldo was Run Down and Taken—The Brilliant Runaway of Major Batchelor—Orders could not Overtake Him, and well they Could Not.

WHILE our devoted troops, with unrelaxing energy, pressed the ever-retiring and dispersing enemy, it is a part of the story that Manila was a hot-bed of rebellious treachery throughout the serious times of the war, allowing no relaxation of vigilance at any time, until the guerrilla nests, as well as the actually organized and armed forces were shattered. Our officers write in a consensus of impressions that the time when a real state of war existed was eight months, dating from the first fighting in the suburbs of Manila; and then the insurgent leaders were active in procuring recruits for mere village and neighborhood raids, but the American authorities in Manila were not allowed to believe they were living with native friends. Among the signs that a new order of things in the capital was expected, was the flight of all the native servants from the Malacanán Palace, the headquarters of the commander-in-chief. These people would have been offended if called *Ladrones* (thieves), and yet they robbed the officers with

great care, circumspection, and discrimination. One of them drove off with the carriage and horses of the adjutant-general, and turned over the outfit to the outside insurgents.

There was a Junta in Manila, composed of "shrewd Filipinos," and the General-in-Chief gives this account of the mercy shown to offenders against the peace and dignity of the United States:

"They were watched, but not restrained of their liberties until the early spring, as no decided hostile act of commission could be proven against them. When arrested they professed to be the most loyal of American subjects, claimed to be working incessantly for American supremacy, and expressed a desire to take at once the oath of allegiance. The principal was placed in confinement. The others took the oath, and were released.

"The captured insurgent correspondence shows that this principal was in very frequent communication with the authorities from whom he received his appointment. In a communication of August 15th he was informed from Tarlac of the receipt there of many of his letters, and was assured 'that there is nothing to fear from those who are at the front of our Government, nor from the people.'"

On the same authority—the highest—this rests:

"The presidente of one of the cities, wealthy in landed estates, was reported to be contributing to a leading insurgent officer who was still engaged in active hostilities. Upon investigation, his friends, who were trusted men, asserted that he could not do otherwise; that he was very anxious for the success of the Amer-

ican arms and the peace of the country, and was doing all he could to effect it, but that he was under painful duress and obliged to contribute of his means upon insurgent demand in order to retain any portion of his property. Thus, as was ascertained, many citizens of friendly intent were situated."

It was ascertained that the insurgents in Manila were in close communication with the active belligerents on the south side of the bay, and supplied them with stores of contraband character, even to the materials for manufacturing cartridges, and so many people were dependent for food obtained by free intercourse, the offenders were let off lightly, for otherwise there would have been famine in the densely-populated districts. Manila was a Grand Hotel for rebel refugees, who considered it a nice place in hard weather, and yet did not abate their hostility. There was continued free trade for specified and approved articles.

The fighting was to be done in the distance, and the American columns made rapid and searching marches, chasing the bands of belligerents, leaving no spot untouched that it was believed harbored a foe. There never was as difficult a job done as by the scouts of our army. The scouting task was far more dangerous and wearing than that of the British in South Africa, and more successful. A letter from an unfortunate man, Albert Sonnichsen, formerly quartermaster on the transport *Zealandia*, made prisoner in the Malolos advance, is an inside disclosure of conditions:

"We are about to march to the northward—where, we do not know. Up to Lieutenant Gilmore's arrival

we have been treated in a most barbaric manner, starved, beaten, and bound; but since the advance of the United States troops our treatment has been a trifle better. We have been living on five cents a day, and most of us are nearly naked. The Spaniards have been treated even worse than us, being tortured in the stocks and starved. Some hundreds are dying of dysentery and various other diseases, but, whether incapable or not caring, the Government does nothing for them. The bearer, Señor Ramon Rey, has been a true friend to us; in fact, had it not been for him and his countrymen we should probably have been starved to death on the retreat from Malolos.

"For God's sake, can nothing be done for us? We have been starving, abused, and treated like animals.

"The bearer has been a true friend to us, and deserves the best consideration of every American.

"Respectfully, ALBERT SONNICHSEN."

This was the humanity of the insurgents when Aguinaldo did not desire to advertise his civilization, as in the case of Lieutenant Gilmore himself.

The general situation in April (26th), 1899, given in a letter by Lawton, "in the field at Norzagaray," says, "the enemy are disintegrating," as small detachments are wandering all over the country, and there seems to be little organization." Buffalo carts were out of the question, except on smooth roads, and there were none such. Therefore, "the soldier was taxed to his utmost capacity, to carry his rifle, ammunition, and blanket roll, without being yoked into a cart to haul supplies as we have been obliged to do." The General

adds, "that was what the soldiers were doing at that moment." He had been trying bulls, and:

"A number of our bulls have died; I can not ascertain accurately how many, but ten or more, and the men pull along the carts.

"These bulls have died from exhaustion, and not from any disease. The four-mule teams have done very well with help over bad places and on the hills, but the two-horse and mule teams could not more than pull the empty wagon.

"I have therefore no transportation, even after the reduction of weight by consumption of rations.

"We have, however, traveled over a rough country with no road. I hope, when I get my transportation in, to replace dead bulls with others found in the country, and readjust and arrange it so that it can continue over good roads and make short marches each day. The fifty pack-mules will give us very little material assistance, as they will not carry one day's rations for the whole command, and I must still rely upon the bull-teams. I can, however, give the pack-train to the squadron of cavalry, including the mounted troop, and it will carry ten days' rations for the whole squadron, and I can use them for flank or rapid movements, and they will be strong enough to maintain themselves anywhere.

"My suggestion, then, is to let me move west down the river by both banks to or near Baliuag, where I should be met by a supply train with ten days' rations. Then let me move north along road through San Yldefonso to San Miguel, and let MacArthur move over the road to the west of the swamp along the river. I can keep my cavalry squadron on my right flank and in





determine that it is, he can move by that route; otherwise he must move on the road by Baliuag, and thence on the same road north to San Miguel, after having joined your column. I have lost all confidence in any map which I have yet seen."

Here the same place and the same date of that of Lawton's letter, Major Eastwick, of the Second Oregon, made a reconnoissance:

"The command moved forward in a generally northerly direction, following the crest of the range of hills which tend in a north and south line, with flankers thrown out when the nature of the growth permitted, though for the most part it was necessary to move in column of files, with flanks unprotected. At nearly every prominent point was a small lookout station, and pile of brush for signal lights, which we burned. At the head of the creek, where the bridge turns sharply to the west, our advance party was again fired upon by the insurgents from a ravine some four hundred yards to the northeast. The fire was returned with some effect, driving the insurgents into the brush. The command followed the ridge to the west to a point overlooking the river."

The day was enlivened with several skirmishes, and the report continues:

"At 12.45 P. M. again taking up the march, ascended the next ridge, where the advance guard was met by a volley from some five insurgents in the valley on the other side. Returning the fire, they were driven beyond range. These insurgents were dressed in red uniforms, and armed with Mausers and Remingtons. From this point could be seen many natives moving north. The

command then proceeded on the ridge and to the ford half a mile north of Angat. The water here was three feet deep at this ford, and, crossing at the point, a halt of forty-five minutes was made. The command then returned to the point by the road on the west side of the river, arriving at four P. M.

“In numerous places in the hills stores of rice, corn, and sugar were found, and also some few bolos, but no fire-arms. It is estimated that about six or seven insurgents were killed, and nine prisoners were taken and are now in confinement. Distance traveled estimated at ten miles.

“Attached hereto, marked ‘Exhibit A,’ is a sketch of the country traversed, and Exhibit B consists of some correspondence found in a house previously occupied by the insurgents. Exhibit C consists of insurgents’ telegraphic dispatches concerning the uprising in Tondo of February 23, 1899.”

The March telegrams from the front contain the following:

“Indang, March 18, 1900.

“Adjutant-General Wheaton’s Brigade:

“Lieutenant Ely, commanding G, Amadeo, reports that at one o’clock this morning volleys were heard south of Amadeo. At five o’clock man from Soledad, a barrio three miles south of Amadeo, reported that a band of Ladrones, only thirty of whom had rifles, demanded money of the place, and being refused carried off all the men and women in the place. He reports that the people of Amadeo now admit that General Trias was east of Amadeo, near Minontoc, ten days ago, and that he is thought to have carried off rifles which

had been hidden between Amadeo and Silang, and that he went to mountains east of Santo Tomas, where a force is gathering. I am sending a company at once to Mendez Nunez, and more men to Lieutenant Ely at Amadeo, to chase the band seen early this morning near Soledad. The detachment yesterday, to co-operate with Colonel Schuyler, reached Buena Vista last night. Will move toward Silang and return to-morrow.

“JOHNSTON, Major.”

The expedition of Major Batchelor, of the Twenty-fourth Infantry, was an unauthorized movement, proceeding step by step, going on with great good luck and exposure, privation and weariness, from Tayug to Aparri; that is, from a town on the only railroad to one on the north coast of Luzon. Efforts were made to stop the Major with his battalion and Maccabebe scouts; but the slender column was not overtaken, and met no ambush. General Lawton was indignant that such risks should be undertaken in so informal a way, but concluded that it was a good thing. The region is given celebrity by Funston's surprising scouting, and capture of Aguinaldo. Here is the stirring report that first aroused curiosity and apprehension:

“Headquarters First Division,

“In the Field, Tayug, November 30, 1899.

“Chief of Staff,—I send you with this latest received from Castner and Batchelor, crossing trail Bayonbong, received last night. Supplies are being sent to them by native carriers.

“Camp near Aboat River, November 26, 1899.—To

Major-General Lawton, Tayug: Left San Nicolás about five A. M., November 24th. Met Private Schick and sixteen Tagalos about three miles from town with two prisoners. Sent him ahead up trail, which turns to left, up steep hillside through thick bamboo. For about five miles trail is excellent. With little improvement bull-carts, not too heavily loaded, can go over it with ease. Trail for this distance follows sides of mountains with easy grades, much labor having been expended on it. At end of five miles trail becomes too narrow and too steep for bull carts. Continued to cuartel formerly used by Spanish troops, about twelve miles from San Nicolás. Found it burned, and no insurrectos. Recent occupation and sign on trail of passage of many ponies, carabao, and people. Continued on until about eight P. M.; trail got very narrow. Several bridges on roads at ravines. Pony train attempted to follow me, but seven ponies fell over hillside, about three hundred feet, to creek bottom. It was too dark for even a man to walk over the trail safely. Two ponies had to be killed. Made about sixteen miles. Men very tired, and had to go to bed without anything to eat. Next morning got some food, very little, and started ahead. Trail was very steep, and went over mountain about five thousand feet high. Men, particularly Tagalos, were so exhausted from hard climbing, had to make a long halt at noon, and cook a little rice, which Twenty-fourth Infantry had when they came up. All were very weak from lack of food. Camped about two miles from Knapo. Tagalo scouts at that place. Twenty-fourth Infantry made a dry camp about three miles behind me. Reached Knapo about 8.30 to-day. Only a cuartel. Evidence of recent

occupation by insurrectos. Left Twenty-fourth Infantry cooking breakfast. Marched to this point, about twelve miles from Knapo. Trail good and well defined, but over very high mountains. Tagalo scouts should be in Santa Cruz to-night; estimated six miles from this camp. Believe Twenty-fourth Infantry did not move from Knapo, as the trail behind them has many stragglers on it, and the command is much exhausted from hard climbing and lack of food. My ponies are with me, but quite worn. Have three more days of food, but can make it last six days. Insurrectos left no ponies or carabaos on trail. Find the natives call it three days from San Nicolás to Bayonbong, but they are good mountaineers, carry a little rice, and make from twenty-five to thirty miles a day. Believe it is a good five-days' march for our troops, unused to anything but mud and bogs. Nothing of importance has happened. No people save a few old men and women in the country. Should be in Bayonbong day after to-morrow. Pack-trains or native carriers only means of transportation which will work over trail. Men in good condition. Only one Tagalo behind; he should reach us to-night. Tagalos ahead seem entirely confident and trustworthy. Hope the train I sent back can get rations, ammunition, and return at once.

"Saw a few deer on trail; no other game. High grass everywhere; not much timber. Very cold weather in the mountains. Streams; apparently no fish. Insurrectos can not live in these mountains without bringing in food with great labor. Believe they are hiding about one-half day's journey from the valleys. Believe much plunder is still hidden at San Nicolás. Immediate advance

toward Bayonbong prevented me from investigating trails near San Nicolás. Barrio of Santa Maria near there is hot-bed of insurrectos, so my Tagalos report. Am doing all I can to push forward, but do not wish to drive my men and land them in the valley of the Rio Magat too weak and worn for any use. Have marched about forty miles by trail in three days—equal to seventy miles in level country. Pony train has worked well. Twenty-fourth Infantry have not seen their ponies since leaving San Nicolás. All maps I have seen of the country are erroneous, and give no idea of the trail at all. Will be off as soon as I can see the road to-morrow, and hope to reach Bayonbong the day after. Very respectfully, (signed) Castner.

“Near Santa Rosa, November 27th.—Adjutant-General First Division: I reached this point without opposition of any sort. Scouts are in my front. The trail is much harder than was reported at San Nicolás. My pony train has not been seen since leaving San Nicolás, but bearers employed there have kept me supplied with rice. I have seen cattle but once, and think there are practically none in the mountains. The trail winds so badly can not give distance marched. I would estimate it at thirty-five miles. I still have two hard marches to Bambang. I have captured sixteen of Aguinaldo's men going to Bayonbong to join him. They seem greatly dispirited, and were hungry. I sent them back with orders to go to San Nicolás and get food. Will probably need ammunition. Will get food of some sort. Command following will need guides at Cuyapo. I have been obliged to make one dry camp and to shorten my



AGUINALDO AS A CHINESE SAILOR.





march two days on account of water; first water beyond Cuyapo, next this side nine miles. I wrote from latter point. Very respectfully, (signed) Jos. B. Batchelor, Jr., Twenty-fourth Infantry, commanding First Battalion.'

“LAWTON, Major-General.”

December 3d, General Lawton reported to headquarters at Manila:

“I repeat to you message just received from Batchelor, commanding battalion Twenty-fourth Infantry at Bayonbong. His instructions did not in any contingency contemplate an advance down river valley below Bayonbong. However, the raid may not be a bad move. Wire immediately such instructions as you wish sent him. I will try to have them reach him in time. Orders to Baldwin's battalion Twenty-second Infantry to return do not seem to have reached him.

“‘Bayonbong, December 2, 1899.—To Adjutant-General, First Division: I have the honor to report my arrival at this town without opposition. The governor of the province, General Fernando Canon, yesterday surrendered the province—three cities, one hundred and ten Spanish and ten American prisoners, and about sixty rifles; delivery not yet completed—to Lieutenants Castner and Munro, who arrived at the same time. Castner, though senior, accorded reception of surrender to Munro in consideration of negotiations already carried on by latter. I have directed people not to be molested. Liberated surrendered insurrectos, and have general and his officers at liberty in the town, but preparing to go to

Manila. I am informed that in Isabela there are about one thousand insurrectos and about the same number in Cagayan, and about two hundred American prisoners in latter province. General Canon informs me he has a letter from Manaoag, near Dagupan, strongly inferring presence there on November 20th of Aguinaldo and his family. The latter was to follow the treasure train and their baggage, but on learning of the capture turned back and went to Villavis and thence to Manaoag. I have heard a rumor that Aguinaldo was making a new trail for himself from near Trinidad toward the east. I find little to eat in the country; no sugar, scarcely any cattle, plenty of coffee and tobacco. My whole command greatly needs clothing, shoes, etc. There is no salt, and I hesitate to advance without it. Bacon all gone. I shall go up to the mouth of Rio Grande unless stopped by orders. Start in that direction to-morrow. I expect to reach Ilagan in about five days, and Aparri on or about December 12th. There is an insurrecto general there with a reported force of nine hundred. If any of these people make serious resistance I may need ammunition bad. I have heard that the navy had a force of some sort off Aparri. The Rio Grande is usually navigable, according to report, and, judging from the volume of the Magat, up to Ilagan. Can not they bring me some salt and ammunition on a small gunboat? There is nothing to stop them to Ilagan. I shall presumably go down the river in cascoes. Please so inform navy officer in charge of suggested gunboat. It would be a great relief to get some clothing. Some of my men are marching barefooted; all without stock-

ings, and some without trousers. I hope my next orders will reach me at Aparri by gunboat. Very respectfully,  
 Jos. D. Batchelor, Captain Twenty-fourth Infantry,  
 commanding First Battalion.'

"LAWTON, Major-General."

It adds interest to the accounts of this march to note that this province of Isabela was the one in which Aguinaldo took refuge, and where he was caught, and that the Twenty-fourth United States Infantry is of soldiers of color, and reported to be of uncommon stature. The regiment gave an excellent account of itself at Santiago.

A headquarters dispatch from Manila, December 3d, ordered: "Arrest Batchelor's advance north down the Magat and Rio Grande Rivers, if possible. Ration his column at Bayonbong, where he will remain until further orders."

General Wheaton succeeded Lawton at Tayug, Lawton being called south to look after the insurgents gathering there in small detachments. Wheaton telegraphed December 5th, "Messenger has been sent to stop Batchelor."

"Tayug, December 2, 1899.

"Chief of Staff, Manila:

"The following received at 10.15 A. M.:

"Bayonbong, November 29, 1899.—Major-General Lawton: I have the honor to submit the following report of operations since my last, dated November 27th: Marched all day, November 28th, over mountains through small barrio of Santa Cruz, and down Aboat

River to Bambang, twenty-two miles, trail crossing river many times. Tagalo scouts captured three insurgents on trail. One major and two captains captured in Bambang. Learned here that eight cavalymen had come in from Dupax and left few hours before our arrival, also that their commander was treating through a peace commission, so-called, in Bambang, consisting of Spanish prisoners, with the governor-general of Nueva Vizcaya, Bayonbong, for a surrender. This has been going on for several days. Peace commissioners' story was mixed, and I determined to march early on Bayonbong, fearing there some chance for treachery. Lieutenant Munro met me on the road, and we entered Bayonbong. As he had already commenced negotiations with these people, I deemed it best to give him the honor of receiving the surrender and let him furnish his terms, as they seemed satisfactory and covered the ground there. The people here, if telling the truth, knew nothing of Aguinaldo. They say he was headed here, but never reached this valley. Will look about me and try to learn of his whereabouts if he is in the valley. Twenty-fourth Infantry are not yet here, though we arrived about nine A. M. My pack-train is with me. People are very good to us, and we can subsist. Will hold on here until Captain Batchelor arrives. Inhabitants tell me that Aguinaldo is not on good terms with these people, and would have hard work to live in this country. No doubt many native troops could be raised in this province who would serve us well. . . . Very respectfully, J. C. Castner, First Lieutenant, Fourth Infantry, commanding Lowe's scouts.'

“LAWTON, Major-General.”

"Manila, December 3, 1899.

"Commanding General, Tayug:

"Department commander does not approve of the suggestion Lieutenant Castner makes in his report to General Lawton of November 29th, that about two hundred of the best of those soldiers (insurgents) who recently surrendered at Bayonbong be armed and equipped.  
SCHWAN, Chief of Staff."

"Headquarters First Division,

"Tayug, December 2 and 3, 1899.

"Chief of Staff, Manila:

"General Wheaton has arrived. We have arranged the transfer of commands satisfactorily. I will start south in the morning, taking six troops Fourth Cavalry, and six companies Thirty-fourth Infantry; latter to start as soon as relieved by Thirteenth Infantry, which has not yet arrived.  
"LAWTON, Major-General."

"Santa Rosa, December 9, 1899.

"Chief of Staff:

"I repeat for your information message just received from Kennon, at San Jose. Castner with his scouts led advance over trail from Bayonbong to San Nicolás. He was followed by Batchelor with battalion Twenty-fourth Infantry, who was followed by Baldwin with a battalion Twenty-second Infantry. Two days later, on receipt of information that Bayonbong would surrender to Munro, messenger was sent to recall Baldwin. Castner or Batchelor had no instructions to go farther than Bayonbong or vicinity. His departure for Aparri was as much of a surprise as though he had started for San

Francisco. A messenger was sent with all haste with orders to him to remain at Bayonbong. Baldwin did not return, and it is not known whether or not messenger to Batchelor reached him. The enthusiasm and desire on the part of all officers to do something has led many of them to unauthorized conduct, which embarrassed me greatly. I have wired Kennon to ascertain definitely situation at Bayonbong, and report facts direct to you. He should, I think, report to Wheaton.

“San Jose, December 8, 1899.—Filed 8.20 P. M.—Colonel Edwards, Santa Rosa: Continued reports reached me of force of party in mountain near Bayonbong and also Aguinaldo’s treasures. Outrages followed departure of Munro from Dupax. Batchelor has gone. Baldwin was at Bayonbong on 3d; present whereabouts unknown. Aguinaldo reported near Bayambang, disguised as Chinaman. Some force needed at Bayonbong, if Nueva Vizcaya is to be held. Effect of departure of troops bad. Baldwin undoubtedly has received his orders to return by this time. His departure will leave Nueva Vizcaya bare. People reported very friendly, but afraid of armed insurgents. To-morrow morning scouting party leaves here for Bayonbong. Telegraph operator at Carranglan can communicate with one at Bayonbong without repairs. Probably very little work needed to put line in first-class condition from native source. Batchelor reported to have had fight near boundary Nueva Vizcaya and Isabela. These conditions are reported for information of division commander. Unless further instructions are received to-night scouting party will leave at daylight to-morrow.’

“LAWTON.”

“Tayug, December 9, 1899.

“General Schwan, Chief of Staff, Manila :

“Native scout came in from Baldwin this morning. Baldwin was at Bayonbong the 5th, and had received no orders. Batchelor had gone north. Letter from Batchelor, dated the 3d, reports action with the insurgents at Cordon, three days' march north of Bayonbong. Insurgents defeated and fled. All natives receive Americans with great rejoicing. Both Baldwin and Batchelor report need everything, especially money, but do n't ask for re-enforcements. I do not understand why orders sent by Lawton had not reached Baldwin by the 5th. Anything going to Bayonbong should go via San Jose.

“WHEATON, Brigadier-General.”

“Manila, December 10, 1899.

“General Wheaton, Tayug :

“Kennon reports scouting party left for Bayonbong over Carranglan trail yesterday. He wants money. I have asked him if 5,000 could not be sent with 25,000 to be sent to you to San Fabian in couple of days. Could you not transport it together with tools to repair Carranglan trail, to Tayug and thence on to him at San Jose? He thinks Carranglan practicable with little work. A battalion must be maintained at Bayonbong, and with that end in view call for whatever you require. Large naval force reaches Aparri to-day.

“SCHWAN, Chief of Staff.”

“Puncan (via San Jose), December 13, 1899.

“General Schwan, Chief of Staff :

“Complying with orders received here last night, I will return to-day to Carranglan, and thence proceed

with two companies to Bayonbong. I arrived at Bayonbong on the 2d of December, and was received by the governor of the province with great cordiality. He was delighted that American troops had arrived. The Spanish priest left after my arrival, and the Filipino priest asked concerning religious affairs. I informed him to resume throughout the province religious services, and that he would be protected and respected in all religious matters. He and the governor asked permission to have church on the morrow for the purpose of giving thanks to God for the surrender of the province without bloodshed. I informed him that permission was not necessary to have church, and that I and all my officers would attend mass at the hour set by him, which we did, thus showing him and the people, as I told them, that we were a Christian people, and respected and protected every one's religion. After the services the city band escorted us to the government buildings, where the governor led in giving 'Viva Americanos,' and in a neat speech told me of his pleasure in getting rid of the insurgents and his desire for peace, and for the Government of the United States to own the islands. I presented the governor with a small American flag donated by one of my officers. In the evening Governor Ramon Ariola gave a banquet at his home to myself and all my officers, at which all his officials were present, and the American flag was displayed from a vase of flowers. All the officials of Nueva Vizcaya province are honestly and sincerely desirous of peace, and are thoroughly glad to come under American rule. The present governor was forced to take the position by the insurgents, but still is an able man, and can be used to great advantage in



behalf of our Government. He has rendered gladly and zealously all possible assistance to our troops. He says the people wish for the Americans, for the insurgents robbed them of everything, forced them to contribute, killed some of their men to obtain money, and in some instances raped their women. He says the province of Isabela is very anxious to become American, and that no trouble will be experienced there, except from roving bands. The Igorrotes at Bagabag have been acting ugly. He further says the province of Cagayan is insurgent, but will be American when insurgents are driven out; that there are something like a thousand insurgents in that province under General Tirona, and troops will meet with resistance. There are now, to the best of my information, many small bands of insurgents in the mountains. In my opinion, a full battalion is the smallest force advisable at Bayonbong to operate by scouting through the various towns. The people have never heard of the President's proclamation, and know nothing about the purpose of the United States. I would recommend that copies be sent for general distribution. The Spanish and insurgents have compelled people to furnish supplies, promising to pay, but not doing so. I would recommend that troops be supplied with money, whereby confidence and faith can be established among the people, thus inspiring them with respect for the Americans.

BALDWIN,

“Major Twenty-second Infantry.”

“Tayug, December 5, 1899.

“General Schwan, Palace, Manila :

“Information from Batchelor, November 30th. Starts north December 1st, and would attack, unless

surrendered, garrison at Isabela. He will repair telegraph line north from Bayonbong. Intends to enlist auxiliaries, and arm them with captured Mausers. Urges that disbursing officer be sent to pay all claims quickly. Wants five hundred dollars sent in small change to make purchases. Deputies from Bagabag in, and tender submission. People cheering American flag. Wants vessel sent to mouth of river with stores, clothing, and rations. I am trying to stop him, but he can not be overtaken if he left on the 1st.

“WHEATON, Brigadier-General.”

“Manila, December 13, 1899.

“General Wheaton, Tayug:

“Entire province of Cagayan surrendered by insurgent authorities to Captain McCalla, commanding naval force recently landed at Aparri, who also received from them arms and other munitions of war. Captain Batchelor’s battalion is reported as in good condition, and to be making good progress in its march toward, and to be not very far from, Aparri.

“SCHWAN, Chief of Staff.”

The remarks of Major-General Otis on the events in Northeastern Luzon are of the deepest interest, and show the triumphs that followed the energy and bravery of our soldiers, at once explorers and conquerors:

“General Lawton was in person at Tayug, where he did not have the advantage of complete telegraphic communication. He was impressed with the belief that Aguinaldo would succeed in moving eastward from the Benguet province of Northwestern Luzon to Bayon-

bong, his recently-designated capital, and he proposed to attack him by the very difficult Carranglan and Tayug trails, while General Young should pursue him from the westward. With this end in view he was endeavoring to supply General Young with the needed troops and supplies while assembling small columns to proceed over the above-named mountain routes. The experience of the Fourth Cavalry detachments in their operations north of Carranglan, and the direction of General Young's pursuit of Aguinaldo indicated that the insurgents could not move as General Lawton anticipated, and he was so informed as soon as he could be communicated with.

"In the meantime, Castner's Tagalo scouts and Batchelor's battalion of the Twenty-fourth Infantry, followed by Baldwin's battalion of the Twenty-second, had started from Tayug for Bayonbong, with instructions to proceed to that city. Having reached it after the surrender of the insurgent military governor of the province in which Bayonbong is situated to Lieutenant Monro of the Fourth Cavalry, who had marched by the Carranglan trail, Captain Batchelor conceived the idea of proceeding northward by the Magat and Cagayan Rivers to Aparri, which he proceeded to do without any definite knowledge of the country over which he intended to pass or the force with which he might be obliged to contend. Every effort possible was made to arrest him, but without avail. Taking Castner's scouts and his battalion of the Twenty-fourth Infantry, he proceeded on this perilous journey, short of rations, clothing; and ammunition, after having sent back a request to have the navy supply him at the head-waters of launch

navigation on the Cagayan River. This movement necessitated the holding at Bayonbong of the battalion of the Twenty-second Infantry, which was needed at other points, and gave great concern for the safety of Batchelor's men, who could hardly escape destruction if the insurgents of the Cagayan Valley should press hostilities. The only hope of their arrival at Aparri, except as prisoners, lay in the belief, as has been stated in the former portions of this report, that General Tirona, commanding the insurgent forces stationed in the valley, would surrender upon invitation. Admiral Watson, who was requested to send a naval force to Aparri, the headquarters of Tirona, when information of Batchelor's movements was received, responded with alacrity. He dispatched the naval vessels *Newark* and *Helena*, Captain McCalla commanding, as soon as supplies for Batchelor's command could be placed on board. Captain McCalla proceeded with great tact, and received the surrender of Tirona, who turned over to him all of his artillery and more than nine hundred stand of arms of improved patterns.

"Captain Batchelor reached the town of Ilagan, Isabela province, about December 8th, having encountered some opposition on his march, especially at Naguilan, where he was obliged to cross his troops over the river and attack an insurgent force which had intrenched itself there to bar his progress. He quickly routed the enemy, who left four dead and four mortally wounded in the trenches. His loss was one man drowned and four wounded. His men suffered from lack of sufficient food and clothing, but were greatly assisted by the inhabitants of the towns and barrios through which they

passed. He continued to descend the river, and received the supplies sent for him by the navy at the headwaters of river navigation. Shortly thereafter orders were issued directing the return of his battalion to the San Jose country and the headquarters of the regiment, proceeding by boat to Dagupan. Castner's scouts were ordered to Vigan to recuperate and increase their numerical strength.

"This march from Bayonbong to Aparri will remain memorable on account of the celerity of its execution, the difficulties encountered, and the discomforts suffered by the troops. It proved beneficial to our interests, as it gave us some practical knowledge of the character of that portion of Luzon and the condition of the inhabitants. It also informed the inhabitants of our pacific intentions, relieved them from Tagalo rule, from which they had suffered, and prepared them to receive kindly the detachments of troops which subsequently passed into that section to establish permanent stations. On his descent of the rivers, Captain Batchelor had received the surrender of the country from the civil governor of one of the provinces, while General Tirona, the insurgent military governor of the entire valley, had made surrender to the commanding officer of the naval force present, who, for the great assistance he had rendered, had appointed him civil governor subject to the approval of the military governor of the islands. The appointment was not confirmed, as the commanding officer of the United States troops which were sent soon thereafter to take possession of the territory was called upon to exercise such civil functions of government as conditions demanded.

“General Lawton, who while at Tayug had been directed to effect the release of the Spanish and American prisoners held by the insurgents in the northwestern Luzon provinces, had determined to proceed northward and join his advance, which General Young was conducting, as soon as he could make the necessary combinations of troops and provide for their subsistence. All insurgent resistance on the Tayug line, excepting that northeast of Carranglan, and northeast of Cabanatuan on the Bayonbong road, had practically ceased. The disorganized troops of the enemy to the westward of Carranglan which had been employed in the north were endeavoring to pass in small detachments southward to their homes in the central portion of the island, with the exception of the small bodies which General Young was severely handling and driving northward. Nearly all of that portion of Aguinaldo’s army, which had formerly occupied the line of the Manila and Dugapan railway, and which still retained organization, was being pressed continually by General MacArthur back into the mountains of Zambales and Bataan. It had already lost by capture its artillery, its supplies, a large number of its rifles, and much of its ammunition.”

It is a fact of great interest that the mountaineers, into whose fastnesses Aguinaldo was compelled to take refuge, were not devoted to his fortunes. He had not been able to terrorize them, and the fact increases the estimation of the share the natives had in his capture in that part of the country.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

### HISTORY OF WAR WRITTEN ON THE FIELD.

How the Telegraphic Dispatches Tell the Tale—It is History Writing by Instantaneous Photography—Scenes and Incidents—The Personalities of Actual Active Service—The Strenuous Life of Lawton—The American Soldier a War Wonder.

ONE of our soldier explorers, after making the acquaintance of the greater of the islands, stated in few words what was known about them: "They number more than one thousand, and the Archipelago is longer from north to south than our Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico; it is wider from east to west than from New York to Pittsburg; certain of the islands are as big as certain of our greatest States. Luzon, at the north, about equals New York in area, and Mindanao, at the south, is almost as big as Ohio. Panay and Mindoro are much larger than Connecticut, and Negros, Leyte, and Cebu would each cover one of our smaller States."

The struggle began with the Filipinos, through the favor shown them by the victorious Americans, who separated the islands forever from Spain, within a week from the declaration of war, by destroying the Spanish fleet. Then came intrigue, falsehood, conspiracy, treachery, malice, and all the Orientalism of demagoguery;

and the very deference with which we treated the rights of the natives, and the referendum to the people of the United States as to what should be done with the Philippines, our possession, and the tedious negotiations and debates on ratification of the treaty at last made, and our long waiting under the poisoned arrows of Malay insolence—all was turned against us. Lincoln was not more forbearing, when he did not order the guns of Sumter fired at those who were building batteries around the fort, than McKinley when he restrained the soldiers of our united country from fighting until they had to defend themselves. The war was long, bloody, and exceedingly difficult, and the several campaigns were such splendid achievements, there are new names in our constellation of heroes that are radiant as stars.

We are fortunate, considering that the warfare was so far away in so strange a country, that military history is now automatically written; for the wires go with the columns, and those who have responsibility talk over them, and their words are recorded imperishably, letters of fire that never fade after they are transmitted, and so the actors are the writers of their own deeds in their own words. The telegram comes to us from the fields of strife charged with all the veracities. There is lacking the formal measure of the solemnities of history, but each telegram is a chapter of truth. When many and many a year has rolled away, the readers of the stories of the war in the Philippines will scan with emotion the words that were wired by Lawton—messages flashing from his brain like the lightning from the clouds. The hardest work, the most dangerous that fell



to the lot of Americans, in clearing the jungles of the Filipino swarms, crouching in ambuscades armed with long-range rifles, was that of the scouts; and Lawton's appreciation of a brave man's devotion was instantaneous. He was not only brave, but generous. He conducted an expedition in the provinces of Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, and Pampanga, covering the period April 21 to May 30, 1899.

The object was to operate in the country north of Manila, between the mountains on the east and the Rio Grande de Pampanga on the west, with San Miguel as the first objective. His chief of scouts was wounded; and here in telegrams is one hero's history of a hero, written unconsciously as he breathed, and not a line of it can be spared:

"In the Field, Angat, Luzon, April 30, 1899.

"Chief Quartermaster of the Division:

"Sir,—The major-general commanding directs that you employ William H. Young as a guide and scout during this expedition at the usual compensation.

"Very respectfully,

"CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,

"Assistant Adjutant-General."

"Baliuag, May 13, 1899.

"Colonel Summers, San Ildefonso:

"Mr. Young, chief of scouts, is reported wounded. He is a brave, gallant man, and I desire everything possible be done for his welfare and comfort.

"LAWTON,

"Major-General Volunteers."

“Hdqrs. First Division, Eighth Army Corps,  
“In the Field, Baliuag, May 13, 1899.

“Major Crosby, First Reserve Hospital, Manila :

“Mr. Young, chief of scouts, my command, seriously wounded yesterday. Send to your hospital this A. M. He is a man of unusual courage and character. He has been very valuable to me, and yesterday successfully led a most desperate charge against odds of more than ten to one. As a personal favor, I ask every possible consideration for him. LAWTON, Major-General.”

“Hdqrs. First Division, Eighth Army Corps,  
“In the Field, Baliuag, May 14, 1899.

“Adjutant General Department of the Pacific :

“Mr. Young, chief of scouts, was seriously wounded while leading his men in a desperate but successful charge against odds of more than ten to one. Mr. Young is a man of intelligence, unusual courage, and character. He has been valuable to me, and his example has been inestimable. As a personal favor, I solicit the general’s interest in his case. His wound will doubtless result in permanent disability. I would be glad if he could be given a commission in the volunteers to date from yesterday. LAWTON, Major-General Volunteers.”

“Hdqrs. First Division, Eighth Army Corps,  
“In the Field, Baliuag, May 14, 1899.

“Dear Major Crosby :

“We are sending you to-day Mr. W. H. Young, chief of our scouts, wounded yesterday in capture San Miguel, one of the bravest and most gallant men soldiers ever knew. General Lawton directed me to write

a personal note, and beg of you, as a personal favor to him, that you would show this man every attention that could be given the most deserving of 'ours.' We do hope his leg can be saved.

"Sincerely yours,

"CLARENCE R. EDWARDS."

"[Telegram.]

"Palace, Manila, May 14, 1899.

"General Lawton:

"Telegraph fully about Mr. Young—age, nationality, former occupation. How long known to you; where you found him, and how you came to hire him. Also what compensation he is receiving, and what force of scouts he has charge of, and status of scouts.

"By command Major-General Otis:

"BARRY, Assistant Adjutant-General."

"Hdqs. First Division, Eighth Army Corps,

"In the Field, Baliuag, May 14, 1899.

"Major Crosby, First Reserve Hospital:

"Kindly elicit and wire me following information concerning Mr. Young, chief scout, sent in wounded to you this morning: Age, nationality, former occupation.

"LAWTON, Major-General Volunteers."

"[Telegram.]

"First Reserve Hospital, May 14, 1899.

"General Lawton:

"Young's age, forty-one; nationality, American; former occupation, miner. He will probably not lose his leg, but have a stiff knee. CROSBY, Major."

“[Telegram.]

“Hdqrs. First Division, Eighth Army Corps,  
“In the Field, Baliuag, May 14, 1899—9 P. M.

Adjutant-General Department Pacific:

“Mr. Young now in First Reserve Hospital. Age, forty-one; nationality, American; Vermont; former occupation, miner; was with North Dakota regiment. Attention called to him by hearing of his exploits scouting with parties sent out whenever chance offered. Saw him first day of reconnoissance toward San Rafael. He was in advance of flankers. Ordered him called in. Intended to send him to rear of column. His appearance and explanation pleased me. I wished information concerning country, and asked him to go forward and capture a citizen and bring him to me. Five minutes later he returned with rifle and bag of ammunition, having found enemy's picket, killed one and brought back his arms; also developed fact that enemy was close to our front, as we found. Prevented our running on to them unprepared. Sent for him next day; talked with and satisfied myself as to his qualifications. Informed him I desired his services, and would employ him as scout and guide. Said he would be glad to serve, but did not care particularly for pay. He, however, accepted employment; no rate fixed. He was to receive the customary salary, which was not known to me. He was permitted to select twenty-five men whom he knew to be good, cool-headed men of courage, and they were detailed as scouts and served under his leadership. The result was most satisfactory; their work has been invaluable. They fell naturally under the influence of Mr. Young, as he is a natural leader, cool, deliberate,

and even tempered. They have all become much attached to him. Eight of them volunteered to escort him from San Miguel to this place last night, arriving at midnight. Mr. Young has won the respect of all officers and men. He with his detachment went out from this place to seek the enemy's storehouses. Were gone four days without rations. Lived on the country. Dr. Crosby telegraphs me he will not lose his leg, but will have a stiff joint. When he recovers I will be glad to have him again, and if we have guerrilla warfare he will be very useful, but will probably be obliged to go mounted. He could undoubtedly enlist company of scouts from mustered-out volunteers.

“LAWTON, Major-General.”

“[Telegram.]

“Hdqrs. First Division, Eighth Army Corps,  
“In the Field, San Miguel, May 16, 1899.

“W. H. Young,

“Chief of Scouts, First Reserve Hospital, Manila:

“Harrington killed to-day at the head of the scouts, doing his duty like the brave and noble soldier he was. I hope you are getting along well.

“LAWTON, Major-General Volunteers.”

Not only is there nothing to spare in this, but nothing to add, except to say the scout got well and continued to distinguish himself.

At this time Aguinaldo was reported by insurgents located at San Isidro in Malolos, and May 17th at Cabanatuam, eighteen miles north, and that the Government was at Tarlac.

On May 19th the following orders were published:

“General Field Orders,

“No. 10.

“Hdqrs. First Division, Eighth Army Corps,

“In the Field, San Isidro, Luzon, May 19, 1899.

“The following telegram received from corps headquarters is published for the information of this command:

“ ‘The Palace, Manila, May 19, 1899.

“ ‘To General Lawton:

“ ‘The following has just been received, and will be published to your command.

“ ‘By command of Major-General Otis:

“ ‘BARRY.’

“ ‘Hot Springs, Va., May 18, 1899.

“ ‘Otis, Manila:

“ ‘Convey to General Lawton and the gallant men of his command my congratulations upon their successful operations during the past month, resulting in the capture this morning of San Isidro.

“ ‘WILLIAM McKINLEY.’

“The above will be read to the several organizations composing this division at retreat on the day it is received.

“By command of Major-General Lawton:

“CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,

“Assistant Adjutant-General.”

(Appendix, p. 256.)

For the movement from San Isidro the following was issued:

“Hdqrs. First Division, Eighth Army Corps,  
“In the Field, San Isidro, Luzon, May 19, 1899.

“Circular.

“Unless orders to the contrary are received, this command will march at five o'clock A. M. to-morrow, the 20th instant.

“By command of Major-General Lawton:

“CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,

“Assistant Adjutant-General.”

The riches of the country fought over appear here:

“In the Field, Baliuag, May 4, 1899.

“Adjutant-General Department of the Pacific:

“Examination of thirty-seven storehouses gives by conservative estimate over one hundred thousand bushels of rice and one hundred and sixty tons of sugar stored in them. About seven storehouses not examined. To burn them would be to burn the town; besides they are mostly fireproof, being of stone with iron roofs. Instructions requested.

“LAWTON, Major-General Volunteers.”

“The Palace, May 5, 1899.

“General Lawton:

“Regarding stores of sugar and rice at Baliuag reported by you, it is evident that they are insurgent war supplies, and must be confiscated. Unless you can as-

certain that a portion of these supplies are private stores, all should be destroyed, although it might be well to distribute them as far as possible to families residing there and in vicinity who desire to receive them. Take the whole matter under further consideration before proceeding to final action.

“By command of Major-General Otis:

“BARRY, Assistant Adjutant-General.”

This is Lawton's official report:

“Large quantities of rice and sugar were found in Baliuag, much of it in storehouses said to belong to the enemy. A conservative estimate of the contents of storehouses not manifestly private was no less than one hundred and fifty thousand bushels of rice and two hundred and sixty-five tons of sugar, which, with the quantities not included, but none the less available, would undoubtedly be sufficient to subsist all troops of the enemy for at least six months. A large storehouse of the tax collector was opened, and the contents issued to the natives, who claimed to have been robbed of their rice by the insurgents, and were now in a famishing condition. Under the careful supervision of the provost marshal this distribution was continued at the suggestion of the department commander to families residing at Baliuag and vicinity.”

Much annoyance was caused by the Chinese coolies, furnished by the quartermaster department as litter-bearers and laborers, wandering from the organizations to which they were attached and committing many minor depredations, necessitating the issue of the following:



“General Field Orders,

“No. 7.

“Hdqrs. First Division, Eighth Army Corps,

“In the Field, Baliuag, May 4, 1899.

“Hereafter each Chinese cooly with this command will be required to wear upon his hat, or other conspicuous part of his clothing, a tag which will be legibly marked in English the name of the organization to which the wearer is assigned or belongs.

“Commencing to-morrow, the 5th instant, all such camp followers found without the identification tag above required will be arrested and turned over to the provost guard.

“No cooly wearing such an identification tag will be required to perform labor for individuals or organizations than that to which he is assigned or belongs, and no unauthorized person will, in any way, interfere with any Chinaman not misconducting himself.

“Commanding officers of organizations are charged with the prompt execution of the above orders, and will be held strictly accountable for the conduct of the coolies assigned or belonging to their respective commands.

“By command of Major-General Lawton:

“CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,

“Assistant Adjutant-General.”

“General Lawton:

“The Palace, May 23, 1899.

“The troops sent you to San Miguel took march for Baliuag this morning. Near Ildefonso attacked by insurgents, whom they drove a mile beyond the city.

Known insurgent loss: eight killed, six wounded; nine guns, and one horse. Our casualties: two men wounded. Troops now resting at Ildefonso. Expect to continue march soon. BARRY."

"San Fernando, May 26, 1899.

"General Lawton:

"Sorry you can not come up. Try to come before you go to the city. Can't look after Baliuag end of line just now. All I can attend to here. Three fights in three days, and more coming. Recommended three days ago a general officer to command that part of line with headquarters at Malolos; no action yet upon recommendation, which I have renewed to-day. In the meantime, until such an arrangement is made, I have asked department headquarters to look out for safety of Baliuag, which seems to me very much exposed.

"MACARTHUR."

"Malolos, May 27, 1899.

"General MacArthur:

"Will make another effort to see you to-day.

"LAWTON, Major-General."

"In Field, Malolos, May 26, 1899.

"Commanding Officer, Baliuag:

"Direct companies to proceed with great caution. Be careful not to be drawn into ambush, nor to proceed so far that they can not return this evening.

"LAWTON, Major-General Commanding."

“Captain Walcutt:                   “Bocaué Bridge, 30th.

“Message received; mules very soft; hard to make pack-mules stand up; will try to get train out within half an hour; have to leave some of the rations.”

“Both signed ‘Devol, Quartermaster.’

“This seems to be the condition at this hour, and is not very encouraging.

“LAWTON, Major-General.”

“Hdqrs. First Division, Eighth Army Corps,

“In the Field, Baliuag, May 5, 1899.

“All persons are forbidden to in any way interfere with bearer, an aged servant of Señor Gonzales, of this town, so long as he remains on his master’s premises. The pony he has in charge, as well as the stores on the premises, are not to be removed except by order from these headquarters.

“By command of Major-General Lawton:

“CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,  
Assistant Adjutant-General.”

“Cross Roads, May 17, 1899.

“Adjutant-General First Division:

“Men are pretty tired from yesterday, but are good for a short march still. Good water at former telegraph station, two and one-half miles.                   HANNAY.”

“[Telegram.]

“Cross Roads, May 17, 1899.

“Adjutant-General First Division:

“Will stop to get water about fifteen minutes.

“HANNAY.”

"[Telegram.]

"Malolos, May 25, 1899.

"Adjutant-General Eighth Army Corps, Palace:

"I understand that a train is on the way out here with forage. We have none. Need some badly. Request authority to take some from train as it goes through. LAWTON, Major-General Volunteers."

"[Telegram.]

"Hdqrs. First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

"Major Devol: "May 25, 1899.

"We are camped here, and can't get any distilled water. Won't you please have a couple of cans sent out on next train for General Lawton, with orders to give it to no one else?"

"EDWARDS, Assistant Adjutant-General."

"[Telegram.]

"Hdqrs. First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

"In the Field, Baliuag, May 13, 1899.

"Captain Case, Ildefonso:

"The General desires you and Birkhimer to pick three or four nice houses for our headquarters. He wishes a careful provost of the town, and that the citizens shall not be disturbed nor their property confiscated nor injured. If he receives no orders to the contrary, he will move his headquarters to San Miguel to-morrow morning.

"He congratulates you, Captain Birkhimer, and the other officers and men engaged in the morning's splendid work.

"The General much regrets Young's injury. Do everything you can. Telegraph line should be rushed to San Miguel.

"EDWARDS, Adjutant-General."

"Quingua, May 5, 1899.

"Adjutant-General First Division:

"I recommend upper ford one-half mile above here. Water is four inches deep in ambulance bed, and is falling one-half inch per hour. Have sent detail for large banca, and telegraphed Walcutt for rope and pulley blocks to be used if river rises. Current is easy and approaches fair; bottom good. Have you any further instructions for me here?

"CASE, Acting Engineer."

"[Pass.]

"Hdqrs. First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

"In the Field, Baliuag, May 5, 1899.

"Let the bearer, a native, pass out of our lines to-day only to bring his family.

"CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,

"Assistant Adjutant-General."

"Hdqrs. First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

"In the Field, San Isidro, May 17, 1899.

"Captain Hannay, Cross Roads:

"When did you arrive? What is condition of your men? Is there any good water in your vicinity? Desire you to rest until three or four o'clock.

"LAWTON, Major-General Commanding."

"[Telegram.]

"San Miguel, May 19, 1899.

"Adjutant-General First Division:

"Just arrived. Slow progress due to ponies being hot. Have pony carriages here, but will have to take ambulance to Baliuag. Expect to go faster from now on. Everything all right. "KING, Aide."

"San Miguel, May 14, 1899.

"(Received at Baliuag, 8.16 A. M.)

"Adjutant-General First Division:

"Am interviewing native residents for information regarding roads, etc. Aguinaldo reported in hiding. Sentiment of natives seems friendly. No news of Pio del Pilar and his four thousand. Everything quiet here.

"CASE, Captain, Acting Engineer Officer."

"[Telegram.]

"Opposite Candaba, P. I., on Rio Grande la Pampanga,  
May 23, 1899.

"Assistant Adjutant-General, First Division, Eighth  
Army Corps, in the Field:

"I have the honor to report as follows: At the trenches bordering the stream where we had an engagement with the enemy, where bridge was partially burned, just south of San Isidro, I was attracted by the unusual appearance of a dead Filipino. This caused me to examine in a careful manner his physique and clothing. The latter would class him as an officer. He was attired with scrupulous neatness; the hose, shoes, and clothing generally indicated one in an officer's station. I then

scrutinized his features, and was surprised to find them of a perfect Spanish type, of which I have seen no better among the Spanish officers at Manila, and precisely of their style. I will only add that I took some precautions during this examination as to preclude mistake regarding points I have mentioned. Press of other matters momentarily arising, as well as failure at first to appreciate the possible importance of this incident, have delayed my mentioning the matter before.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“W. E. BIRKHIMER,

“Captain Third Artillery, Judge-Advocate.”

“San Isidro Road, May 16, 1899.

“Adjutant-General First Division:

“Have moved two miles. Troops resting a few minutes. The roads are getting worse, and a little rain would make them absolutely impassable for wheeled vehicles. No enemy visible. The insurgent telegraph line completely demolished. McKENNA.”

This from General MacArthur was a cheery good-night from him to Lawton, when there was to be music very early in the morning:

“My own arrangements are all ready to commence operations to-morrow, and expect to be fully engaged 4.30 A. M. If you are at San Jose you may hear some of the noise. Good luck and hearty good wishes for the best success in every direction.”

## CHAPTER XXV.

### HIDE-AND-SEEK OF AGUINALDO.

Increase of His Fury as Fortune Faded—The Pursuit of Him was Swift and Fierce, and His Flight Adroit and Furtive—MacArthur Reports Eighteen Boxes of Records in One Capture—The Rehearsal in the Mountains by Funston of His Capture of Aguinaldo—How He Happened to Know the Country so Well.

THE pursuit of Aguinaldo, when he realized that flight, and not fighting, must be his occupation and that of his followers, was interesting as a fox-hunt. He probably owed his escape from the columns that surged around him to the stratagem of circulating reports as to his presence that were calculated to mislead. There was no apparent lack of intelligence about him—there was too much. At one place, however, he and his escort were seen, hatless, covered with mud, with horses in the last stages of dilapidation, November 22, 1899. Young occupied Aringay on 19th instant, which place it was reported Aguinaldo and two hundred followers had quit on the 17th, heading for Bayonbong. Young, with three hundred Maccabebes, was pursuing him, and Castner's scouts, northeast from San Nicolás, endeavoring to cut off movement east.\*

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\* Colonel Mallory, with Colonel Fiebeger, a professor at West Point, called on Aguinaldo at his private residence in Manila, April 21st, and he said:

"I was often very close to the Americans. I expected to make



The American soldiers, officers and enlisted men, all grades from commanding generals to the privates, have not had the credit in military history or the general comprehension of the people they deserve, for the strenuous and well-directed efforts, after the insurgent armies were stricken and driven with great losses, until broken up, to do the work with strong columns at last performed by a company of Maccabebes and five Americans, including General Funston—the capture of Aguinaldo. The destruction of the enemy was so thorough that most of the individuals deserted their organizations, and made way to their homes, where they mingled with the friendly inhabitants who greeted our troops as amigos. Aguinaldo had nearly ten thousand men that he called the Army of the North, where he had expecta-

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my greatest stand at Calumpit. When I abandoned Tarlac, I commanded fifteen hundred riflemen. I anticipated General Wheaton's landing at San Fabian. I planned to retreat to Nueva Vizcaya, but was frustrated by the brave General Lawton. I slipped through the cordon with two hundred and fifty men only four hours before the landing party came ashore."

In response to a question concerning his opinion of the American troops, he said:

"How terrible are the Americans! They are splendid and ferocious fighters. I no sooner built arsenals and barracks than they destroyed them. Colonel March chased me in the most lively manner for two months in the western mountains until I worked eastward with thirty horses and eighty men. I crossed to Cagayan, and lived on the east coast for eight months. My outposts often saw the Americans, but I did not participate in a single engagement, though I once commanded 40,000 riflemen. The watchfulness of the army and navy practically destroyed filibustering to Luzon.

"I do not desire to discuss insular politics. I am undecided as to my future plans. I believe that the Federals will be strong agents in the pacification of the Archipelago."

tions of preventing the advance of the United States troops. The Northern insurgent force was smashed in action, and lost all their artillery supplies. The extent to which the enemy were disarmed appears in a telegram from General MacArthur, dated Bautista, December 11, 1899:

“The property captured at Mangatarem and vicinity has been delivered at this point. It consists of seventeen cannon, one hundred small arms, a quantity of tools from the arsenal, some eighteen boxes of records, postage and other stamps, making altogether several tons. I propose to retain it here under guard until the railroad is open through to Manila.”

Lawton was a formidable leader, fearless in floods as under fire. He telegraphed in the height of the chase from the West Agno River: “I have been water-bound here for two days, streams both sides of me being unfordable; it distresses me to report the death by drowning of Lieutenant Luna, Thirty-fourth Infantry, who was my acting aide, while following me through Agno River, three P. M., 15th instant; also two men of my escort, as follows: Privates Holter and Bass, Troop I, Fourth Cavalry; it has rained almost constantly since leaving San Isidro, and I must again recur to the fortitude, courage, endurance, and cheerfulness of the whole command;” and made his contribution to the cheery conditions in this form: “Were it not for enemy’s stores we would be in desperate straits. As it is, we are wet, filthy, and cheerful. We are fearfully strung out, but the enemy seems demoralized, and I have no serious misgivings. The wind shifted to the west this A. M.,

and I hope the rain will cease. Two days good weather, and we will be on our feet."

There is no art of descriptive writing that conveys as many true pictures of the scenes and struggles of active military service as the short, sharp, vivid business telegrams of the officers who are on the fire-lines and absorbed in duties—this for example:

"Paterno left Tarlac with insurgent treasury 8th instant; Buencamino and Aguinaldo on night 13th. Buencamino now here. He says Aguinaldo started out with two thousand men from Dagupan and Bayambang, but only got through with small party. It is not thought that he can cross to Bayonbong. Certainly he can not do it with his transportation."

Chief of Staff telegraphed Lawton, November 26th:

"The report that I wired you that Aguinaldo left Bayambang going westward is now known to be erroneous."

Lawton wired from road beyond San Jose, November 14th:

"Leave all transportation here. Half of it is now at San Jose under Lieutenant Ripley. The insurgents are reported strongly intrenched at Binalonan with one thousand men. No bridges. I leave First Sergeant Mancy in charge with one company and sick. I need rations and ammunition, but I shall not stop on that account. I am liable to run against Aguinaldo's army, and would like Sergeant Mancy's company sent to me as soon as it can be done, also such other re-enforcements as you can spare me. (Signed,) Ballance.

"LAWTON, Major-General."

“San Fabian, November 27, 1899.

“General Schwan, Manila:

“To prevent the murder of Aguinaldo’s mother and his little son by the natives about Cabaruan, I have brought them here, and placed them in the care of the padre at San Fabian.

“WHEATON, Brigadier-General.”

“Manila, November 27, 1899.

“General Wheaton, San Fabian:

“The mother and son of Aguinaldo are to be sent to Manila under proper care by first available steamship. Report their departure by telegraph.

“SCHWAN, Chief of Staff.”

“In Field, Tayug, November 24, 1899.

“Chief of Staff, Manila:

“There appears to be no organized force of insurgents east of the railroad south of the mountains and north of San Isidro. It is evident that the property of the insurgent Government went over the trail from San Nicolás; that some troops passed that way; also that it was the rear end of the train that was captured by Young; that Aguinaldo intended to pass by this road, but that he was cut off by Young. Many of the insurgents are returning individually. The people of this country are disaffected toward Aguinaldo, and there is little trouble in securing information and assistance. I do not think the insurgents can remain north of the mountains. We can now more readily distinguish them from the natives, who will not conceal them.

“LAWTON, Major-General.”

Lawton, Nov. 24th, wired headquarters at Manila: "I hope the information wired me concerning Aguinaldo's whereabouts is correct, but doubt it. (The information was that Aguinaldo was south of Manila. Lawton was right, the fugitive had fled north.) There is no information that he came to Tayug, although he doubtless started for this place, and his property and baggage came here and was captured. There is information that Aguinaldo was in Urdaneta, and that his wife was at Asingan, where she spent the night. I was shown the house in which she slept. Cut off from Tayug, Aguinaldo passed through Binalonan to Pozorrubio, where he spent the night of the 14th, passing north via Alava, as has before been explained. I was skeptical of all this information until I heard the statement of Señor Luis Perez from his own lips, that Aguinaldo was in Pozorrubio on the night of the 14th. There are other items of corroboration too long to explain. Still, it may have been prearranged deception. Aguinaldo, with plunder, reported to have left Tarlac November 1st for Bayonbong. Now time for your column to move up railway with celerity."

General Otis explains this in these words:

"General MacArthur was poorly provided with transportation at this time—a large part of his wagon-train, which he had placed in good condition, having been sent to General Lawton under an emergency."

Lawton telegraphed:

"On Road beyond San Jose, November 14, 1899.

"Chief of Staff, Manila:

"I am pressing on to join Young as fast as possible. Roads are impassable for teams or carts, and it is useless

to think of getting them through in time. I will push three troops of cavalry through to-night, if possible. Everything behind will be forced along as fast as possible."

MacArthur in the last stages of the war, reporting one of Bell's fine dashes, referred to insurgent generals running away with not more than a dozen men each, and "Officers as well as soldiers are reported as disgusted at the continuation of the war. The generals are, however, trying to carry out the Aguinaldo policy, and are making a desperate effort to hold their men a little longer, and are shooting officers who tender their resignations. This action has terrified many."

The inhabitants who gave any information about insurgent forces were treated with severity, often killed on the spot; and any answer would cause an appropriation or destruction of property.

The trouble was with the roads. A chief of staff, telegraphed from Caranatanan, November 21, 1899:

"Erwin just returned, and reports roads utterly impracticable for wagons loaded as his were with but 2,200 pounds. Told him to reduce to 1,200, and push on to San Jose. Am pushing bull-carts over now. We are having much trouble with ferry, so decided not to cross our headquarters for fear of blocking the moving of supplies on carts. Will cross first chance, but am fearful we can not get over till to-morrow night. Roads are frightful."

MacArthur put his plan of campaign in a few words, following the railroad.

"My purpose is to rush the track at such speed as to prevent destruction, and have locomotive with cars

following up on the firing-line with fifteen or twenty days' rations and the necessary material for repairing track which the insurgents destroy after I start to rush them. To-day the reconnoitering party went nearly seven miles up the track, drove in a small insurgent party, and heard locomotives in the town. They are undoubtedly carrying off the stuff, but it indicates that the railroad line north of Gerona is still intact. My purpose will be to let them alone in Gerona for the present, so as to encourage them to continue their service till the very last minute, and thus keep the railroad intact until we can make our arrangements to seize the whole thing by a stroke of hand. The rails found by Captain Bell, of the Thirty-sixth, yesterday, number 2,500, making approximately five miles of track. The water pump and tank in the railroad yard is all right, and there is considerable wood fuel, as there is at several points on line."

The military maps, giving the movements of the columns of American invaders after the insurgents were whipped away from Manila, show the thoroughness of the scouting, and that hard work was not spared. The traces of columns in the provinces tell of the condition described by the Aguinaldo commands when "the sound of the American rifles was heard on all sides, and there was no place to go!" The numbers of the natives were not taken into account, nor was the equipment considered a serious matter. Wherever the Americans found detachments of armed men standing or skulking, they charged and drove them. All sorts of modern guns seemed to be useless in the hands of the Tagalos, who had often pretty good fighting stomachs, but not striking faculties.

Colonel Howze, Thirty-fourth Regiment United States Volunteers, in his vigorous scouting, said the pluck of his officers and men in traveling rapidly "over impassable trails was remarkable." He added:

"Inhabitants here say that it is impossible for the enemy to get through the mountains; but they have gone there and will probably get through, as they have plenty of food for the small command that they have. With all this work, General, you can understand the condition of my command. Send me one hundred fresh men with good shoes, or send me shoes for my men, and I'll drive the enemy through these mountains."

Those were the delectable mountains in which Aguinaldo was caught. The date of this incursion was December, 1899.

Insurgents formerly maintained quite a force at Baler. It was here that they had captured, several months before, a detachment from the U. S. S. *Yorktown*, consisting of an officer and several sailors, while in a small launch it was reconnoitering in that vicinity, and it was supposed that they retained there a few of their troops. They were still practicing guerrilla warfare west of the mountains along the Bongabong and Pantabangan road, and it was necessary to send out a proper number of men to successfully march to, capture, and place a permanent garrison at Baler, and have an organization of sufficient strength to protect itself in making the return journey to the place of departure. The three companies of the Thirty-fourth Infantry were deemed adequate for all purposes. General Funston was directed to take charge of and accompany the battalion, station two of the companies at Baler, and to



return to his headquarters at San Isidro with the third. Supplies for the troops were to be sent in small coasting steamer from Manila by the water route through the Strait of San Bernardino, thence north to the Baler coast. The command left San Isidro on February 13th, and Pantabangan on the 15th, expecting to reach the objective point on the 19th. The vessel was sent from Manila to arrive at Baler on the last-named date, and the troops were directed to communicate with it as soon as it should appear off the coast, since it was not considered safe for it to enter the harbor without assistance from the shore. The expedition as planned was successful throughout. The enemy had withdrawn from the town, and no very serious opposition was encountered on the march.

Following received from Major March:

"Cayan, P. I., December 7, 1899.—General Young or commanding officer at Candon: I have destroyed Aguinaldo's body-guard, and killed General Gregorio del Pilar. General Concepcion and staff have surrendered to me, and will be sent to the seacoast. Five hundred and seventy-five Spanish prisoners, including one hundred and fifty friars, have been liberated, and the province of Lepanto cleared of insurgents. Aguinaldo has been driven to mountains, a fugitive without a command, and is making toward Bayonbong. My loss is two killed and nine wounded. Insurgent loss in battle of Tila Pass, fifty-two killed and wounded. (Signed,) March, commanding."

"Major Sirmyer, Thirty-third Infantry, has just arrived from Dolores. Colonel Hare marched from Pidigan, via Pilar and Manaba, to San Jose; captured vice-

presidente of Bocay with three hundred dollars and letter to Aguinaldo addressed to Cayan. Three insurgents captured with arms and ammunition state that many insurgents are escaping; and that they had been without food for three days. Colonel Hare, with one hundred picked men, is on Howze's trail, leaving two hundred and seventy men in Bangued. He captured second messenger with letter to Aguinaldo, which states that they would concentrate at Bannajin, Ilocos Norte. Colonel Hare left San Gregorio, December 9th. Navy landed force at Laoag to-day, consisting of one hundred men, also Captain Koehler, Thirty-seventh Infantry, with one gun. Major Swigert, with one hundred cavalry, should reach Batac, on coast road, to-morrow, with instructions to reconnoiter Bannajin to the east. The one hundred men landed at Laoag include fifty men from the U. S. S. *Wheeling*, and fifty men sent by me with one gun from this point—all that could be spared. Leave to-morrow morning on *Samar* with twenty men of my escort for Laoag."

The extracts above are of exceeding interest, as they show where and how Funston picked up the plan of finding and trapping Aguinaldo. It is all the more creditable to the Kansas hero that his "climax" of audacity was not successful through luck.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

### CHARACTER SKETCH OF AGUINALDO.

A Study of his Motives and Men—His Style and the Tagal Tongue—Aguinaldo Remote from the People—His Environment and Ambition Despotic—The Caprices of his Fortunes—Has he a Chance yet to Repair Ruins?—The Destiny we Face.

THE study of the life of Aguinaldo, ascertaining clearly, as one may, the results of historical experiments, the clay of the pit from which he was digged, finds him a sarcasm on the boasted civilization of the age, a burlesque of the advancement of his generation. We behold him far from the schools, and of an illiterate tribe, knowing well only the Tagalog dialect, which is written, but has not made important contributions to prose or poetry. It has vigor, the strength of coarseness. Men of ideas, it is said, find it a clever medium of expression. The witness against Aguinaldo that he does not command Spanish as he would like, is himself. He states the fact in friendly correspondence. After dividing among the secretaries and interpreters, those who have surrounded, promoted, and exploited the Tagal leader, all that can be reasonably bestowed, we find in the mass of publications that go with the name Emilio Aguinaldo a considerable remainder of marked individuality to be charged to somebody, and plainly identified with the name it bears. The man is singularly

destitute of a great deal of intelligence that is of the commonplace. There are many things it is astonishing he does not know, but he rises to poetic inspirations. How he picked up his style we can not tell; but the puzzle as to where the unexpected is revealed in a boy who has all the earthly disadvantages, is not a new one. There is vitality in the Filipino blood—and ought to be; for there is a greater variety in it, and perhaps brain also, than is found anywhere else. We of the United States find that no strain of blood we have got from the East has proved a detriment, and the African is not to be excepted. The Philippines call on the Asian races that look to the rising sun for that which is new, as we look that way for the old.

When General Anderson and Aguinaldo exchanged a few letters, perhaps neither of them thought of it, but they were representative of the hemispheres that we style the Old and the New—the Asian and the American. The Orient and the Occident burned in their correspondence. Here was another irrepressible conflict. It was education in conflict with egotism. The opposing forces are distant—opposite as the poles. Both have gained their conquests in the torrid zone—Anderson of the temperate clime, and Aguinaldo of the tropics; Anderson of the schools and camps, the trees made hardy by frost—his antagonist of the rice-fields and the palms, the thorny thicket and rasping grass. It was the corn and wheat and the apple against the orange, the alligator-pear, and the citron. The conduct of Aguinaldo, through the deep depravity of it, according to Europe's standard, has been but slowly revealed, was hateful in the extreme; but the calm

audacity of the Tribal representative, confronting one of the mighty peoples, had in it the something that was in some of the impassive and implacable natives of North American forests, and such leadership as arose before Pizarro and Cortes came, in the Andes of Peru and the lofty plains of magnificent Mexico.

Anderson was not slow to read the book before him, and apply a lesson. He said:

"I submit, with all deference, that we have heretofore underrated the native. They are not ignorant, savage tribes, but have a civilization of their own; and although insignificant in appearance, are fierce fighters, and for a tropical people they are industrious."

General Merritt, looking upon the Pasig River from the windows of the palace where Aguinaldo tries to meditate, witnessed a scene of much animation, and said of the endless processions of boatmen, gliding to and fro in canoes carrying loads of forage like stacks of hay, balancing their fickle burdens with swift-shifting and delicate touches of a single oar, that none of them ever seemed to be troubled with his task. There is something in it that reminds one of the fanatical industry of the Chinese, and the eternal toil of the Japanese over their fisheries and the walled garden terraces that lead up their mountains by gigantic steps.

The business of boats on the Pasig is not barbaric. It is going to and pulling from market. The Tagalo Malays are fishermen and the farmers of the rice swamps. The Spaniards claim to have taught the tribes to cultivate hemp, rice, coffee, and sugar, to have raised them from savagery; but they found a hardy race, helped them help themselves; but did not take the cruelty out

of them. And the various races and tribes are more cruel to each other than to all others. They have a passion for revenge, and recreation in the torture of the unfortunate. They have their educated class—not large; their musicians—they are all musical—their society; their prejudices of nameless ferocity; their superstitions rank as in darkest Africa; they are thoroughly believers that they are brave, honorable, and respectable. They are not, however, fierce for utter truth-telling, or readily repentant of the guilt of flagrant deception, nor quick to repudiate and condemn the phases of falsification. The inherent value of truth has not been impressed upon them from infancy, to bear in maturity the fruit that is more than golden, and the self-respect in sacrifice that is more precious than silver and gold, or the pebbles that sparkle with unquenchable fire. It is rather an unwarranted pride of caste or condition, or the product of many millenniums, that the Asiatics, whether by the shores of the elder Continent, according to our own accepted records, or on the islands that dot the huge Pacific, are satisfied with their own teachers and literature, theology or politics, and that they are not reformers, not trying, so far as they know, to better the world or change religious culture or spiritual influence of any dominions, to magnify morals, or cast down thrones. They lose no time in setting up or throwing over Republican forms of government. Monarchical institutions are held to be everlastingly according to human nature—a settled, indisputable, and enduring state of affairs; and as for self-governing people, none exist in Asia. They are an unknown quantity there. Aguinaldo must have been a daring hypocrite when he prom-

ised to be a Republican as soon as his despotism was completely established. Asia contains no example of government of the people by the people. When he speaks of a "stable form of government," he must mean a Government by himself and for his own sake, for that is the one shape that stands. He never seems to have had a thought that all or any one of his decrees should be referred to the people. The referendum is a feeble fantasy. He got thirteen votes for President of a Junta in an English colony, and upon that his claim in every hour of his life since that he is the true and only master of nine millions of people, and all of them owe him implicit obedience. He picked men out and put them in office. Nobody voted for anybody, unless in a committee, and there was no complaint about the right of suffrage. A hundred years of American predominance might give these people the first lessons for ruling themselves. Now the application of the theory of the rights of man, as set forth in the Declaration of Independence, is incomprehensible, is lost on Filipinos.

Seldom in the rise and fall of men of public affairs has there been an enterprise less promising, a scheme less hopeless, than that of Aguinaldo setting forth on the dispatch boat *McCullough* from Hong Kong for Cavité, to pit himself and followers, seventeen in number, against the fortunes of two Nations, fighting beyond seas and continents, in the East Indies, as the greater nations of Europe—Great Britain, France, and Spain—contested with battleships, and transports that carried regiments, the possession of the West Indies for two hundred and fifty years.

Aguinaldo had no nation, never had an army, or

directed one in a fight. He was for a time an inmate of a famous fortress the Spaniards could not take, and, therefore, bought it. Aguinaldo sold it and acquired capital, but no glory. Once he was thought a hero and a patriot. Now all know he was neither. He has been compared with the great and good revolutionists of high repute in history. His cause was not that of liberty, but of a personal despotism, himself the despot. He was chosen for the distinction by himself. He had not a good cause in any way. It was not honest. His first intercourse with the United States was making to the Government dishonorable proposals. He had done by contract written, with the Split Rock fortress, of which he was commander, what Benedict Arnold did with West Point; and did what Arnold did not, sold the guns and the men too, and carried off transfer tickets for pieces of silver. There was a dispute over the division of the spoil. Only two specific sums of the \$400,000 the Spaniards paid, before the fraud was exposed, have since been accounted for. Artacho got \$5,000, and Aguinaldo \$50,000. That which remained vanished. Aguinaldo had many uses for money, and it is unlike his people to be disturbed about the details of book-keeping.

Aguinaldo bought by Spain, snubbed by the United States, discredited by his own associates and people, with the exception of those who departed from their country with the cash paid for their consent to deportation, he admitted at the meeting of the Junta, in which he had his first Presidential experience, that he sold himself to the Spaniards, saying if he fought them the money paid him for himself and companions could be



attached and held away from him by English law, if the Spaniards claimed that he was their property and had sold his liberty to fight them, and, therefore, violated the contract as soon as he opposed them in war. That was his reason for not wanting to go to see Dewey, unless he had a contract for a "divided armament" with the admiral signing, sealing, etc., for the United States. He gave up to go, but what he said May 4, 1898, was a pronunciamiento of war to a finish with the United States. His first days at Manila were disheartening. Then each day did marvelous things for him. He did nothing for himself, except to see that the Americans were the strong men and the great Nation, and that his chance for empire was to beat them. His first work of diplomatic art was to have a series of irritating troubles with the United States. He was clearly against them, playing, however, a double part. That is not merely asserted or alleged. The captured documents contain absolute proof. There is no known fact in Spanish colonial wars that is more prominent. It will soon be a work of malevolence or indifference to truth to question that.

Fancy the small, brown young man, age thirty years, educated under the auspices of all evil fortunes, except bad health with morbid modesty. He did not seem to be calculated for conquests, or even for serious contentions. But he was unflinching in all sorts of self-assertions. He referred to Manila and all the cities and villages and to the Philippines, as though he had a quit-claim deed for all the islands with their rivers and forests and their millions of men. It was funny in a way to observe the small man bear himself with confident gran-

deur, such that insignificance was self-expanded to immensity. He had as much faith in himself as Mohammed. He had been allowed to come under the Stars and Stripes; and there was such magic in it for him as no Americans ever enjoyed. It was not for them, though. He was the beneficiary. Legions had arisen from the soil for him, and he had not stamped it with his small boots. An army was raised by his foes and put in his hand, and he accepted it as if it was an inheritance. He betrayed those who were forcing his fortunes beyond the understanding of all but believers in dreams, and yet they served him, and he moved not, yet waxed daily and hourly, and became one of the phenomena. The small, brown man, in white clothes, slender, thin in the legs, with hair that could not do other than stick up straight and stiff,—with diminutive hands and feet, his pride shaded with a touch of humility that meant anything else, behaved as if he might be a Roman emperor of the age of Cæsar Augustus, with the world between his little legs. Everything was “my” that was not “I.” “My people,” “my Government,” “my orders,” “my army,” “my capital.” He repaid the informal call of Dewey and Anderson by arresting an American officer who passed a Filipino sentinel without deference. He refused to help Anderson, or to allow his “my people” to give aid to furnish camps without his order. He demanded to know whether Anderson would recognize his “my Government.” He referred soberly to “the two nations”—Philippine and American. He said it was “necessary” to save trouble for the Americans to tell him what they came for and were going to do. His people would grow hostile, he said, if they were not

recognized. He had something on the fire all the time, told fairy tales about his military operations, and beguiled even the veterans who disbelieved in all Orientalism. He extracted compliments from Dewey and Anderson, and made haste to tackle General Merritt, and give him provocation enough to have ordered him off the premises; but he wanted the admiral to carry Manila—no doubt, for the joint use of himself and the Spaniards—and talked about the blood and toil and money spent by him and his army besieging the city. He became responsible for a fabrication, that one of his generals, Norvel, had regained six field-pieces taken from the Americans by the Spaniards, when the nearest approach made to that was the flight of the same Norvel's men from a trench when there was a smart fire, though the natives were in the way of the Americans, who held their own on the inner line and never had a thought of its abandonment, while the natives ran a fast race to the rear. At last, he wanted the captain-general's palace that General Merritt occupied. The Americans thought rather well of themselves and what they had to do, but that was nothing to the rapture of satisfaction the Filipinos took in the fictitious splendor of their feats of arms, for the first fighting they did worth a mention was with Americans.

If the Americans have a weakness about their relations to mankind, it is that of holding as inferior to themselves the descendants of all Europeans, except of the races and nations to whom our several citizens trace their ancestry; and people of labor, black or white, red or brown, are, the white American is sure, of an inferior order; and if there is any color held to be more

objectionable than the black, it is the brown and the mixtures of red, yellow, copper, and brown—the last, perhaps, the most alarming discovered. There was a little brown man, thirty years old, weight one hundred pounds, and perhaps a few ounces, legs that if attached to an American would cause him to be rejected as an applicant for enlistment at any recruiting office as a private soldier; and the brown, small person, with a dusky, coppery tinge in his face, was going up and down playing tragedy, acting a great part in a great drama, playing himself alone, and, come to think of it, playing it rather well, beating Iago at his own double-faced personation, and holding within his slender self the mockery that no matter which killed the other, made his game; and he was watching and waiting to secure the chances of “joint occupation,” and put in his treacherous blade for a ready, fatal stroke. This young man knew enough not to indulge his hate and treason until he had improved the time the Americans lost in Paris and Washington, in restoring centralization from the outer trenches around Manila, facing inward, and harvesting provinces to come to his help, assailing the Americans with falsification, and maligning them with malice, never abating in the least his portentous presumption, protesting in final defeat that he knew it was coming, for he had not miscalculated resources, but declaring that from the beginning he had foreseen military discomfiture; but, as for him, he would not live a slave, and he had taken oaths that compelled him to wage war while he had breath in his body. So sacred were his vows, that he would free his country or perish in the effort; and now, captured and prisoner, he has con-

cluded he could still permit himself to live, and bear the stings of unredeemed oaths; that, as for himself, his duty was to die or free his beautiful country; and he has sworn once again that he will "true allegiance bear" to the Government of the United States, which he has been saying and swearing for years was slavery.

When the play is over, whatever may be the closing scene, this great actor will have played many parts, and we may trust the lesson of his life will aid his people to know that it was a happy fortune for them when Americans landed on their shores and liberated them from odious tyranny; and that all shall know, too, that when assailed treasonably they were triumphant in arms, and generous in purpose, as invincible in power, and able by their wisdom of teaching by example to found a Republican form of Government even on Asian soil, with Asiatic people, grounded by the teachings and heightened by the glories of the great North American Republic, whose heads, hearts, and hands have builded an Empire of Liberty, that will be a splendid gateway for the procession of Progressive Mankind, that has marched ever westward, until it enters upon the Conquest of Asia.

Aguinaldo offers a difficult problem. It would be unlike him if, in the school of adversity, he is taught there are better ways and means than he has tried, and find at last the wisdom of a sacrifice of self in the healing and building of nations. If that is what his oath to bear true allegiance to the country whose destiny he could not change means to him, God bless him and help him to keep it loyally, and win in peace victories denied in war, and do works to repair ruins he has wrought. It

is not impossible that the strong hand that has chastised him may be kindly in its guidance; but it needs still strength to strike or sustain. It is better to uplift than to put down, and it may not be too late, for the Tagalog leader may be influential for the good of his countrymen. That can not be by the impersonation of tyrannous principles. If he is worthy, he may have a recognition in a better way and with a broader bearing, than he coveted in his strife to be a conqueror. His career, as an enemy, self-appointed, of the United States, closed in captivity. All our countrymen should bear in remembrance that "this country of ours" is the foremost of the nations in its interests, powers, opportunities, on the shores and islands of the greater ocean of the globe; and from this supreme situation we face the future that we have done our duty in accepting the destiny to go forward with confidence.

## CHAPTER XXVII.

### AGUINALDO'S PARENTAGE AND EARLY DAYS.

What His Friends Say, and the First Adventure as an Insurgent—The Singapore Incident—The Captured Documents Destroy Filipino Fables.

IT is not a novel experience of one who has suddenly attained great notoriety, to find that the recollections of friends of his early days are difficult to reconcile, and that his foes are equally contentious as to the steps he took before he walked in a strong light. We are fortunate in undertaking the labor of writing a first life of Aguinaldo, to find that the European who was his earliest friend has given, from personal knowledge, a statement of his parentage and boyhood, and gives particulars of his first distinction as an insurgent.

The man is Mr. Howard W. Bray, and the form of his testimony is a letter addressed to Mr. W. T. Stead, of London. Mr. Bray is so fiercely a partisan of Aguinaldo, and so forcible in resolute praise of him, that in order to give his version of facts fair play, it is necessary to eliminate his fault-finding with others. Mr. Bray is an extremist. He says he was the only European who before the Hispano-American War could claim the ac-

quaintance and friendship of Aguinaldo. Mr. Bray states:

"I enjoyed the hospitality of his father's house in Cavité Viejo as far back as the year 1883, when the subject of the sketch quoted by you from the *American Review of Reviews* was a boy of thirteen. I am certainly the only foreigner who has enjoyed the confidence of the Filipino leaders both before and during the rebellion against Spain, and, above all, I was the medium through which Aguinaldo was brought into relations with the American Government in Singapore last April. I was residing temporarily in Singapore owing to the disturbed state of the Philippines, especially in the province where my estate is situated, when General Aguinaldo came down from Hong Kong to consult with me on the situation. The American consul-general there, Mr. Spencer Pratt, at once requested me to arrange an interview, which I did, at the same time acting as interpreter when the conditions of Aguinaldo's co-operation with Admiral Dewey were settled, which President McKinley has since repudiated, under the pretext that the consul-general was not authorized to act.

"Emilio Aguinaldo was born on March 22, 1870, in the town of Cavité Viejo, not only of pure Filipino, but also of pure Cavité blood. He is neither the 'offspring of a Spanish general' nor a 'dissolute Jesuit,' but born in lawful wedlock of an old patriarchal family who have resided there for generations. His parents were in comfortable circumstances, and owned considerable landed property. His father was imprisoned for supposed complicity with the rebellion of 1872, but was afterwards



liberated because proved to be innocent. He was the youngest of three children, and was educated first at the school in his native town, afterwards at the College of San Juan de Letran, in Manila, under charge of the Dominican Friars. There are no Jesuit priests in Cavité, consequently he could never have been a 'house-boy' with one, and his father was sufficiently well off to educate his son himself without such extraneous aid as your report suggests. He neither studied medicine nor theology, but left the college of San Juan in the fourth year of his studies owing to the death of his father, in order to assist his mother in the management of the family property."

This would bear higher stamp of veracity, if the coloring matter were not so florid. Mr. Bray discredits his judgment when he states as true the gossips of the Tagalo believers in the theatricals and the evident fables, such as ignorance fancies and makes a faith in the adulation of ambition. We are told his father was probably the victim of a monkish poisoner, and that the Spaniards made attempts to kill him with arsenic. It was a part of Aguinaldo's game to cultivate such stories. It is important in Asia for a man with imperial aspirations to give himself a surrounding of superstition. The shelter of a fog is wanted. That the Church of Rome is opposed to Freemasonry is not news, and that the frightful character of the Katapuna brotherhood in Luzon intensified antagonisms is of record. That young Aguinaldo was a Mason and rebelled first against the Church is true. He became mayor of his native village, Cavité Viejo, and was in that position when the insur-

rection of 1896 broke out. Mr. Bray is a competent witness of the fact. Aguinaldo became a "suspect," and finding he was about to be arrested, took the initiative, and captured Imus. Mr. Bray gives this account of that incident:

"Imus, the headquarters of the civil guard of the province, where the Recoleta friars have a fine fortified estate house. Here the civil guard had intrenched themselves, and the first resistance was met with; but Aguinaldo, with nothing but a revolver and a whip in hand, scaled the walls at the head of his troops and captured the whole place amidst a storm of bullets."

This is very interesting, but not, save in outline, reliable, for Bray knows no better than to believe in the accusations of the bad faith of Admiral Dewey, who has recently said:

"When all of the documents are published, it will be perfectly clear that no obligation rested upon the American forces to treat the Filipinos as allies."

The proof was furnished long ago in the character and the professional intelligence of the admiral and his official correspondence.

An interview was had with Mr. Aguinaldo at his private residence in Manila, April 21st. He said he was "learning English and studying the American Government," and he "greatly desired to visit the United States," but was "at the disposition of the authorities;" and he "generally indorsed the acts of the Philippine Commission." He considered for days "whether he would take the oath of allegiance or be deported to Guam; but since he has taken the oath he accepts Amer-

ican rule unconditionally, and asks guidance with seeming childlike faith." "Childlike and bland," perhaps.

Mr. Bray is too extravagant to be trusted with the truth; and it is evident he has said much he would unsay if he could revise his writings in the broad daylight of the Captured Documents.

## CHAPTER XXVIII.

### MANILA AS AN EXTINCT VOLCANO.

The Ancient City the World's Storm-center—Three Armies and Three Fleets Assembled—The Conflict of Races and Ages—Aguinaldo's Representative Character—The First American Blood Shed—The Monroe Doctrine Beyond Seas—Contrast between Cuban and Philippine Questions—Key to the Career of the Tagal Tyrant—An Astonishing Personification—The Burning Mountain in the Lake—Dewey's Candor a War Declaration, but his Duty—Doom of Defeat Visited—Prisoner in a Palace a Lesson for Tyrants.

THE writer does not need to go further than his own experiences to find reasons why the Americans and Filipinos fail to perform their appointed tasks in the Philippines harmoniously. I had usual advantages to be correctly informed as to what was going on there when I arrived, and yet that the elements contained that which threatens storms was erroneously estimated, and there were many things I took for granted about which afterward it was clear that I was mistaken.

I landed with General Otis, and drove with him through the strange old Spanish city—it was two hundred years old before the British army sailed away from New York. As we entered the harbor made famous the world round by the battle in which the American fleet destroyed that of Spain—the news came to us by

a "winged boat, a bird afloat," that the American army, under General Merritt, possessed the city—that the Spaniards had surrendered on easy terms, and that there were propositions in the form of a protocol promising peace. The crowd of soldiers on the steamer did not like the news. They were far from home, and hungry for adventure. That there was to be peace all of a sudden was the last of their thoughts and the least of their desires.

There were great throngs of people on the streets and in all public places. In and about Manila there were three armies and three fleets. The Spaniards were held captive within the walled city, filling the enormous churches, two thousand soldiers in the Cathedral alone. There were ten thousand American soldiers quartered in the city and immediate vicinity, and on the outside of it unnumbered groups of insurgent Filipinos. They came in unarmed to view the town. There was difficulty about wearing side-arms, for there was a disposition to use them somewhat recklessly and indiscriminately.

The first of the fleets in prominence and import were the warships of the United States—the safe basis of operations for the American army. Dewey was in snowy-white raiment, adorned with a few little gold buttons, on the quarter deck of the famous flagship. There were two grim, uncouth monsters, monitors—iron citadels afloat. This was where authority was seated and power was exhibited. There was another fleet that was wrecked, and only partially visible—a few ragged scraps and broken sticks standing out of the water. The third fleet was that of the American transports that had brought the army from the United States

—the foreign warships—Germany the most considerably represented; and an array of idle merchantmen.

In the City Hall were tens of thousands of rifles corded up, walnut stocks and steel barrels to be returned to the Spaniards if we were not going to stay. Here was unfortunately the first note of uncertainty, which grew, as time passed, more and more discordant. What should the treaty be? The Commission of treaty-makers was soon to meet in Paris. The eyes of General Otis keenly searched the animated scenes on all sides, as our driver, with sturdy and swift ponies found the mysterious clues to the Manila labyrinth. All was queer, everything interesting, much was charming; and there was something that caused thoughtfulness. Here was a convention of mysteries—puzzles—the end of which no man could see. I think the first thing General Otis said was: “Shall we have to give these people, as Charles Sumner would say, the ballot—aye, sir, the ballot?” I’m afraid I said, “A lot of them look as though you shall have to give them the bullet first.” There was an agreement that “there are problems here.” We had been having hints from a good many people at home that there were problems there—perhaps these also were a part of those. We had not been in town until lunch-time before several statements were made about Aguinaldo that were not of a reassuring character, and were provoking. What should a little fellow like that have to do with us? Curious thing, was n’t it, that he must be bothering himself about what we were there for, and how could he dare to impertinently insist until he got peremptory orders not to interfere with the locality and the activity of our army and the policy of our military administration? The

tendency was to American anger, but there was a shade of amusement about it that such insignificance should be so intolerable in presumption. It was worse than being pestered by a pagan from China.

We had heard of this man as the leader of the insurgents before leaving home, and there the universal disposition had been to treat him considerately and make him useful. But here he was taking the initiative to treat us insolently, give us trouble to assert himself as the indisputable monarch of the islands. Certainly we had not calculated upon it that he was to be other than subordinate, and, in fact, we all knew he never would have got there at all if he had not most solemnly promised three several American consuls that he would be a good Christian and a good American; that first, and, above all, he would be strictly obedient and submissive to Admiral Dewey. And here he was set up as a Dictator, and he had set himself up. Nobody had voted for him. Himself had appointed himself. That was n't the worst of it—he was insisting upon dictating. The stories that left their color on memory were that he was of ugly behavior—that he acted in a troublesome, exasperating, tormenting way—and who but he had started a Government of his own; erected a pedestal, and climbed upon it like a monkey on a stump, and was claiming the country and all worth having, from the center all around to the seas, as his very own; was issuing proclamations that he held were laws of the land from the moment he signed them, and that all men had to obey them! This was not all: he had an army more numerous than that of Spain or of the United States. This seems serious now when it is written; but

then it was a dramatic surprise—a farce being played as a tragedy, and nobody discovered a war-cloud as big as a man's hand. There was a tropical vapor, though!

One of the quick questions was, What did Dewey say about this? And the prompt reply was, that the admiral said Aguinaldo had the "big head," and would need a new hat. This did not add momentarily to knowledge, but it was rather reassuring. In a few days I ascertained that there was no spirit of levity about what the admiral said. Indeed, that he and General Anderson were the men who did not think that all was well—that he wanted more soldiers and more ships of war. Did n't think he had battleships enough—wanted a squadron that could smash any other in those seas, for there was no telling what mischief might be afoot; that we were not on new ground or in fresh water, but in a novel situation, and the wind might blow four ways before long, and waltz off into a cyclone, called in that country a typhoon. Dewey was the man aloft with a big glass to his eye, who studied the barometer and could see the wrinkle on the water far away, and the tinge in the sky that tells that a whirlwind is gathering, and there is to be expected one of the terrors of the sea of China—one of the mighty spinning bubbles, to be formed and whirled away to meet the sun, and blot it out for a while on the Pacific Ocean.

The President had informally invited the admiral to go to Paris and instruct the Commission, but he did not care for that task, said he was not ready to go, wanted things settled first. General Anderson, I was told, had been stirring Aguinaldo up by writing letters





GENERAL MACARTHUR'S HEADQUARTERS  
AT MANILA, WHERE AGUINALDO IS CONFINED.



AGUINALDO'S WIFE.



AGUINALDO'S MOTHER.



to him, and Aguinaldo had nothing to do but write letters to Anderson; and there were others who thought that Anderson had been mistaken in noticing him—that he ought to be treated with silent contempt, or something to that effect. Of course, it seemed that in the Tagalog we had on hand we might have caught a Tartar, and certainly, whatever he was, he was rising up a good deal, if much talk about him was good evidence of an increase of altitude. Noticeably there was intense curiosity about the man. He had been manifesting himself in ways that were dark as those of the “Heathen Chinees.” At any rate, he was interesting to a journalist. He was only ten miles away, across the bay, and I soon had an engagement to go and see him. He was told that I had been in Cuba at the time of Weyler’s Administration—had written the story of Cuba, a big book—and knew something about Spanish colonization, its mysteries and miseries, and he was interested about this “veteran observer,” who desired to pay his respects. The day was appointed, and the hour. I was to have an interview with the Dictator in the middle of the day, August the 25th. General J. F. Bell, then Chief of the Bureau of Information, was going with me. Incidentally, Bell was doing an important work of justice and benevolence in investigating the cases of Filipinos, and let go those who were under arrest for political crimes, as they called it, the proceedings of insurgents. Suddenly there came news that there had been fighting and bloodshed on the picket lines between Cavité and Bacoor. An all night’s ride was before General Bell, over a wretched road, to get from General Merritt’s headquarters to General

Aguinaldo's headquarters, to ascertain the truth about the fighting. The story is told in this correspondence:

“[Telegram received from Aguinaldo, 5.13 A. M.,  
August 25, 1898.]

“General Merritt:

“Concerning trouble between Philippine and American forces at Cavité, I have received notice of the death of one American soldier and three wounded. It is said that this happened by their being drunk. They fired in the air in the beginning, but afterwards fought among themselves. General Anderson says death has been occasioned by my people, on account of which I have ordered investigations to ascertain the truth and demonstrate that the Filipinos try to be in harmony with the Americans. If I shall find any one of my people guilty, I shall order severe punishment.

“Yours respectfully, AGUINALDO.”

“[Reply to telegram received from Aguinaldo, 5.13  
A. M., August 25, 1898.]

“[Telegram.]

“Malacanan, August 25, 1898—8.05 A. M.

“General Aguinaldo,

“Commanding Philippine Forces, Bacoor:

“Thanks for your telegram. I am glad to learn of your intention to investigate fully. I am desirous with you that harmony should prevail, and request you always, in event of trouble, to communicate directly with me, as you have so wisely done this time.

“MERRITT.”

General Bell and I called on Aguinaldo on the 27th. Bell was grave on the subject of the trouble near Cavité, and, as he had official responsibility, not talkative. It was a delicate theme. The dispatch of Aguinaldo was the account his men gave. His accusation that the affair grew out of the drunkenness of American soldiers was a facile slander. There was a keen feeling of resentment on the part of the Americans, that a comrade should have been slaughtered and others hurt, and it was understood that we were not in the habit of getting killed without taking pretty good toll of the killers. Americans, as they subsequently proved again, are competent to get value received, and to have something to show for their powder burnt when the casualty lists came in. Now, Aguinaldo had been incredibly impertinent in arresting an American officer of Anderson's staff the very day of his landing, and the "little Tag" had been otherwise adroitly playing the part of an enemy, and that with a thin disguise of cynical affability. Anderson, on the 4th of July, had written Aguinaldo that he "had the honor to ask him not to interfere with my officers in the performance of their duties, and not to assume that they can not visit Cavité without asking permission." This is pleasantly worded, unless the words are subjected to scrutiny. There is that in it that is angry. There is a likeness between this caper of the Tagalog—the bloodshed on our picket line—to the method of Aguinaldo's troops after a good deal that was tentative in hostility, when they forced the fighting on the 4th of February following; and there was an ominous note of warning in General Merritt's telegram: "Always in event of trouble, communicate directly with

me, as you have so wisely done this time." The edge of things was getting fine. It was easy to get up a fighting temper. There was a chance for a sudden and great flame to be kindled.

It was the skirmish on the picket line, with the casualty list on the American side, one killed and three wounded, that was in the air when I crossed the bay and had an interview with "His Excellency." It was said to be agreeable to him to be called so, and nobody minded much what they called him. He was very sorry, of course, that such a disaster had happened, and his good offices could be depended upon to prevent anything of the sort occurring again. At this time few had never heard of the Biac-na-Bato treaty. Mr. Williams, our consul at Manila, had mentioned it as a "cash bribe," but did not give names. If I had known that Aguinaldo had avowed to his committee at Hong Kong, May 4th, that he proposed to get from the Americans, to arm the natives, and then to use the arms against us if he could not get what he wanted by a "written contract" for a "division of armament," and as for himself, that he should be established as a tyrant in his own country, with the friendly co-operation of the United States, the atmosphere would have been changed in and around his headquarters. What we now know he had done at that time, that which declared him our enemy then, and always since, for there was no possibility of consenting to what he with unyielding pertinacity claimed. He had, two months and two weeks before I saw him, opened correspondence with the Spanish Captain-General Rivera to tender his services to Spain, and on frequent occasions referred to Spain as "Our old Mother Coun-

try," and professed an affectionate interest in her welfare. He was a vigorous and ready habitual letter-writer, and when I sent my card to him, the reply was, the General was "writing a letter to General Merritt," who for some days had been subjected to his unwelcome attentions.\*

One thing I ascertained before leaving his house that is pertinent now—he had a policy that he did not call in terms then in conversation, one of "divided armament," but he mentioned it and said to me, in reply to a question, he wanted a Protectorate—an American Pro-

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\* It was the impertinent letter of Aguinaldo, August 27, 1898, to General Merritt, that he was dictating when I called on him with General Bell. A portion of its impertinences follow:

"I can not do less than manifest my surprise at knowing that you have formed the idea that my commissioners compromised themselves in the conference of the 15th, to retire my troops outside of the line that you would designate.

"I understood, and still understand, as well as the Commissioners, that the evacuation of my troops of the posts that they occupy to-day on the outskirts of the city would take place when the proposed conditions were accepted by you, among which figured the condition that the agreement (treaty) should be in writing to be valid; for which reason, not yet having accepted some of the propositions made at the time, nor those that were substituted in my previous communication, I do not think that up to now I have contracted said obligation.

"If I have permitted the use of the water before the formalization of the treaty, it was more to demonstrate that I am disposed to sacrifice to friendship everything that does not prejudice too much the rights of the Philippines. I comprehend as well as yourself the inconvenience of a double occupation of the city and its suburbs, given the condition stipulated in the capitulation with the Spaniards; but you ought to understand that, without the long siege sustained by my force, you might have obtained possession of the ruins of the city, but never the rendition of the Spanish forces, who could have retired to the interior towns."

tectorate. By that he meant the use of our navy to see that no European Power interfered with schemes to make himself the Ruler of his country. This was in perfect consistency with that which he said to his committee before his departure for Cavité. He did not speak of the Monroe Doctrine by that name, but what he said meant its application to the Philippines as well as to Cuba. He was willing to divide armament, and by that he meant the armed national sovereignty. He was free of tongue about "the two nations;" one was his personal perquisite, the Philippines; the other was the United States, and assuming equality, at least, for his end of the earth, he was willing to prescribe what should be done by "both nations." He was perfectly composed when he talked of wanting all ashore, and admitting casually that we could float in the water outside, and drive away all disagreeable persons who should dare attempt colonization, and thereby the extension of monarchical rule on American soil. It was Aguinaldo who laid that egg, and a goose-egg it was, early in the season. He had his imitators and followers in that, as in other things. His language is not quoted here, but his meaning given.

The Americans had expected to find in the Philippines the product of a mixture of Spaniard and Malay, under the policies being pursued with her colonies, and they were aware of a Spanish army, largely native. Aguinaldo ought to have credit for originating the fashion of referring to our Cuban policy as perfectly applicable to that of the Philippines. He neglected some matters of the highest consequence in order to draw that parallel. The Cubans are one people, though



a mixed race. They are of one Church, while the Philippines have a mingling of nearly all races and religions—great communities of Mohammedans, tribes that know nothing either of Christ or Mohammed; a thousand inhabited islands instead of one; three distinct races, and forty tribes; such a variety of humanity as exists only there. One notable distinction between the two colonies of the Spaniards under comparison is, that the Spanish army in the Philippines was largely native. There is nothing of that in Cuba, where the Peninsular and Insular Spaniards were hereditary and inveterate enemies. In Cuba there are no original natives. The gentle race Columbus found perished in slavery, of hardship, cruelties, and the contagions of disease that poison civilization. The native Cubans were exterminated—totally removed. In Cuba is an immense African impression. The blood of the Dark Continent is ineradicable there. In the Philippines there were no Africans until the Americans introduced them—the first seen was a servant of General Greene. Philip, who imposed his personality and his name upon the gift of Magellan, prohibited the introduction of Africans, and they were rigidly excluded accordingly. The African slave-trade could make no landings there, while in Cuba it furnished the labor, and brought over from the Congo coast the sharks with the slaves. The frightful tigers of the sea were lured across the Atlantic by the bodies of the blacks that died during the fatal voyage, and were thrown overboard. The conditions in Cuba were, aside from racial and religious questions, not those of Luzon. The only similarity was that the capital cities of Havana and Manila were Spanish; and this difference to

remark: Havana has been frequently and awfully scourged with the yellow-fever, and it has never appeared in Manila. It may be added of Manila, that neither from Bombay nor from Hong Kong nor any other seaport where the ghastly fever has prevailed, has it ever been infected with the plague. The elementary civilizations of Cuba and Manila differ. In Cuba the Spaniards of later generations, and for the advantages they believed of sending over the favorites of the governing class for a course of spoliation, to extort from the people, themselves of predominating Spanish origin, their substance from the golden soil through office-holding, and the monopoly of the better class of situations in business. This was privileged plunder. The Spaniards came and departed in swarms with the regularity of the seasons, each harvesting corruption and fattening on the marvelous riches of the island, taking homeward with them ill-gotten gains, leaving the native Cubans poor, proud, and trained in idleness, almost as helpless as resentful. Nearly half of the Spanish soldiers in the Philippines were natives, and very few and far between natives in Cuba got into the army. Youngmen of the Philippines took to the Spanish army as an occupation and aristocracy, and were good soldiers, as the Spaniards were in the habit of saying, when under the master race as officers. In Cuba the temporary residents, the "Peninsulars" that immigrated to crowd the "Islanders," formed a special corps of troops, the "Volunteers," held to be superior in material, stronger and better drilled than the regulars. They were not made up of collections of conscripted boys. The volunteers were the terror of the island, foremost in most of the

tragedies that distinguished the Spanish rule, playing first and last an important part in the military drama. They added to the military strength of Spain more than forty thousand rifles. They were between the regular Spanish Peninsular regiments and the Cuban-Spaniards, and had a domineering propensity toward both. In the Philippines there were regulars only, but the ranks filled largely with natives, and, as the story ran, they were reliable as the northern races of India as soldiers of England. It does not appear whether Aguinaldo or American statesmen inclined to be sympathetic with him have taken into account this dissimilarity between the populations of the Spanish possessions in the East and the West Indies.

It is the key of the career of Aguinaldo that the Spanish army was in its fighting men half Spanish and half Malay. Aguinaldo himself, after his first exile, because he was an enemy of the Church, managed to be trained in the army and navy of China—a most unusual course of instruction—and then served as a Spanish soldier, so that he did not fail of practical military instruction suitable for the ranks and capable of petty positions, and, that far along, a smart man is a smart man, for a' that. When we consider the proportions and the forces of the several races and their training, between the Spaniards and the Malays and Americans in the Philippines, we perceive the certainty of conflict between the newcomers and the older occupants of the islands, with a tendency, in spite of all that had happened under Spanish misgovernment, to bring the inhabitants who had had generations of experience together in opposing those who had so recently presented themselves, and

were proud of praise as liberators. There was friction so fiery in this contact that an explosion of war could be calculated upon as confidently, at least, as the patient prophecies of the weather bureau. The evidence easily admitted scientific attention and application, with examples of illustration.

There are plain common causes for the phenomenon that goes by the name of Aguinaldo. He is not as peculiar as representative. There are millions discernible to be in a degree like him. Otherwise he would not be. Great men are not so different from small men, as it is the popular way to feel and to say. Much depends upon how they are taken from the mines—what human ore is in the parent pit? As the world goes on we strike streaks of commonplace development. Men who are of extraordinary endowment resemble others important. Men do not create—they stand for creation. The Spanish army of the Philippines was more and more made up of Aguinaldos. He got an advertisement when distinguished by the confidence of the Spaniards in making him the bearer of silver appropriated for peace into exile. It may be a sordid view to take, but there could have been no more conclusive proof of confidence by the Spaniards than they gave Aguinaldo in his letter of credit for money alleged to have been earned by him as peace-promoter. It was the stamp of old Spain on a young native that he was worth buying that made him the leader of his people. If it had not been for that bribe, some other nobody would have been a great man; that is, would have been caught at the front of the movement that the American war started, and, in accordance with the Asiatic man-worshiper's mania, hailed as en-

dowed with the supernaturalism of the deeply-dyed superstitions of torrid lands. There would have been no trouble finding an Aguinaldo of another name—not, of course, the identical creature, but the same in the end.

It has been held by Americans at large that it is improbable Aguinaldo was a triple traitor, grossly bribed, false to obligation, untrue to race and country, ignorant to the extent of not knowing the functions and offices of the governments of civilized peoples; that he could have been so friendly and laudatory to the Spaniards at Biac-na-Bato as to lift a glass of wine to his lips at the banquet following his consent to sell the arms of his men and dismiss those he had commanded, to toast on that happy occasion the royal family of Spain; that he should have proposed to bribe American officers of honorable repute with percentages of contracts, and the American Government and Nation with the proffer of Philippine provinces, and to divide the world into sovereignties of land and water, and as he had not a navy take the land to himself, and give the watery waste to Americans; that he should have approached Captain-General Augustin, who came when Rivera was gone, and entered into corrupt speculations with one as the other; that he took the bribe money into his possession as personal, and by an act of prestidigitation caused the sacred public funds to vanish in his private pocket, not without remonstrance, but without reproach; that he should have appointed himself President, Commander-in-Chief, Chief of State, Head of the Army, Dictator, and appointed also all the Cabinet officers and military chiefs that pertain to a great Power; that he wrote about Washington in the style of Napoleon, and yet did not

know that the consuls of our country were not empowered to treat and contract by themselves at their pleasure with nations, and to bind and loosen the Powers from written contracts; that he should seem to be so imbecile as to go to Wildman, of Hong Kong, and Pratt, of Singapore, and Williams, of Manila, as august, overbearing authorities, and then to Dewey, Anderson, Merritt, and Otis in succession, to administer as he should direct the Government of the United States for his honor and profit,—all this is set down as beyond belief; but it is all true, and means that Aguinaldo is an imaginative and representative man, and like goes with like.

His fancy flew far with him, and his egotism, the very faculty of irresponsible command, was exalted. The talent of command and execution was strong within him. Modesty never embarrassed him, and his inordinate, indurated, exclusive, selfishness far exceeded, for the purposes of his ambition, intelligence and intellectuality. There must have been centuries of preparation for such an individuality to arise on Philippine soil in the shadows and the airs, the burning blood and brooding brain of Asia.

The Spanish-American War came on, and found Aguinaldo in exile and far away from his exile's home. He was exiled with his own consent, and was absent on his own business. He knew he had taken and offered bribes, and was not ashamed or sensitive about it. He was planning to cajole and cheat the Americans and the Spaniards, turn about, and was not the friend of either, but the foe of both, with the lofty conceit in him that he could drive them as a tandem team attached to a Tagalo chariot. He respected himself as much as he ever did,

and aspired more than ever and babbled about his ideals in his proclamations, to be himself idealized by millions of the Americans he adored, envied, and despised.

Such personifications come and go, and are costly, according to circumstances, and the eccentric attracts the essential, the mystical, the material; but the Dictators, no matter how they arrive and depart, are never the friends of freedom. An Asiatic despot does not found a government of the people. If through such teachers the arts of self-government are taught, the object-lesson that corrects all before it must be the overthrow of the idols—the breakage of the system of dynastic personality. Aguinaldo was not in methods a man for men. He was typical of tyranny. The Government that he formed he spoke of in the first person singular. His “My Government” was not with the “consent of the people,” and was even without the knowledge of the people. The fundamental dogma of his political faith was, if the people would give him all for liberty, he would return to them what it might please him to hold was good for them. This was his New Republic. It was an old one, and had perished many times long before he was born. Wisdom had known it as imposture, vanity of vanities, at best self-deception, thousands of years ago, and only acceptable at all because organization is better than anarchy.

The combination of explosives at Manila, when the Americans held the Spaniards in captivity with one hand, and with the other thrust aside the Filipinos, sending Spain to the churches and hotels, and repelling the congregation of tribes, whose homes were on the islands, back to the villages and the jungles, was as fascinating

in its possibilities and its certainties as any chemistry of the century then close to the end of its chapter. In the Great Century there were two such centers of incandescence of the world—the fermentation of France that we call the Revolution, the crater of which was Paris; and the dwelling of Americans of the States upon the simmering volcano, after earthquakes had shaken and lightnings illuminated the land with the outburst of the stored energies of devastation, in and around Washington City. The Manila peril was not early obvious to the common sight, and American officers and students of history sailed away for their happy homes, believing all was well, and celebrating victory and peace with honor when there was but a thin and trembling shell over an abyss of fire. A bottomless pit was under the sod, and the crust hot under the hurrying feet of the children of all the continents. The city and harbor witnessed a War Congress of Nations, summoned to arms by the thunder of guns and the thrill of the bugles that gave orders in martial music.

In a lake near Manila is a low, scorched, and rent mountain, that is silent so long at times that it, as a volcano, is forgotten save in fading tradition, so that confidence grows in its extinction. But in the midst of forgetfulness that scarred hill is again tottering and bursting, the skies flame and the steeples tumble, and there is another revelation of the fiery heart of our planet—"lest we forget" that "the earth hath bubbles as the water hath," and is itself a bubble floating. This mountain that hides its fires may be accepted as like Manila in '98.

Aguinaldo knew the Americans were stronger than



the Spaniards, therefore the people in his way, and he hated them for their power, and sought a ground of common cause with the Spaniards. He had the instinct to be sure Spain had fallen in the Philippines, to rise no more, and wanted them to aid him repel the Americans. If there was to be a Philippine Empire for him, he would be willingly under the protection, but not the sovereignty, of the United States. He wanted to be guarded by the American fleet; but the presence of the American army he felt as a menace. This very policy was set forth in the Hong Kong Conference, May 4, '98, with almost frankness. His key-words were, "Divided armament." Writing to the Secretary of the Navy, June 27, '98, Admiral Dewey said of Aguinaldo, now famed for marvels in cunning, and matchless in duplicity: "Established self Cavité, outside arsenal, under the protection of our guns, and organized his army. I have had several conferences with him, generally of a personal nature. Consistently I have refrained from assisting him in any way with the force under my command, and on several occasions I have declined requests that I should do so, telling him the squadron could not act until the arrival of the United States troops."

Then, and in this way, mortal antagonism appeared. No divided armament was possible without breaking the peace. Dewey did not understand Aguinaldo's ambition. It was absurd as it was logical. It was according to nature, at least in the tropics. Aguinaldo had no occasion to be philosopher or statesman. He knew, and others did not, what he wanted, and lost no moment of movement on the line he marked out for his path. He was for a while the only man touching the events

in Manila with a lamp to guide his steps. He was not a silly child with clouded thoughts, but an Oriental dreamer with an inspiration he had faith in, that he had only to will, to be; the way clear, and the vision a reality.

From the moment Dewey told him he could not act with the squadron "until the American troops came" a state of war existed—existed in principle. Dewey was a candid sailor. Aguinaldo put on the manner and employed the words of friendliness, but between the lines he wrote his firm purpose was visible, and through all crookedness and hypocrisy his works progressed, and in his plans the greater one was to inflict a catastrophe to dismay Americans and appall Spaniards—use the city of Manila as a burnt-offering, and mingle with its destruction the slaughter of the American army. He could do without it, for it was a bulk of civilization, and was simply to be sacrificed to the ideal Filipino Empire that must begin in a victory of barbarism.

How marvelous it is that the Spaniards trained an army of Filipinos for Aguinaldo; that the Americans destroyed the Spanish navy for him; that the Spaniards gave him money to pay the expenses of his journeys of intrigue; that the Americans took him home from exile under their flag that was dazzling his countrymen with its glories, and gave him the prestige of triumph to enlist them for his cause; that the Americans, though they drove him out of Manila, allowed him to besiege the camps of the conquerors, and use the central seat of authority over the Archipelago, to propagate the mission of the Tagalos to rule in all the provinces!

After all, when the Day of Destiny came for the stern trial of arms, the doom of defeat was visited upon



*Mrs. FUNSTON  
Mother of  
the General.*



*Ex.  
Congressman  
Funston,  
the General's  
Father.*



*Mrs.  
FREDERICK  
FUNSTON.*

*Gen Funston  
In the field.*



**GEN. FUNSTON.**  
*in fatigue uniform*





him, the Malay youth who attempted the rôle of the Corsican Emperor, found his Waterloo and his St. Helena—his fatal battlefield of Manila, and his prison-house the palace where he claimed he was master. At last he was throttled and caged like a wild animal. That, too, was the logic of his life—a lesson for tyrants forever.

## CHAPTER XXIX.

### MR. AGUINALDO.

What Shall His Harvest be?—Policy for our Colonies and Constitution—Aguinaldo an Advertisement with Millions in it—Let Him Quit Business, and go into Opulent Private Life—Can He be Trusted?—Let Him take an Office in Wall Street.

THERE is nothing in the personal character or the racial antecedents of Aguinaldo that permits the people of the United States to rely upon him for any other public service than may be given, by a man all men know, beyond that of an example of prosperous citizenship. Two things related to his condition may be held assured—the inhabitants of the Philippines will not for a century be capable of governing themselves, and the Archipelago will not for that time be fit for a State.

The success of the English in bringing order out of the Malay States' confusions, and the engaging surroundings that belong with stability, are the symptom in current experience that offers encouragement; but we have not in the Philippines homogeneity to begin with. If all the tribes of the Philippines were Malays, and if we could be confident of as good administration as the English of this generation have in their colonies, we would know what to depend on. Thus far our knowledge does not add to confidence enthusiasm.

It has been found that for purposes of military man-

agement the Philippines divide conveniently into four departments, and the precedent will have influence in fixing upon the division of the thousand inhabited islands into territories. We could not well arrange at the start better than to repeat the military divisions.

As there is one island, Luzon, larger than Ohio, and one, Mindanao, large as Indiana, and half a dozen equal in area to Delaware, the task will be too scattered for one territorial governor, if a part of his duty is to make himself acquainted with affairs.

We can not now take into business consideration the parting with any of the islands; but it will be an innocent speculation if we should find Mexico willing to part with Sonora and Lower California, "contiguous territory," in exchange for Mindanao and perhaps a fringe of southern islands, and find enough to try on our "open door" for commerce and our professional statesmanship in civilization. Mexico is not a foreign monarchy, but the nearest and best sister Republic. It would not harm any version of the Monroe Doctrine we have yet heard of, if Mexico acquired a few islands in the South Pacific, or even in the West Indies. Mexico was for a long time an agency of Spain for the Government of the Philippines, but lost her labor in that line when she became independent of the Peninsular thralldom.

It does not seem to one who ventures beyond the commonplace in speculative politics impossible that we may find a way to limit citizenship that will not conflict with the susceptibilities of the strict constructionists of the Constitution, especially in the States that have made the strongest efforts to assert the supreme sovereignty of the several States,

The construction and adjusting administration of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments of the Constitution have not been perfectly satisfactory, and the States where the color and labor questions are most acutely developed together have found within themselves methods of construction of universal citizenship and suffrage that only need adjudication to the effect that the two war amendments were arranged so radically that they nullify each other, to solve a very considerable problem; and there are those of conservative education in the schools of experience, the great alumni of which are of the highest and broadest potentiality, when told if we are to part with either of the amendments that, as the case exists, automatically nullify each other, that we could the better part with the fifteenth, because the fourteenth has a clause that permits, with a penalty, the abatement of the suffrage extension that has been found distressing in communities containing majorities of human beings who require ripening without too much responsibility, before endowed with unrestrained self-government. If there is a derelict clause of the Constitution afloat, bottom upward, that may be struck in some stormy voyage by the Ship of State, and in the night, to the detriment of her sailing on, it should be removed, and north and south, far west and far east, within the Valley of the Mississippi and beyond seas, may open upon a great policy that will commend itself to the people, who, in the fine imperative and rotund Spanish phrase, "Order and command."

Mr. Aguinaldo—it is not now disrespectful to omit the "Excellency" or "General" since he "never set a squadron in the field" of war personally, unless it was



when the Boys in Blue ran after him in the woods, forming according to swiftness trying to catch him. Mr. Aguinaldo can not be wanted in any United States executive capacity, for he has very liberally construed administering oaths of the most serious form, and taken them himself with the utmost solemnity. More than this, he has had a habit of changing forms of government that would prove inconvenient under our system. It is not too far away, as we nowadays travel, to say that Mr. Aguinaldo has been too frivolous in every respect, except his respect for himself, which has amounted to the elephantiasis of vanity in the estimation of public responsibilities; but we may add that there is a sphere of usefulness that it is to be believed may be congenial, in which he may be fortunate, and confer, with good will, good luck upon his co-partners or fellow-organizers, stockholders, and trustmen.

Mr. Aguinaldo is not merely a history-maker—he is a money-maker, and the cause of others making and losing money. He has shown comprehension of the art, talent, and utility of cash, but must be cared for in all attentions paid him, with a view to his welfare. He has had a good deal of the shadow of human greatness over him, though the fame he has sought has not carried him as a living organism to the cannon's mouth. He has enjoyed exceedingly the bubble reputation, however, and now he may have a turn of thought curving away for the primrose paths that invite the young men of our age to seek the substantials according to the yellow gold standard.

The first item in the newspapers about Aguinaldo was about money. It was a telegram from Hong Kong

that attracted attention in England, stating one Artacho had brought suit against Aguinaldo for a share of a Spanish "dotation" or "concession in cash," dotated, conceded, and paid Philippine patriots, of whom he was one at that time, to depart from their native land—they called it deported—that it might be thoroughly pacificated by their absenteeism—and perhaps much better and smoother stated in that unmistakable and well-known old Spanish style so favored with familiarity in all countries redeemed from Spain, of sheathing the sword and drawing the purse. All the while of the war, Aguinaldo was never discovered without pocket money. The Filipino Cabinet officers and their secretaries and interpreters were always when traveling supplied with abundant liquors—choice wines in decorated bottles—cigars equal to Havanas, cash competent for contingencies. The Imperial Dictatorial Presidential Commander-in-Chief and Captain-General must have had a liberal civil list, or he could not have afforded such large liberality. The dignitaries wore diamonds on their left-hand little fingers, and pointed out things with pride, using that finger. When the wife of Aguinaldo was taken prisoner she had nearly ten thousand dollars in gold coin. When she was traveling she was too wise to depend on the silver standard or paper multiple. It was said in jest by a high officer at the headquarters of the army of the United States in Manila—the mother and wife of the Dictator having arrived as prisoners, and being made safe and comfortable where they would be respected, when the remark was made, as the ladies seemed rather cheerful for prisoners—that nothing was lacking to a happy family reunion of the Aguinaldos

but the presence of Emilio. The missing link has been supplied, the aching void filled. Emilio has arrived in the bosom of his household, and shown himself susceptible to the calls of affection. It is already in evidence that he has inclined his ears to the voice of his country, which has been whipped in war in all branches, civilized and guerrilla. He heard a voice say, "Let us have peace." He has heard the opinions of his many generals and some of his home-guard of statesmen, and all begged him pathetically, as Nero is solicited in the *Quo Vadis* play, to care for his tenor notes—to be good to himself—and he has reconsidered all the old oaths he has taken, and has sworn again—sworn off, as it were, as Old Rip did, meaning well—reformed himself, by taking oath enough to swallow all the rest—Moses' rod like—and now he is redeemed, if not regenerated or disenthralled. He is a sworn vassal of the United States. He should be removed from the environment and perils of some of the temptations of official public life, and go into business.

He would be a fine figure-head for a business house, a palatial and colossal establishment, in Manila—to go into, and get out too, at the right time—gold, oil, the twenty kinds of native hardwoods, the tobacco, hemp, rice, sugar, coffee—anything, everything, a thousand tropical islands afford. He can have branches in San Francisco, Denver, Omaha, St. Louis, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, New York, London, and Hong Kong. The latter is the greatest city he ever saw. Agoncillo can tell him better than to make up his mind until he sees Paris. Sixto Lopez can tell him of Boston. There can be gigantic developments of resources—promotions

of gilt-edged stock, trust combinations, all the millionaire's machinery of this age of the world. He, as an advertisement, can make millions for himself and others. He can have an office in Wall Street—a splendid apartment in a sky-scraper—participate in the Waldorf functions; have special wires from his private office in the twentieth story to forty cities; be interviewed every day; see his portraits in the papers more and more; go to Washington and see how great the influence of consuls at the ends of the earth is in the State Department—make the acquaintance of the real diplomats; pay his respects to the real President, twice elected, of a real Republic—millions of free votes given him; visit Europe; be as great a man as Oom Paul; find that there are gold-mines in the governments of our municipalities surpassing in certainty those in South Africa. He can have a partnership with the Tammany Tiger, and with sleeker animals in other cities; select an island in the summer seas, far off west or east as men may sail or steam over the blue convexities of the gigantic ocean, and then go in for a private residence with cloud-capped towers; build a palace surpassing that of the stately dome in Xanadu,

“Where Alph the sacred river ran,”

and provide for his private capital a city of the castles of Spain, his beloved and revered old mother; summoning the high Art Architects to outbuild for him the cathedrals of Europe and the temples of India.

## CHAPTER XXX.

### THE CAPTIVE IN THE PALACE.

The Pathos of Aguinaldo's Case—The Part He Played was According to His Make-up—He was Not a Napoleon—Not a Corsican, but a Tagalo—He Knew what Superior Force was before he was a Prisoner—His Guerrilla War Responsibility—His Address of Surrender to the United States, and its Construction—He has Rented a House—Fitzhugh Lee on Fred Funston—Beautiful Speech of Fred's Father—Put it in the Schoolbooks:

THE story of Aguinaldo a prisoner in the palace where the rulers of his native land have lived in pomp—and he had for a little time fought to succeed them—is not lacking in pathos; for as he came into the world and found it, he is not to be tried by the tests, when his conduct is characterized, applicable with severity to those of cooler climes, fairer hopes, broader chances, better schools, and brighter scenes. He was a poor boy of a subordinated race. The civilization that dawned upon a land where there was darkness had for representatives, taskmasters whose teaching of human rights was in the interest of the few. The stars did not seem to shine for the many. The army and the Church told the same cloudy story for manhood. While the fields and forests bloomed, there was a darkened firma-

ment. Whittier wrote the Prayer and Song of the Black Man:

“We pray the Lord He show us signs  
We some day shall be free;  
The north wind told it to the pines,  
And the wild duck to the sea.”

There was a white light from the East shining in America that touched the black man's uplifted eyes, but the Great Country that faced over the oceans the rising and setting suns, welcomed the children of the East, but not of the West; and the Yellow and Brown men dwelling in the sunset lands, the majority of the human race, were restrained of liberty of emigration to the Morning Country, where the rule of the majority of men was the law, the tradition, and the boast.

The Portugese navigator, voyaging west, found the farthest Archipelago of the Pacific; and as he had sailed from the sun, it fell, by the arbitraton of the later and greater Rome, under the sovereignty of Spain. Centuries passed, and war in the West Indies kindled war in the East Indies. A fleet came from the land Columbus found, to disinherit Spain; the prows of the warships of America plowed the Orient that held the treasures of which Columbus dreamed; and the ships from the East met the ships that came from the West. Then the squadron of the Spaniard was not. The mighty hand of the American Republic was laid upon the islands of Asia, and was a power on the shores of the Ancient Mother Continent. Unhappily the young man destined to become conspicuous in revolutionary war—the first between a kingdom and a Republic in Asia—failed in his understanding that the welfare of his race and

the millions that dwelt on the thousand islands of Philip was largely confided to him, not for further fostering of tyranny, but to open a door in the venerable walls that sheltered immemorial dynasties, and prepare the way for liberty, for the founding of an Asiatic Republic.

The young man of the shadow-tinged blood of the Orient failed to comprehend the one opportunity of thousands of years, and confide in the flag of the Stars of America. There was an army and a province in his hand, gained by no virtue or strength, no act of his own—an army that should have been for freedom; but when the parting of the ways was reached, Emilio Aguinaldo was not a Republican, not a Democrat, but a Dictator, and for Spain as against America—for the dead, rather than the living. This mad choice was not made through any mistake as to duty that keeping faith with the people imposed—it was the way chosen for a motive utterly personal. Aguinaldo was not for the people, but for himself. He conspired and fought against Liberty. He was not informed of the forces changing the face of the earth. More than a year he had been in hiding—a hunted man—when a strong hand, unexpected as though it had been on an arm reaching from the sky, seized him, and drew him to the palace a Captive. There his wife and mother came to him free. The wife had fled with gold, and could not vanish in the jungles, or walk with her burden in darkness, and had been sheltered in Manila under the flag of that freedom which has meant a change of the course of destiny for our new possession, from one-man rule to all-men rulers.

That which prevented Aguinaldo from being the

friend and ally of Americans, that he professed and promised to be, was the ambition he and his friends had to be what Spain had been, master of millions to impoverish industries, oppress the people, and be spoilers of the land. The Filipinos have merits that appeal to the kindness of those who have for generations had more light, breathed air that imparted manly vitality and the immortal inspirations. The Filipino is industrious, he has intelligence; but he is a Malay imitation of a tropical Spaniard, and the fatality that is in his blood and education is that when he is empowered and has authority, he does as he thinks a Spaniard would do in his place. The model is not excellent, and the impersonation an evil mockery. Aguinaldo has acted up to his teachings. He sought to place himself so that he could get the winnings of the war, and it was according to his sense of honor that he should cheat the combatants and betray both for the realization of his own purposes. His idea of patriotism was that he should please and help himself. He brought terrible losses upon his people. He had power, and used it as a ruthless, remorseless tyrant. He is superstitious, and had no other conception, when he found an army commanded by himself, than that he was a man born to be Imperial. He said he could not refuse the offerings of Providence. As an Asiatic, he could not well know better. He would have been the rarely glorious man of an age and race, if he could have been superior to his surroundings. He could not; and felt he had fought the fights appointed for him, and as he could not, a prisoner, make terms, he could find justification for sparing scenes of slaughter. His language is, he submits to an "irresist-



ible power," and no man so confronted can do otherwise than he, unless moved by the invincible spirit of sacrifice, that is taught and teaches the way to gain all is to cast away all. It was Hebrew wisdom of slow growth through thousands of years that reached that altitude. It was an impossibility for one of Malay and Chinese blood. In his prison, Aguinaldo was agitated, consulted his friends, and for a time was obdurate. The evidence was the time had come for him to submit. The mystics who respect nothing else revere superior force. Probably he knew little of Napoleon. He was easily possessed of a few commonplaces about Washington, but he was too conscious of himself to play the part of another. Presumably, he had heard of Napoleon, the most imperious of intellectual emperors, but not enough to parallel his own situation with that of the Conqueror, who parceled out kingdoms at his pleasure and carved Europe with his sword. The time came when the Cæsar of his thousand years, the man of the Star and the Eagles, the Cocked Hat and Gray Coat, felt that even he must surrender for the sake of France; that the highest duty was to make peace. Aguinaldo's procrastination of surrender is not an imitation, but it is like the bulletin of submission to fate, when Napoleon appealed to generosity, and was given St. Helena.

Aguinaldo has rented a house in Manila, and there will be well guarded for his personal protection and the public safety. He would not now have ability to revive rebellion if he cared or dared to do it. The address he issued April 19th to the inhabitants of the Philippines possesses a certain consonance with the heretofore. It

is not the first time the Ex-Dictator has made his obeisance to sheer force. He has had education in force.

The insults he inflicted upon Americans, and presumptions asserted repeatedly, were unbearable, and he was checked in turn by Anderson, Merritt, and Otis with stern warnings. Two days after the surrender of Manila, General Merritt directed his adjutant-general, Babcock, in regard to the aggressive attitude of the Tagalos, to "make them understand that they must not hold a line encircling the city. The commanding general will not tolerate a line of troops or works which would give the appearance that our troops were hemmed in by a besieging force." It was stated that the insurgents might billet their commands in the villages, but "under no circumstances will they be allowed" to surround the American army. There was only one thing to do with Aguinaldo from the first, after he had turned over to him the native Spanish troops, and that was to use force to drive him back, peaceably if possible, forcibly if necessary. We know now what was not known then—that Aguinaldo was in the Spanish interest; not our ally, but enemy; that his policy was to subordinate the United States by commanding both fleet and army, or to support, with motives of his own, the sovereignty of Spain in the islands; that his part in the siege of Manila was a fraud, his troops a nuisance; and that all statements to the contrary, naval, military, or civil, were not based upon information, but were the filtration of the falsehoods of the insurgents, and military courtesies that were strained to sustain the primacy of the policy of peace. There was not one of our officers who did not exercise the greatest forbearance

toward and attempt to humor the frantic little pretender, and treat his vanities as one affects to admire the adornment of painted savages. The Americans for some time failed to realize that they were themselves objected to, that the Tagalo policy was to drive them out of the land and over the sea. Even now the anxieties of peace of our countrymen and their civilities, meant to abate the piratical propensities of the insurgents, are quoted as proof that the marauding greed of the men Spain had bought and was using, should have been submissively summarily recognized as the true expression of National Republican Sovereignty, according to the Declaration of Independence and Constitution of the United States.

The attacks upon the Government of the United States for the Philippine Administration have been directed first of all, and with the greatest perseverance and indulgence of animosities, to the assertion that it was the duty of our officers to placate the natives and win them to our side, and it is pointed out that in the beginning inhabitants were all with us. The terse truth is, that they would have remained our friends to the end if they had been capable of self-government. That they were incapable was demonstrated by the influence of Aguinaldo. He had to deceive the mass of his own countrymen, to arouse them against the United States. They were led to accept him as their leader, because the native troops of the Spaniards found him and surrendered to him, and then he quarreled purposely and made himself offensive with all Americans with whom he came in contact. His demands were not tolerable. The only way of pacificating him was to recognize his

Dictatorship as a true national Republic. He would have been the friend of the United States before he was crushed, only on the condition that our ships and men-of-war should aid him in establishing an Empire. There was no other way. There was no American officer in contact with the Aguinaldo pretension who was not insulted, and driven to announce that force would be used if continuance in a studied course of overbearing vindictiveness was not prevented.

The most delicate question in the case of Aguinaldo was his identification with guerrilla warfare, and his personal ferocity in the directions given for the murder of sentinels. General MacArthur, November 23, 1899, wrote to the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, saying, "The so-called Filipino Republic is destroyed;" and he added, "It is a fugitive," and the guerrilla warfare would be the irresponsible acts of men proposing to lead small detachments "without a shadow of authority from a *de facto* Government." They would necessarily act on "individual whims." This was "individual action." The Filipino army "as an organization had disappeared," and those keeping the field "became simply leaders of banditti, and in this view how would it do to issue a proclamation at an early date offering complete amnesty to all who surrender within a stated time, with a payment of thirty pesos to every soldier who gives up a rifle, and declare with emphasis that after the date fixed the killing of American soldiers would be regarded as murder, and that all persons concerned therein would be regarded as murderers, and treated accordingly? Such a proclamation would have the effect of forcing the generals to consider the expediency of continuing

a hopeless struggle which would commit them irrevocably to death or life-long expatriation."

The objections to carrying out this weighty recommendation were, that it could not be published so as to bring it "within the knowledge of the ignorant masses, from which the insurgent armed force was drawn." The policy would have to be uniform, and months were taken for news to pass from one island to another. There were American soldiers held as prisoners, and five thousand Spanish subjects, "upon whom the insurgents would retaliate should we publicly proclaim an intended enforcement of the law in all its rigor. Our mission was to pacify the inhabitants by acquainting them with a knowledge of our pacific intentions, which a proclamation drawn upon lines the circumstances warranted would certainly have misled. The insurgent leaders, civil and military, were, as I knew from the confessions of those captured or who had surrendered, fully aware of the penalties they invoked by adopting guerrilla methods of warfare, and our own officers had a keen appreciation of conditions. It was not therefore thought to be prudent to openly proclaim to our soldiers that all Filipinos still bearing arms, whether collectively or individually, merited the fate of robbers or murderers caught red-handed, for fear that barbarities might result, or at least that too great a license might be practiced."

The prudence of General Otis in avoiding extreme severities will meet with commendation, but General MacArthur had much provocation. The guerrilla bandits infested the country, and the people were mercilessly persecuted—the ladrones (thieves) plundered them

without mercy, adding torture and murder when their extortionate demands were not promptly complied with. The wealthy inhabitants, those possessed of estates, were in a precarious condition. The scattered insurgent forces, which still retained some form of organization, called upon them for contributions to the insurgent cause, promising upon compliance to protect them from the cruelties of the robber bands. They demanded of the city authorities, appointed by our own officers, the imposition and collection of taxes and the sale of insurgent cedulae for insurgent uses, on penalty of confiscation or destruction of private property.

Aguinaldo's address to the inhabitants of the Philippines, issued April 19, 1901, was in these words:

"I believe I am not in error in presuming that the unhappy fate to which my adverse fortune has led me is not a surprise to those who have been familiar with the progress of the war. The lessons, taught with a full meaning, and which have recently come to my knowledge, suggest with irresistible force that a complete termination of hostilities and lasting peace are not only desirable, but absolutely essential to the welfare of the Philippine Islands. The Filipinos have never been dismayed at their weakness, nor have they faltered in following the path pointed out by their fortitude and courage. The time has come, however, in which they find their advance along this path to be impeded by an irresistible force which, while it restrains them, yet enlightens their minds and opens to them another course, presenting them the cause of peace. This cause has been joyfully embraced by a majority of my fellow-countrymen, who have already united around the glori-

ous sovereign banner of the United States. In this banner they repose their trust and belief that, under its protection, the Filipino people will attain all those promised liberties which they are beginning to enjoy. The country has declared unmistakably in favor of peace. So be it. There has been enough blood, enough tears, and enough desolation. This wish can not be ignored by the men still in arms if they are animated by a desire to serve our noble people, which has thus clearly manifested its will. So do I respect this will, now that it is known to me. After mature deliberation, I resolutely proclaim to the world that I can not refuse to heed the voice of a people longing for peace, nor the lamentations of thousands of families yearning to see their dear ones enjoying the liberty and the promised generosity of the great American Nation. By acknowledging and accepting the sovereignty of the United States throughout the Philippine Archipelago, as I now do, and without any reservation whatsoever, I believe that I am serving thee, my beloved country. May happiness be thine!"

This document bears internal evidence that it was hammered out with toil and care. Aguinaldo consulted many friends; among them General Trias, held to be second in command, and the address is the product of much anxious deliberation. Professor Schurman, of Cornell College, the head of the Peace Commission when the war was on, states the important points, as follows:

"First, Aguinaldo's recognition that a complete termination of hostilities is absolutely essential to the welfare of the Philippines; second, his confession that the Filipinos have declared unmistakably for peace, and

that a majority of them have hopefully accepted American sovereignty; third, his assurance that his countrymen already enjoy some of the liberties promised by the Americans, and confidently expect, with improved conditions, to enjoy them all; and, fourth, Aguinaldo's own acceptance of the sovereignty of the United States."

A Manila dispatch gave this detail:

"When told that ninety per cent of the population were in favor of peace, he responded, 'Even so, my lot is yet with those upholding the cause of the insurgents. With their consent I would quit, but otherwise how can I? By the trickery of the Americans I was captured. Now that I am a prisoner I must consider what is best. Liberty is sweet, but those whom I deserted would hate me. Hard is my situation. I would respect my word, but sometimes I think exile and imprisonment would be preferable.'"

Another correspondent says:

"It is said that Aguinaldo is strongly adverse to reverting from his former attitude, but that he must regard the best interests of the Filipino people. The sisters of Dr. Barcelona have called upon him, bringing a plentiful supply of linen. Aguinaldo is well supplied with money. He celebrated his thirty-second birthday the day before he was captured. The birthday festivities were prolonged, and only terminated on the arrival of General Funston."

The scene of the acceptance by Aguinaldo of the conditions that constrained him is sketched in a special cable, thus:

"Aguinaldo's consent was won only after patient effort by Arellano, who pointed out to the insurgent



chief the laws that have been enacted for the Filipinos by the Americans. When Arellano had convinced him of the justice of these measures, Aguinaldo said: 'Enough. I am satisfied with America.'"

It appears that the ignorance of the Ex-Dictator of American history and institutions is inconsistent with his literary reputation being the work of his own head and hands. He consulted a dictionary a great deal while writing, and no doubt was lost without his able staff; for a captured letter of his to Sandico shows he is bothered to speak and write Spanish, the Tagalog being his native speech, and it is not a refined language, but has a fine ring when rendered well into Spanish. One of his ways of soothing his restlessness was to walk hurriedly about his room, running his fingers through his hair.

Forgetfulness of the kind of enemy he has been to the United States would not be pardonable. He has rather been the will than the brains of his rebellion. His greatest shrewdness was in taking full advantage of knowing what he wanted, and going with resolution and energy to gain it, while we were in an unready state as to duty, and fell into delays that lasted six months longer than they should before we had a treaty. Every moment of this time was employed by the Tagalogs in doing mischief.

He moved to his house near the palace occupied by General MacArthur, the military governor, and is chaperoned by Colonel Mallory, a young officer, of a family of distinction of Virginia. The first correspondent who called on the former Filipino Generalissimo says:

"He appeared to be considerably worried. He has

aged considerably since he assumed the Dictatorship at Bacoar in 1898. He refused to say anything for publication. He is afraid that his statements might be misconstrued. He is extremely uncommunicative even with his friends."

This indicates a change of mood, for it is the manner of his days of ordering and commanding to follow the Spanish formula of supreme executive power.

The full particulars of the capture of Aguinaldo show that the hearty recognition given the Captor by General MacArthur was not too strongly drawn, that the words were those of discretion as well as enthusiasm. General Funston had made a study of the subject, scouted the province of Isabela, and knew what the people were. General Fitzhugh Lee, in San Francisco, gave this incident, the most interesting that has been given to the public of the Kansas hero, and it is a good story on General Lee himself, though he did not say as much of his own generous act as another would say:

"I remember Funston very well," said Lee. "One morning when I was consul-general in Havana a hungry, hunted-looking chap appeared in my office. He said his name was Funston, and that he had been fighting with the insurgents for a year and a half, and that he was sick and wounded, with a Mauser bullet through his lungs, his hip broken by his horse being shot under him, and his constitution shattered by fever. He had made his way to the coast. I bought him a ticket to New York, and also fitted him out with some clothing. When Funston arrived in New York, January 17, 1898, a blizzard was howling through the streets, and he must have shivered as he limped down the gang-plank. After

his return to Kansas, war-talk was in the air. He was appointed colonel of a regiment, and you know the rest."

The marriage of the General took place during the interval between the Cuban and Spanish war. He was with the insurgents in Cuba and against the insurgents in the Philippines, and has a firm belief that he was all the time on the right side, and that the side of his country.

The speech his father made to the neighbors, who came two hundred strong with a band of music, was very happy, and had the substance of good things in it so handsomely that it should find its way into the school-books. Mr. Funston, Senior, tried to avoid speech-making, but had to stand up in full view, and then he said that which will have long life:

"My Friends and Neighbors: I am sure that your presence here to-night is exceedingly agreeable to myself and wife. It is the climax of our lives. And when I say that, I do not forget my own life, which has not been without its successes. But when the sun is setting low in the life of a parent, nothing brings such deep and unmixed joy to the heart as honors to one's child.

"I want to say for Fred that he has always been a good son. I do not mean that he has lived a life prescribed by his dear mother and myself, but that there has been no little meannesses in his life; his ideals have always been high. His associates have been picked for their virtues, and he has sought to accomplish something in the world, something worth doing, not something merely that would bring notoriety. I know the boy's character thoroughly—and I say he was always a

good boy. The success which has crowned his life might well teach a lesson to young men, to have an aim in life, and make that aim high.

“And so this glorious news comes to us, and is doubly welcome. It is welcome to us because it has brought acknowledgment from you, his neighbors, and from the people of his State and country that you are proud of him. And, furthermore, it is welcome because it comes on the happy birthday of his little mother, who to-day celebrates her fifty-eighth year.”

Mrs. Funston stood by his side as he spoke from the veranda, and as he closed, three cheers were given for the “Little Mother and the brave little General.” Just then some one in the house started “America” on the piano, and for half an hour patriotic songs floated out the open door and were taken up by the throngs outside.

## CHAPTER XXXI.

### CAPTURED DOCUMENTS HIGHEST AUTHORITY.

Inner Light on Disputed History—What the Captured Documents are, and What They Prove about Aguinaldo—Themselves Conclusive, they are Corroborated by Environment and Coincidence—Tagalo Treachery and Spanish Co-operation—The Truth of the Insurrection Comes to Us with the End of it—There is One Record of a Ballot in the Junta, with Thirteen Votes—The Attitude and Evidence of American Consuls—The Outlook of Our Orient.

THE captured documents in the possession of the War Department of the United States Government stand for what they say. There are many of them, varying in importance from those that give clear light where there has been darkness, to mention of matters that are trivial. They consist of private and confidential letters written by Emilio Aguinaldo and others, without reserve, interpreting public papers and acts. These, to be conclusive, must be corroborated to fit into circumstances and give local coloring and characteristics, so as to fix themselves firmly in association.

In the case of Aguinaldo there have been heated discussions as to his motives and the spirit of his actions, the integrity or criminality of his conduct, and there have been broad and bitter disagreements and controversies that have affected the public opinion of our

country. The captured documents that are of the greatest moment are not letters, but the carefully-written and thoroughly-authenticated "minutes" of sessions of the Filipino Junta of Hong Kong, and they are the "Book of Acts." The Spanish of committee is "Junta." Insurrections against Spain, at home or abroad, have always been in the hands of committees; and there have been not infrequently conflicts of jurisdiction between rival committees—wars of Junta with Junta. Hong Kong was the great city nearer than any other to the shores and the hearts of the Filipinos. It is an English colony, safe from Spanish oppression, free from the masterly inertia of China, or the hatefulness for the Filipinos of the dominance of Chinese. There is rancor between the races, and yet those of mixed Filipino and Chinese blood are the most fortunate of men in that part of the world in making and keeping money.

For a long time there have been Filipino colonies in the great cities on the shores of Asia and adjacent islands—the principal one at Hong Kong—and that man of the blood of the inhabitants of the Filipines who grew to independent fortune was happy if he could make money in his native land, salt away capital in securities beyond the grasp of Spain, and follow his money to live in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong colony had the reputation of wealth, and, of course, were enemies of the colonial system of the Spaniards. A Junta, disposed to dabble in revolution to sympathize with insurgents, was the inevitable product of that soil and air. Hong Kong was the place in which to look for a Junta, and in the Junta to find a leader of insurrections against Spain. There are few things proven about

the youth of Aguinaldo, beyond the origin of him in the province of Cavité and his boyhood in the town, but one may believe the statement made without prejudice or to asperse, that he was in the service of the army and navy of China, and got into China through Hong Kong; and it is easy to agree that this was the better part of his education. The first appearance of Aguinaldo's name in a cable dispatch was touching the attachment suit of Artacho against Aguinaldo.\* The former sought to prevent the latter from disposing of certain moneys paid by Spain to certain persons, who had agreed for a considerable sum, and collateral promises of various kinds, to stop an insurrection which was not of a very serious nature, but served the Spanish officers in charge of the Colony to make money out of the Mother Country; and they gave a part of what they got to pacify the insurgents, the manager of the transaction being Pedro Paterno, and the principals in the agreement and handling the cash, Captain-General Rivera and General Captain Emilio Aguinaldo. At the time the Hong Kong Junta of Filipinos became historical, nearly all the great men of it had been participants in the Biac-na-Bato treaty, and the President of it was the man who had the

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\* London, Friday, April 29, 1898.

A dispatch to the Daily Mail from Hong Kong, dated Friday, says: "A few weeks ago, before the Hong Kong Supreme Court, Artacho, the Minister of the Interior in the provisional government, applied for an injunction to restrain Aguinaldo (the insurgent leader) from parting with \$400,000 that had been remitted here by the Spanish Government for distribution among the leaders of the late insurrection.

"Other members of the Council propose issuing disclaimers against Artacho's action, and expressing confidence in Aguinaldo. He and his colleagues have devised a plan of going to Manila in their own vessel and have a large supply of arms and ammunition."

money in two banks, the custodian of the money the Spanish conceded.

When war arose in the Philippines, between the United States and the Filipinos, there were captured during the flight of the army of the insurrection from the second, third, or fourth Capital of the Aguinaldo Government, the number depending on the turn of the question, whether Cavité and Manila were first to be counted, or the beginning admitted to be Bacoor. The war Capital, at any rate, was Malolos, and precious papers were carried away in haste, and the retreating army burned the houses to show how desperate they were. The fate that befell the family of Aguinaldo overtook the papers of the Junta. They were saved by falling into the hands of Americans, who appreciated them. The "minutes" of the meetings of the committee, when action was taken in the matter of the Artacho suit, backed as it was by the Paterno petition for an equitable division of the funds, was signed by eight of the participants in the "cash bribe" treaty. Aguinaldo was sustained by the majority, for the greater number of the patriots agreed to give up guns and disbanded the immediate command of the "Chief" as he officially sailed abroad with the money. The dissatisfied, with the exception of Artacho, remained in their native land, and he did not stay long in China. At this meeting the secret history of the sale of arms by Aguinaldo and the deposit and defense of the money was given.

There was another meeting, the "minutes" of which have been preserved—the meeting at which Aguinaldo, returning from Singapore, assumed his permanent Presi-



gency of the Junta, and pleaded that he should not go to Cavité to see the American admiral, without making a treaty, a "written contract," with him. Here we have the only record that exists of the number of votes cast in founding the Republic of the Philippines. This Junta was *it!* At this meeting of the Junta there was certainly a full attendance, for the President had returned from Singapore, the Spanish-American War had broken out, the Spanish fleet was no more. Agoncillo had been President during the absence of Aguinaldo, who was re-elected and to be reinaugurated. A Vice-President was to elect and to inaugurate. The minutes declare that when the votes were counted, Don Galicano Apacible had ten votes, Don Rosario had two votes, Don Luchan one vote, in all thirteen. Now this was the only appeal ever made to the people to voice their patriotic purpose of converting a foreign committee to a Republic beyond the Sea of China. It was at this meeting the committee became the Republic that Aguinaldo wanted recognized, and raged about the injustice of nations in not welcoming the new Power. This meeting was held May 4th, 1898, fifteen days before Aguinaldo met Admiral Dewey, and the minutes of the meeting furnish the proof that he was then the enemy of the United States and the friend of Spain against the United States. Read the proceedings of the Filipino Committee, in Hong Kong, 24th of February, 1898, and May 5, 1898. This volume contains both in full. When the latter meeting was held, there was a temporary President in the chair, who stated that Aguinaldo had just arrived from Singapore, and "must now take possession of the office to which he had just been elected." We see further along that when

Aguinaldo took the oath of office, "Don Filipe Agoncillo turned over the Presidency to Don Emilio," who wanted a committee to go, and was brought to change his mind by his predecessor in the Presidency.

Agoncillo thought the time *was then* to "*arm themselves at the expense of the Americans.*" That is what they did. Agoncillo added, "The Filipino people, unprovided with arms, will be the victim of the demands and exactions of the United States." This shows the anticipation of a difficulty with the United States, and the policy that prevailed over the objections of Aguinaldo to go himself, was, that the chance to get arms was then; and to do it at the expense of the United States, to fight against the States with the arms. The next sentence of Agoncillo was, "Provided with arms [the Filipino people] will be able to oppose themselves to them [to the United States], and struggle for their independence." The Hong Kong documents prove that the "President," Aguinaldo, and his staff of seventeen, were conspirators against the United States, contemplated, discussed, and decided upon a course of trickery toward the United States, that could mean but one thing—a profession of being "allies," and to play that game to get arms from us, and then to fight against us for independence. The inevitable end of this was an alliance with the Spaniards, and the use of the two armies—the Spanish and the Filipino—to defeat the Americans. That was all they knew about our country; but hereafter such mistakes will not be made.

The President of the United States sent the "minutes" of the meeting referred to, direct to the Senate of the United States, on a call for the papers by the Senate,

March 27, 1900, as "copies of English translations of minutes of insurgent meetings, held at Hong Kong, China, February 24 and May 5, 1898, and of a certain other paper appended hereto, marked "I," said documents being found in insurgent public records, recently captured by our troops in the Philippine Islands." The paper marked "I" relates to the "contract" made at Biac-na-Bato, December 19, 1897.\* There is no more carefully and responsibly authenticated official document in the archives of the United States.

In Chapter XV of this book "the first proof of Aguinaldo's treachery" is one of the most striking and strange papers ever "captured" for publicity. It is Senate Document 208, Part 3, Fifty-sixth Congress, First Session, containing a letter signed "I-I-9-6-I-M," "written on paper used in the private office of the President," and "M," the letter at the end of it, the first letter in the word "Miong," and "Miong" in the Philippine Presidential cipher is "Emilio." Captain John R. M. Taylor, Fourteenth Infantry, "in charge insurgent records," Manila, February 16, 1900, certified a translation of this letter to be "correct to the best of my ability." . . . "The handwriting of it, as of other official documents accompanying, is that of A. Valarde."

This document should receive most searching and

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\* This is given as the date of the contract; and yet Consul Wildman reported he remembered the arrival of Aguinaldo and party at Hong Kong in September, 1897; and the Agoncillo proposal of a treaty was November 3, 1897. The dates are a puzzle if the contract was not made until forty-six days later, unless the gun contract and two provinces tender was before the cash had been paid. Perhaps the reconciliation of the discrepancy is by way of the fact of two payments of \$200,000 (Mexican) each, that the first was an advance on account.

scrupulous attention. It is addressed to General Diego Rios, who surrendered the Spanish garrison he commanded to the Aguinaldo forces, and that was the heaviest and most embarrassing shock the Americans ever received in the Philippines. In reading the letter carefully (pages 163, 164, 165, 166, "Aguinaldo and His Captor"), we perceive it draws the line on which the surrender to the Filipinos, rather than to the Americans, was made. This is the stronger showing, because the Spaniards had notified General Otis of their readiness to submit, and he had dispatched an expedition to take possession. The submission to Aguinaldo's forces, rather than to the fleet and army of the United States, shows there had been a "treaty," or, as the Filipinos would say, "a contract," with the Spaniards. The surrender of the second city of the Archipelago, on one of the richest of the islands of the sea, to the insurgent natives, was like, under such aggravating circumstances, the loss of a battle by the Americans. It was a distinct disaster to the cause of our country, and a victory for all our enemies, that they rejoiced over greatly. It was Aguinaldo's one victory as against us. It was all the more disturbing and burdensome, mortifying, scandalous, and disastrous, because we were not at war with the natives, nor had we made a treaty with Spain. It was a traitorous intrigue that caused it. We could not bombard the town, for we were not formally and actively at war with any organized force in it. There was a community of good feeling and bad feeling between the Spaniards and Tagalogs, and we were held up as a mark for the insolence of the insignificant, as our soldiers were when they were treated to the baboonery of the Tagalo

tribe and their allies before Manila until the fighting began.

We presume there will be no honest question of the verity of this letter as coming from Aguinaldo. It is framed in circumstances that assert its authorship. One of the evidences that it is from him is that it is false in itself. The plain proposition on the face of the letter, and in every line, and between the lines of it, is that it was written by an "ally" of Spain. He had the hope of preserving "from the shipwreck the sovereignty of Spain on these islands." That is the kind of an ally he was of the United States. Possibly he may not have thought he could win at that, but in the event of loss he expected to be able to compel the Americans to pay a high price for his favor; and the Spaniards might turn over the islands to him, and they had bought him and knew the argument that would get him. Spain had not yet ceded and sold the islands to us. They were for sale to somebody, however, and Spain might get her revenge for her awful defeat, by helping the Filipinos into war with us. The letter would have been of much interest and import if it had referred to the Iloilo matter only. It goes further, and, as events were running, far back to June 9th, when, he says, naming General Augustin, in a letter to him of "June 9th last." Now the conspiracy thickens, and the treason is rank! The letter-writer takes pains to say Augustin paid no attention to his June 9th letter. That is a smooth way of not offending one Spanish officer, while attempting and succeeding in beguiling another. Aguinaldo and Augustin had been communicating by way of Legarda in Manila during the siege, the Spaniards getting fresh meat through the

lines of the Filipinos on double passes. Aguinaldo's name was the one that carried the meat to the Spanish lines.

The letter to Augustin was written on the very day he found himself in possession of the province of Cavité and seven thousand guns! Just then he was armed according to the Hong Kong program, and turned the arms against those who gave him free passage home as a devoted friend of the United States. The captain-general who negotiated the Split Rock treaty and helped divide the cash, and had promised to stay and carry out impossible reforms, was in Madrid, and it was time for the Filipino salesman to arrange a "contract" for mutual advantages with the captain-general of the period. The conduct of Aguinaldo has uniformly, from then until now, sustained this explanation of his character, and the cultivation of his personal ambition and greediness for cash in bank.

In Chapter XXI we give the full text, with the exception of a few sentences that are introductions, and do not signify, of the guerrilla book of tactics, prepared by the Filipino Revolutionary Committee located in Madrid, Aguinaldo's dear "old Mother Country." That is what he called the bloody monster.

The Filipinos have a school of the art of assassination, under the disguise of warfare. Madrid is the place for the enemies of the United States to find sympathy. This book of "tactics" is not a captured document. It is a proclamation of the adaptability of the methods of murder, according to the talent and traditions of the Spanish, that for such service may be part of scientific education.

There is another document not captured, or secret or lacking in fame, kindred of the Madrid school of assassination with Filipino professors. It is the "Instructions to the Brave Soldiers of Sandatahan, of Manila," the opening feature that Aguinaldo himself designed in preparations to destroy the Americans in Manila and the city also. This document is dated Malolos, 9th of January, 1899. The Sandatahan is an organization for secrecy in crimes of bloodshed. It is supposed to be the most intense form of Malay love of country. The self-governing Tagalos have the idea of very private proceedings in public matters deeply implanted, and their leader, Aguinaldo, was at the trouble to prepare, as a painstaking labor of love, a manual of arms for murderers, who were to do their work after the manner of sneak thieves. Killing their enemies craftily was their game. One of the consummate artist touches in this work of the head and hands of Aguinaldo is stated in very simple language. This statesman says, "One"—meaning one of the "Brethren of Blood"—"One should go alone in advance to kill the sentinel." That is not hard to remember. It is a case of perspicacity. In order to do this with ease and grace and humane purpose, with the highest motives, this should be read from Article 4, "They should not, prior to the attack, look at Americans in a threatening manner." Of course, this is a hint to be friendly with those who are marked for murder, to be pleasant and a lover of Americans, just to put no one on guard. Then comes the nice, stealthy strategy of "one man" going alone to neatly and quietly "kill the sentinel"—that the "attack on the barracks by the Sandatahan should be a com-

plete surprise." There we have Aguinaldo's Washingtonian plan of campaign! Here are a few points that will bear repetition, for we give the whole paper in this volume, Chapter XVII.

"Article 2. All of the chiefs and Filipino brothers should be ready and courageous for the combat, and should take advantage of the opportunity to study well the situation of the American outposts and headquarters, observing especially secret places where they can approach and surprise the enemy."

There is to be a chief of the bloody brethren, and he should "send in first four men with a good present for the American commander. Immediately after will follow four others, who will make a pretense of looking for the same officer for some reason, and a larger group shall be concealed in the corners or houses in order to aid the other groups at the first signal. This, wherever it is possible at the moment of attack."

These are delicate touches by Aguinaldo himself, and sketches of him, therefore. It is this sort of warfare on "Yankees" that is taught under Spanish auspices at Madrid—it is a specialty of tropical civilization.

A few days before the news of the climacteric achievement of the Kansas hero, Funston, there appeared in one of our important illustrated papers, that has made the utmost of the picturesque in the Philippines, an account of Aguinaldo at Singapore by Mr. Pratt, the American consul then there when the Spanish-American War came to pass. One of the mysterious episodes of the life of Aguinaldo was his visit to Singapore, under the evident auspices of Mr. Bray, an Englishman. There was a certain state about this excursion,



associated with a ludicrous display of caution, perhaps meant, in the minds of the managers, to magnify the proportions of the mysterious, great man, so carefully guarded, and yet so eagerly written up and profusely published by Mr. Bray. Mr. Pratt's enthusiasm was so warm it was kept within an affectation of diplomatic restraint only by subjecting it to a great strain of suppression that soon gave way; and presently the consul was called to order with an unaccustomed accent of reproach from the State Department. He explained his conduct like a gentleman, who felt he had been imprudent with excessive attention to public business. Mr. Pratt took the precaution to have Aguinaldo interviewed, so as to know just what to depend upon, and then gave the young Malay a fatherly talking to about the duty he owed to civilization and to the Americans, and, above all, to put himself submissively into the hands of Admiral Dewey and obey his orders in everything; and then, as a farewell mark of the highest consideration given the most famous great men—Aguinaldo and his staff—who did not then want any comforting of a pecuniary character, but were very dignified and self-sustaining, they were smuggled aboard a steamer under assumed names, and hurried off to see Dewey "at once," and go right to "co-operate" with him. If there was anything Aguinaldo wanted, it was to co-operate. The great chief, who, as now appears, was in funds, for he had drawn \$50,000 on personal account from the holy patriotic fund of Spanish silver ("Mex."), arrived at Hong Kong the day after the battle of Manila, and then did not want to see the victorious admiral at all until he had a "written contract" with him, signed and sealed

and recorded in the "Book of Acts" of the Hong Kong Committee, which is the only form of Republican Government that ever passed through two summers in Asia. The reading of Ex-Consul Pratt's paper on Aguinaldo was like the Singapore episode a few days before a revolutionary event. The Singapore incident immediately preceded the destruction of the Spanish fleet, and the Pratt paper in *Collier* got out in time to confront the news that Aguinaldo was a captive and no longer disguised, and, one ought to be able to add, known in his true colors, which were Spanish! Mr. Pratt's paper is an agreeable bit of writing—there is nothing in it and that is well done. We are told of the fact that Aguinaldo was a pleasing personage for the American consul to meet, and one would have expected that, for our consuls were all more or less moved by the climate and conditions of responsibility, and took comfort in the passing shows. Mr. Pratt remembers still how his distinguished friend had a room with a big window in it that looked out on a grove of palms—a very tempting, but not unusual, sight in the tropics—and he had a wonderment about the treatment of the good man by our Government, and complains a good deal for Aguinaldo—as a great man lost to us. Our State Department did not seem to take so kindly to the mysterious Malay as the consuls, who were in a condition of inflammation of the brain about their various senses of duty—their fault being that they could not let anything alone. They were all right except they were too warm-hearted, confiding, and simple in their manners, and overdoing in their dutifulness, as they comprehended their several vast, various, and solemn responsibilities. With the exception of Mr. Pratt, they had not been accustomed to

the airs of Asia, and he, perhaps, had had a breath or two more of them than was good for his system. They were all honest and patriotic men, who, with opportunities to do a good deal of mischief, did only a little, and that in the old line of trying to do too much, and doing it at an abnormal temperature. Their little slips on paper with ink have been amusing, even a little amazing, but not injurious, save as they have led some of our politicians, who are powerful in the production of ideals, into false estimates of amateur official word-painting. Our consuls involved in the Asiatic end of the war were imprudently zealous, and said things they did not know with an unbecoming assumption of the higher walks of international excellence. They designed better than they did. They have been quoted a great deal, and interpretations placed upon their utterances quite to their disadvantage, but in no case the color of dishonor. Wildman of Hong Kong, Williams of Manila, and Pratt of Singapore, undertook to be monitors for the head of the Hong Kong Filipino Club, who had appointed himself President of the Philippines in a mass-meeting of thirteen committeemen, and recognized himself as holding the office, and also took cognizance of his Government as that of a Great Power, offering to find the United States navy employment to check European monarchical colonization in Asia, under the Monroe Doctrine. This was the best he could do. It was not bad, but it was barbarous. Mr. Wildman, when bribes were offered out of the Spanish Peace Fund, and Artacho attached the bank account, wrote the whole outlay to the State Department, and though he had a few days of deception as to Aguinaldo, early in the strenuous season described the Filipino cobra as he moved in a

shining coil with a swollen head, and told the silly side of the wisdom of the serpent. Mr. Williams had the weakness of credulity, and was frank to fearlessness in his familiar hold on the handles of the world. Mr. Pratt had a happy way of avoiding the bottom of the facts that were not suitable to his idealities, but skimmed off the bubbles of the fountains, was pleased with his own affability, and came out strong on the 4th of July for the United States and the Philippine Republic, with its strongly American Hong Kong President; and he was unaffectedly surprised when the Third Assistant Secretary of State, severe, sensible, and exact, dispatched him a specimen of artificial ice, with ammonia and other burning fluids in it, to be used when the romantic tendencies of the torrid clime that tease the north temperate imagination set in. He made no grave mistakes beyond believing in the grandeur of the Tagalo tribe of Malays that had crossed the Sea of China, after starting a Republic with conspicuous omen, but unlucky number, the same number of citizens that we had of original States. He actually believed in their self-government and the republican form of it, gotten up by the immortal thirteen, and when he ceased to be in the civil service of the United States, he—it is our misfortune—lost interest in current history, or he did not go so far into it as to assimilate the news as it flew around the world. He does not know any more now about Aguinaldo than he did three years ago—he closed his mind and books and papers on the subject. Those years have been a blank to him in Philippine affairs. He has not read the captured documents. He does not know that it was soon after Spain had lost her navy, Aguinaldo was willing to give up Spain for the sake of accepting as a

present that of the United States, to stand off the navies of Europe, but that otherwise he was a Spanish sympathizer; and Mr. Pratt does not shed a ray of light upon the reasons for the visit of the Tagal chief to Singapore. That has never been stated with the purpose or the permission to tell the truth. Perhaps Aguinaldo may now state the facts. Mr. Pratt seems to be shy of fresh supplies of truth.

Now that there is no partisan politics in the Philippine question, within the common senses of sight and touch of the strong-handed and clear-headed people, there will be no sufficient inducement for the formation and combative assertion of false theories and the perversion of plain facts. The captured documents are as authentic as any official papers that could be assorted as specimens for the historical material of our country. The papers found in Major Andre's boots by the card-playing cowboys at Tarrytown were not more authentic than those taken in Aguinaldo's baggage, and in the cave that was chosen as a safe deposit by the fugitive Filipinos. Disputation about the curved lines Aguinaldo followed will cease, for it will no longer serve him to be a falsifier on his own account. He will explain that he had a right to prefer his "old mother country Spain" to the new and mighty master, the United States. He can say it was his privilege to make choice of the continuance of the first swarm that lit on the islands, and fearing the Peninsular Spaniard might be better (according to his political and moral philosophy and military ambition, and apprehensive that the Yankees might have great appetites)—might be better than the continental North Americans.

Aguinaldo's proclamation of his own surrender is

not inconsistent with his career. He has known how to recede when he struck the limit. Told that he was not to enter Manila with his army, though he was posed as our friend, he knew enough to be sure that was not his time to fight the Americans, and he yielded, and waited and watched and worked for himself. Ordered not to draw military lines around our army and give himself the style of besieging us, he desisted for a few weeks, when he saw our peace policy allowed him to go on with his haughty schemes, and wait for a better chance, and he crowded our soldiers harder than ever. He demanded the Malacanan Palace for his own, but retired when superior force was up against him. He agreed with McKinley and Merritt when he saw he must, that it would be a mistake to undertake "joint occupation." That phrase was only a subterfuge, for his meaning was to wipe out the American army with the help of the Spaniards. He ordered the pure water turned on in Manila when Merritt was about to use military force to compel him. He found bull-carts and bamboo for Anderson when that officer was about to send out foragers and take what was wanted forcibly, paying for it, but seizing it.

He yields to irresistible force in his proclamation of surrender, that his people—his "O, My Beloved People!"—may have peace. He can not help it, and gives up. He respects force—the only thing he does respect—and he is intelligent enough to despise the flatterers, though he is fond of flattery, and misunderstands it. His correspondence shows that. He should not have flatteries, but force, for our sake and his sake. He never knew anything about ballots, but the long-range rifle-ball and the keen bayonet and the far sweeping of the

artillery he comprehended. An Asiatic knows when he is whipped, and thinks it the part of wisdom to yield to fate—this in a degree not known in Europe, America, Australia, or Africa.

We are a great Asiatic Power—the Great American Power—a World Power—and we have taught Aguinaldo the lesson in the only way in which he would or could receive instruction. The Philippines are our possession. We could not rid ourselves of the responsibility of victory. The Filipinos are our pupils, to be taught self-government, and we have to take plenty of time to it, and we are to judge of their scholarship and mark their progress with the deepest interest, recognizing it with satisfaction. We could not champion Aguinaldo as a nation, for he was a fake nation, and as a power he was our creature, and the references were to our sovereignty. Events have spoken, and will have it their own way. Aguinaldo officially recognized himself. It was all that could be done for him, and he did it himself. His office is gone, and as an unofficial person he recognized us. If he does not inhale the idea that he has a party in the States, and under the Constitution being annexed by treaty, is eligible to the Presidency, he may be a useful inhabitant of a Territory, to be considered by us in quantity and quality as we consider New Mexico, Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, and the Aleutians.

The captured documents clear the mysteries from the Oriental air for us; enable us to know who were and are our friends and foes. We fear no one, and shall be good to ourselves and to others as always. We have got the hang of self-government—we keep the school-house of it, are masters in it, and can afford to be just

and generous, to maintain the Monroe Doctrine in America, and to keep Tycoons off our possessions in Asian islands. Aguinaldo's submission will make peace, and we should soon have had peace without him. We shall know how to keep our promises, and not to accept the presumptions of others as our obligations. Our policy in the Philippines has been broad and straight, and we stand squarely there, let the winds blow as they may from the quarters of the globe. We shall teach ourselves, studying the character of Aguinaldo, how to educate him to give compensation for the costly sacrifices he has caused; and we should deal with him according to his deeds; and knowing we have a giant's strength, know also "it is tyrannous to use it like a giant;" and so apply the wise Lincoln's golden words to the Archipelago, for which we have all the titles of war and peace, "With malice toward none, and charity for all."

The Aguinaldo proclamation is a "captured document," for it comes from a prisoner of war, and confirms the history other papers have made known. There are other documents, doubtless, of like consequence, and now will be clouds of witnesses for the truth—that the policy of our country in the Philippines was right all the while, and is crowned by a victory that is complete and auspicious. And, whether Republicans or Democrats, no matter in what generation our ancestors came to our country—whether we are between the two great oceans of the world, or the islands of either—we are all Americans, and, when the drum beats and the flag flies, march all one way, and that the way that glory guards and honor guides.



Harlae à 2 Agosto 1899

Pr. Teodoro Sandico

Sto Domingo

Guinapalan ab kun agungui-  
linan coy coy guino: sum-  
arkin nyanon any imong sulat  
tuloy. Guinamit agad any trapla  
ma sa pag-tugon sa imio nra

Suog mo pong panimala  
any nra balitan inioy ting-  
tamo any saaling mag-catotoo  
sa dakilang hindi co pa naririni-  
yon, ay asahan mo pong  
publiko co agad, na di maaring  
pababayan copá, any cahimat  
di inio aco sulatan, ay  
talagan mag-ucusa sa pag-  
tatanggol, bakit any caunahan  
ay talaga nan any dapat coy pa-  
rin sa lahat nyanon sa  
inio pa caya? Ba

gay naman sa sulat ninio sa  
iniyong bayan ay tinanggap ko  
po ngayon calakip tinatutulan  
na pasasalamat

Comunista po sa iniyong  
lahat at may otos in'caya dito  
sa iniyong dating si  
Effimialoy

Ngayon may bagong alay hi-  
guin na si omionay may isang  
articulo si Si. Mabini sa de-  
p<sup>a</sup> ma. ay titulo ay "Alp<sup>a</sup>  
Congreso" na totoong pinun-  
daan dao ang mga ito buod  
sa talagan hindi rao dapat pa  
hin iyon dahil sa mahalagang  
ata atiny bayan at isang pang-  
bibigat na parang isang probos-  
na tayong malang union,  
enan copo at hindi pa nababasa  
at mabasa o man, ay discubhan  
na inintindihan, dahil sa tanto

naansino na bahagiya pa  
ayon na caalam in ilay mi-  
cay Castilla; at di omawoy  
firmado in ngalam Paraliti-  
co, ay masabing articulo

Casamay

THIS LETTER, WRITTEN BY AGUINALDO IN THE TAGALOG DIALECT, HIS NATIVE TONGUE, TO THEODORO SANDICO, CONTAINS THE STATEMENT HE DOES NOT WELL UNDERSTAND THE SPANISH LANGUAGE. IT RELATES TO MABINI, WHO HAD THE REPUTATION OF BEING THE "BRAINS OF THE AGUINALDO GOVERNMENT," AND IS NOW A PARALYTIC. THE ORIGINAL IS IN THE WAR DEPARTMENT, AND PHOTOGRAPHED, BY PERMISSION, FOR THIS BOOK. THE OFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF THIS LETTER IS IN CHAPTER XII, PAGE 132.

CINCINNATI, MAY 1, 1901.

MURAT HALSTEAD.



APPENDIX.

TRANSLATION OF PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF  
TREATY OF BIAC-NA-BATO.

NOTE.—The corrections and changes found in the original in pencil are given in the translation in red ink. The changes are, except where otherwise noted, in the handwriting of P. A. Paterno. It is evident that he, as representing the Spanish Captain-General, refused to agree to the clauses stricken out, which is done in pencil, evidently the same pencil of Paterno's changes.

J. R. M. T.

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The Translator's note is given as written, but we distinguish the Spanish corrections of the Aguinaldo and Paterno papers by printing the words omitted in *italics*. The changes made in pages 423, 424, 425, 426, are significant. Every attempt to use the name of Aguinaldo as relating to political power is stricken out. The title "President" is in all cases removed. The paragraphs in pages 425, 426, that were red-inked, leave the action as an undertaking "for revenue only."

## THE MYSTERY OF THE TREATY OF BIAC-NA-BATO.

THE name Biac-na-Bato is Tagalog, and means Split-Rock. It is the stronghold of the insurgents of '96 in the isle of Luzon, to which they resorted when they had been driven out of the Province of Cavite, where the insurrection that gave distinction to Aguinaldo originated. The papers following are of the captured documents that are in the archives of the War Department, and they are of very great interest to all who desire to know thoroughly and perfectly the character of the Aguinaldo group who made the arrangement with the Spaniards, Pedro Paterno being the arbitrator. This distinguished Filipino appears to have been the originator of the idea of the negotiations, which were planned on his part and that of Aguinaldo, to secure some recognition by the Spanish Government as a political organization and force; in other words, Paterno and Aguinaldo made the same effort there that subsequently characterized so many of their proceedings to secure, in some shape, from somebody, recognition as the representatives of a Filipino Republic. It is to be remarked that while there is a great deal of talk about a treaty growing out of this negotiation, there is not known or acknowledged to be anywhere a copy of that instrument. The probability is there was no treaty, and the face of the papers exhibited below indicate that. They show that, though Paterno drew up an elaborate document for the Spaniards to consent to, declaring Aguinaldo to be the President of an Insurgent Republic, the Spaniard who ran over the document with his red lead pencil marked out everything of that nature, and confined the negotiation expressly to the surrender of arms, the abandonment

of the insurrection by those engaged in it, and the provisions for the payment of money which was made by express stipulation a personal matter. In other words, this paper proves that the treaty referred to with so much pomp by the Aguinaldo party was a mere bargain and sale agreement, and a completely dishonorable matter all the way through. It was, as Consul Williams said it was in his first statement about it, a cash bribe, and nothing else; and it settles the question of the dishonesty on both sides, and the extreme presumption of Aguinaldo and his Filipino associates in the affectation of nationality. In these papers are given the respective dates of the progress of the transaction and the departure of the insurgents, who had agreed to be deported simply because they were paid to go out of the country, and they could afford to go, for they managed to get nearly a thousand dollars for each of the guns that they gave up, the only specifications of the guns being that there were 225 of them, and the first payment was for \$200,000.



331376-A. G. O.

N  
RDS:WAS.

SEÑOR DON EMILIO AGUINALDO,

CHIEF OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY OF THE  
PHILIPPINES.

THE undersigned has the honor to present himself unexpectedly in your Headquarters in Biac-na-Bato, and states that he does so impelled only by his vehement love for the country in which he was born, to explain the many reasons why the hostilities caused by the revolution ought to stop, as to attain at present the whole of the desires which are sought to carry into effect, it would be necessary to first ruin the Filipino People, and whoever boasts that he loves that people should remember that the Spanish Government holds in suspense the longed-for reforms solely because those very men continue to bear arms.

In truth, on various occasions I have heard the Governor-General of the Philippines lament this suspension as he is very desirous of establishing and unfolding during his command a new series of reforms bound to give satisfaction to the country, and if they are not everything which has been asked, it is because it is impossible to root out in one day that which has endured for more than three centuries.

I have also repeatedly heard the Most Excellent Señor Marques de Estrella state that understanding as nobody else could, his obligations he had placed himself at the head of the brigade which took the last trenches of Cavite so that he could have the right to pardon without any limitation; on account of which he dictated the proclamation of the 17th of last May and amplified it extensively in

applying it to others, raising all the embargoes and even holding his arms open to receive deserters themselves.

Having then, reforms and true pardon, I permit myself to counsel that a truce is advisable for the unfolding of the generous propositions and proposals of reform which now animate the Spanish Government represented in the Philippines by the very noble and fatherly Most Excellent Senor Don Fernando Primo de Rivera, and in the Peninsula by the great and liberal statesman, Most Excellent Don Segismundo Moret y Predergast, author, in 1870, of the order of the abolishment of the religious sects, of the creation of the Philippine Institute, of the reforms of the University of Manila, and so many beneficent plans for the country directed toward giving representation in the Spanish Cortes to the Archipelago and to liberate this people from the powerful dominion of the religious orders.

Such are the reasons which prompt me to present myself spontaneously at these headquarters and I submit them to the high consideration of Your Excellency so that you may deign to accept them for the termination of this fratricidal struggle by a convention of peace which is bound to assure the prosperity of our beloved country.

BIAC-NA-BATO, 9th August, 1897.

(Signed)

PEDRO A. PATERNO.

I certify that I believe this translation to be correct.

JOHN R. M. TAYLOR,

Captain 14th Infantry.

In charge of Insurgent Records.

MANILA, P. I., July 6, 1900.

Taken back from Paterno (Aguinaldo's hand)

The Excellent Senor Don Pedro Alejandrino Paterno, having unexpectedly appeared in the Mountain of Biac-  
before me

na-Bato on the 9th of August, 1897, in the *Headquarters of the President of the Philippine Republic*, stating that he presented himself impelled solely by his vehement love for the country in which he was born, to state the many rea-  
our

sions there were why we should lay down arms, contenting ourselves with a portion of the amount which we asked for, since in order to gain at present all of our desires it would be necessary first to ruin the Filipino People, and those who consider themselves lovers of that country must remember that the Spanish Government is holding in suspense its carrying out of the reforms solely because we are in arms. That the said Senor Paterno has on several occasions heard the Governor General of the Philippines regret this suspension, as he is anxious to plant and bring to completion during his command a new series of reforms intended to satisfy the country, and if they are not all that which we ask for it is solely for the reason that in a day it is not possible to extirpate what has been taking root for more than three centuries. That also many times he heard the Excellent Senor Marques de Estrella say that, knowing his duty better than anybody else, he had placed himself in front of the Brigades which took the last trenches in Cavite in order that he might have the right of pardon without any limitation whatever; on account of which he dictated the proclamation of the 17th of May last, and extended its provisions fully to all persons, taking off all restrictions and even holding his arms wide open to welcome even deserters themselves.

As reforms then and actual forgiveness are promised, Senor Paterno advises us to restrain our warlike ardor and give an opportunity to the General's desires for reform

which animate the Spanish Government represented by the very noble and paternal and most Excellent Senor Don Fernando Primo de Rivera.

On account of these various other considerations, not connected with the field of battle, and influenced by the undeniable authority exercised by Senor Paterno in questions concerning the Filipines ————— he has presented himself before my presence as willing to guarantee this negotiation by his own life so valued by all Filipinos.

Chief of the

The undersigned, Don Emilio Aguinaldo, *President of Revolutionary Army*

*the Philippine Republic*, names the Excellent Senor Don Pedro enter into harmonious relations

A. Paterno, as arbitrator to *sign a peace* with the Spanish Government giving him full powers to determine, fix and receive the total sum of the funds or values which the Spanish Government grants us and to distribute them according to his knowledge and sense of equity, everywhere recognized, not only to those who have taken up arms but also to those who without having taken part in the suffering from the consequences of the war campaign, are *compromised with us* and who are now endangered *by this present convention of peace on account of their obligations and interests.*

before me

Don Pedro A. Paterno has solemnly sworn *to the Council of the President* to reveal no secret of the revolution, at any time or place under pain of loss of life and honor, promising to overcome, if the Spanish Government aids to the execution of his pacific him, all obstacles opposed *to the due execution of contracts, intentions and negotiations payment of money and other obligations contracted.*

These difficulties once overcome and the resources *or*

*values* trusted to, the said Senor Paterno having been according to his instructions secured, they having been deposited *in his own hands*, and after we have sent our certificates that the total amount of the funds are in the custody of Senor Paterno of our free will, we shall turn over all the arms which we possess to the person designated by the Captain General and General-in-Chief of the Philippine Army, Don Fernando Primo de Rivera asking him for amnesty. The President and his Cabinet *consider that this action on their part is worth 3,000,000 pesos.*

We commit our existence and that of our families and also of all of those who have taken part in the present revolution to the very noble and generous instincts of the Marques de Estrella, Grandee of Spain, hoping from his paternal forethought the sums necessary for us to live free in our towns under the protection of the Spanish authorities in our towns where our property has been destroyed, or in foreign parts where we shall have to set up our hearths.

*In exchange for such protection from his Excellence, the Governor General of the Philippines, we promise to re-establish order and defend the peace in the Philippines during the three coming years until September, 1900, during which period we hope the desire political, ecclesiastical, civil, administrative and economical reforms, of which the principal, are the following, will be carried out:*

I. *Expulsion of the religious orders or at least regulations forbidding them to live together in cloisters.*

II. *Representation of the Philippines in the Spanish Cortes.*

III. *Application of true justice in the Philippines equal for the Indian and the Spaniard. The same laws in Spain and the Philippines. The Indians to have a share in the higher offices of the civil administration.*

IV. Change of the laws governing property, upon taxes and the holding of Church benefices in favor of the Indian.

V. Proclamation of the individual rights of the Indian, as, for example, his liberty to combine with others in associations, and the liberty of the press.

*The President takes into consideration the spirit and the letter of this writing to present it to the General Assembly; which he hopes will approve it, but it is his duty to state that without the approbation of this Assembly, which will be called together as soon as possible, the President of the Filipino Republic can not put it in effect.*

*As a preliminary base for the harmony and the definite peace between the President and the Spanish Government, the President, who has the honor to sign this paper, will issue a General Order suspending all forward movements of the Revolutionary Army of the Island of Luzon, as soon as he receives the necessary supply of rations to permit them to remain stationed in the mountains having no relations with the cities and towns during the period of convocation and action of the General Assembly.*

And to prove this to be the truth, I sign, Rubricate, and seal with our accustomed seal, in Biac-na-Bato.

(Signed)

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

SEAL,

of

President of  
Filipine Republic.

Entered in the proper book No. 4.

(Signed)

MARIANO LLANERA.

Seal of the  
Commanding General  
Centre of Luzon.

(Signed)

M. NATIVIDAD.

I certify that I believe this translation to be correct.

MANILA, P. I., July 5, 1900.

Captain 14th Infantry.

In charge of Insurgent Records.

Accepted and agreed to  
Difficulties (In a 3d handwriting in red pencil)

## ACT OF AGREEMENT ADOPTED FOR THE PACIFICATION OF THE ISLAND OF LUZON.

IN the Royal Palace of Malacanan, residence of the Excellent Senor Captain General of the National Armies Don Fernando Primo de Rivera y Sobremente, Marques de Estrella, Governor and Captain General of the Philippine Islands and General in Chief of its army, said Excellent Senor being in private audience on the 15th of November, 1897, which the Excellent Senor Don Pedro Alejandro Paterno, Knight, Grand Cross of the Royal American Order of Isabel de Catholic Advocate, and resident of the City of Manila, who states as follows:

That inspired by his ardent love of the Spanish Fatherland and of the soil of the Philippines on which he was born, and convinced of the magnanimous sentiments of the nation and of the Government, sentiments so magnanimously shown in the conduct followed by the present Governor-General of the Archipelago; he has proposed then, himself to co-operate in the re-establishment of peace utilizing the influence which he exerts among his countrymen, since this influence of his is something thoroughly well established; that in order to attain this end, he had a conference with the principal leaders of the Rebellion in their own camp where exhorted them to lay down their arms and to subject themselves to the laws for the good of the country and the improvement of the condition of their followers and of their own material interests, that his exhortations and labors have not been sterile, since at the end of a long discussion, the leaders above mentioned, inspired by the same idea of peace and with reawakened love of their country, informed him, that they realized that the state of war retards the inauguration of benefi-

cent reforms in place of hastening them and placing full confidence in the liberal and generous spirit of the Government of his Majesty of his illustrious representatives in these islands, that his efforts have been constantly directed against the inveterate abuses and ills which oppress the Filipino People, and they are now ready to cease their hostile attitude and to co-operate with all their power and ability in the re-establishment of peace and that in obedience to the pacific and conciliatory desires the said leaders have conferred upon Don Pedro Alejandro Paterno, here present, the ample powers which he exhibits signed on the 5th of last November in the Mountain of Biac-na-Bato by Don Emilio Aguinaldo, Supreme Chief of the Insurgents in arms and by the other leaders, Don Mariano Llanera, and Don Baldomero Aguinaldo, his subordinates, powers which designate him as the arbiter and which give him full authority to negotiate an agreement providing for the submission of those who still maintain a hostile attitude against the power of the State.

The Excellent Senor Captain General Don Fernando Primo de Rivera having thoroughly understood the nature of the mission undertaken by the Excellent Senor Don Pedro Alejandro Paterno, in accordance with the powers signed by Don Emilio Aguinaldo, Don Mariano Llanera and Don Baldomero Aguinaldo in which it is stated that the said Don Emilio Aguinaldo assumes the position of full and absolute representative of those who fight against the laws established in the Philippines, such being the position conferred upon him by an assembly composed of individuals taking part in the Rebellion and by the organization created by the same for the conduct of the government, the said Excellent Captain General having stated that he congratulated himself upon the attitude adopted by Senor Paterno and on account of the tendencies and



proposals of those represented by Senor Paterno stated that he considered worthy of gratitude and praise the services rendered by that gentleman for the establishment of peace, and that he was animated by the same desires himself, as he had shown in his proclamations amnesty and in a large number of orders and decisions, he was accordingly ready to facilitate any steps taken toward the pacification, being ready to renounce the laurels of victory in the coming campaign to avoid the shedding of blood and any reason for enduring hatreds and rancors between those who, having the same God and the same Fatherland, ought to live in fraternal concord and a community of interests and of affections.

The Excellent Senor General in Chief having received with benevolence the propositions formulated by Senor Paterno, the latter stated the chief desire of those whom he represented was to submit, that the future of those who lay down their arms on the altars of the country should be free from any penalty for the past and that they should be supplied with the sums indispensable to their continued existence in the territory of the Nation or in foreign parts; and considering these desires attainable and others unacceptable, both members of the conference having considered the matter with a thoroughness and from the lofty point of view which so difficult and important matter requires, the Excellent Captain General Don Fernando de Rivera y Sobremonte, exercising the authority with which he is invested and the full and unlimited power which the government of his Majesty has conferred upon him, and the Excellent Senor Don Pedro Alejandro Paterno, in the name and as representative of the Leader of the Insurgents in Arms and of the other two leaders who signed the powers delivered to him, which he has shown, agree to end the conflict which at present afflicts with desolation

and with blood certain regions of the Island of Luzon; the agreement being comprised in the following clauses:

I. . . . . Don Emilio Aguinaldo in his quality as Supreme Leader of those in the Island of Luzon now waging open hostilities against their legitimate government and Don Baldomero Aguinaldo and Don Mariano Llanera who also exercise important commands in the forces mentioned are to cease their hostile attitude, surrender their arms that they are using against their Fatherland, and are to surrender to the legitimate authorities claiming their rights as Spanish Filipino citizens which they desire to preserve. As a consequence of this surrender they obligate themselves to cause the surrender of such individuals as actually follow them and those who recognize them as Leaders and obey their orders.

II. The surrender of arms will take place in accordance with an inventory on the — day of —, at the hour and place

which will be decided upon, the Military Commander designated for this purpose by the Excellent Senor General in Chief is to take charge of the same.

III. The surrender of the individuals referred to will take place as far as concerns the leaders of bands or allied troops with the formalities and at the time and place to be determined upon hereafter, each person surrendering himself to receive at the time of surrender a passport or pass which he needs to travel freely to the place where he wants to go. Spaniards, foreigners and deserters from the Army will not enjoy this privilege, but will remain in the hands of the Military Authorities, their cases to be disposed of as provided in the fifth and sixth paragraphs.

IV. All those who avail themselves of the provision of this act will stand free from any penalty they have incurred from the offense of rebellion and kindred crimes, the Excellent Senor General in Chief binding himself to concede

a general amnesty covering such offenses and to authorize the persons surrendering themselves to freely choose a residence in whatever portion of the Spanish territory or of foreign parts which they desire. This clause is not to be construed as conflicting with the provisions of the fifth and sixth clauses of the present act.

V. The deserters of the Army who avail themselves of this act will be pardoned from any penalty, but will have to serve as soldiers in a disciplinary corps for the period which remained of their enlistment at the date of their desertion.

VI. The Spaniards or Americans and foreigners who present themselves claiming the benefit of this act will be comprised in the general pardon, but will be expelled from the Philippine Islands.

VII. The parties or bands which do not recognize the leadership of Don Emilio Aguinaldo nor obey his orders who claim the benefits of this act will obtain them in full if they surrender themselves before the date set down.

VIII. The parties and bands which do not surrender before the date mentioned in the preceding paragraph will be pursued and treated as subject to the present laws covering such cases or as parties of robbers and assassins if on account of their organization the character of their leaders or their own acts they appear to deserve such a description. Nor will the benefits stated accrue to those who surrender themselves immediately before they are to be attacked or during the pursuit following an action.

IX. The Excellent Senor General in Chief will provide the necessary means for supporting the lives of those who surrender themselves before the date given in the second paragraph in view of the painful situation to which the war has reduced them, but he will negotiate only with Don Emilio Aguinaldo through the Excellent Senor Don Pedro Alejandro Paterno.

X. And in case that any of the preceding paragraphs are violated the provisions of the whole act will remain null.

In testimony of which the Excellent Senor The Captain General Don Fernando Primo de Rivera, in the name of and as representative of the Government of His Majesty and the Excellent Senor Don Pedro Alejandro Paterno in the name of Don Emilio Aguinaldo bind themselves to execute the provisions of this act and sign it. Three copies of which are to be drawn up, one to be forwarded to the Minister of War, one will remain in the office of the Captain General of the Philippines for reference and for execution, the other will be given to the arbiter the Excellent Senor Don Pedro Alejandro Paterno, the said gentleman stating in the name of those whom he represents that they confidently expect that on account of the foresight of the Government of his Majesty that it will take into consideration and satisfy the desire of the Filipino People in order to assure them the peace and well being which they deserve.

I certify that I believe this translation to be correct.

JOHN R. M. TAYLOR,

Captain 14th Infantry,

In charge of Insurgent Records.

MANILA, P. I., July 7, 1900.

## PROGRAMME.

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### MAY GOD GUIDE TO GLORY.

Day  
18th Nov.

Departure of Don Jose Salvador for Biac-na-Bato with the reply of the conference with the Governor General and with the passes for the insurgents in general.

20th Nov.

Sending out the orders of pacification, from Don Emilio Aguinaldo to all his barracks scattered throughout various provinces.

7th Dec.

Arrival of Don Pedro A. Paterno at Biac-na-Bato with Don Miguel Primo de Rivera and General Tejeiro or General Moret, being guests in the Government house, in company with the family of Don Emilio Aguinaldo, Don Artemio Ricarte, Don Jose Salvadoe Natividad, Don Ysabelo Artacho and other chiefs of rank in the insurrection.

8th Dec.

Surrender of arms of the immediate command of Don Emilio Aguinaldo to the Spanish Government in some place between Biac-na-Bato and San Miguel de Mayumo.

Simultaneously the Spanish Government will give to Don Pedro A. Paterno to give it in turn to Don Emilio Aguinaldo the sum of six hundred thousand pesos to distribute them among the insurgents.

8th Dec.  
(Afternoon.)

Arrival of Don Emilio Aguinaldo and other Insurgent Chiefs with Don P. A. Paterno at San Miguel de Mayumo.

10th Dec. Departure at Manila of Don E. Aguinaldo and companions.

15th Dec. Arrival of the mentioned gentlemen to foreign parts.

19th Dec. Don Emilio Aguinaldo will telegraph to the Insurgent chief which shall have remained in Biac-na-Bato to prove to the Generals Primo de Rivera and Tejeiro that they can abandon, if they should so prefer, the Government house at Biac-na-Bato.

From the 20th to the 31st Dec. Surrender of arms of the other remaining commands of the insurrection.

1st Jan. The "Te Deum" will be sung in the Cathedral and the decree of general amnesty will be promulgated.

2d Jan. To Don Pedro A. Paterno two checks or notes will be given, one at four months' date for value of 100,000 pesos, and another of six months' date for value of 100,000 pesos, which constitute the 2d and 3d payments.

Interlineations—Don Isabelo Artacho—it is good. Blotted—que constituye—it is not good.

Biac-na-Bato, 15th November, 1897.

(Signed) EMILIO AGUINALDO.

(Sgd) MARIANO LLANERA.

(Sgd) BALDEMERO AGUINALDO.

(Signed) PEDRO A. PATERNO.

I certify that I believe this translation to be correct.

JOHN R. M. TAYLOR.

Captain 14th Infantry,

In charge of Insurgent Records.

MANILA, P. I., July 6, 1900.

## PROGRAM.

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- 14th Dec. Departure of Don Ysabelo Artacho with the approval of the Ex-Sr. Governor General of the Convention of Peace.
- 16th Dec. Issue of the orders proclaiming peace to all his troops in the various provinces by Don Emilio Aguinaldo.
- 23d Dec. Departure of S. Miguel de Mayumo of the Excellent Senor Don Pedro A. Paterno with the Excellent Senores Generals Chief of the General Staff, Don Celestine Fernandez Tejeiro and Don Ricardo Moret, an adjutant, two staff officers and Lieutenant Colonel of Infantry Don Miguel Primo de Ribera.
- 24th Dec. Arrival at Biac-na-Bato of the most Excellent Senores Generals Tejeiro and Moret, Adjutant and two aids who will be met in the road by Don Ysabelo Artacho and Don Jose Salvador Natividad.
- 25th Dec. Departure of Don Emilio Aguinaldo and his companions with Don Pedro A. Paterno and Don Miguel Primo de Rivera for Lingayan, where the Spanish Government will have a merchant Steamer to take them to Hong Kong, the gentlemen going aboard may take their revolvers and the two rifles asked for by Don Emilio Aguinaldo. On the departure of these gentlemen from Biac-na-Bato the Spanish Government will give, by Don Pedro A. Paterno, to Balde-  
mero Aguinaldo a letter payable to the order of

25th Dec.  
(Continued.)

the Spanish-Filipino Bank upon some Bank in Hong Kong for the sum of \$400,000 dollars the cost of the exchange being charged to the Spanish Government.

27th Dec.

The above mentioned gentlemen having left the port of Lingayan for Hong Kong and having arrived at Hong Kong, Don Emilio Aguinaldo will telegraph to Don Artemio Ricarte in order that he may carry out the following: First, the turning in of the arms and munitions inventoried; Second, the carrying out of the order of Aguinaldo, given before his departure from these islands, for the turning in of all arms remaining in the hands of the various groups of Insurgents scattered in various provinces. Third, that he may notify General Tejeiro and other gentlemen who remain in Biac-na-Bato that they may abandon their residences in said town. As soon as the 225 fire arms, 2,382 cartridges, and 20 pieces of ordnance, and 2 sabers are turned in to the Spanish Government at Biac-na-Bato, these are the officially inventoried articles, Don Artemio Ricarte will notify Don Emilio Aguinaldo in cypher in order that he may draw upon or cash the letter of exchange for 400,000 dollars guaranteed by the Government of the Filipines and the Captain General will notify Don Miguel Primo de Rivera and Don Pedro A. Paterno that he has received the arms mentioned.

General Tejeiro and Don Artemio Ricarte will distribute passes and guarantees to the insurgents permitting them to go where they see fit.

As soon as men and arms have come in, surrendered to amount to over 700, half at least of the arms being modern ones, Don Pedro A.



27th Dec.  
(Continued.)

Paterno will be given two checks for the same sums, one for \$200,000 and the other for a like amount which will be good when the Te Deum is sung and the general amnesty proclaimed which will be just as soon as peace reigns in the Filipines; the existence of bands of Tulisanes (armed robbers) will not be considered as a bar to this.

The surrender of the arms, when the 225 and other articles mentioned have been verified, will be to any body of troops, and will be recorded in triplicate receipts, one for the Governor General, one for Don Pedro A. Paterno and the third for Don Artemio Ricarte as to whom the Governor General will give the necessary instructions.

This program is the same as the original project by the Excellent Sr. Don Pedro A. Paterno, and the insignificant variations from it whose explanations accompany them are made in agreement with the said gentlemen who signs it at Manila, 14th December, 1897, with the General in Chief. The Captain General Fernando Primo de Rivera, The Arbitrator—Don Pedro A. Paterno. There is a seal which is incised: "Office of the Captain General of the Filipines. Headquarters of the General Staff." There are two signatures, Fernando Primo de Rivera and Pedro A. Paterno.

A COPY.

I certify that I believe this translation to be correct.

JOHN R. M. TAYLOR,

Captain 14th Infantry,

In charge of Insurgent Records.

MANILA, P. I., July 6, 1900,

Abbott Basement

JAN 10 1975

BOSTON COLLEGE



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